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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The benefits and hazards of nuclear energy: Two sides 
of the same coin  
Nuclear reactors are important for the generation of energy. The use of nu-
clear reactors for peaceful purposes started in the mid-1950s with the estab-
lishment of the first commercial nuclear power plant in the former Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1954. Since then they have been 
widely used in many ways on land, for example, for the operation of power 
plants, in outer space to launch satellites and at sea for propelling ships. 
Nowadays the use of nuclear reactors to generate power has become inevita-
ble for many countries, particularly the developed nations, and an issue for 
the future for the developing countries as a result of the inevitable decline of 
fossil fuel energy sources such as coal, oil and natural gas, in addition to the 
high costs of these sources when compared with nuclear fuel.
1
 Moreover, 
nuclear energy is a clean source of energy, it does not emit any greenhouse 
gasses and other pollutants into the air, and does not present any threat to the 
environment if it has been used in a safe manner. The use of nuclear energy 
will inevitably help to protect the environment from the hazards arising from 
the use of traditional fuels if it does not lead to any serious accidents. The 
traditional fuels now present a real threat to the environment because of the 
increase in harmful emissions. The use of nuclear energy in a safe manner 
prevents climate change resulting from the harmful emissions caused by the 
use of traditional fuels.
 
Consequently, the international community is faced 
with a great challenge if nuclear energy is used instead of traditional fuels. 
The international community is obliged to take efficient safety and precau-
tionary measures to prevent the occurrence of major nuclear accidents and 
their harmful consequences, and must ensure the safe operation of nuclear 
reactors, the safe handling and transport of nuclear substances, and the safe 
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705, at pp. 700-701. 
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 Nathalie L. J. T. Horbach (ed.), “Contemporary Developments in Nuclear Energy Law: 
Harmonising Legislation in CEEC/NIS”, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague/London/Boston, 1999, at p. xvii. 
2 CHAPTER 1 
 
 Nevertheless, the increasing number of nuclear reactors raises the possi-
bility of serious nuclear accidents. An inherent problem in using nuclear 
power is that radiation is not normally visible and no one can stop its spread-
ing through the atmosphere to surrounding States. Therefore, there is a high 
probability that it will cause transboundary nuclear damage to the environ-
ment of other States as well as in the global commons. As a consequence of 
the multiple uses of nuclear reactors, major nuclear accidents may occur when 
nuclear reactors cause transboundary environmental nuclear damage beyond 
the States on whose territory the nuclear activity was conducted or under whose 
jurisdiction or control such an activity was carried out. Since nuclear reactors 
have been used for peaceful purposes, a number of major nuclear accidents 
have already occurred and have had serious harmful consequences for people, 
property and the environment. The worst accidents in the history of nuclear 
reactors were at Windscale in Great Britain in 1957, Chalk River in Canada in 
1958, Cosmos 954 Satellites in Canada in 1978, the Three Mile Island in the 
United States in 1979, Chernobyl in Ukraine in the USSR in 1986, Tokai-Mura 
in Japan in 1999 and Fukushima in Japan in 2011.  
1.2 The aim of the study 
The objective of this dissertation is to provide an analytical, practical and 
theoretical framework on international liability and responsibility for envi-
ronmental damage caused by major nuclear accidents as a result of nuclear 
activities. As hazardous activities not prohibited by international law, nu-
clear activities are carried out under certain obligations aimed at controlling 
the performance of these activities in order to prevent damage before it oc-
curs. The dissertation therefore aims to examine of the primary obligations 
imposed upon the State by international law to prevent, reduce and redress 
damage caused by a nuclear accident. Breaching these obligations means 
that the State is responsible for wrongful acts. However, liability for nuclear 
damage caused by nuclear energy as a lawful activity is essentially based on 
the absolute or risk liability. The liability applies to the operator of a nuclear 
installation or the Installations State
3
 when a nuclear accident causes nuclear 
damage. Therefore, the dissertation also aims to examine liability for envi-
ronmental damage under the absolute liability principle. 
 These questions are studied by examining and analyzing the special re-
gime for nuclear liability drawn up in certain nuclear liability conventions 
and the traditional rules in international law on the liability of States for en-
                                                     
3
 The study will use the terms “the Installation State”, “the Origin State”, “the Source 
State”, “the State in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or control the activity 
has been carried out” to indicate the same meaning. 
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vironmental nuclear damage, as a function of their international liability for 
the injurious consequences of acts not ordinarily prohibited by international 
law, as well as State responsibility for such damage as a result of breaching 
its obligations under the general rules of international law. The Conventions 
govern the liability of the operator of a nuclear installation and State inter-
vention to provide additional compensation to victims of nuclear damage 
under the nuclear liability conventions. However, the examination of the li-
ability of the State under international law will provide the basis for a com-
prehensive concept of international responsibility to prevent, minimize, and 
redress environmental damage caused by nuclear accidents according to the 
general rules of international law as adopted in the International Law Com-
mission (ILC) draft articles on international liability and responsibility. 
 Thus the long-term aim of the nuclear liability regime as presented by 
this study is to provide two types of protection to victims of nuclear damage: 
precautionary and curative protection. Precautionary protection requires the 
general and comprehensive application of the rules adopted in decisions, 
recommendations, international conventions and the general rules in interna-
tional law. It is “protective” in the sense that these rules are applied in order 
to prevent the risk of nuclear accidents. Curative protection, on the other 
hand, is applied when environmental damage has already been caused by the 
accident and is aimed at mitigating or even reducing (if not fully eliminat-
ing) and repairing the damage caused by the accident. This is the purpose of 
a comprehensive international regime of nuclear liability.  
 Finally, in terms of scope, the study carries out a thorough examination of 
the various elements of liability which constitute a comprehensive interna-
tional liability mechanism to govern liability for environmental damage 
caused by nuclear accidents. However, it is limited by the fact that it only 
covers environmental damage caused by peaceful nuclear activities, while 
excluding damage caused by non-peaceful nuclear activities. The scope is 
also limited to environmental nuclear damage caused to a State as a subject 
of international law and excludes damage caused in areas beyond the terri-
tory or beyond the jurisdiction or control of a State, i.e., damage caused to 
the global commons. Due to the complexity of the latter damage, the ILC 
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 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/57/10), Para. 447; Report of the ILC at its 58
th
 session in 2006, submitted to the Gen-
eral Assembly (A/61/10), at p. 112, para. 7; Michael J. Matheson, “The Fifty-Sixth Ses-
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1.3 Liability problems and the response at the 
international level  
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 has been the most dangerous accident up to 
now and alerted the whole world to the danger of using nuclear reactors. 
Widespread damage from the accident has been documented in and outside 
the USSR.
5
 This accident had harmful effects on people, property and the 
environment worldwide. The specific characteristics of the accident led to 
the widespread distribution of radioactivity throughout the northern hemi-
sphere, mainly across Europe. The accident caused many billions of dollars 
worth of damage, not only in the USSR, but also throughout the rest of 
Europe. Outside the immediate area surrounding the site of the accident, 
most of the costs resulted from preventive measures ordered by governments 
to protect their populations and the environment from the hazards of ionising 
radiation. Nevertheless, the USSR refused to accept liability for the damage 
caused by the accident in other countries and only accepted a moral respon-
sibility, insisting that it would not endorse liability in the absence of a bind-
ing treaty obligation to that effect. The USSR was not a party to any nuclear 
liability convention and there is no convention on State liability for nuclear 
damage. As a result, no victim of the Chernobyl accident was compensated 




 The Chernobyl accident revealed the inadequacy of the existing regime of 
international liability to repair the damage suffered as a result of a major nu-
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 Norbert Pelzer, “The Hazards Arising Out of the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy”, in: 
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 The accident highlighted the need to promote the traditional 
rules of international law on liability and the weakness of the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions to deal with technological advances and uses of nuclear reac-
tors. It revealed even greater gaps and inadequacies in the existing nuclear 
liability conventions, as well as in the national legislation of certain coun-
tries.
8
 After the accident, the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinaf-
ter the IAEA) Member States recognized the need to review the ordinary 
rules of international liability and to develop new rules of international law 
to cope with the potential danger arising from the use of nuclear reactors.
9
  
 This led to the development of the existing nuclear liability conventions 
and the adoption of new rules on nuclear liability to cover damage caused by 
the use of nuclear energy. The nuclear liability conventions were developed 
during the early 1960s, under the auspices of specialized international or-
ganizations in the field of nuclear energy, when the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy were in their infancy.
10
 The 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party 
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Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter the Paris Convention)
11
 
and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
(hereinafter the Vienna Convention)
12
 constitute the basis of the present in-
ternational regime of civil liability for nuclear damage. In addition to these 
two main conventions, other related instruments
13
 cover the liability of the 
operator of a nuclear installation for nuclear damage caused by land-based 
nuclear reactor installations and by the transport of nuclear materials.
14
 The 
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first step in improving this nuclear liability regime was the adoption of the 
1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention 
and the Paris Convention, which linked the two Conventions, in order to ex-
pand the geographical scope of each convention to be applicable to nuclear 
damage caused by a nuclear accident in the territory of the Contracting Party 
of the other convention.
15
 Another significant step forward in improving this 
liability regime was taken under the auspices of the IAEA on 12 September 
1997; delegates from over 80 States adopted the Protocol amending the 1963 
Vienna Convention
16
 and a new Convention on Supplementary Compensa-
tion for Nuclear Damage.
17
 Similar improvements were made with the con-
clusion of the 2004 Protocols amending the 1960 Paris Convention and the 
1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention.
18
 
 While the existing conventions governing compensation for nuclear dam-
age are based on the concept of the civil liability of the operator, the need for 
additional compensation provided by the State is broadly recognized in the 
1963 Vienna Convention as amended in 1997, in the 1963 Brussels Supple-
mentary Convention as amended in 2004 and in the 1997 Convention on 
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 The existing nuclear liability regime was certainly improved with the 
amendments of the nuclear liability conventions which, inter alia, covered 
environmental damage and recognized a wider role for State intervention to 
provide compensation for nuclear damage. However, this intervention is still 
governed by the civil liability regime and is limited to particular sums of 
compensation provided for under the conventions. The existing nuclear li-
ability conventions cover only the liability of the operators of nuclear plants, 
and do not deal with the liability of the State for transboundary nuclear dam-
age.
20
 Consequently, there are a number of liability cases that are not cov-
ered by this civil liability regime alone. For example, these include the re-
sidual liability for transboundary environmental nuclear damage when the 
liability of the operator and State under the nuclear liability conventions has 
been exhausted, liability for damage caused as a result of disposing of radio-
active waste and damage caused by military installations, as well as damage 
caused by accidents during the transport of radioactive material by sea where 
the material is transported from a State that is not a Contracting Party to the 
nuclear liability conventions. A legal framework for international liability 
for injuries from the present use of nuclear reactors is certainly necessary 
because the present liability regime is still inadequate.
21
 
 So far no treaty has comprehensively covered the issues of international 
liability. In the absence of an inter-state liability treaty applicable to trans-
boundary environmental damage, liability will be governed by the general 
principles and traditional rules of liability under international law.
22
 Unfor-
tunately, these are not adequate to govern liability for environmental damage 
caused by major nuclear accidents. As demonstrated at the time of the Cher-
nobyl accident, the existing traditional rules of international liability are nei-
ther comprehensive nor sufficiently well developed to cope with the legal 
problems arising from the use of new technologies.
23
  
 The need to develop the classical rules of State responsibility for its 
wrongful acts and international liability for damage caused by hazardous 
activities to meet the challenges of new technologies, such as nuclear energy 
and space activities, had already been highlighted by writers of international 
                                                     
20
 U. V. Kadan, “Liability for Damage Caused by A Catastrophic Nuclear Accident”, in: 
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21
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Association, 1998, at p. 425. 
22
 Pelzer, 1994, at p. 272. 
23
 Philippe J. Sands, “Chernobyl: Law and Communication”, UK/North America/Australia 
and New Zealand, 1988, at pp. 5-6.  
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law even before the Chernobyl accident.
24
 The doctrine of international law 
has emphasized the role of international liability for the protection of the 
environment.
25
 The significant role of international case law in promoting 
rules and principles of international law, including rules of liability, was also 
recognized. As Jules Basdevant had already observed in 1936:  
‘Responsibility is an essential part of any juridical system. The effectiveness of 
a juridical system depends on whether it is more or less developed or more or 
less well structured. Responsibility may also serve as an instrument of legal 
development, as it provides guarantees against abuse: the remarkable devel-
opment of French administrative law is partly due to the existence of adminis-
trative tribunals whose jurisprudence, in the absence of texts, has largely estab-
lished the responsibility of the Administration itself – not only the personal and 
the ineffective responsibility of the administrative agents – for acts of abuse of 
which its subjects are victims. 
The theory of responsibility could serve the same function in the international 
system. Its degree of effectiveness and to some extent, the possibilities of the 
development of international law, depend on the place it is given’.
26
  
In international law, decisions have been made in a number of international 
cases dealing with issues of international liability for damage caused by haz-
ardous activities. These created certain primary obligations and principles 
governing prevention, reduction and reparation of damage caused by such 
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25
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 Such obligations can be found in the Trail Smelter Case between 
Canada and the United States (1941),
28
 in the Corfu Channel Case between 
Albania and Great Britain (1949)
29
 and in the Lac Lanoux Case between 
France and Spain (1957).
30
 The principles established in these cases have 
become principles of international customary law and have been accepted by 
most of the doctrine of international law.
31
 They should apply in nuclear li-
ability cases. International liability could be incurred if such obligations have 
been breached by a State constituting a wrongful act, or if actual environ-
mental damage has been caused by such hazardous activities, and the rules 
and conditions of the absolute liability are already in existence.
32
 In its deci-
sion of 1997 concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project Case between 
Hungary and Slovakia, the International Court of Justice (the ICJ) recog-
nized the liability of both parties, as they had both breached treaty obliga-
tions between the two States. This is the first case in which the ICJ dealt 
with issues related to the environment and State responsibility in relation to 
breaching treaty obligations for environmental damage. In this Case, the 
Court decided that Hungary was responsible for its wrongful acts committed 
against Slovakia. As the Court stated, ‘Hungary was not entitled to suspend 
and subsequently abandon, in 1989, the works on the Nagymaros Project and 
on the part of the Gabčíkovo Project for which the Treaty of 16 September 
1977 and related instruments attributed responsibility to it’.
33
 This judgement 
is one step in the development of the rules of international law concerning 
liability for environmental damage. This is because the respect of the State 
for its environmental obligations can also help to prevent environmental 
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damage caused by hazardous activities in the future. The vital role taken by 
the ICJ in promoting rules of international law
34
 was clearly emphasized by 
Judge Robert Jennings, the former president of the ICJ, in his address to the 
UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992. In his speech Judge Jennings highlighted the significant role of the 
Court decisions as a source of international law and the value of its reports 
as a contribution to the elaboration of the rules of international law.
35
 
 In fact, the real attempt to draw the attention of the international commu-
nity to the need to improve the rules of international liability for environ-
mental damage was made in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on Human En-
vironment.
36
 This Declaration adopted primary obligations which oblige 
States to exploit their natural resources according to international law. Prin-
ciple 21 of the Stockholm Declaration obliges a State to ensure that hazard-
ous activities conducted within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control 
do not cause any damage to the environment of other States or the global 
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 Principle 22 of this Declaration encourages States to cooperate 
to develop rules of international law on the liability for environmental dam-
age caused by such activities.
38
 This means that rules of liability already ex-
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http://www.unep.org/AbidjanConvention/docs/Abidjan%20Convention%20English.pdf 
(accessed on 3.4.2012); 
http://www.unep.org/AbidjanConvention/The_Convention/Protocols/Convention_Text.a
sp (accessed on 3.4.2012); Article 11 of the 1981 Lima Convention for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment and Coastal Areas of the South-East-Pacific, concluded on 12 
November 1981, entered into force on 19 May 1986, available at: 
http://www.cfr.org/chile/convention-protection-marine-environment-coastal-areas-south-
east-pacific-lima-convention/p20595 (accessed on 13.4.2012); Article 235 of the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; Article 14 of the 1983 Cartagena Convention for 
the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean 
Region; Article 15 of the 1985 Nairobi Convention for the Protection, Management and 
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region 
(Nairobi Convention), signed on 21 June 1985, entered into force in 1986, available at: 
http://www.cfr.org/africa/convention-protection-management-development-marine-
coastal-environment-eastern-african-region-nairobi-convention/p20590 (accessed on 
13.4.2012); Article 12 of the 1989 (UNEP) Basil Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal; Article 12 of the 1991 
(OAU) Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import Into Africa and the Control of 
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, done at 
Banko, Mali, January 29, 1991, 30 ILM 773 (1991); Article 16 of the 1991 Protocol on 
the Environment to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty; Article 7 of the Convention of the Protec-
tion and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, done at Helsinki, 
March 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269; Article 13 of the 1992 UN/ECE Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents; Article 14 (2) of the 1992 UNCED Con-
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ist, but it is necessary to improve the existing legal system of liability to 
meet recent technological advances and to cover damage caused by such 
new technologies.
39
 The rules of liability adopted by the Stockholm Declara-
tion were an attempt to encourage States to develop rules of liability for en-
vironmental damage.
40
 This is particularly important with regard to envi-
ronmental nuclear damage which often crosses the boundaries of States.
41
 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration was also reflected in the 1992 Rio 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (UNCED). Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration almost literally repeats 
the language of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.
42
 At present, 
these principles are considered principles of customary international law re-
garding the protection of the environment from the hazards arising from haz-
ardous activities, as adopted in many international instruments. Nevertheless, 
the application of the principles to the issues of international liability for en-
vironmental damage as customary international law is still ambiguous and 
unclear in practice. It was considered that ‘the formulation of Principle 21 
can provide little or no support in favor of any specific theory of liability, let 
                                                                                                                            
vention on Biological Diversity; Article 25 of the 1992 Helsinki Convention of the Pro-
tection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area; Article XVI (4) of the Bucha-
rest Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, signed in a diplo-
matic conference of Bulgaria-Georgia-Romania-Russian Federation-Turkey-Ukraine in 
Bucharest on 21 April 1992, entered into force in 1994, 32 ILM 1101 (1993), available 
at: http://www.blacksea-commission.org/_convention-fulltext.asp (accessed on 
3.4.2012); Article 3 (1) of the 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Par-
ticipation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, con-
cluded in Aarhus, Demark, on 25 June 1998 (Aarhus Convention); Article 27 of the 2000 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal 29 
January 2000, Treaty Series, No. 17 (2004); Article 19 of the 2003 World Health Or-
ganization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, as updated in 2004 and 2005, 
available at: http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241591013.pdf (accessed on 
18.4.2012); Article XXIV of the 2003 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources, adopted at Maputo on 11 July 2003, available at: 
http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails?id=TRE-
001395&index=treaties (accessed on 18.4.2012). 
39
 R. P. Dhokalia, “Imperatives of New International Law and Expanding Dimensions of 
State Responsibility”, in: TA, Vol. XX, 1993, at p. 257; Sohn, HILJ, Vol. 14, 1973, at p. 
493. 
40
 Sohn, HILJ, Vol. 14, 1973, at p. 495. 
41
 Fadel, ERIL, 1980, at p. 162. 
42
 For the UN Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development, see Report 
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26, Vol. I, 3-14; 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
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 Moreover, there is one European liability Directive
44
 which covers liabil-
ity for environmental damage caused by occupational activities and which 
also refers to a number of liability directives.
45
 This Directive established the 
framework of liability for environmental damage according to the “polluter 
pays” principle.
46
 However, it does not apply to environmental damage 
caused by nuclear activities when the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) Treaty and the nuclear liability conventions are applicable.
47
 
In addition, even though the directives apply to environmental damage, they 
include principles of liability which conflict with those in the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions. This allows the operator to avoid liability when the victims 
fail to prove that he caused the damage, or was negligent or acted in conflict 
with the provisions of the Directives. Moreover, they do not limit the liabil-
ity of the operator of the activity, nor oblige him to maintain financial secu-
rity.
48
   
                                                     
43
 Günther Handl, “Balancing of Interests and International Liability for the Pollution of 
International Watercourses: Customary Principles of Law Revised”, in: CYIL, 1975 pp. 
156-194 at p. 161. Reprinted by Anthony D’Amato and Kirsten Engel (eds.), Interna-
tional Environmental Law Anthology, Anderson Publishing Company, Anderson Pub-
lishing Company, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1996, pp. 93-151, at p. 107. 
44
 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
on Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environ-
mental Damage. (OJ L 143 of 30.4.2004, p. 56). 
45
 For instance see, Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on Conservation of 
Wild Birds (OJ L 25.4.1979, p. 1), 1979L0409— EN— 01.01.2007 — 006.001— 2, 
available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1979L0409:20070101:EN:PD
F (accessed on 26.4.2012); Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the Conser-
vation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora (OJ L 206 of 22.7.1992, p. 7), 
1992L0043— EN— 01.01.2007 — 005.001— 1, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1992L0043:20070101:EN:PD
F (accessed on 26.4.2012); Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 October 2000 on Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the 
Field of Water Policy (OJ L 327 of 22.12.2000, p. 1), available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:327:0001:0072:EN:PDF (ac-
cessed on 26.4.2012). 
46
 Eliana Danzi, “Some Reflections on the Exclusion of Nuclear Damage from the Scope 
of the Environmental Liability Directive”, in: Pelzer (ed.), 2010, pp. 191-212, at p. 192.  
47
 Article 4 (4) and Annex V of the Directive 2004/35/CE. 
48
 Johan G. Lammers, “New Developments Concerning International Responsibility and 
liability for Damage Caused by Environmental Damage”, in: HYIL, Vol. 19, 2006, pp. 
87-112, at pp. 93-96. 
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 Finally, reference should be made to the significance of the work of the 
International Law Commission of the United Nations (ILC) on the codifica-
tion of international law of liability and the responsibility for developing the 
rules of international liability in general, and with regard to those for envi-
ronmental damage caused by hazardous activities tolerated by international 
law in particular.
49
 After more than fifty years of examination, the ILC has 
succeeded in the past decade in concluding the codification of the general 
principles of law and customary international law related to the questions of 
international liability. The work of the ILC on the examination of these top-
ics is the real development of the law of international liability, rather than 
the codification of its rules. As the Special Rapporteur Rao argues: ‘The 
draft Articles on prevention should be treated as a progressive development 
of international law, particularly in respect to obligations concerning the 
management of risk and engagement between States of origin and States 
likely to be affected’.
50
 The topics of international liability developed by the 
ILC could apply for the protection of innocent victims and the environment 
from nuclear damage. They could not only apply for reparation of nuclear dam-
age, as expressed in the classical ideas of liability, but also as comprehensive 
rules of liability that can prompt States to take all the necessary measures to 
prevent, reduce and repair the harmful consequences of a nuclear accident. This 
view is reflected in the ILC Draft Articles adopted on State responsibility for its 
wrongful acts and those related to international liability for injuries arising from 
acts not prohibited by international law. 
1.4 Motivation for the research and review of the 
literature 
An important motivation for the researcher in selecting the subject of this 
study was to look for solutions to the remaining nuclear liability problems, 
as the issues of State liability for environmental damage caused by nuclear 
                                                     
49
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted 
by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001), Report of the In-
ternational Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, Official Records of 
the General Assembly, Fifty-six session, Supplement No. 10, (A/56/10), chapter IV.E.1; 
Draft Articles on Prevention of Tansboundary Harm Caused by Hazardous Activities, 
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session, UNGA 
Official Records, Supplement No.10 (A/66/10), pp. 370-436; Draft Principles on the 
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activi-
ties, with commentaries in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly (A/61/10). 
50
 Pemmaraju Sreenivasu Rao, “Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities– A sub-topic of international liability –”, in: EPL, 32/1 (2002), pp. 27-28, at p. 
28. 
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activities have not been resolved. Moreover, due to the decline in traditional 
fuels and the economic advantages, the use of nuclear reactors to generate 
power will be an issue for many countries in the future, particularly the de-
veloping countries, and more liability problems are anticipated. Moreover, 
the study will fill the gaps in the literature on international nuclear liability. 
The relevant research questions have not been dealt with adequately in the 
body of literature. A review of the existing literature and sources of research 
material by the author revealed that there are relatively few studies on any 
aspect of this field. In fact, none of the literature comprehensively covers the 
issues of international liability for environmental damage caused by nuclear 
activities. It is worth mentioning that since the revisions of the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions in 1997 and 2004, only a few studies have been carried out 
on the subject of international liability for environmental damage.
51
 These 
studies examined the issues of international liability for environmental dam-
age under public international law in general. None of them comprehen-
sively covered international liability for environmental damage caused by 
nuclear facilities. This research intends to provide a comprehensive and ana-
lytical study of international liability for environmental nuclear damage re-
sulting from the use of nuclear reactors, based on the liability of the operator 
of a nuclear installation and the Installation State. A comprehensive regime 
of liability to govern the issues of liability for damage caused by hazardous 
activities and the role of the State in sharing liability with the operator for 
damage caused by such activities was actually drawn up by the Working 
Group which was established by the ILC in 2002 to review the relevant as-
pects of international liability for ultra-hazardous activities.
52
 According to 
                                                     
51
 For some relevant and recent books in the field of international liability and environ-
mental damage, see: Marie-Louise Larsson, “The Law of Environmental Damage: Li-
ability and Reparation”, Kluwer Law International & Norstedts Juridik, The Hague and 
Stockholm, London, Boston 1999; Rüdiger Wolfrum and Christine Langenfeld et al., 
“Environmental Protection by Means of International Liability Law”, Erich Schmidt 
Verlag GmbH & Co., Berlin 1999; Nathalie Louisa Johanna Theodora Horbach, “Liabil-
ity Versus Responsibility under International Law: Defending Strict State Responsibility 
for Transboundary Damage”, PhD thesis University of Leiden, the Netherlands, 1996; 
René Johannes Maria Lefeber, “Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Ori-
gin of State Liability”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, 1996; 
Phoebe N. Okowa, “State Responsibility for Transboundary Air Pollution in Interna-
tional Law”, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000; James Crawford, Alain Pellet, 
and Simon Olleson (eds.), “The Law of International Responsibility”, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2010. 
52
 See: United Nations, International Law Commission, Report on the work of its fifty-
fourth Session (29 April-7 June and 22 July-16 August 2002) General Assembly, Official 
Records, Fifty-Seventh Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/57/10), at p. 223, para. 441. 
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the report of the Working Group, the operator bears primary responsibility 
for damage caused by ultra-hazardous activities in any regime of liability 
because he has a direct control over the operation of the activity.
53
 However, 
that liability should be limited by the available amount of insurance or his 
own financial resources in order to give the operator the chance to survive as 
an operator.
54
 The State also shares the liability with the operator because it 
is responsible for the implementation of appropriate international and na-
tional legal regimes of liability and for ensuring equitable and adequate 
compensation for the victims.
55
 The greater hazards involved with nuclear 
energy certainly justify moving the liability from the operator to the State.
56
 
Finally, the concept of international liability for environmental nuclear dam-
age has not yet been defined in international law and continues to be a con-
troversial issue within the doctrine of international law. Given the fact that 
nuclear power is generated increasingly to reduce carbon-based energy, a 
systematic study of the subject has therefore now become important.  
1.5 The main research questions 
This study considers whether international law imposes upon States any ob-
ligation to prevent, reduce and repair environmental damage caused by nu-
clear accidents. If such an obligation exists and a nuclear accident causes 
transboundary environmental damage, is the State liable for repairing the 
damage? If so, what is the extent of its liability? What standards of care ap-
ply and what is the liability based on? Can the liability of a State arise from 
the fact of the damage alone, or it does it arise only from its failure to meet 
the internationally accepted standards of conduct? What are the legal conse-
quences of liability? These questions are also related to other issues such as 
attributing liability to a State for damage caused by private activities if the 
operator has failed to fulfil its financial obligations, the type of damage to be 
compensated, etc.
57
 These are the fundamental questions the thesis will ad-
dress.  
                                                     
53
 See: United Nations, International Law Commission, Report on the work of its fifty-
fourth Session (29 April-7June and 22 July-16 August 2002) General Assembly, Official 
Records, Fifty-Seventh Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/57/10), at p. 225, para. 451.  
54
 Ibid, at p. 226, para. 454.  
55
 Ibid, at p. 226, para. 455. 
56
 C. Wilfred Jenks, “Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities: International Law”, in: 
RDC, Vol. 117, Part I, 1966, pp. 99-200, at p. 178. 
57
 Barron, CJTL, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1987, at p. 650; Sands, 1988, at pp. 5-7. “Complexity of 
the subject matter is further compounded by difficult questions of meaning of nuclear 
damage, causality, latent nuclear damage, etc.” See U. V. Kadan, 1995, at p. 557. 
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1.6 Methodology  
To investigate the matter, the thesis will adopt an analytical approach. Meth-
odologically, it carries out an analysis of the provisions of the existing nu-
clear liability conventions and other sources of international law which deal 
with liability and compensation for environmental nuclear damage with a 
view to clarifying and defining the liability of a State to prevent, reduce and 
repair the incidence of environmental nuclear damage caused by reactor acci-
dents. Treaties are the most important source in the domain of international 
environmental and nuclear law, as all environmental and nuclear issues have 
been addressed in conventions and regulations. However, in the absence of a 
convention on international liability for nuclear damage, there are rules which 
apply in similar cases under the general principles and the traditional rules of 
international law, particularly those arising from international judgements and 
decisions. The study also touches upon the similarities and dissimilarities 
between the conventions and the judgements. The main basis of the analysis 
and the conclusions will be deductive reasoning.  
 The main sources of data for this study are treaties, literature, judicial 
decisions, decisions and recommendations of international organizations 
such as the work of the IAEA, the NEA, EURATOM, the ILC, UN General 
Assembly, as well as other primary and secondary data sources in the field 
of nuclear liability and related fields.  
 We will study the data collected from relevant treaties and State practice 
in an analytical search for patterns and interrelationships as a useful predic-
tive tool. We will arrive at conclusions by determining the applicable rules 
for the liability of a State in the case of a nuclear accident that has caused 
transboundary environmental nuclear damage to other States. To reach this 
conclusion, the issues of nuclear liability will be studied, as organized in the 
following section, in an analysis of the primary and secondary factual pieces 
of evidence collected by the researcher. 
1.7 Structure and organization of the study 
The study is organized in four parts, and divided into ten chapters, including 
this chapter which summarizes the various aspects of international liability 
for environmental damage caused by peaceful nuclear activities and presents 
the research subjects. Part I also includes chapters 2 and 3 which define 
transboundary environmental damage caused by major nuclear accidents and 
its relationship with international liability. Chapter 2 provides the factual 
background and a description of the major nuclear accidents that have oc-
curred since nuclear reactors have been used. It outlines the nature and char-
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acteristics of transboundary environmental nuclear damage and shows the 
amount of damage that can be caused by a nuclear accident to which the 
rules of international liability apply. Chapter 3 defines the legal concept and 
the scope of the environmental nuclear damage for which reparation can be 
made. This definition is necessary to establish and determine the scope of 
liability for nuclear damage. Liability cannot be established unless the envi-
ronmental nuclear damage was caused by nuclear activity. Finally, the terms 
“damage” and “accident” in the title of the study were used by jurists of in-
ternational law in a confusing way. This causes misunderstandings of the 
subject matter and the concept of international liability. To remove this am-
biguity, the related chapters of this part of the study provide a definition and 
clarification of these terms, as defined by the doctrine of international law.
58
 
 Part II comprises chapters 4 and 5, which investigate the primary obliga-
tions imposed upon the State to prevent and minimize environmental nuclear 
damage as a preventive function of international responsibility. Chapter 4 
examines the legal basis of the obligation to prevent and reduce damage as an 
essential State responsibility for environmental damage caused by nuclear ac-
tivities under the general rules of international law. It examines three issues. 
It clarifies whether the principle of prevention is a general norm or a general 
principle or a customary international law principle, and examines the legal 
basis of the principle of prevention and the principle of cooperation between 
States to prevent and reduce environmental nuclear damage. Chapter 5 dis-
cusses the procedural rules and obligations under international law for the 
construction of a nuclear installation and its operation to prevent and reduce 
environmental damage. These obligations are based on the principle of pre-
                                                     
58
 In terms of the terms which appear in the title of the study, the term “responsibility” is 
used to indicate State responsibility for wrongful acts and the term “liability” is used to 
indicate State liability for lawful acts. These two terms are used in this study because 
nuclear activities are lawful activities and liability for damage caused by such activities 
is based on risk liability. However, a breach of the rules regulating these activities consti-
tutes unlawful responsibility. This approach was taken by the ILC and majority of the 
doctrine of international law. Furthermore, the term “environment” is used rather than 
the term “milieu humain” because this was agreed by the States during the 1972 Stock-
holm conference. Moreover, the term “damage” is used rather than the terms injury, 
harm, impair, impact, affect etc., because it is term most often used by the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions and other instruments. Finally, the term “accident” is used rather than the 
term “incident”, which is used by the nuclear liability conventions because the technical 
reality, as adopted by International Nuclear Event Scale which was prepared by a Group 
of Technical Experts from the IAEA and the NEA, and other international instruments 
indicate that the term “accident” means that serious and transboundary damage is caused 
by a nuclear event, while the term “incident” means that minor damage is caused by a 
minor nuclear event. 
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vention and reduction of environmental damage. If these obligations are 
breached, the State is responsible for wrongful acts. The examination covers 
two aspects, the obligations of the State before the occurrence of a nuclear 
accident and the obligations of the State after the occurrence of a nuclear 
accident. The first includes the obligations of the Installation State to ensure 
the safe operation of a nuclear installation, for example, by enforcing a regu-
latory regime, designating the liable operator, carrying out an environmental 
impact assessment, and taking care of the issues of nuclear safety of a nu-
clear installation. It also includes the obligations of the Installation State, 
other States and international organizations to provide the necessary infor-
mation to prevent and reduce damage caused by a nuclear activity. These 
may include, for example, providing prior notification in the case of the con-
struction of a nuclear installation, consultation, negotiation, exchange of in-
formation and providing information to the public. The second aspect exam-
ines the obligations of States after a nuclear accident to provide early 
notification and assistance under the general rules of international law and 
the 1986 conventions on early notification and assistance in case of a nuclear 
accident. 
 Part III comprises chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9, which deal with State responsi-
bility and liability for environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident 
under the general rules of international law as a function of international li-
ability to make reparation. Up to now, liability for nuclear damage has been 
governed by international conventions which cover the liability of the opera-
tor, and also by the traditional rules of liability under international law which 
govern the liability of a State for nuclear damage. The aim of chapter 6 is to 
determine the applicable regime of liability and the person who is liable for 
the damage, to make a distinction and determine the relationship between 
civil liability and international liability for environmental nuclear damage, 
and to investigate whether there is a possibility of integrating the two re-
gimes of liability in a single unified regime. In practice, as well as in theory, 
there is some confusion about the relationship between the two regimes in 
relation to liability for environmental nuclear damage. The chapter examines 
both aspects. It examines whether or not there is an obligation on the State to 
intervene and to repair the environmental damage caused by nuclear activi-
ties and examines the nature of nuclear liability. This determines whether or 
not such liability should be based on civil or international law, or on both. 
Chapter 7 provides an analysis of State responsibility for its wrongful acts 
according to the general rules of international law in the case that it has 
breached the nuclear liability conventions or principles of international law 
or has omitted to perform its obligations under them. This will help to estab-
lish the liability of the State in the case of a violation of the obligations with 
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regard to preventing, minimizing and redressing the incidence of environ-
mental damage caused by a nuclear accident. Since the liability for damage 
caused by lawful nuclear activities not prohibited by international law is 
based on absolute liability, chapter 8 examines the basis and origin of the 
objective liability of a State for environmental nuclear damage caused by 
such activities. This liability is based on actual damage caused by a hazard-
ous activity, irrespective of any fault or negligence on the part of the party 
that caused the damage. Chapter 9 discusses the legal consequences of the 
failure of a State to observe its environmental and nuclear obligations under 
international law and in the case of the occurrence of a nuclear accident 
causing transboundary environmental damage where these obligations have 
not been violated. The consequences of the liability could be the cessation of 
the nuclear activity concerned, for example, in the event of the violation of 
international safety standards, or the reinstatement of the damaged environ-
ment to its status quo ante, or providing an official apology to the injured 
State if the damage is limited, or providing compensation for environmental 
damage caused by the nuclear accident. As liability for damage caused by 
lawful activities is based on the idea of absolute liability, the only conse-
quence of liability is compensation for damage caused by the accident.  
Finally, Part IV provides summary conclusions drawn from the various 
chapters of the study and recommendations which are included in chapter 10 
of the study. It concludes that the rules of liability for environmental nuclear 
damage as presented in the study constitute a comprehensive international 
liability regime which serves to prevent, reduce and redress nuclear envi-
ronmental damage caused by a nuclear accident. 
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Introduction  
Liability in any legal system always starts with damage and ends with com-
pensation or reparation. Liability cannot be incurred in the absence of dam-
age.
1
 As Georges Scelle argues, ‘[t]he concept of liability starts with damage 
and ends with reparation. Between the two, the intermediate mechanism of 
the positive rule of law will determine what damages will be repaired, by 
whom and in what proportion. There is no necessary link between the point 
of departure and the point of arrival’.
2
 Thus the element of damage is con-
sidered one of the important elements in international liability for environ-
mental damage caused by nuclear activities. In risk liability or liability for 
lawful activities, damage is an essential element required for attributing the 
liability to the State or the operator of a hazardous activity. Liability for nu-
clear damage caused by a nuclear activity is established by the mere fact of a 
nuclear activity causing actual damage, without the need to prove fault or 
negligence on the part of the State or the operator liable for the activity. 
Equally, in responsibility for a wrongful act, responsibility and damage fol-
low from a State breaching its obligations under international law. These 
concepts were expressed by García Amador, the first ILC Special Rappor-
teur on the topic of international liability, in his lecture at The Hague Acad-
emy of International Law at the end of 1950s. He argued that: 
‘In effect, should the “risk” theory be carried to its ultimate and logical conse-
quences, the causing of the injury could by itself alone give rise to the duty to 
make reparation; for such a duty would exist even in cases where the injury has 
resulted from acts or omissions performed in the exercise of a right’.
3
  
The element of damage is also one of the main factors in distinguishing be-
tween international liability for lawful and unlawful activities under interna-
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 Bernhard Graefrath, “Responsibility and Damages Caused: Relationship between Re-
sponsibility and Damages”, in: RDC, Vol. 185, Part II, 1984, pp. 9-150, at p. 107; Juraj 
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ternational public, Editions Domat-Montchrestien, Paris, 1948, at p. 909. 
3
 Francisco V. García-Amador, “State Responsibility: Some New Problems”, in: RDC, 
Vol. 94, Part II, 1958, pp. 365-491, at p. 389. 




 This is because the requirement for the existence of damage in 
risk liability is different from the requirement in liability for a wrongful act. 
The doctrine of international law agrees that the element of damage in liabil-
ity for lawful activities is a constituent element required to incur the liability, 
which relies upon material and immaterial damage caused by the activity 
concerned. However, the element of damage is still a controversial issue in 
the system of international liability with regard to the liability of a State for 
wrongful acts, as material damage is not necessarily a constituent element. 
Damage resulting from a breach or omission of an international obligation 
by a State can be caused without material damage being suffered. The ele-
ment of damage in this case is moral damage,
5
 which is considered an ele-
ment of international liability or at least one of the main conditions constitut-
ing State responsibility for wrongful acts.
6
 This is the so-called legal damage 
or moral damage, which results from the violation of a legal right by a State 
vis-à-vis other States.
7
 Consequently, in practice there are difficulties in 
identifying the responsibility of the State for environmental damage caused 
by a nuclear activity in the case of a violation of international law, as in the 
case of the Chernobyl accident.
8
  
 Damage caused by nuclear activities is defined by the nuclear liability 
conventions and in general by the ILC in its Draft principles on the alloca-
tion of loss.
9
 However, legal damage as a result of the violation of interna-
tional obligations is dealt with under the general rules of international law as 
adopted by the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Wrongful 
Acts. The position is not entirely clear as regards compensable transbound-
ary environmental nuclear damage in the nuclear liability conventions and 
the ILC Draft Articles on international liability. This is because nuclear 
damage is defined without determining the scope and extent of compensable 
nuclear damage. The same applies with regard to the concept of legal dam-
age, which is still vague and not wholly accepted in international law as a 
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constituent element in the liability of a State for its wrongful acts.
10
 The ele-
ment of damage in international liability is considered one of the most com-
plicated issues in international law and has attracted attention during the de-
bates on the topic of international liability within the ILC as well as in 
discussions between the scholars. 
 This part of the study examines and identifies the concept and scope of 
reparable environmental damage caused by major nuclear accidents, and its 
relationship with international liability. This will be examined in chapter 3 of 
the study. However, before proceeding with a legal analysis of the subject 
matter it will be useful to provide some factual background and a description 
of the major nuclear accidents caused by nuclear reactor installations in the 
following chapter. This will demonstrate the risks and harmful consequences 
of a major nuclear accident result from nuclear activity, and the type of dam-
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28 PART I 
 
29 
2 MAJOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS:  
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
A large number of nuclear accidents occur during the daily operation of nu-
clear reactor installations, the transport of nuclear substances and other ap-
plications of nuclear activities, such as nuclear-powered ships. Such acci-
dents may occur as a result of defective equipment, or defects in other 
components in a nuclear power plant, or for any other reason when nuclear 
activities are carried out. The majority of these accidents are minor acci-
dents, which may not result in any serious damage to human beings and the 
environment, and have only a minor impact on the workers in the installa-
tions. However, in the case of a major nuclear accident caused by these ac-
tivities, it poses a danger to many countries both near and far and contami-
nates the environment as well as the atmosphere. 
Among the accidents caused by nuclear reactor installations a few had se-
rious transboundary consequences for people, property and the environment, 
and gave rise to particular concern in the international community (see chap-
ter 1). These accidents will be examined in section 2.3 of this chapter. Sec-
tion 2.4 provides a summary of the types of nuclear accidents, and classifies 
these accidents in relation to the concept of the geographical scope of applica-
tion of the nuclear liability conventions. Finally, section 2.5 concludes that this 
classification of nuclear accidents is important to determine the limits of the 
application of the nuclear liability regime. However, before proceeding with 
examining these issues, section 2.2 defines the concept of the terms “incident” 
and “accident” in order to indicate which term is relevant in this study. 
2.2 Nuclear incident or nuclear accident 
The term nuclear “incident” has been adopted in the nuclear liability conven-
tions rather than the term nuclear “accident” to express the concept of a “nu-
clear event”. However, in practice, particularly in the field of nuclear tech-
nology, and in nuclear liability law, the two terms “incident” and “accident” 
sometimes express the same concept of a nuclear event, while at other times 
they are used to refer to two different notions. Thus there is disagreement in 
the literature about the exact definition of a “nuclear event”. The term “inci-
dent” as adopted in the nuclear liability conventions has also been used in 
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some of the literature. It was argued that the term “incident” was used in the 
English text rather than the term “accident” in order to cover both major and 
minor events as referred to in the Paris Convention.
1
 In other literature, the 
two terms “incident” and “accident” have been used for different concepts. 
This differentiation in the use of the two terms leads to some ambiguity and 
confusion in the definition of the concept of a nuclear event. In the absence 
of a consensus about the definition, every State will, of course, define the 
concept of a nuclear event in accordance with its own language. Conse-
quently, the definition of the concept of a nuclear event will differ from one 
country to another. At the same time, using the two terms, “incident” and 
“accident”, reflects the wide-ranging concept of a nuclear event, and the ex-
tent and scope of liability. This may raise the question of the convenience of 
using the term “nuclear incident” as adopted in the nuclear liability conven-
tions to express the reality of the concept of a nuclear event. 
According to the technical terminology adopted by the IAEA Interna-
tional Nuclear Event Scale, the two terms, “incident” and “accident” express 
different notions.
2
 The term “incident” expresses a minor event in a nuclear 
installation, which usually occurs during the normal everyday routine opera-
tion of a nuclear installation. Such events involve a lower level of radioactiv-
ity and have no serious consequences. The harmful consequences of these 
events are limited only to property and workers inside the installation, and 
are easily overcome without the need for any international assistance. On the 
other hand, the term “accident” refers to a major event in a nuclear installa-
tion. Such events cause serious damage not only inside the nuclear installa-
tion, but also outside the installation, and the consequences can extend be-
yond the national borders of the State in whose territory the event occurred. 
They involve high levels of radioactivity that can be considered a nuclear 
catastrophe. In such events, the Accident State may request international as-
sistance from the international community or international organizations, in 
                                                     
1
 NEA, Liability and Compensation, 1994, at p. 46. 
2
 After the Chernobyl accident, The International Nuclear Event Scale was prepared by a 
Group of Technical Experts from the IAEA and the NEA. This Scale is to be used in the 
case of the need for prompt communication and assistance and to indicate the level of 
notification in the case of a nuclear accident. Events are classified on a scale of seven 
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scale. Events without any safety significance are called “deviations” and are classified as 
level 0. According to the Scale, level 1 is (normal), level 2 (incident), level 3 (serious 
incident), level 4 (accident with local consequences), level 5, (accident with wider con-
sequences, level 6 (serious accident) and level 7 (major accident). The International Nu-
clear and Radiological Events Scale (INES), 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/ines.pdf (accessed on 26.2.2012). 
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order to prevent and to minimize the harmful consequences of the nuclear 
accident. The IAEA Scale clearly makes a distinction between the everyday 
routine events occurring during the normal operation of a nuclear installa-
tion, and major and unexpected events occurring in nuclear installations.  
The concept of a nuclear event, as presented in the IAEA Scale, has been 
reflected in practice in the formulation of several international instruments in 
the nuclear field. For example, the term “accident” was adopted in the title of 
the 1986 Conventions on the early notification and assistance in the event of 
a nuclear accident.
3
 These Conventions oblige the Contracting States to 
make notification of a major nuclear event occurring in a nuclear installa-
tion, and provide assistance to deal with any harmful consequences. More-
over, according to the Peace and Nuclear War Dictionary:  
‘There is [a] distinction between a nuclear accident and nuclear incident. 
Whereas a nuclear incident may cause a long-term hazard, a nuclear accident 
poses an immediate danger to life and property. An incident in a nuclear power 
plant could release enough radiation to kill thousands of people and contami-
nate cities, land, and water for decades. Both nuclear incidents and accidents 
are commonly referred to as accidents’.
4
  
In fact, the distinction between the two terms, “incident” and “accident”, 
corresponds with the purpose of the nuclear liability conventions. This is 
because nuclear damage caused by minor activities is excluded from these 
conventions. Therefore, the term “incident” should be used by the Conven-
tions to express a minor nuclear event which involves minor harmful conse-
quences, while the term “accident” should be used to express a major nuclear 
event which involves serious harmful consequences. These definitions 
should be adopted in the nuclear liability conventions in future amendments. 
Otherwise the conventions should adopt the two terms, “incident” and “acci-
dent”, and indicate that the two terms express the same concept. These con-
ventions cover nuclear damage caused by a major nuclear event, rather than 
that caused by a minor event, which has been left to be covered by national 
law. Therefore, the notion of a nuclear incident as adopted in the nuclear li-
ability conventions is misleading. This is because the term “incident” does 
not reflect a sudden and unexpected nuclear event as indicated in the IAEA 
                                                     
3
 The Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on 
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident and Radiological Emergency, the two Con-
ventions were adopted on 26 September 1986. See IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/335 and IAEA 




 Sheikh R. Ali, “The Peace and Nuclear War Dictionary”, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, 
California, Oxford, England, 1989, at p. 170. 
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Scale of Nuclear Events, while the term “accident” corresponds to the tech-
nical reality in the nuclear field.
5
 On the other hand, if the two terms, “inci-
dent” and “accident”, are adopted in the nuclear liability conventions, this 
will lead to problems with regard to finding similar words for the two terms 
in languages other than English, such as French
6
 and Arabic, which contain 
only one word to express the two terms, “accident” and “incident”. This 
leads to confusion in the literature between the words “incident” and “acci-
dent”, used in the English language to interpret and explain the concept of a 
nuclear event. In his 1994 Report to NEA Steering Committee, Strohl argued 
that: 
‘It has to be acknowledged that in this connection the Paris Convention raises a 
problem of terminology which stems from the time at which it was written; the 
English text is certainly less crisp because the word “incident” does not neces-
sarily carry with it the meaning of a sudden and fortuitous event. The Vienna 
Convention appears to have circumvented this problem to some extent, starting 
by defining “nuclear damage” in a similar way to the Paris Convention, but 
then using the term “accident” to qualify the occurrence or succession of oc-
currences causing the damage; hence the difference is merely apparent.  
Today the French word “accident” would perhaps be replaced by “évènement” 
- which becomes “incident” in English – making clear that it may be “instanta-
neous or continuous”, like the recent Convention of the Council of Europe on 
civil liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environ-
ment; we may also note that chemical pollution can have the same gradual 
character as the effects of ionizing radiations. Also the French expression 
“évènement nucléaire” would not be very satisfactory. In fact it is quite natural, 
in the spirit of the time and in the absence of any better agreed terminology, 
that the authors of the Paris Convention should have used the ordinary vocabu-
lary of third party law, while adopting a somewhat unorthodox meaning of the 
term ‘accident’ (in French) which nevertheless conforms to technical reality in 
the nuclear field. This semantic consideration – particularly sensitive in the 
French version – does not cast any doubt on the definition itself’.
7
 
To avoid such confusion, in the absence of common agreement on the use of 
a single term for the concept of a nuclear event, the study adopts the same 
language as that adopted in the technical reality in the IAEA Scale of Nu-
clear Events. The term “accident” will be used in the sense of a nuclear 
                                                     
5
 Group of Governmental Experts on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear En-
ergy, “Determination of A Liability Regime Applicable to the Long Term Storage and 
Final Disposal of Radioactive Waste”, Note by the Secretariat, NEA/LEG/DOC(94)1, at 
p. 25. 
6
 Ibid, at p. 25. 
7
 Ibid, at p. 25. 
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event, and the term “incident” as defined in the Conventions covers a nuclear 
event.  
2.3 Major nuclear accidents 
2.3.1 The Windscale accident  
This accident occurred in the Windscale nuclear power plant at Sellafield on 
the Cumbrian Coast in England, in October 1957. It was the first serious ac-
cident caused by a nuclear reactor installation, since nuclear reactors had 
been used for peaceful purposes. This plant was constructed after the Second 
World War for peaceful purposes. It relied on natural uranium as a nuclear 




 The accident occurred in reactor No. 1 as a result of a broken down con-
trol device during the course of a routine operation of the installation. Con-
sequently, the fuel elements melted, releasing large amounts of radioactivity 
and infecting a number of people and the environment in the vicinity of the 
plant. The two other reactors operating in the plant were also shut down.  
 The British authorities examined 238 people living in the vicinity of the 
plant. 126 of them were affected by radioactivity, but nobody was seriously 
injured.
9
 In addition, the milk production within 200 square miles of the 
plant was declared unfit for consumption for a period of time. The milk pro-
duction was contaminated by the radioactive iodine released by the acci-
dent.
10
 As a result, a considerable number of farmers were affected by the 
accident. Furthermore, the damage caused to the plant itself amounted in 
total to two million pounds sterling.
11
 The accident also had a harmful trans-
boundary environmental impact on a number of neighbouring countries, viz. 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, etc.
12
 How-
ever, no State claimed compensation for the damage. 
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34 CHAPTER 2 
 
 
2.3.2 The Chalk River accident 
This accident occurred in an experimental reactor in Canada in May 1958, as 
a result of the breakdown of one of the nuclear fuel rods inside the reactor in 
the apparatus carrying the nuclear fuel, when spent fuel elements were being 
removed.
13
 The defective fuel rod was found burning after being removed 
from the test reactor. Consequently, the reactor was shut down for a time to 
be decontaminated, and for the installation and other facilities to be cleaned 
up. Nobody was seriously exposed to radioactivity.
14
 The accident contami-
nated the interior of the reactor, and released limited amounts of radioactiv-
ity in the vicinity of the installation.
15
 However, nobody claimed compensa-
tion for this damage.  
2.3.3 The Cosmos 954 accident 
A number of nuclear accidents occurred in objects in space operated by nu-
clear reactors or nuclear energy, such as Cosmos 1402 in 1983 and Cosmos 
1960 in 1988.
16
 However, the most serious accident which has occurred in 
outer space up to now was the Cosmos 954 accident. This accident occurred 
on 24 January 1978 in the ex-USSR satellite Cosmos 954, which was carry-
ing 50 kg of isotope of enriched uranium 235 in the reactor operating the 
satellite. The satellite broke up, and caused radioactive contamination over 
50,000 kilometres of the northern territory of Canada.
17
 Consequently, ‘[t]he 
deposit of hazardous radioactive debris from the satellite throughout a large 
area of Canadian territory, and the presence of that debris in the environment 




2.3.4 The Three Mile Island accident 
The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident occurred in reactor No. 2 at the Three 
Mile Island nuclear power station in Pennsylvania in the United States, at 4 
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 Major nuclear accidents: Factual background 35 
 
a.m. on 28 March 1979.
19
 The total capacity of the plant at that time was 960 
Mwe.
20
 The accident happened as a result of the failure of the feed water 
pumps to supply the reactor. This failure led to the turbine automatically 
shutting down, causing an increase in temperature and pressure in the pri-
mary cooling water of the reactor.
21
 The water and steam escaped from the 
pressure valve when the relief valve failed to close, allowing thousands of 
gallons of cooling water to escape from the reactor.
22
 This continued until 
the level of water supplying the reactor reached the normal water pressure. 
The operators did not realize this until the core of the reactor lost cooling 
water and the heat increased to the point where damage was caused.
23
  
 The reactor core was very badly damaged, and some of the fuel melted 
due to a shortage of the cooling water that cools down the reactor core. 
There was also extensive contamination of the primary coolant circuit. The 
interior of the reactor was contaminated, and some radioactivity was released 
through the ventilation stack before the contaminated building was effec-
tively isolated. However, nobody on the site of the installation was badly 
injured, although the accident caused heavy damage to the population living 
close to the plant. Two million people living in 80 square kilometres around 
the plant were slightly affected by radioactivity.
24
 Immediately after the ac-
cident, the Governor of Pennsylvania announced that there had been an acci-
dent, and evacuated 11,000 people from a radius of 15 miles of the accident 
area to another site five miles away.
25
 
 The accident was ‘attributed largely to errors by operating personnel in 
failing to diagnose what was happening and consequently taking a number of 
actions which made matters worse. Some of these diagnostic mistakes were 
due to design weakness in instrumentation systems. Other errors were due to 
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2.3.5 The Chernobyl accident  
The Chernobyl nuclear accident occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant in Chernobyl in the Ukraine, a state of the former USSR, at 1:23 a.m. 
local time, on Saturday, 26 April 1986. The accident happened in reactor No. 
4 during a turbine test. The USSR authorities did not immediately make noti-
fication of the accident. However, on 28 April 1986, an abnormally high de-
gree of radioactivity was recorded in the surrounding countries, and this was 
announced by the Swedish and Finnish authorities. The USSR authorities 
announced that there had been an accident in a televised statement at 9.00 
a.m. three days later, stating that: ‘An accident has taken place at the Cher-
nobyl Power Station, and one of the reactors was damaged. Measures are 
being taken to eliminate the consequences of the accident. Those affected by 
it are being given assistance. A government commission has been set up’.
27
 
Four months later, the USSR authorities sent a detailed report to the IAEA 
about the relevant facts of the accident.
28
 
 Furthermore, as mentioned above, because of the delay in the notification 
of the accident by the USSR authorities, the international community imme-
diately mobilized itself and adopted, under the auspices of the IAEA, the 
“Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident” and the “Conven-
tion on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emer-
gency”, which were adopted on 26 September 1986 in a special conference 
held in the IAEA Headquarters from 24-26 September 1986.
29
 The USSR 
authorities were very slow to take measures to protect the victims and the 
environment and to repair damage caused by the accident. These measures 
were taken by the USSR authorities only after public protests in 1989.
30
 As a 
result of these protests: 
‘At the end of 1989, the governments of the three republics [most affected by 
the accident] adopted special programs to cope with the aftermath of the Cher-
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nobyl accident. Parliamentary hearings on the accident took place at the repub-
lican and federal levels during the spring of 1990. On April 25, 1990, the Su-
preme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a special decree establishing a unified 
program of urgent social aid measures for victims. It allocated fourteen billion 
roubles for this program from the federal budget. In addition, both the federal 
government and the three republics created special administrative bodies and 
state committees to ameliorate the consequences of the accident. 
The parliaments of the three republics, as well as the federal government, 
adopted special laws providing aid for Chernobyl accident victims and creating 
a legal regime for managing the radioactively polluted territories. The federal 
law, passed May 12, 1991, that enacted these provisions is entitled “On the 




The Chernobyl accident was the worst accident in the history of the use of 
nuclear reactors. The radioactivity caused by the accident surpassed 50 mil-
lion Curie, which is equal to the levels that would result from the simultane-
ous explosion of 500 atomic bombs.
32
 The accident had harmful conse-
quences inside and outside the USSR. The reactor concerned and the fuel 
used to operate the reactor were completely destroyed. The reactor was en-
tirely new, and had only been in operation for three years. It was not insured, 
because it was owned and operated by the State. Therefore the value of the 
reactor was not covered by any insurance.
33
 In addition, the 350,000 people 
living in the accident area were evacuated as far as one hundred miles away 
from the area,
34
 31 people died immediately after the accident, and about 140 
people suffered various degrees of radiation sickness and poor health. The 
accident also had long-term harmful consequences. Tens of thousands of 
people are expected to develop diseases such as thyroid cancer 
35
 and people 
who were directly exposed to the accident suffered psychological effects.
36
 
Moreover, the accident badly affected the economy, property and the envi-
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ronment of many States, particularly agricultural production.
37
 Radioactivity 
caused by the accident contaminated the agricultural crops and animal prod-
ucts of many States.
38
 It spread throughout the northern hemisphere and af-
fected more than one hundred thousand people across Europe.
39
 For exam-
ple, Italy prohibited the sale of green vegetables, resulting in losses for 
farmers of approximately one hundred million dollars.
40
 In Sweden 100,000 
reindeer became unfit for human consumption, and in Germany the accident 
caused the loss and damage of many agricultural fields. Other damage 
caused by the accident was described as follows: 
 ‘The widespread radioactive contamination of the air, water and soil entailed 
direct damage to spring vegetables, milk-producing cattle had to be kept from 
grazing, the consumption of milk and other foodstuffs had to be supervised, 
import restrictions became necessary, the fixing of state intervention levels led 
to a change in consumers’ eating and buying habits, travel agencies and trans-
port undertakings specialised in Eastern Europe business lost their clientele, 
and finally, seasonal workers in agriculture lost their jobs’.
41
  
The rescue operation also cost approximately $2.7 billion.
42
 As a conse-
quence of the damage and loss, prices rose in many countries and the overall 
economic performance of these countries declined significantly.  
 Moreover, at the end of 1995, the G7 countries and Ukraine signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding to establish a comprehensive programme 
for decommissioning the remaining parts of the Chernobyl nuclear power 
plant by the year 2000. The G7 countries provided $500 million as grant as-
sistance, and another $1.8 billion in anticipated investments which were pro-
vided by the international financial institutions.
43
  
 The Chernobyl accident has clearly shown that a major nuclear accident 
can cause an enormous amount of damage, not only in the Installation State, 
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but also outside the borders of that State.
44
 It showed that the range of nu-
clear damage suffered as a result of a major nuclear accident seems almost 
limitless. Despite the fact that there are no precise figures available on the 
damage caused by the Chernobyl accident, the costs of the accident over the 
last two decades may have surpassed hundreds of billions of dollars.
45
 These 
figures are expected to increase further, particularly with regard to the cost 
of measures to restore the environment to its previous condition in the re-
gions affected by the accident, which may take a very long time. This is be-
cause ‘[n]o one knew the real scale of [the] environmental catastrophe [... in 
Chernobyl and thus] it will take […] one hundred years or more to restore 
the quality of the environment and liv[e]able conditions in these regions’.
46
 
 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the USSR attributed the cause of the 
accident to a violation of the regulations by the operating personnel, and re-
jected any legal liability for the consequences of the accident under interna-
tional law, only admitting moral accountability.
47
  
2.3.6 The Tokaimura accident  
The Tokaimura accident occurred in a uranium processing plant in To-
kaimura, Japan, at 10.35 a.m. local time, on 30 September 1999, when three 
workers were mixing a liquid batch of uranium at a plant operated by JCO 
Company Ltd., a private company.
48
 The accident is considered the third 
worst nuclear accident after Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, and one of the 
major nuclear accidents in the history of Japan.
49
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 Immediately after the accident, the three workers involved in the prepara-
tion of the nuclear material were hospitalized.
50
 Other people were exposed 
to radioactivity, including 145 JCO employees, 60 government officials and 
207 local residents.
51
 Radiation emitted by the plant was ten thousand times 
over the normal limit permitted during the course of the normal operation of 
the plant.
52
 The level of radiation emitted by the accident reached the levels 
which occur in an accident in a nuclear power plant.  
 In addition, a number of people living in the area surrounding the plant 
were evacuated and suffered from the effects of the accident. According to 
the Interim Report of 5 November 1999 of the Investigation Committee for 
the Critical Accident at the Uranium Processing Plant, which was established 
by the Nuclear Safety Commission on 7 October 1999 to investigate the ac-
cident, the immediate consequences of the accident included: 
The ‘evacuation of approximately 50 households within 350 metres and the 
recommendation to remain indoors for approximately 300 000 people living 
within a 10 km radius, transportation facilities were cancelled and schools and 
other public facilities were temporarily closed, as were private companies. The 
effects of the accident were very large, both socially and economically. Resi-
dents living near the site were not only inconvenienced [… by] the evacuation 
and the recommendation to stay indoors, but they […] were [also] subjected to 
the mental and physical [… suffering] caused by rumours. At the same time, 
[…] measures [… such as] psychological counselling are necessary. Following 




The investigation after the accident revealed that the three workers working 
with the nuclear substances did not have any government training or a li-
cence to work with nuclear material.
54
 It was also reported that the operator 
of the plant was liable for nuclear damage caused by the accident due to his 
failure to take the necessary safety measures to prevent the accident.
55
 The 
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accident revealed that a number of nuclear facilities operating in Japan were 
in violation of the health and safety measures, and nuclear law. Conse-
quently, the Japanese Ministry of Labour issued instructions to improve re-
cords and safety measures. The Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Source 
Material, Nuclear Fuel and Reactors was amended on 13 December 1999 
and entered into force on 1 July 2000, to improve nuclear safety regulations. 
Finally, a new Special Law on Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster 
was adopted on 17 December and entered into force on 16 June 2000, to 




2.3.7 The Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
The Fukushima nuclear accident occurred as a result of the explosion of the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant that had been damaged by an earth-
quake (magnitude 9.0) and a tsunami, in Japan on 11 March 2011.
57
 This 
was the second serious nuclear accident that occurred in the nuclear industry 
in Japan, after the 1999 Tokaimora nuclear accident and the third major nu-
clear accident in the history of nuclear reactors used for peaceful ends, after 
the 1979 Three Mile Island and the 1986 Chernobyl accidents.
58
 Reactor 
buildings were damaged by explosions caused as a result of the damage sus-
tained in the massive earthquake and tsunami.  
 The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant consists of 6 reactors, four of 
which were damaged by the earthquake and tsunami. The damaged reactors 
included: reactor number 1, in which an explosion destroyed the reactor 
building on 12 March; reactor 2, in which an explosion caused a radiation 
leak on 15 March; reactor 3, in which an explosion destroyed the reactor 
building, and the spent fuel pools of units 1 and 3, causing radiation to leak 
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into the atmosphere on 14 March; reactor 4, in which an explosion caused 
extensive damage to the reactor building on 15-16 March.
59
  
 As a result of these explosions and the damage to the power supplies 
caused by the tsunami, the cooling system of the reactors failed to supply the 
reactors with the cooling water needed to slow down the nuclear reaction 
process and reduce the heat inside the reactors. Consequently, the water 
stopped circulating and began to boil, creating steam. The fuel rods got hot-
ter and reacted with the steam, creating hydrogen gas. The technicians at-
tempted to release the gas and steam from the pressurised vessel to reduce 
the pressure inside the reactor. However, the gas exploded and damaged the 
reactor buildings. In addition, there were two major fires in reactor 4 caused 
by low water in storage pools designed to cool spent nuclear fuel. The offi-
cials flooded the reactor with seawater as an emergency coolant to cool 
down the reactor, and used boric acid to reduce the nuclear reaction process 
inside the reactors. On 17 March, helicopters dropped seawater onto reactors 
3 and 4 to fill the storage pools containing spent fuel rods with water. To 
bring the situation under control, power had to be restored to the plant’s 
damaged cooling system so that the pumps could be used again to pump 
cooled water into the storage pools and bring the nuclear fuel back to safer 




 In addition to the damage caused to the reactors, the accident also caused 
considerable damage to the surrounding population and the environment.
61
 
The Japanese authorities evacuated the population living in the vicinity of 
the plant immediately on the same day of the accident to an area 3 km from 
the plant, for their protection. However, on the following day, when the 
situation worsened, they were evacuated once more to another area 20 km 
further away.
62
 An estimated 115,000 people were evacuated from the area 
around the plant, 15,000 were confirmed dead and many others were injured 
and affected by radioactivity.
63
 Of course, these figures include the victims 
of the earthquake and the tsunami. The environment was also severely af-
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fected by the radioactivity caused by the accident. Platinum was discovered in 
the soil around the area surrounding the plant and in seawater, and there were 
high levels of radioactivity due to melting nuclear rods and interaction with the 
water. There were also economic losses resulting from prohibitions of food-
stuffs, the temporary closure of businesses and electricity problems.  
2.4 Types of nuclear accidents 
Although there are different classifications of nuclear accidents in the sci-
ence of nuclear technology, they can be divided into two main categories as 
regards the application of the provisions of the nuclear liability conventions: 
the first category includes major and minor accidents; and the second in-
cludes internal, external and transboundary nuclear accidents. The first cate-
gory of nuclear accidents corresponds with the technical definition of a nu-
clear accident, while the second is identical to the geographical scope 
approach. This classification is recognized under the IAEA International 
Event Scale. It also corresponds with the classification of the doctrine of nu-
clear liability law. The Scale classifies nuclear accidents into three main 
categories, major accidents, minor incidents and non-nuclear incidents. A 
brief summary of the classification of nuclear accidents according to the 
geographical scope of application of the nuclear liability conventions, i.e., 




2.4.1 Internal accidents  
Internal accidents include minor accidents which occur inside a nuclear reac-
tor and gradual releases of radioactivity during the course of the normal op-
eration of a nuclear installation, where the harmful consequences of a nu-
clear accident are limited inside the installation itself. Usually this type of 
nuclear accident occurs during the normal course of operation of a nuclear 
installation. The harmful consequences of such nuclear accidents are limited 
to the installation itself, workers in the installation and the environment in-
side the installation. In this respect, a large number of nuclear accidents oc-
cur during the routine operation of a nuclear installation. Damage caused by 
such accidents is not covered by the nuclear liability conventions. It is cov-
ered under the ordinary law of the Installation State, if the law provides for 
this. The authors of the nuclear liability conventions exempt the operator 
from liability for nuclear damage caused by nuclear accidents to the nuclear 
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installation itself during construction, on the site of the installation, or on any 




2.4.2 External accidents  
An “external accident” means any accident occurring in a nuclear installa-
tion and its harmful consequences outside the installation or during the 
transport of nuclear substances within the territory of a State, but without the 
damage spreading beyond the boundary of the State. The harmful conse-
quences of such types of accidents could include grave effects on people, 
property and the environment. Numerous nuclear accidents of this type have 
occurred since the initial use of nuclear reactors. As mentioned earlier, the 
most serious accidents which have occurred in land-based nuclear reactors 
were the 1957 Windscale accident in Britain,
66
 the 1958 Chalk River acci-
dent in Canada,
67
 the 1979 Harrisburg accident in the Three Mile Island in 
Pennsylvania, USA,
68
 the 1999 Tokaimura nuclear accident in Japan
69
 and 
the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. The harmful consequences of 
these accidents were very serious and caused nuclear damage to many peo-
ple and the environment in areas surrounding the installations. They also led 
to the dumping of agricultural and industrial products in these areas.
70
 Dam-
age caused by external accidents is usually covered under the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions. 
2.4.3 Transboundary accidents 
Transboundary nuclear accidents include any accident occurring in a nuclear 
installation, or to nuclear substances transported to or from the installation, 
causing harmful consequences not only on or around the site of the nuclear 
installation, but also beyond the borders of the State. The harmful conse-
quences of transboundary nuclear accidents caused by nuclear facilities are 
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serious, and spread from the country in whose territory the accident occurred 
to other States, or to the global commons, causing nuclear damage to per-
sons, property and the environment.  
 In general, transboundary damage is defined as the ‘harm caused by ac-
tivities carried out in places under the jurisdiction or control of one State and 
arising in places under the jurisdiction or control of another state or in places 
outside national jurisdiction (the global commons)’.
71
 It also ‘means damage 
caused to persons, property or the environment in the territory or in other 
places under the jurisdiction or control of a State other than the State of ori-
gin’.
72
 Thus the notion of a nuclear accident is closely interrelated with the no-
tion of nuclear damage, as damage is a natural consequence of any accident. 
However, there is no definition of an environmental accident.
73
 
 This type of accident might occur in nuclear-powered ships as they sail 
from one place to another, or in ships transporting nuclear materials, or in 
objects in space, or in a land-based reactor installation in the case of major 
accidents. A few nuclear accidents have caused harmful transboundary con-
sequences, i.e., the Cosmos 954 accident in 1978
74
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 As mentioned above, transboundary nuclear damage may be covered un-
der the existing nuclear liability conventions, or under other international 
conventions, or the general rules of international law. For example, trans-
boundary damage caused by nuclear ships is covered by the 1962 Brussels 
Nuclear Ships Convention. Damage caused during the transport of nuclear 
material and land-based installations may be covered by the 1971 Carriage 
of Nuclear Material Convention, the Amended Paris Convention, the 
Amended Vienna Convention and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary 
Convention. However, transboundary damage caused by objects in space is 
governed by the 1972 Outer Space Convention. Transboundary damage 
caused by a nuclear power station can be covered under the nuclear liability 
conventions or under the general rules of international law.  
2.5 Conclusions 
An examination of this chapter leads to the following conclusions. First, the 
terminology used in the nuclear liability conventions is misleading, and does 
not reflect the technical reality in practice, as adopted in the technical field 
and used in some of the legal literature. According to the technical definition 
adopted in the IAEA Scale to classify nuclear events, the term “incident” 
expresses a minor nuclear event, while the term “accident” expresses a major 
nuclear accident. Therefore under the nuclear liability conventions, the term 
“accident” is appropriate to describe major nuclear events, and the term “in-
cident” to describe minor events. The two terms “incident” and “accident” 
should be inserted in the nuclear liability conventions. In that case, it would 
be difficult to find similar words which correspond to these two terms in 
other languages.  
Secondly, major nuclear accidents caused by nuclear installations can 
cause considerable amounts of damage and not only have harmful conse-
quences inside the nuclear installation, but also outside the installation. This 
is even worse if the accident causes transboundary environmental damage 
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beyond the borders of the State in whose territory the installation is located 
or under whose jurisdiction or control it has been operated.  
 Thirdly, the classification of nuclear accidents can be seen from two per-
spectives, the technical and geographical perspectives. From the first per-
spective, nuclear accidents could be classified as major and minor accidents, 
or sudden occurrence accidents and gradual emission accidents. However, 
from the second perspective, nuclear accidents might be classified into three 
types, i.e., internal, external and transboundary accidents. These classifica-
tions are based on the level of radioactivity resulting from a nuclear accident, 
which corresponds with the technical reality and with the provisions of the 
nuclear liability conventions. A nuclear event is classified as a minor or in-
ternal incident when the harmful consequences are limited to the installation. 
However, it is classified as a major or external incident when the accident 
causes serious environmental nuclear damage which spreads outside the in-
stallation. In addition, a nuclear accident is classified as a major or trans-
boundary accident when its harmful consequences spread beyond the borders 
of the Accident State or the State under whose jurisdiction or control the in-
stallation was operated.  
 Finally, the significance of these classifications lies in the fact that under 
the nuclear liability conventions the operator of a nuclear installation is not 
liable for nuclear damage caused to non-Contracting States or transboundary 
damage by nuclear activities, in the case that the national legislation pro-
vides this. The conventions consider the operator liable for nuclear damage 
caused by a nuclear accident outside the site of the installation and liable for 
transboundary nuclear damage when the Installation State is a Contracting 
Party to the applicable nuclear liability convention. The conventions also 
exclude the operator from liability for minor nuclear damage caused by mi-
nor nuclear accidents resulting from minor nuclear activities.  
 
49 
3 REPARABLE ENVIRONMENTAL NUCLEAR 
DAMAGE: LEGAL BACKGROUND 
3.1 Introduction     
Reparable environmental damage is a complex problem and difficult to de-
fine under the nuclear liability conventions and other norms of international 
law, particularly when it concerns environmental damage caused by nuclear 
activities. This is because environmental damage can be produced or associ-
ated with other damage. It is difficult to separate environmental damage 
caused by nuclear activities from other related nuclear damage, personal and 
property damage, economic loss, etc. Moreover, the harmful consequences 
of environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident on human health may 
develop decades after the accident occurred. In addition, there is no separate 
definition under the nuclear liability instruments for environmental nuclear 
damage, as part of the definition of nuclear damage in general. Similarly, the 
provisions on nuclear liability under the nuclear liability conventions cover 
environmental and other nuclear damage. 
 ‘A legal definition of damage to the environment [therefore] is of fundamental 
importance, since such a definition will drive the process of determining the 
type and scope of the necessary remedial action – and thus the costs that are 
recoverable via civil [and international] liability. Legal definitions often clash 




The Chernobyl accident demonstrated that a major nuclear accident can 
cause serious physical and immaterial damage to people, loss or damage to 
property and environmental damage, as well as other related damage includ-
ing the costs of preventive measures, cleaning up and the reinstatement of 
the environment to its status quo ante, and economic losses of profits for 
people as well as the State. This illustrated the importance of widening the 
concept of nuclear damage under the nuclear liability conventions to include 
broader provisions on the concept of reparable damage caused by a nuclear 
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 It was considered that the concept of compensable nuclear damage 
should cover all environmental nuclear damage which is caused by and re-
lated to a nuclear accident to a sufficient degree. This implies covering not 
only direct damage caused by the accident, such as physical or material 




 This chapter examines the reparable environmental nuclear damage 
caused by nuclear accidents. It focuses mainly on the definition of the con-
cept of recoverable damage caused to the environment by nuclear activities. 
The chapter answers certain questions necessary to determine the recover-
able environmental nuclear damage. These questions are: What is the con-
cept of environmental nuclear damage covered by international law? What is 
the type and extent of such damage? Is all environmental damage caused by 
a nuclear activity covered under international law, or are there certain condi-
tions restricting the recovery of such damage? To answer these questions, 
the chapter examines the concept of nuclear damage and the conditions of 
the recoverable environmental damage under the nuclear liability conven-
tions and the general rules of international law. The analyses focus first on 
defining the concept of terms related to damage, then the concept and scope 
of environmental nuclear damage covered under international law. Finally, it 
examines the conditions required to provide compensation for environmental 
nuclear damage. These issues are examined in relation to the relevant provi-
sions of international law. However, as nuclear damage has been defined 
under the nuclear liability conventions, and there are also numerous interna-
tional instruments dealing with the concept of environmental damage, these 
instruments will be a significant source in examining the issues of environ-
mental nuclear damage.  
 The chapter is divided into 7 sections. Section 1 includes this introduction 
and Section 2 defines the terminology related to damage, harm, injury, etc. 
This is particularly important because the different conventions do not use a 
coherent and specified term for the concept of damage. Every convention 
has adopted different terms. Nevertheless, these conventions are the most 
relevant sources for the definition of recoverable nuclear damage and liabil-
ity for such damage. Section 3 defines the concept of recoverable environ-
mental nuclear damage, as developed in the nuclear liability conventions and 
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other norms of international law. Section 4 examines the scope of recover-
able nuclear damage including environmental damage. It determines the ex-
tent of compensable environmental nuclear damage, and its relationship with 
other nuclear damage. This is important to determine the scope and extent of 
the liability for environmental nuclear damage. It also examines the concept 
of legal damage and its role in the liability for transboundary environmental 
consequences. It discusses whether or not damage caused by a State as a re-
sult of the violation of its international obligations constitutes an element in 
the liability for a wrongful act. Section 5 investigates the main conditions 
required for recoverable environmental nuclear damage. Section 6 describes 
the significance of environmental nuclear damage as the main element in the 
international liability mechanism.  
3.2 Damage, harm and injury 
The term damage is invariably used in the literature and international in-
struments to refer to different notions such as damage, harm, loss, pollution, 
contamination, impairment, harmful consequences, impacts etc. However, 
the most common terms used in this respect are the terms damage, loss, harm 
and injury. For example, the term “damage” is used in the nuclear liability 
conventions, and the terms “harm” and “injury” are used in the ILC Draft 
principles on the allocation of loss and the ILC Draft Articles on prevention 
of transboundary damage. The ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for 
wrongful acts do not use the term “injury”, although the term “injured State” 
is used in Article 40 of these Articles, while the term “damage” is used in 
Articles 35, 42, 44 (1) and 45 (1).
4
 Furthermore, the terms “loss”, “injury”
5
 
and “harm” are sometimes used interchangeably in the ILC reports.
6
 Damage 
covers the term “loss” and “impairment” in the nuclear liability conventions. 
The term “loss” is used in these conventions in relation to personal and 
property damage, and the term “impairment” in relation to damage caused to 
the environment. The terms “pollution” and “contamination” are also used in 
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a general way in the sense of environmental damage, as the term “pollution” 
is used often interchangeably with the phrase “damage caused to the envi-
ronment”.
7
 It was argued that: 
‘The terms “injury”, “harm”, “damage”, “loss”, etc. are not defined consis-
tently in international law and there are no agreed or exact equivalencies be-
tween them in the various official languages of the United Nations. A review 
of any given field will reveal a range of terms and definitions specific to the 
context – for example, in the various treaties dealing with transboundary pollu-
tion. Given the current state of international law, it would be wrong to presume 
any specific definition of “injury” or “damage” applicable across the board. 
The many declarations and agreements which lay down primary rules of re-
sponsibility do not seem to be in derogation from any general rule about injury 
or damage, nor do they embody so many special provisions given effect by 
way of the lex specialis principle. Rather each is tailored to meet the particular 
requirements of the context and the balance of a given negotiated text. Thus 
the most that the articles can do is to use general terms in a broad and flexible 
way, while maintaining internal consistency’.
8
  
There are subtle distinctions between the three terms. It has been argued that 
the term “damage” is a financial concept, and the term “harm” is a physical 
concept, while the term “injury” or “loss” is a legal concept.
9
 Nevertheless, 
physical damage or physical harm can be expressed as physical injury.
10
  
 Some authors consider that the term “damage” includes material or moral 
detriment suffered by a State. Material damage is expressed in terms of 
money or indemnities and also includes moral damage which requires finan-
cial compensation. The latter refers to injury caused to a State such as a loss 
of honour or dignity or damage to its political interests.
11
 According to 
Brownlie, damage also means loss, whether this involves a financial quanti-
                                                     
7
 Marie-Louise Larsson, “Legal Definitions of the Environment and of Environmental 
Damage”, in: Scandinavian Studies in Law, Vol. 38, 1999, pp. 155-176, at p. 158, avail-
able at: http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/38-7.pdf (accessed on 20.9.2011). 
8
 James Crawford, Jacqueline Peel and Simon Olleson, “The ILC’s Articles on Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Completion of the Second Reading”, 
in: EJIL, Vol. 12, No. 5, 2001, pp. 963-991, at p. 971. 
9
 Lefeber, 1996, at p. 16. 
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 Bruce A. Hurwitz, “State Liability for Outer Space Activities in Accordance with the 
1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects”, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1992, at p. 13. 
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 Handl, AJIL, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1975, pp. 50-76, at p. 51. 
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fication of physical injury or damage, or other consequences resulting from a 
breach of an obligation.
12
  
 Other authors consider that the term “injury” is ‘the legal wrong done to 
another arising from a breach of an obligation, as “consisting” of damage. In 
some cases damage may be the gist of injury, in others not; in still others 
there may be loss without any legal wrong (damnum sine injuria)’.
13
 Accord-
ing to Article 31 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, injury covers 
any damage, whether material or moral, arising from an internationally 
wrongful act of a State.
14
 Nevertheless, some lawyers in the ILC considered 
that ‘the word “injury” should be reserved for a breach of a legal obligation 
which might, but need not necessarily, entail material damage. In the context 
of liability, it would be better to speak of “harm” or “loss” rather than “in-
jury”, to make it clear that the reference was to material damage and also to 
avoid any confusion with injury caused by wrongful acts’.
15
 According to the 
Special Rapporteur Crawford, the terms “injury” and “damage” are distinct, 
as the concept of “injury” in the term “injured State” involves the concept of 
a “legal injury”, while the term “damage” refers to material or other loss suf-
fered by the injured State.
16
 Similarly the Special Rapporteur Riphagen ar-
gues that, ‘…injury and damage are not identical terms. Injury means an in-
fringement of a right, and does not necessarily create a damage in the 
ordinary sense of the word’.
17
 However, Handl refers to the Trail Smelter 
arbitration, and states that: 
‘Some confusion surrounds the tribunal’s use of the terms “injury” or “dam-
age” (“damage” being the term the parties preferred to “injury”) and “dam-
ages” in the sense of indemnities. […T]o be sure [that] “injury” [has been suf-
fered, it] must be established by clear and convincing evidence, [but] no 
further substantive qualifications can be inferred with certainty from this deci-
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 Brownlie, 1983, reprinted 1986, at p. 199; Ian Brownlie, “Principles of Public Interna-
tional Law”, Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, at p. 459. 
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14 August 1998, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.4 (1998), at p. 3, para. 105. 
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grees of State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/354/Add.1, 12 March 1982, ap. 26, foot-
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sion. Thus the essential question of whether “injury” means material damage 
or [also] includes moral damage […] has not been dealt with conclusively’.
18
  
In conclusion, these arguments suggest that the term “damage” applies to the 
State liability for lawful activities, and the term “injury” to State responsibil-
ity for unlawful acts. However, in practice, the terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably for the liability of a State for both lawful and unlawful ac-
tivities. For example, material damage caused by a nuclear accident can also 
cause moral or psychological damage, which can be assessed in terms of in-
demnities. Thus it could be argued that the term “damage” can be used as a 
synonym of other terms, such as harm, injury, etc. However, the term “dam-
ages” means compensation or indemnities. Perhaps this was the reason that 
the drafters of the nuclear liability conventions adopted the term “damage” 
to mean the harmful consequences caused by nuclear activities and compen-
sation for that damage. These conventions govern liability and compensation 
for nuclear damage. According to the Preamble of the Paris Convention, the 
Contracting Parties are ‘DESIROUS of ensuring adequate and equitable 
compensation for persons who suffer damage caused by nuclear incidents”. 
Moreover, according to Webster’s Dictionary, “damage” means ‘injury or 
harm that impairs value or usefulness. […] However, [o]ften, damages 
[…are used in the sense of] cost; expense; charge’.
19
  
 These synonyms do not have the effect of limiting or expanding the scope 
of liability, unless the terms are used to indicate a particular concept. This 
thesis adopts the term damage rather than the term impairment or any other 
term, although it sometimes refers to these terms. This is because the term 




3.3 Definition of the concept of nuclear damage 
The definition of nuclear damage under the amended nuclear liability con-
ventions was extended to cover not only personal and property damage, as 
was provided for under these conventions before the amendments, but also 
damage caused to the environment, economic loss, and the costs of preven-
tive measures and measures for the restoration of the impaired environ-
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 However, the conventions do not contain provisions and concrete 
criteria for determining the scope of this damage. In the absence of such crite-
ria, the scope of recoverable nuclear damage is subject to a personal assessment 
by national judges according to the national law of the competent court.
22
 Un-
der the nuclear liability conventions, the nature and extent of compensation for 
such damage are determined by national law.
23
 Consequently, in the case of a 
major nuclear accident, such as the Chernobyl accident, it is not possible to 
provide compensation for all the environmental damage caused by a nuclear 
accident, unless all the elements of the nuclear damage have been assessed. 
Therefore it is important to determine the scope of nuclear damage, particularly 
because under the nuclear liability conventions liability for nuclear damage is 
governed by a limited amount of compensation, estimated for each nuclear ac-
cident.  
 Reference should be made to the definition of nuclear damage as adopted 
in the Amended Vienna and Paris Conventions, which is based on defini-
tions of damage in other instruments of liability, particularly those related to 
hazardous activities, such as pollution of the environment, and other instru-
ments related to the protection of the environment in international law and 
State practice. The blueprint for these instruments is the 1992 Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.
24
 The same definition of damage 
caused by hazardous activities as defined in this Convention was used in the 
Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.
25
 
                                                     
21
 Article I (1) (k) of the Amended Vienna Convention; Article I (f) of the Convention on 
Supplementary Convention; Article 1 (a) (vii) of the Amended Paris Convention. For the 
definition of the concept of nuclear damage, see Fiona Wagstaff, “The Concept of Nu-
clear Damage under the Revised Paris Convention”, in: Norbert Pelzer (ed.), “Die Inter-
nationalisierung des Atomrechts (Internationalizing Atomic Energy Law)”, Tagungs-
bericht der AIDN/INLA-Regional tagung am 2. und 3. September 2004 in Celle, Norms 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 197-206; Måns Jacobsson, “The Regime of 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage and the Convention on Nuclear Third Party 
Liability- A Comparison”, in: International Nuclear Law Association (INLA), Nuclear 
Inter Jura’ 89, 1989-Nuclear Law for the 1990’s- Tokyo, Japan September 25-28, 1989, 
Proceedings (for participants only), Tokyo, Japan 1989,  pp. II-81 to II-100, at pp. II-89 
to II-100. 
22
 Exposé des Motifs of the 1960 Paris Convention, para. 39; Article I (k) (ii) of the Vi-
enna Convention. 
23
 Article 11 of the Paris Convention; Article VIII of the Vienna Convention. 
24
 Birnie and Boyle, 2002, at p. 484; Vedran Šoljan, “The New Definition of Nuclear 
Damage in the 1997 Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability 
for Nuclear Damage”, in: OECD/NEA and IAEA, 2000, pp. 59-83, at p. 77. 
25
 See, Article 2 (c) of the 1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Dam-
age Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. 
56 CHAPTER 3 
 
Therefore, the definition of compensable environmental nuclear damage in 
the amended nuclear liability conventions is similar to the definition of dam-
age in those instruments.  
 Like the nuclear liability conventions, the ILC Draft principles on the allo-
cation of loss define compensable damage in general. These principles pro-
vide only for heads of damage without defining the scope and extent of re-
coverable damage. According to these principles, “damage” means 
significant damage caused to persons, property and the environment. More 
specifically, the definition of damage under these draft principles covers: 
loss of life or personal injury; loss of, or damage to property including prop-
erty which forms part of the cultural heritage; loss or damage to the envi-
ronment; the costs of reasonable measures to reinstate the impaired envi-
ronment, including natural resources; and the costs of reasonable response 
measures.
26
 In contrast, the ILC Draft Articles on State responsibility for 
wrongful acts do not define the concept of recoverable damage because it 
was deemed that it is covered by the primary rules of international liability 
for lawful acts, rather than by State responsibility for wrongful acts.
27
 How-
ever, the absence of a definition may cause some confusion, ambiguities and 
uncertainty about the application of State responsibility norms to environ-
mental nuclear damage. Consequently, ‘the ambiguities in the threshold of 
harm contribute to the general confusion regarding the working of the law of 
State responsibility in relation to the environment’.
28
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3.4 Scope of reparable damage caused by a nuclear 
accident 
3.4.1 Material and physical environmental damage 
3.4.1.1 Personal damage 
As noted, the nuclear liability conventions define compensable personal 
damage caused by a nuclear accident, as “damage to or loss of life of any 
person”,
29
 without giving any definition of such damage. This restricted 
definition of nuclear damage does not determine whether or not the concept 
of nuclear damage covers other damage related to personal damage, such as 
immaterial damage caused as a result of the impaired environment. This 
gives the competent court the flexibility to decide whether or not to include 
such damage in the concept of nuclear damage. Moreover, the phrase “any 
person” and the relationship between the injured person and other persons 
who suffer injuries as a result of a nuclear accident are not clearly defined. 
There is no indication that the phrase refers only to natural persons or 
whether it also refers to any other legal person who has a relationship with 
the injured person, including legal persons such as companies and institu-
tions, and international persons such as States and international organiza-
tions. Also, the phrase “any person” is inappropriate for the person who has 
suffered nuclear damage, and should be replaced by the word “victim”. Un-
der the ILC Draft principles on the allocation of loss, the definition of victim 
is more specific and means ‘any natural or legal person or State that suffers 
damage’.
30
 This concept of persons who have suffered damage allows the 
State itself, its subjects and legal persons with independent legal personality, 
such as companies or other legal institutions, to receive compensation if they 
suffer nuclear damage resulting from the impaired environment caused by a 
nuclear accident. In addition, the State is a victim, when the nuclear damage 
is caused by a nuclear accident in a nuclear installation located in the terri-
tory of another State or under its jurisdiction or control. This is because nu-
clear damage suffered by citizens of the State is considered to be indirect 
moral damage suffered by the State itself.
31
 The State is obliged to protect its 
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citizens from damage caused by another State.
32
 Thus the term “victim” is 
also an appropriate term for the State and its subjects if they suffer damage 
as a result of the impaired environment. 
 As regards the scope of personal damage caused by a nuclear accident, a 
person exposed to radioactivity may receive a fatal or harmful dose causing 
permanent or temporary physical injury or suffer genetic effects as a result 
of excessive exposure to radioactivity.
33
 ‘The term radiation exposure refers 
to any occasion on which a human or other animal or a plant has been placed 
in the presence of radiation from a radioactive source’.
34
 A person exposed 
to radioactivity can suffer from physical or immaterial damage if he has been 
exposed to a certain level of radioactivity above the permitted legal limit.
35
 
However, the injured person must prove that the damage was caused by a 
nuclear accident in a nuclear installation or caused by nuclear substances.
36
  
 Physical damage may involve damage to the body of the injured person 
or to his heritage. Bodily injury covers the death or any other physical inju-
ries caused to the person exposed to radioactivity. Such damage can be rec-
ognized either immediately after the exposure to radioactivity, or a long time 
after a nuclear accident in case of latent damage. It is easy for victims of a 
nuclear accident to prove the causal link between the damage suffered and 
the accident in the case of immediate injury. However, it is difficult to prove 
causality in the case of latent injuries because the damage may take a few 
decades to develop. In addition, the reasons for the damage may vary as it 
may be associated with other diseases, or may result from a combination of 
nuclear and non-nuclear damage, or be caused by low levels of radioactiv-
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 For example, cancer may take a long time to appear, and may be the 
result of exposure to radioactive substances, or it may have other causes.
38
  
 Hereditary damage is also caused by exposure to radioactive materials, 
but the injured person is usually not the person who was exposed to radia-
tion. This damage may result in the infertility of the person exposed to radia-
tion, or in birth defects. However, it is more difficult to prove hereditary 
damage than bodily injuries. This is because in most cases, hereditary dam-
age appears a long time after the injured person’s exposure to radioactivity.  
 In addition, a nuclear accident may cause immaterial damage to the per-
sons exposed to radiation and their relatives, for example, their children or 
parents or other relatives who witnessed the accident, particularly people 
who live near the place of the accident. In most cases therapy for psycho-
logical injuries takes longer than physical damage. This is because the per-
son exposed to the nuclear accident may remember the accident for a long 
time, and find it difficult to forget. For example, the victim may be haunted 
by memories of the accident throughout his life. The Chernobyl accident is a 
good example of this. It had a psychological impact on children who were 
exposed to radiation caused by the accident in many countries, as well as 
those who lived in the vicinity of the accident. It is also expected that the 
accident will affect generations to come.
39
 A report drawn up by the Green-
peace organization in 2006 on the effects of the Chernobyl accident twenty 
years later showed that it led to severe psychological and mental disorders in 
many people exposed to the radiation caused by the accident, particularly 
children.
40
 According to this report, ‘[t]he UN Chernobyl Forum Expert 
Group “Health” (EGH) (World Health Organization 2005) has outlined four 
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related areas of concern: stress-related symptoms; effects on the developing 




3.4.1.2 Property damage 
Like personal damage, the nuclear liability conventions and the ILC Draft 
principles on the allocation of loss refer to “loss of or damage to property” 
generally,
42
 without determining the scope, nature and extent of com-
pensable property damage. This was left to the judgement of the competent 
court. Nevertheless, the definition of the words “damage or loss to property” 
may indicate the scope of property damage covered under the conventions. 
In defining these words, Black’s Law Dictionary states that:  
‘The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of 
ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, 
real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to 
make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and in-
terest and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises and in-




This definition is exclusive and general, and includes the material and imma-
terial value of the damaged or lost property. Tort law also states, with regard 
to “damage or loss to property”, that ‘any infringement on any rights result-
ing in a diminishing of a value of such rights should be compensable’.
44
 This 
definition expands the concept of nuclear damage to cover material loss or 
damage to property itself, and economic damage caused as a result of loss of 
property and profits, as well as damaged property as a result of the impaired 
environment.  
 The scope of damage or loss to property resulting from a nuclear accident 
may include a third party, property in general or property on the site of a nu-
clear installation or the installation itself. It is divided into two main catego-
                                                     
41
 Ibid, at p. 95. 
42
 Article I (1) (k), (ii) of the Amended Vienna Convention; Principle 2 (a) (ii) of the 
2006 ILC Draft principles on allocation of loss. 
43
 Black’s Law Dictionary (Abridged 6
th
 Edition 1991), at p. 846, as quoted from State of 
Michigan in the Supreme Court, judgment of appeal dated August 2006, Supreme Court 
No. 130748, at p. 9, at: http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/11-
06/130748/130748-AppelleesSupp.pdf (accessed on 14.2.2012). 
44
 Catarina Holtz, “The Concept of Property and Related Issues in Liability Law-Possible 
Implications for the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy”, in: NLB, No. 40, 1987, pp. 87-98, at p. 88. 




 the first includes direct damage to property caused as a result of direct 
exposure to radiation. This may include, for example, contaminated places 
exposed to radiation such as houses, burned cars, livestock, hospitals, indus-
trial and commercial companies and places affected by the nuclear accident, 
etc.
46
 It also includes property damage resulting from fire, explosion and pol-
lution caused by a nuclear accident, as well as land unfit for use for a period 
of time due to the widespread pollution caused by the accident, or any other 
property damaged as a result of a nuclear accident.
47
 The second category is 
indirect damage (so-called “economic loss”) caused because a person is pre-
vented from using or benefiting from or enjoying properties or from visiting 
places contaminated by radioactivity. This may involve loss or damage of 
goods, including an embargo on the sale of goods or on production, as well 
as loss of benefit or profit as a result of the exposure to radiation, such as the 
closure of a factory or company.
48
  
 There is no doubt that according to the interpretation of the rules govern-
ing liability for nuclear damage and on the basis of evidence presented to the 
competent court, material damage caused by a nuclear accident can be cov-
ered by the nuclear liability conventions, and other norms of international 
law. However, in relation to immaterial damage, it is difficult for the court to 
identify the reality of such damage,
49
 and to provide an accurate assessment, 
for example, of the enjoyment of a valuable picture damaged as a result of a 
nuclear accident.  
3.4.1.3 Environmental damage 
The 1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Vienna Convention do not refer to 
nuclear damage caused to the environment and other related damage. This was 
left to the judgement of the competent court in accordance with the applica-
ble rules of the ordinary national law, if it provides for this.
50
 Unfortunately, 
few of the national laws which have been adopted on the protection of the 
environment define environmental damage in general.
51
 Therefore the 
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Amended Vienna Convention, the Convention on Supplementary Compen-
sation, and the Amended Paris Convention included environmental damage 
under other headings of nuclear damage covered by these conventions. 
However, the scope and extent of compensable environmental nuclear dam-
age has also been left to the judgement of the competent courts in accor-
dance with national law.
52
  
 In the absence of a description of the scope of environmental nuclear 
damage under the nuclear liability conventions, it should be considered in 
the light of other instruments related to the environment in the field of inter-
national law.
53
 There are certainly considerable numbers of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements in the field of environmental law which cover envi-
ronmental damage, especially instruments related to liability for pollution 
and damage caused to the environment by hazardous activities. These in-




 However, it was considered that if there is no precise and specific defini-
tion of the scope of environmental damage in the nuclear liability conven-
tions, the definition of the environment itself defines environmental damage, 
as well as its scope and extent.
55
 Therefore this section first defines the “en-
vironment” and then “compensable environmental damage”.  
3.4.1.3.1 Definition of the environment 
It should be noted that it is very difficult for international lawyers and other 
professionals in the field of science to give a precise definition of the envi-
ronment.
56
 This is because to define the environment, it is necessary to as-
                                                                                                                            
1991. See Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, “Manual of European Environmental 
Law”, Second edition, Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, UK 1997, at p. 
6; The South Australian Environmental Protection Act 1993, Section 5. 
52
 Patrick Blanchard, “Responsibility for Environmental Damage under Nuclear and En-
vironmental Instruments: A Legal Benchmarking”, in: JNRL, Vol. 18, Issues 3, 2000, pp. 
233-253, at p. 235. 
53
 Patrick Blanchard, “Responsibility for Environmental Damage Caused by Nuclear 
Accident”, in: Nuclear Inter Jura 1999, Proceedings, October 24-29, 1999, Washington, 
D.C. USA, pp. 283-296, at p. 283; Philippe Sands, “Observation on International Nuclear 
Law Ten Years After Chernobyl”, in: RECIEL, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996. pp. 199-204, at p. 
200; Philippe J. Sands, “Liability for Environmental Damage and the Report of the 
UNEP Working Group of Experts”, in: Timoshenko (ed.), 1998, pp. 1-22, at p. 5. 
54
 Timoshenko (ed.), 1998, at p. 123. 
55
 For definition of environmental damage, see Sands, 1998, at p. 4; YILC, 1995, Vol. II, 
Part Two, at p. 86, para. 377; Mensah, 1998, at p. 62. 
56
 ‘During the last half century or so, the term “environment”, has become a buzz-word, 
resorted to in all sorts of contexts, resulting, therefore, in imperfect, unclear, even mis-
 Reparable environmental nuclear damage: Legal background  63 
 
sess all the elements and items in the environment, which are usually interre-
lated. Moreover, ‘it is difficult both to identify and to restrict the scope of 
such an ambiguous term, which could be used to encompass anything from 
the whole biosphere to the habitat of the smallest creature or organism’.
57
 In 
addition, international environmental law has only recently emerged in the 
body of international law. The term “environment” appeared in international 
law in the mid-1960s with the emergence of international environmental 
law,
58
 as part of international law, not separate from it.
59
 The term environ-
ment was used as an official legal term for the first time in the 1972 United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference). 
This referred to the “environment” without giving a definition of the term.
60
 
It is worth mentioning that in the preparatory activities for the Conference, 
the term “milieu humain” was adopted in the initial text and documents of 
the Conference to express the concept of the environment. However, in other 
meetings of the Conference afterwards, this was replaced by the term “envi-
ronment”, as it was considered more convenient.
61
 Similarly, the Final Dec-
laration of the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment referred to the environment without providing a definition of the 
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 Since the adoption of these Declarations, the term 
“environment” has been used in the formulation of international practice and 
widely adopted in many instruments in international law. However, although 
the Stockholm Declaration does not contain a definition of the environment, 
it refers to the natural resources of the earth including air, water, land and 
other natural resources and ecosystems.
63
 
 Furthermore, ‘although “environment” does no have generally accepted 
usage as a term of art under international law, recent agreements have con-
sistently identified the various media included in the term’.
64
 The environ-
ment was broadly defined in environmental law instruments in such a way as 
to include both the cultural heritage and natural resources, including water, 
soil, fauna and flora, and their interaction, property which forms part of the 
cultural heritage, the landscape and environmental amenities.
65
 This broad 
definition of the “environment” has been incorporated in international trea-
ties and agreements, state practices, practices of international organizations, 
regional agreements as well as in national laws.
66
 The model definition of 
the environment is given in the 1993 Council of Europe Convention on Civil 
Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environ-
ment (the 1993 Lugano Convention).
67
 This Convention defines the envi-
ronment as natural resources, both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, soil, 
fauna and flora and the interactions between them; property which forms 
part of the cultural heritage; and the characteristic aspects of landscape.
68
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This broad and exclusive definition of the concept of the environment is re-
flected in the formulation of the definition of the environment in the ILC 
Draft principles on the allocation of loss. According to these principles, ‘the 
‘environment’ includes natural resources, both abiotic and biotic, such as air, 
water, soil, fauna and flora and the interaction between the same factors; and 
the characteristic aspects of the landscape’.
69
 These elements are compli-
cated and interrelated, and form the framework, setting and living conditions 
of mankind with their influence and impact.
70
 This definition of the envi-
ronment is too broad, difficult to implement in practice, and depends on 
what a Contracting Party wants. Therefore, the recent trend in international 
law is in favour of a broad definition of the environment which can be easily 
implemented in practice. The narrow approach would be adopted if the 
broad definition led to unreasonable results.
71
  
 The 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities (CRAMRA) also provided a restricted definition of the environ-
ment.
72
 As we will see, this convention incorporated the definition of the 
Antarctic environment, as well as a definition of environmental damage 
caused to the ecosystem of the Antarctic environment. National environ-
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mental law has also adopted a restrictive definition of the environment, 
sometimes for a particular purpose.
73
  
 The doctrine of international law has also made some attempts to define 
the environment. In general, Barboza, the former Special Rapporteur of the 
ILC, simply defines the environment as the environment in which mankind 
lives, or as the human environment. This definition covers all the aspects and 
elements of the lives of human beings. However, according to Barboza, this 
definition of the environment excludes the harmful consequences of the en-
vironment on human health and on property, which would be covered by the 
definition of the concept of environmental damage.
74
 Similarly, Amer de-
fines the environment as the total surroundings in which human beings live, 
and by which they are affected (as well as affecting them). In that context, 
this definition is exclusive and comprises all the natural and industrial ele-
ments of the environment. The natural elements fall under the wider mean-
ing of the definition of the environment. This includes all cultural and civi-
lized elements of the environment. However, the industrial elements fall 
under a narrow definition of the environment. This includes the physical 
elements of the environment, in which human beings live.
75
 
 These wide definitions of the environment mean that a distinction can be 
made between three interrelated terms: “ecosystem”, “nature” and “envi-
ronment”. The ecosystem is ‘the complex of an ecological community and 
its environment functioning as a unit in nature’.
76
 The 1992 Convention on 
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 also defines “ecosystem” as ‘a dynamic complex of 
plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living envi-
ronment interacting as a functional unit’.
78
 This ecological system involves 
the surroundings of a particular unit of the natural world, and its relationship 
with the physical environment.
79
 This is a narrower definition of the envi-
ronment because the rules established under this system only govern a par-
ticular sector of the general environment such as the “Antarctic” and or the 
“marine environment”. In contrast, the term “nature” is a broader concept of 
the environment than the concept of the ecosystem. It includes the primary 
elements of nature used by man, such as land, water, animals, and other ele-
ments contained in nature. However, the term “environment” consists of the 
natural elements of nature and other manufactured elements, which are 
added to nature by man.
80
 The physical sense of the environment, as indi-
cated in that concept, is the one that concerns the definition of recoverable 
environmental damage, as discussed below. 
3.4.1.3.2 Definition of environmental nuclear damage 
As the Chernobyl accident showed, the enormous amount of nuclear damage 
caused by the accident affected the agricultural production of citizens of 
many countries, as well as the general environment. However, the nuclear 
liability conventions do not provide a definition of environmental nuclear 
damage. In my opinion, environmental nuclear damage is defined as the 
harmful consequences of new elements which are produced by a nuclear ac-
cident and are introduced into the environment, adversely affecting it. As the 
environment refers to everything on the planet, radioactive elements which 
affect the environment as a result of a nuclear accident may affect a specific 
sector of people and/or the global community in general or the global com-
mons. This is because ‘all damage occurring on the Earth can be understood 
as damage to the environment’.
81
 Furthermore, Pelzer defines environmental 
damage as ‘…every kind of decrease of the quality of life which is caused by 
a certain occurrence or a series of occurrences, and which affects the whole 
population in a certain region’.
82
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 Environmental damage is also defined in numerous international instru-
ments related to the protection of a State, as an injured party, and civil liabil-
ity for damage caused to the environment by private activities.  
In relation to State liability, instruments which define environmental 
damage include the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resources (CRAMRA), which has not entered into force.
83
 This Convention 
defines environmental damage caused to the Antarctic environment, as ‘any 
impact on the living or non-living components of that environment or those 
ecosystems, including harm to atmospheric, marine or terrestrial life, beyond 
that which is negligible or which has been assessed and judged to be accept-
able pursuant to this Convention’.
84
 The broadest concept of environmental 
damage is defined in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
This Convention defines environmental adverse effects as ‘changes in the 
physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have 
significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity 
of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic 
systems or on human health and welfare’.
85
 This definition is derived from 
the definition given in the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer.
86
 In its Draft Articles on international liability for acts not prohibited 
by international law, the ILC included in Article 24 damage to the environ-
ment and damage to persons or property.
87
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 Environmental damage has been defined in numerous international in-
struments which deal with civil liability for environmental damage. For ex-
ample, Article 2 (7) (c) of the 1993 Lugano Convention defines environ-
mental damage as ‘loss or damage by impairment of the environment in so 
far as this is not considered to be damage within the meaning of sub-
paragraphs a or b above [Article 2(7)(a) or (b)] provided that compensation 
for impairment of the environment, other than for loss or profit from such 
impairment, shall be limited to the costs of measures of reinstatement actu-
ally undertaken or to be undertaken…’ Similar definitions are given by other 
instruments which deal with civil liability for environmental damage.
88
 
 An exclusive and elaborated definition of the concept of environmental 
damage is given in Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 April 2004 on Environmental Liability with regard to the 
Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage. In Annex V the di-
rective refers to the nuclear liability conventions. It establishes a strict liabil-
ity regime for dangerous activities, and a fault liability regime for non-
dangerous activities. The Directive defines environmental damage as: 
‘(a) damage to protected species and natural habitats, which is any damage that 
has significant adverse effects on reaching or maintaining the favourable con-
servation status of such habitats or species. The significance of such effects is 
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to be assessed with reference to the baseline condition, taking account of the 
criteria set out in Annex I; 
Damage to protected species and natural habitats does not include previously 
identified adverse effects which result from an act by an operator which was 
expressly authorised by the relevant authorities in accordance with provisions 
implementing Article 6(3) and (4) or Article 16 of Directive 92/43/EEC or Ar-
ticle 9 of Directive 79/409/EEC or, in the case of habitats and species not cov-
ered by Community law, in accordance with equivalent provisions of national 
law on nature conservation. 
(b) water damage, which is any damage that significantly adversely affects the 
ecological, chemical and/or quantitative status and/or ecological potential, as 
defined in Directive 2000/60/EC, of the waters concerned, with the exception 
of adverse effects where Article 4(7) of that Directive applies; 
(c) land damage, which is any land contamination that creates a significant risk 
of human health being adversely affected as a result of the direct or indirect in-




However, the Directive does not contain a sufficient regulatory framework 
for liability for nuclear damage which can be consulted in the case of a nu-
clear accident. It only establishes a mechanism that internalizes the eco-
nomic costs for the producer according to the polluter pays principle.
90
 The 
Directive does impose public liability for environmental damage, but ex-
cludes damage to health of people and their property.
91
  
3.4.1.3.3 Type of compensable environmental nuclear damage 
In general, there are some differences within the doctrine of international 
law regarding the type of compensable environmental damage. Some argu-
ments consider all compensable damage under the heading of damage as 
damage to the environment.
92
 Therefore compensable environmental nuclear 
damage includes: damage caused to persons and property as a result of the 
impaired environment; damage caused to the environment per se; costs of 
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preventive measures to prevent and reduce damage to the environment; costs 
of the reinstatement of the impaired environment; and economic loss caused 
as a result of the impaired environment. However, other arguments exclude 
personal and property damage from environmental damage, even though 
such damage can be caused by environmental damage, assuming that per-
sonal and property damage is included under a separate heading of damage.
93
 
The same view was expressed by Sands, who argues that: 
‘In relation to environmental damage, however, the liability rules are still 
evolving and in need of further development. Environmental law refers here to 
damage to the environment, which has been defined in treaties and other inter-
national acts to include four possible elements: (1) fauna, flora, soil, water and 
climatic factors; (2) material assets (including archaeological and cultural heri-
tage); (3) the landscape and environmental amenity; (4) the relationship be-
tween the above factors. Most legal definitions of the environment do not, 
therefore, include people and their property’.
94
  
Moreover, according to the Special Rapporteur Barboza:  
‘Harm to the environment should be considered separately from harm to per-
sons or private property, or from the State itself, since harm to the environment 
is more difficult to quantify: it involves harm to things such as air, water and 
space which cannot be appropriated, which are shared and used by everyone 
and do not belong to anyone in particular. Environmental harm may also be far 
more extensive than the other kinds of harm mentioned, however, and the pri-




However, according to these arguments, the damage means pure environ-
mental damage or pure ecological damage. This is because the definition of 
environmental damage in general includes damage to persons and property 
caused as a result of the impaired environment, the costs of preventive 
measures, the costs of restoring the impaired environment and economic loss 
caused to the environment. Accordingly, compensable environmental dam-
age is divided into five categories: (1) environmental damage to persons and 
property; (2) the costs of the reparation of the pure environmental damage 
which has caused a reduction in the value of the environment itself or of the 
amenities of the environment. Such damage is recoverable because the dete-
rioration of the environment constitutes a loss to the whole community; (3) 
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the costs of preventive measures taken to prevent or to reduce the harmful 
consequences of the damaged environment; (4) the costs of the restoration of 
the damaged environment to its status quo ante and the elimination of the 
harmful consequences of a nuclear accident and restoring the environment so 
that it has the same value and is in the same condition as before the accident; 
(5) economic loss to the environment related to the above-mentioned dam-
age, which has been caused as a direct consequence of the damaged envi-
ronment.
96
 Each of these elements will be discussed in turn. 
3.4.1.3.3.1 Environmental damage to person or property 
It is difficult to separate damage caused by a nuclear accident to person and 
property, and damage to the environment itself. This is because there are 
certain common elements associated with such damage. Nuclear damage 
caused to the environment by a nuclear accident, can cause damage to per-
sons and property at the same time.  
 The most relevant aspects of environmental nuclear damage caused to 
persons and/or property by a nuclear accident have been already covered and 
explained in the above-mentioned category of damage to persons and prop-
erty.
97
 In general, liability for damage caused to persons and property is de-
termined in accordance with the ordinary law of tort and international liabil-
ity regimes, which cover personal and property damage.
98
 However, the 
provisions of tort law only apply where environmental damage caused by 
hazardous activities is characterized under tort law as environmental dam-
age.
99
 Usually the concept of “property damage” under the law of tort is too 
limited to cover transboundary nuclear damage, as nuclear damage caused to 
the environment by a nuclear accident may affect large areas of the envi-
ronment, and most of the elements related to the environment, i.e., land, wa-
ter and air, and ecosystems.  
 The concept of environmental damage as a category of nuclear damage 
may concern the contamination of the environment caused by a nuclear acci-
dent, which in turn causes damage to persons and property. The contamina-
tion can subsequently have a harmful impact on human life, leading to loss 
of life or personal injury. As mentioned earlier, as a result of Chernobyl ac-
cident, many European countries prevented the human consumption of the 
contaminated foodstuffs produced in the countries affected by the accident. 
The European Community Commission suspended imports of certain agri-
cultural products of many European countries in order to reduce the effects 
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of contamination caused by the accident. This also includes the actual or po-
tential damage that might be caused to human health, damage to living or 
non-living resources, the “destruction or diminution of resources”, the dam-
age to amenities, the “destruction or reduction in natural, social or cultural 
amenities” and the damage to property, “damage to or loss of property”.
100
 
Therefore, it was considered that the concept of personal and property dam-
age would be given a broader definition to include such damage.
101
  
3.4.1.3.3.2 Damage to the environment per se 
Environmental damage per se is recognized as a separate category when 
damage has been caused purely to the environment and is not related to per-
sonal and property damage. Damage to the environment per se is referred to 
as “pure environmental damage” or “ecological damage”. It is defined as 
‘any significant physical, chemical or biological deterioration of the envi-
ronment’.
102
 Introducing these substances may change the condition of the 
environment from good to bad. This may also lead to harmful consequences 
for persons and property. The Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) is an 
example of this. It implicitly refers to pure environmental damage, when it 
refers to changes in the temperature and other characteristics of the waters of 
the River Carol, and its effects on Spanish interests.
103
 The Tribunal stated: 
‘It could have been argued that the works would bring about an ultimate pol-
lution of the waters of the Carol or that the returned waters would have a 
chemical composition or a temperature or some other characteristic which 
could injure Spanish interests’.
104
 This is also implicitly recognized by the 
ICJ in the Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, Hun-
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 the Australia and New Zealand Nuclear Tests Cases, 22 
June 1973 and 20 December 1974
106
 and the Case Concerning Certain Phos-
phate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), 26 June 1992.
107
 
 Pure environmental damage sometimes affects ‘a particular sector or the 
whole of the environment which has a measurable adverse impact on the 
quality of the environment itself or on its ability to support and sustain an 
acceptable threshold of quality of life or viable ecological balance’.
108
 Pure 
environmental damage may be caused, for example, by a nuclear accident on 
a nuclear-powered ship, or by a ship carrying nuclear substances, or by the ille-
gal dumping of nuclear waste at sea. This inevitably contaminates the water 
itself, as well as marine life. Everything in the environment will be contami-
nated by radioactivity in the water as a result of the accident. 
 In addition, a distinction must be made between environmental damage 
and compensable environmental damage. This is because not all environ-
mental damage can be compensated. The operator or the State is not liable 
for environmental damage below the levels permitted according to interna-
tional standards. However, some treaties recognize liability for environ-
mental damage simply if the environment is polluted, while other treaties 
stipulate that recoverable environmental damage must have adverse effects 
on man and the environment.
109
 In this sense, the Special Rapporteur Bar-
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 Thus environmental damage may include any adverse impact on man, his 
property and the environment, while compensable environmental damage 
refers to environmental damage covered by ‘schemes of restitution and li-
ability, and embraces only economic losses, or rather harm expressed in eco-
nomic terms’.
111
 Unfortunately, although the nuclear liability conventions 
cover environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident, they do not cover 
“pure environmental damage”. This is because there are technical, environ-
mental and financial reasons to prevent the reparation of pure environmental 
damage. However, excluding pure environmental damage from being cov-
ered by the nuclear liability conventions is unjustifiable, and contrary to the 
polluter pays principle, which obliges the polluter to pay for the economic 
burden resulting from his activity.
112
 It was argued that victims of pure envi-
ronmental damage can be compensated if the traditional methods used for 
calculating such damage are scrapped, and new guidelines to assist national 
courts in calculating such damage are developed.
113
 
3.4.1.3.3.3 Costs of preventive measures 
The Chernobyl accident demonstrated that preventive measures are neces-
sary after a major nuclear accident to protect people and the environment 
from the harmful consequences of the accident. These measures cost enor-
mous sums of money. As mentioned above, immediately after the accident, 
the inhabitants living in the vicinity were evacuated a long way from the ac-
cident area and the contaminated environment, in order to be protected from 
radioactivity. This cost the USSR Government and the victims of the acci-
dent considerable amounts of money.
114
  
However, the costs of preventive measures were not included in the con-
cept of nuclear damage in the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention. 
This was left for the competent court to decide in accordance with national 
law. This means that determining the costs of preventive measures may vary 
from one court to another.
115
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Therefore, after the Chernobyl accident, the USSR suggested including 
the costs of preventive measures in the concept of nuclear damage in future 
amendments of the nuclear liability conventions.
116
 Afterwards, the question 
was comprehensively examined by the IAEA Standing Committee and the 
NEA Group of Governmental Experts. The discussions on this matter were 
based on the concept of preventive measures as adopted in numerous inter-
national instruments in international law, which served as the basis of the 
concept of preventive measures under the nuclear liability conventions.
117
 
The concept of preventive measures was adopted in the Amended Vienna 
Convention, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation, and the 
Amended Paris Convention. These conventions cover the costs of preventive 
measures taken as a result of a nuclear accident, and other related loss, or 
damage resulting from taking such measures.
118
  
According to the Amended Vienna Convention, the concept of preventive 
measures is defined as ‘any reasonable measures taken by any person after a 
nuclear incident has occurred to prevent or minimize damage referred to in 
sub-paragraph (k) (i) to (v) or (vii), subject to any approval of the competent 
authorities required by the law of the State where the measures were 
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 Similarly, the Amended Paris Convention defines the concept of 
preventive measures as ‘any reasonable measures taken by any person after a 
nuclear incident or an event creating a grave and imminent threat of nuclear 
damage has occurred, to prevent or minimise nuclear damage referred to in 
sub-paragraphs (a) (vii) 1 to 5, subject to any approval of the competent au-
thorities required by the law of the State where the measures were taken’.
120
 
This approach was also adopted by the ILC in its Draft Articles on interna-
tional liability for damage caused by activities not prohibited by interna-
tional law.
121
 This concept of preventive measures is broadly defined to in-
clude all recoverable costs of preventive measures.
122
 It includes any 
protective measures to be taken by States or by any individual affected by a 
nuclear accident. These measures may include, e.g., rescue operations, 
emergency assistance, and any other measures taken to prevent, or to miti-
gate the impact of radiation emitted by the accident from spreading to the 
population and the environment.
123
  
According to these definitions of preventive measures, there are three 
conditions required for the compensation of costs of preventive measures to 
be taken as a result of a nuclear accident. First, preventive measures should 
be reasonable. “Reasonable measures” as defined under the nuclear liability 
conventions means that in accordance with the law of the competent court 
the adopted measures should be appropriate and proportionate, having regard 
to all the circumstances which constitute the concept of nuclear damage.
124
 
Nevertheless, the nuclear liability conventions do not provide a precise defi-
nition of “reasonable measures”, or the criteria to be used as a guideline by 
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the competent court to determine the circumstances in which eligible preven-
tive measures for compensation could reasonably be taken. The fact is that 
the Conventions provide for a general approach to these measures, and leave 
the competent court to elaborate the relevant criteria for taking reasonable 
measures. The competent court must therefore take into account all the cir-
cumstances, nature, and extent of the damage at the time to determine the 
“reasonableness” of taking such measures.
125
 This should be assessed ac-
cording to the available facts and in the light of relevant scientific and tech-
nical expertise, available when the measures are taken.
126
 However, if ‘a gov-
ernment or other public body decides to take certain measures, this does not in 
itself mean that the measures are reasonable for the purpose of the Conven-
tions’.
127
 This may give rise to a problem in the case of a claim for compen-
sation for regular expenses which are interrelated with the measures taken to 
prevent and reduce the harmful consequences of a nuclear accident.
128
 
 Secondly, any claims for compensation for costs of preventive measures 
to prevent or to minimize harm to the environment, should be assessed on 
the basis of objective criteria.
129
 The damage caused by the accident must be 
serious. Consequently, preventive measures taken to prevent insignificant 
harm to the environment are not covered under the nuclear liability conven-
tions.  
 Finally, preventive measures must be approved by the competent authori-
ties of the State in accordance with national law, which determines who is 
entitled to take the measures.
130
 Preventive measures taken after a nuclear ac-
cident can be taken by any person, the government or private persons.
131
 Pre-
ventive measures may also be taken by the operator of a nuclear installation, 
or any other individuals affected by the accident. In principle, preventive 
measures taken after a nuclear accident are usually taken by the Installation 
State in whose territory the accident occurred or by the State affected by the 
nuclear accident to protect its population and the environment. In most cases, 
the State affected by a nuclear accident is the Installation State, which is 
therefore obliged to take preventive measures after the accident. This obliga-
tion is justified by the fact that it has the right to permit the operation of nu-
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clear installations in its country and at the same time benefit from the nuclear 
energy that is generated, which allows for development. The affected State is 
also in the best position to take immediate action to prevent and reduce the 
harmful consequences caused by a nuclear accident in its territory, i.e., mak-
ing notification and providing assistance.
132
 However, if the affected State is 
not the Installation State, there is a general obligation upon it to protect its 
populations and citizens from being exposed to any danger. Accordingly, the 
State plays a more essential role than individuals in providing preventive 
measures in case of industrial and natural catastrophes. The role of State in-
tervention in such cases is significant in dealing with the damage caused by 
the disaster. The State uses all available means to prevent the spread of 
harmful consequences of the accident, while the capacity of individuals to 
take such measures at the time of the disaster is usually limited.  
The effectiveness of preventive measures taken after a nuclear accident 
certainly relies on collective efforts made by the affected and non-affected 
States. It should be noted that before the Chernobyl accident preventive 
measures were coordinated at national level, according to the national legis-
lation of the State. This was based on a number of recommendations adopted 
by ICRP, WHO, ILO, and Basic Safety Standards adopted by the IAEA, 
which were aimed at improving the safety measures of the installations. 
However, after the Chernobyl accident, this situation changed, as the interna-
tional measures were taken after a nuclear accident, coordinated in particular 
by the IAEA and the OECD/NEA, which take a leading role in coordinating 
and providing assistance to States.
133
 
3.4.1.3.3.4 Costs of measures to reinstate the impaired environment 
Another positive development in the concept of nuclear damage introduced 
by the Amended Vienna Convention, the Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation, and the Amended Paris Convention is covering costs of 
measures to reinstate the impaired environment after a nuclear accident. Un-
der these Conventions, the concept of reinstatement measures is defined as 
‘any reasonable measures which have been approved by the competent au-
thorities of the State where the measures were taken, and which aim to rein-
state or restore damage or destroyed components of the environment, or to 
introduce, where reasonable, the equivalent of these components into the 
environment. The law of the State where the damage is suffered shall deter-
mine who is entitled to take such measures’.
134
 This provision contains cer-
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tain conditions for recovering the costs of reinstatement measures. First, the 
permission for taking such measures must be approved by the competent 
authorities of the State. Secondly, the measures should be aimed at the rein-
statement and restoration of destroyed components of the environment, and 
finally the measures must be reasonable.
135
  
The above-mentioned instruments cover the costs of reinstatement meas-
ures undertaken or to be undertaken, unless the impairment is insignificant.
136
 
This includes the costs of cleaning-up measures taken to remove contamina-
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tion from the impaired environment, and restoration measures taken after 
removing the contamination caused by a nuclear accident to eliminate all the 
contaminated elements introduced into the impaired environment, where it is 
possible to reinstate the environment to its previous condition, as it was be-
fore the accident.
137
 For example, this may include cleaning up the site of the 
installation and the surrounding environment by removing debris, nuclear 
waste and contaminated objects as a result of a nuclear accident. These must 
be eliminated to return the contaminated environment to the condition it was 
in before the accident. However: 
‘It should be underlined that this definition undoubtedly does not introduce the 
concept of reinstatement of the impaired environment to its pre-existing condi-
tion. Namely, the desire to restore the environment to its condition prior to the 
nuclear incident shall be subject to the rule of reason. The highly complex na-
ture of ecosystems may prevent attempts to achieve a meticulous reinstatement 
of the environment which in many cases may appear impossible and unreason-
able in the technical or economic sense. Specific problems may be the assess-
ment of natural regenerating processes and the necessity of appropriate steps to 




Moreover, it was stated that: 
‘Providing a remedy for long-term adverse effects to the environment is more 
complicated. The meaning of “restoration” in the case of environmental dam-
age carries both subjective judgment and objective evaluation. What is repara-
ble and what is not often goes beyond the liability regime. When a liability re-
gime is designed specially for a common area such as [the] Antarctic, 
additional monetary compensation, beyond that immediately necessary to re-
pair the damage, may be required for the protection of the environment and its 
ecosystem on a long-term basis. Even so, it needs to be restricted to a reason-
able range for the benefit of the activities in the region’.
139
 
Finally, it should be noted that although the nuclear liability conventions 
stipulate that compensable environmental damage caused by a nuclear acci-
dent should be significant, these conventions provide no criterion to deter-
mine what is considered “significant” or “insignificant” harm, or to distin-
guish between the two levels of damage. This has clearly been left to be 
decided by the competent courts, according to the scientific standards estab-
lished by national law. In that case, the measures to reinstate the impaired 
environment that have actually been undertaken or are to be undertaken will 
                                                     
137
 Šoljan, 2000, at p. 74; Hanqin, 2003, at p. 252. 
138
 Šoljan, 2000, at p. 77-78. 
139
 Hanqin, 2003, at p. 257. 
82 CHAPTER 3 
 
open up the way for further costs, even if these uncertain costs are not cov-
ered.
140
 The instruments also cover the costs of reinstatement measures, if 
such measures are reasonable. This means that the measures taken should be 
necessary and appropriate for restoring the environment to its previous con-
dition. This must be assessed on the basis of the available scientific and 
technical standards at the time that the measures are taken.
141
 
3.4.1.3.3.5 Economic damage 
The idea of covering the economic loss suffered by victims of a nuclear ac-
cident in the nuclear liability conventions is not new. It was proposed during 
the negotiations in the Conference which adopted the Vienna Convention in 
1963. However, it was rejected due to the differences of opinion of the Con-
tracting Parties.
142
 Economic loss is also recognized by many civil liability 
regimes of tort law.
143
 Most legal systems allow compensation for loss of 
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profit or earnings caused as a result of damage to property and personal in-
jury. Reference should be made to the fact that the concept of economic loss 
in the civil law systems is different from the concept of economic loss in the 
common law system. Civil law systems cover economic loss resulting from 
material and immaterial damage caused to property, while the common law 
systems distinguish between consequential damage and pure economic loss. 
According to the theory and jurisprudence of common law, compensation 
cannot be made for pure economic loss.
144
  
 Therefore, it is not surprising that the concept of economic loss, as an 
element in nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident, was adopted in the 
Amended nuclear liability conventions.
145
 However, the Amended Vienna 
Convention did not establish any basic guidelines to determine the scope and 
extent of economic loss to be compensated.
146
 Under this Convention, eco-
nomic loss can be divided into three categories: the first is economic loss and 
damage caused as a result of loss of life, personal injury, and damage to 
property, which may result, for example, in a loss of earnings.
147
 This can 
also include economic loss caused as a result of an embargo on agricultural 
or animal products, or any other loss of production as a result of exposure to 
radiation caused by a nuclear accident. Moreover, it includes trade between 
States affected by the embargo because of the products contaminated by a 
nuclear accident, as well as business and economic activities of people and 
States.  
The second category is economic loss caused to environmental amenities. 
It covers economic interests which are adversely affected by loss of income 
from any use or enjoyment of the environment, where the damage caused to 
the environment is significant and is not covered by the category of eco-
nomic loss to property.
148
 For example, the owner of an hotel who has suf-
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fered economic loss as a result of a lack of customers because of the envi-
ronment is contaminated by a nuclear accident
149
 is entitled to compensation 
for this damage,
150
 even if he has not suffered personal or property dam-
age.
151
 This applies provided that the victim relies for his income on the use 
of the polluted area which is badly contaminated and the profits from his 
activities have been reduced.
152
 Nevertheless, this provision seems contradic-
tory. It allows compensation for economic interests related to any use or en-
joyment of the environment, and at the same time it stipulates that the im-
pairment of the environment must be significant. At the same time, the term 
“any enjoyment” means any reduction in the benefit from the use of the en-
vironment which can cause economic damage without causing any signifi-
cant impairment to the environment. Hence, victims of a nuclear accident 
should be compensated if their use or enjoyment of the environment is ad-
versely affected, even if the impairment to the environment and economic 
interest from such use or enjoyment is insignificant.  
 The third category covers any other economic loss. Under the Amended 
Vienna Convention, the concept of nuclear damage is extended to cover any 
economic loss other than damage caused as a result of the impaired envi-
ronment, if this is permitted under the general law of civil liability of the 
competent court.
153
 Hence, compensation for this type of damage depends on 
whether or not there is a provision covering such damage under national 
law.
154
 In contrast, the Amended Paris Convention does not include other 
economic loss in the definition of nuclear damage. Consequently, the opera-
tor of a nuclear installation is not liable under the Paris Convention for any 
other damage caused by a nuclear accident, as long as there is no provision 
under the Convention to cover such damage. This leads to discrimination 
between victims of nuclear damage when the victims are citizens of a Con-
tracting Party to the Paris Convention or to the Vienna Convention, when the 
1988 Joint Protocol is applicable. The acceptability of claims under this 
category of economic loss has been left to be decided by the competent court 
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in accordance with the general law of civil liability. Therefore in practice, 
even if economic loss, as an element of nuclear damage, has been included 
in an international convention, the interpretation of the nature and extent of 
such damage should be decided by the competent court. However, this will 
be assessed in each individual case according to criteria established by the 
court, which determines the reasonable compensation for loss of income 
caused to victims of a nuclear accident.
155
  
 Economic loss suffered by victims of a nuclear accident is usually indi-
rect damage or loss caused to the victims of the accident. It is a secondary 
damage, which should only be compensated after the compensation for the 
nuclear damage caused by the nuclear accident, when they are associated. In 
most cases, economic loss is a result of nuclear damage caused to persons, 
property or the environment, or any other associated damage. It was argued 
that: 
‘As a general rule it would seem that domestic third party liability laws envis-
age compensation for economic loss flowing from personal or property dam-
age as part of the compensation to be ordered for that personal or property 
damage. Where, however, a person suffers economic loss without suffering 




The US courts awarded compensation for economic loss caused by the Three 




 Economic loss or damage caused by a nuclear accident usually results 
from direct nuclear damage caused by it to individuals or to the State. It cov-
ers damage to persons, property or the environment, or other economic loss 
deemed to be such by the competent court in accordance with the rules of 
national or international law, depending on the case where it is presented. It 
usually covers damage or loss of profit or earnings for persons, damage to 
property and the environment per se, or any other indirect damage resulting 
from a nuclear accident. For example, the owner or the user of a contami-
nated property, or of a particular place in the environment, may suffer eco-
nomic loss as a result of the accident, but such damage cannot be compen-
sated, unless the original damage (property or environmental damage) was 
compensated. The concept of nuclear damage under the nuclear liability 
conventions covers economic loss caused as a result of products being con-
taminated by ionising radiation above the permitted levels of radioactivity. 
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Thus economic loss resulting from indirect damage caused by a nuclear ac-
cident, or economic loss caused as a result of property being contaminated 
by radioactivity under the permitted level of radioactivity, is excluded.
158
 
This is because the original damage covered by the nuclear liability conven-
tions is excluded. This has been left to be assessed and decided by the com-
petent court. In addition, to prove economic loss, there must be a compre-
hensive assessment of all the elements of nuclear damage suffered by the 
victims of the accident. This must be done by experts after the accident and 
it may take several years. It is a difficult task, because all the elements of 
economic loss must be assessed in each individual case. The competent court 
decides whether or not the economic loss caused by a nuclear accident can 
be compensated on the basis of this assessment. 
 The costs of evacuating people from the contaminated environment after 
a nuclear accident and renting houses for the refugees are also an urgent 
problem. This must be taken into account in the assessment of the economic 
loss and damage to the environment. The costs of evacuation have to be paid 
to the victims while they have to leave their homes until they can return 
when the situation is safe. The victims are also entitled to receive living ex-
penses if they suffer loss of earnings during the time of evacuation.
159
  
 Furthermore, with regard to pecuniary and evacuation losses caused by a 
nuclear accident, it is useful to refer to the Report of the Presidential Com-
mission on Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents to the US Congress, which was 
published in 1990. This Report provides a detailed illustration of the scope 
of pecuniary loss caused by a nuclear accident. In this Report, the Commis-
sion suggested a very broad interpretation of the recoverable nuclear damage 
caused by a nuclear accident. In the Report the Commission proposed three 
categories of recommendations for recovering the pecuniary damage caused 
by a nuclear accident. The first category of recommendations concerns the 
recoverable nuclear damage for individuals. It includes costs associated with 
evacuation, decontamination, resettlement and emotional distress. The sec-
ond category of recommendations concerns losses incurred by farms and 
businesses as a result of temporary evacuation costs, permanent abandon-
ment, decontamination costs and loss due to the reduction in value of prop-
erty, the relocation of the business, etc. The final category relates to loss and 
damage caused to the Federal State and local authorities. This category con-
cerns financial expenditure, such as the cost of emergency response efforts, 
damage to public land, buildings, railways, water supply facilities, loss of 
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revenue from income, sales and other taxes, loss of revenue as a result of a 




 Finally, the pure economic loss caused by a nuclear accident is another 
issue related to this category of economic loss. Pure economic loss is usually 
suffered by victims of a nuclear accident where there is no material dam-
age.
161
 Compensation of economic loss may give rise to certain difficulties if 
the nuclear accident caused only economic loss, without causing any mate-
rial nuclear damage. According to the Amended Vienna Convention, the ap-
plicable law of the competent court must decide on compensation for pure 
economic loss, which may be covered by the category of other economic 
loss.  
3.4.2 Legal damage and transboundary environmental 
consequences 
As noted above, the debate on the element of damage as a constituent ele-
ment in international liability does not arise in the case of environmental nu-
clear damage caused by nuclear activity as a lawful activity. This is because 
damage is an essential element in the liability for environmental damage 
caused by nuclear activities. The liability applies to the operator of a nuclear 
installation or to the State where actual environmental nuclear damage is 
caused by a nuclear accident. This is an essential condition for risk liability 
for damage caused by hazardous activities when the damage is caused with-
out any violation of the rules of international law. However, in some cases, 
damage is associated with a State’s violation of its obligations under interna-
tional law or the State has violated its environmental and nuclear obligations 
without causing physical environmental damage. The matter becomes con-
troversial and difficult when there is no material damage, although interna-
tional rules and standards have been violated. This means that the State is 
responsible for its wrongful acts, but the element of damage has to be identi-
fied. This raises the question of what damage is meant in the State’s liability 
for a wrongful act, and whether or not it is a necessary element in the liabil-
ity. 
 The importance of this question lies in the fact that as we will see later, 
international law imposes certain international obligations upon States to 
prevent, reduce and remedy damage caused by hazardous activities. The im-
plementation of these obligations is significant in preventing environmental 
                                                     
160
 Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents, Vol. one, August 1990, 
at pp. 76-78. 
161
 NEA/LEG/DOC (89)4, at p. 1. 
88 CHAPTER 3 
 
damage caused by nuclear activities. The violation of these obligations may 
incur State liability even if no environmental damage is caused by the nu-
clear activities. This was emphasized in the 2006 Draft principles on the al-
location of loss, which states that ‘States are responsible for infringements of 
their obligations of prevention under international law’.
162
  
 The element of damage was debated by the ILC during the codification of 
the Draft Articles on State responsibility.
163
 However, from the start the ILC 
did not consider that it was a constitutive element for State responsibility for 
its wrongful acts. This was indicated by the Special Rapporteur Ago in his 
second report to the ILC.
164
 In his third report, Ago argued that ‘under interna-
tional law an injury, material or moral, is necessarily inherent in every violation 
of an international subjective right of a State’.
165
 This approach was also sup-
ported by the States in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly 
during the debate on the issues of State responsibility. For example, the 
Netherlands Government that: 
‘The Netherlands Government also agrees with the Commission’s decision not 
to make damage a constitutive element of a wrongful act. This decision ensues, 
indeed, from the structure of the draft; whether or not damage is required is a 
matter of primary rules. The Commission’s decision is also correct from an-
other point of view: a State could have a legitimate interest in the fulfilment of 
an international obligation which has been breached in a specific case even 
though it has suffered no damage’.
166
  
Accordingly, the ILC Draft Articles on State responsibility do not include 
damage among the main elements constituting a State’s liability for a wrong-
ful act. According to Article 2 of these Articles, ‘[t]here is an international 
wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) 
Is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) Constitutes a 
breach of an international obligation of the State’. These are two main ele-
ments necessary for State responsibility for wrongful acts. The first element 
is a subjective element, while the second element is objective.
167
 This provi-
sion does not refer to the element of damage as a third constitutive element 
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of State responsibility for its wrongful acts and its relationship with interna-
tional liability.  
 Damage as an element in State responsibility for a wrongful act was also 
a controversial matter in international case law. In its judgment in the Phos-
phates in Morocco Case the PCIJ stated that, ‘[t]his act being attributable to 
the State and described as contrary to the treaty right of another State, inter-
national responsibility would be established immediately as between the two 
States’.
168
 However, in the decision of the General Claims Commission in the 
case of the Dickson Car Wheel Company (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States 
of July 1931, the Commission considered that the existence of the element of 
damage is necessary to establish the liability of the State. It stated that: 
‘It is indispensable therefore, in order that a claim may prosper before this 
Commission, that two elements coexist: an unlawful international act and a 
loss or injury suffered by a national of the claimant Government. The lack of 




The doctrine of international law also deviates from this by accepting dam-
age as a constitutive element in State responsibility for wrongful acts. Some 
authors consider it a necessary element in the liability,
170
 as they consider 
that in international law damage is a breach of a right or legal interest of a State 
as one of the subjects of international law.
171
 The damage is inherent in inter-
national obligations and ‘only a condition for the existence of the objective 
elements of the violation’
172
 and not a constitutive element in the liability for 
a wrongful act.
173
 They consider that the violation of international obliga-
tions erodes the rights of other States and view it as legal damage which is an 
introduction and source of State responsibility in international law only in the 
case of a violation of a legal right.
174
 They assume that any violation of an 
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international obligation imposed upon one State adversely affects the subjec-
tive right of another.
175
 Therefore, if an international wrongful act is commit-
ted by one State directly against another State, it is not necessary for the in-
jured State to prove that it has suffered actual damage. The illegal act is in 
itself sufficient to constitute a legal interest.
176
 Preserving this legal interest 
in the field of international relations is more important than the economic 
interest or material damage. As Garcia Amador said: 
‘[I]n international relations political and moral considerations are of special 
importance, generally carrying more weight than economic or other considera-
tions or interests. In fact, economic considerations often play a secondary part, 
being in a way subordinate to such political and moral considerations as the 
“honour and dignity of the State” which has been wronged, either directly or in 
the person of one of its nationals’.
177
  
This is because there are no inherent limits on the concept of legal interests, 
as compared to material interests.
178
 Furthermore, ‘there is no [violation of a] 
right without a remedy’.
179
 Thus the breach of a right of a State by another 
State entails a remedy. 
 The concept of legal damage is also expressed by the concept of immate-
rial damage or moral damage. In addition to its relation to a violation of in-
ternational obligations, ‘[n]on-material damage is generally understood to 
encompass loss of loved ones, pain and suffering as well as the affront to 
sensibilities associated with an intrusion on the person, home and private 
life’.
180
 International case law recognizes moral damage being eligible for 
compensation. In 1923, the Tribunal decided to award compensation for ma-
terial and moral damage in the case between the United States of America 
and Germany for damage caused to the American citizens who were on 
board the UK Ship Lusitania, which was attacked by a German submarine 
off the coast of Ireland on 7 May 1915. There were 197 American citizens 
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on board the ship, and 128 perished.
181
 The Tribunal stated in its decision on 
compensation for moral damage suffered by the victims: ‘Mental suffering is 
a fact just as real as physical suffering, and susceptible of measurement by 
the same standards’.
182
 It also stated that ‘[m]ental suffering to form a basis 
of recovery must be real and actual, rather than purely sentimental and 
vague’.
183
 The Tribunal took into account the mental suffering and shock 
caused by the many deaths of family members in the sinking of the Lusita-
nia.
184
 The Tribunal considered: 
‘[T]hat under the rules of international law, the injured party is ‘entitled to be 
compensated for an injury [...] resulting in mental suffering, injury to his feel-
ings, humiliation, shame, degradation, loss of social position or injury to his 
credit or to his reputation. [T]here can be no doubt [about this, and the] com-
pensation should be commensurate [... with] the injury. Such damages are very 
real, and the mere fact that they are difficult to measure or estimate [... in 
monetary terms does not make them any] less real and affords no reason why 
the injured person should not be compensated...’
185
  
This was also the view of the PCIJ in the case concerning the interpretation 
of paragraph 4 of the Annex to Article 179 of the Treaty of Neuilly between 
the Government of Bulgaria and the Government of Greece.
186
 In its judg-
ment, the Court stated that the last sentence of the Treaty of Neuilly should 
be interpreted as authorizing claims in respect of damage incurred by claim-
ants not only as regards their property and interests but also as regards their 
person by reason of ill treatment, deportation, internment.
187
 
 According to these judgments, moral damage can be compensated, but 
only when it is real damage suffered by persons. However, as regards moral 
damage suffered by States, the view was that this cannot be compensated. In 
the Trail Smelter Case: ‘[I]n its decision of 1938, the Tribunal rejected the 
claim of the United States for ‘damages in respect of the wrong done the 
United States in violation of sovereignty’.
188
 It stated that, ‘[t]he Tribunal is, 
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therefore, of opinion that neither as a separable item of damage nor as an 
incident to other damages should any award be made for that which the 
United States terms “violation of sovereignty”.’
189
 According to Handl, ‘a 
claim for moral damages might have been disallowed in this case of transna-
tional air pollution’.
190
 However, such damage is subject to agreement be-
tween States.
191
 Thus actual moral damage is not considered a constituent 
element in responsibility for a wrongful act. There is no evidence to com-
pensate such damage in international case law, because agreement itself is 
one of the legal consequences of the responsibility of a State for a wrongful 
act.  
 Liability is always based on damage, and in the absence of damage re-
sponsibility cannot be attributed to a State. However, due to the different 
nature of State responsibility for wrongful acts from its liability for lawful 
acts, the liability for lawful acts is based only on actual material damage or 
moral damage, while responsibility for wrongful acts is based on legal dam-
age or moral damage resulting from the destruction of one State’s legal right 
by another State. Every State has a legal right to preserve its sovereign dig-
nity and this may not be violated by another State. This right was upheld by 
the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited, Judgment of 5 February 1970. The Court stated that ‘all 
States have a legal interest in its observance. In order to bring a claim in respect 
of the breach of such an obligation, a State must first establish its right to do so, 
for the rules on the subject rest on two suppositions’.
192
  
 Moreover, if that right has not been respected, there is imminent danger of 
causing material damage in some cases. This applies particularly with regard 
to international obligations governing hazardous activities. As mentioned 
above, international law imposes certain obligations upon the State to pre-
vent, reduce and repair the incidence of environmental damage caused by 
nuclear activities. If these obligations are breached, this can lead to trans-
boundary nuclear damage caused by nuclear activity. As mentioned above, 
the USSR attributed the Chernobyl accident to the operating personnel and 
to negligence with regard to implementing nuclear safety regulations. In fact, 
the accident occurred as a result of a lack of supervision by the USSR au-
thorities to enforce international obligations related to nuclear safety in nu-
clear installations. In addition, the liability of a State for environmental dam-
age caused by nuclear activities applies when actual damage is caused by the 
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activity and this damage must be compensated, while a State is responsible 
for wrongful acts, even if there is no actual damage, and must correct the 
situation before breaching an international obligation.
193
 As Graefrath ob-
served: 
‘[T]here is no reason at all to ignore the difference between international re-
sponsibility and liability by summarizing both as “forms” of responsibility. 
The aim of one rule is to guarantee an international obligation and, the aim of 
the other is limited to an allocation of damages that, taking into consideration 
and balancing the different interests, has to be specifically agreed upon. Both 
methods aim, in very different ways, at guaranteeing peaceful international co-
operation. International responsibility arises with the violation of an interna-
tional obligation whether or not material damage occurred. Not all damage en-
tails liability but there is no liability without damage. The allocation of damage 
is the essential purpose of liability agreements concerning lawful activities and 
that can be accomplished by very different means and methods’.
194
 
3.5 Conditions of compensable nuclear damage 
Certain conditions must be met for compensation to be made for environ-
mental nuclear damage caused by a major nuclear accident. These include: 
(1) the occurrence of a nuclear accident or the existence of a nuclear activity; 
(2) the fact that actual environmental nuclear damage is caused by the activ-
ity; (3) a causal link between the damage and the accident or the activity; (4) 




3.5.1 A nuclear accident or nuclear activity 
The first condition that must be met for compensation for environmental nu-
clear damage is the existence of a nuclear activity as defined in international 
law. However, it is important to emphasise that not every nuclear installation 
can be considered to be a nuclear installation. The concepts of a nuclear in-
stallation as well as nuclear activity are taken from the list of definitions of a 
nuclear installation in the applicable nuclear liability convention.
196
 The rea-
son for imposing this condition is that the extent of the operator’s liability 
under the nuclear liability conventions is limited to each nuclear accident. In 
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addition, the limited amount of radioactivity resulting from a nuclear event 
which cannot be considered a nuclear accident cannot give rise to interna-
tional liability. Hence, if nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear activity, but 
the concept of the nuclear accident or nuclear activity cannot be identified 
according to the terms of the applicable nuclear liability convention, it can-
not be compensated, unless it is covered by national legislation or by another 
international instrument. Normally, low levels of radioactivity caused by a 
nuclear activity have only a limited impact on the worker and the surround-
ing environment inside the installation. Therefore, under the nuclear liability 
conventions, such damage is covered by the ordinary national liability re-
gime.
197
 However, the above-mentioned condition does not apply in the case 
of State responsibility for wrongful acts. In the case of a violation of an in-
ternational obligation, the State is responsible, even if there is no accident 
and no material damage has taken place. Thus the definition of the notion of 
a nuclear installation and the notion of a nuclear accident is a significant is-
sue in limiting or expanding the liability for nuclear damage under the nu-
clear liability conventions. However, it should indicate which is the more 
relevant as a criterion for determining the liability. Deciding on an effective 
standard of liability is important to determine the amount of compensation 
payable to victims of nuclear damage under the nuclear liability conventions. 
An effective standard of liability determines whether or not the victims will 
be fully or partially compensated, or not receive any compensation at all. 
Therefore, establishing a criterion to determine the amount of the operator’s 
liability was one of the primary concerns of the drafters of the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions. There were some differences of opinion among the Con-
tracting Parties and in the doctrine of nuclear liability law in particular re-
garding a relevant standard of liability. There were two different approaches; 
the first was that liability for nuclear damage would be limited to each nu-
clear accident, while the second was that the operator’s liability should be 
determined on the basis of each nuclear installation. Both approaches insist 
that their standard is in the interests of the victims of a nuclear accident, the 
operator of a nuclear installation, the insurance companies and the protection 
of the nuclear industry. 
3.5.1.1 A nuclear accident as a criterion of liability 
Although victims of environmental nuclear damage should be compensated 
whether compensation is provided per nuclear accident or on the basis of the 
installation, the nuclear liability conventions and the national nuclear liabil-
ity legislation of both Contracting and non-Contracting Parties have taken 
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the nuclear accident as the standard to determine the extent of the liability 
for nuclear damage.
198
 The liability of the operator of a nuclear installation 
for nuclear damage was based on each individual nuclear accident.
199
 Dam-
age caused by a nuclear accident to people and the environment must be 
compensated within the limited liability determined under the applicable 
convention for each nuclear accident. When this has been exhausted, the op-
erator of a nuclear installation is no longer obliged to compensate nuclear 
damage, even if some victims have not yet been compensated.  
In support of this approach, it was argued that there are certain reasons to 
justify the limitation of liability for nuclear damage on the basis of each in-
dividual nuclear accident.
200
 First, the limitation of liability for every nuclear 
accident provides the victims with the required financial protection. This is 
because they have the right to submit their claims for compensation from the 
operator on this basis of the nuclear accident concerned.
201
 Secondly, the 
limitation of liability to each nuclear accident is a precise standard of liabil-
ity for determining the amounts of compensation and a prescribed period 
which expires after a certain length of time.
202
 This is because the extent of 
liability for a nuclear accident is known in advance, and the date of the nu-
clear accident and the applicable period are also known. Thirdly, it may be 
difficult to determine which nuclear installation caused the damage, if a se-
ries of accidents occurred in a number of nuclear installations on the same 
site. Consequently, it may be difficult to determine which financial cover 
applies for the damage if the installations are operated by different operators. 
According to the 1963 IAEA Official Records of the International Confer-
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ence on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage which adopted the Vienna Con-
vention:  
‘The limitation of the operator’s liability in amount may be set on a “per inci-
dent” or “per installation” basis. If under a pure per installation system several 
nuclear incidents occur in one nuclear installation, the first incident may absorb 
all or a great part of the limited liability fund. Although a series of incidents 
occurring in the same installation may be considered rather hypothetical, in-
jured parties of later incidents might be left uncompensated. In the case of nu-
clear consignments such an eventuality is not so unlikely. On the other hand, a 
“per incident” system always assures a certain minimum liability regardless of 
the number of incidents’.
203
  
Finally, determining liability on the basis of a nuclear installation may bank-
rupt insurance companies because liability will be unlimited, and therefore 
the operator will fail to fulfil his financial obligations.
204
 Insurance compa-
nies refuse to insure the nuclear industry where the liability of the operator is 
not transparent and not known in advance. They are afraid that a single nu-
clear accident, like the Chernobyl accident, could put the insurance industry 
at risk.
205
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3.5.1.2 A nuclear installation as a criterion of liability 
In support of this approach, it was argued that limiting the operator’s liability 
on a “per nuclear installation” basis is a practical standard for determining 
his liability. A nuclear accident as a standard of liability is too vague and 
ambiguous to enable the competent authorities to determine who is liable for 
nuclear damage, unless the liable person is engaged in pursuing a nuclear 
activity (nuclear installation).
207
 The nuclear liability conventions are not 
applicable to nuclear damage unless a nuclear accident has occurred in a nu-
clear installation. Limiting liability per nuclear installation provides victims 
of nuclear damage with financial protection. It guarantees them compensa-
tion in cases that the period provided for under the applicable nuclear liabil-
ity convention has expired.
208
 In addition, the concept of a nuclear accident 
is not easy to define if there is a series of events, or in the case of the gradual 
emission of radiation from a nuclear installation during the normal course of 
operation, or during the disposal of radioactive waste. In such cases, it is dif-
ficult to determine the factors which contributed to causing the nuclear acci-
dent, or the exact time and date of the accident, as well as the cause of the 
damage where nuclear contamination was caused by constant emissions 
from a nuclear installation or in the case of leakages of radioactivity.
209
 
There are certain direct and indirect factors which may contribute to causing 
a nuclear accident. A nuclear accident may occur as a result of a mechanical 
failure in the plant, or be caused by a hurricane, or any other unknown rea-
son, including geographical or atmospheric factors such as atmospheric pres-
sure. If a nuclear accident occurs during the normal course of operation of a 
nuclear power plant during a tropical typhoon or hurricane, it can be difficult 
to determine its exact cause.
210
  
In fact, it is not easy to determine the extent of liability that is required 
for environmental nuclear damage where liability is on a “per nuclear acci-
dent” basis. This is mainly due to the fact that nuclear energy involves haz-
ards and has special characteristics. Nuclear risks are not visible to the hu-
man eye. Nuclear radiation cannot be perceived by the human senses, it 
cannot be felt, smelled, tasted, heard, touched or seen. Furthermore, nuclear 
radiation may cause immediate damage to human cells, but in most cases 
this only becomes apparent a long time after the nuclear incident. It can also 
affect future generations. Nuclear radiation does not respect the geographical 
and political boundaries of States. It can spread from the country of origin of 
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the nuclear accident, causing nuclear damage to other countries and the 
global environment. This may cause contamination in the food chain, ani-
mals, planets and water or may affect all human life.
211
 In these cases, the 
operator can avoid liability if the nuclear accident was used as the standard 
to determine liability for nuclear damage. The concept of a nuclear accident 
cannot be clearly defined in the case of nuclear damage caused by the grad-
ual emission of radioactivity. In addition, it is difficult to determine the start-
ing date of the applicable period, and the operator is not liable for the dam-
age which becomes apparent after that period. In such cases, the concept of a 
nuclear accident does not apply as the standard for the gradual release of ra-
dioactive emissions. Therefore the standards for a “nuclear installation” 
should apply when the causal link between the nuclear damage and the in-
stallation has been proved. The authors of the nuclear liability conventions 
were aware of this from the start of the regime. According to Paragraph 4 of 
the Conclusions of the Third Session of the preparatory work for the Paris 
Convention prepared by Group of Experts on third party liability: 
‘The general feeling was in favour of a limitation per installation, rather than 
per incident, provided that the maximum amount was always available. The 
view of the technical experts was that it is extremely difficult to determine ex-
actly what constitutes a nuclear incident in view of the danger of slow or con-
tinuous radioactive contamination. Moreover, such contamination may not be 
considered by insurers as an incident, and [the] premium for installations 
would be lower than for [an] incident’.
212
  
In addition, using the standard of a nuclear installation to determine the li-
ability of the operator gives the operator and his guarantor advance knowl-
edge of the required maximum extent of liability to enable them to fulfil 
their financial obligations.
213
 Another characteristic of a nuclear installation 
standard is that the authors of the nuclear liability conventions considered 
that all the nuclear installations which exist on the same site count as one 
nuclear installation.
214
 Moreover, limiting the liability per nuclear installa-
tion is preferable, particularly in the case of a series of nuclear accidents in a 
nuclear installation and in the case of damage caused to the environment. 
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These arguments are supported by the Exposé des Motifs of the Paris Con-
vention, which states that:  
‘Although the operator will thus be required to have financial security avail-
able for each nuclear incident, in practice insurance coverage will, it seems, 
only be available per installation for a fixed period of time rather than in re-
spect of a single incident. There is nothing in the [Paris] Convention which 
prevents this, provided that the maximum amount available is not reduced or 
exhausted as a result of a first incident without appropriate measures being 
taken to ensure that financial security up to the maximum amount is available 
for the subsequent incidents’.
215
  
This is reflected in practice, as insurance companies provide insurance for 
the nuclear industry per nuclear installation for a period of time and not on a 
per nuclear accident basis.
216
  
 Finally, the remaining problem is how to ensure that the required 
amounts of compensation are sufficient and available to compensate all vic-
tims of nuclear damage, and how to oblige the operator to continue taking 
out insurance for his liability to compensate all the victims whether or not 
any accident has occurred in his installation. This is because the operator has 
an obligation to have full coverage available in respect of each nuclear acci-
dent that may occur at his nuclear installation, and the question is how this 




3.5.2 Actual damage 
In general, international jurisprudence and the doctrine of international law 
agree that compensable damage should be based on certainty and facts.
218
 
This was emphasized by the PCIJ in its Judgment on the Chorzów Case be-
tween the Government of Germany and the Government of the Polish Re-
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public. In its judgment, the Court stated that ‘it would come under the head-
ing of possible but contingent and indeterminate damage which, in accor-
dance with the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals, cannot be taken into ac-
count’.
219
 This means that uncertain and imminent environmental damage is 
not eligible for compensation. In that sense, compensable environmental 
damage is the direct damage caused by the activity. However, the idea of 
making a distinction between direct and indirect damage was rejected by the 
Tribunal in the Case concerning the United States Products Company 
(United States v. Germany South Porto Sugar Company (United States) v. 
Germany. The Tribunal stated that ‘[t]he distinction sought to be made be-
tween damages which are direct and those which are indirect is frequently 
illusory and fanciful and should have no place in international law’.
220
  
 The requirement of actual damage, as a condition of liability for damage 
caused by nuclear activities, has not been adhered to in the doctrine of inter-
national law or by the nuclear liability conventions. This is because the na-
ture of nuclear damage is different from the nature of conventional damage. 
Actual damage can be proved in the case of immediate damage caused by a 
nuclear accident. However, it is difficult for victims to prove that they have 
suffered from latent damage after a nuclear accident. Such damage may only 
become apparent several years after the accident.
221
 Therefore, it was argued 
that the State should bear the liability for direct and indirect damage caused 
by nuclear activity. Liability for the latent damage can be incurred in the 
light of the scientific and medical evidence.
222
 
 The nuclear liability conventions do not distinguish between direct and 
indirect nuclear damage either. The conventions cover nuclear and non-
nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident. In some cases, it is possible 
that nuclear and non-nuclear accidents occur at the same time, or a nuclear 
accident can cause nuclear as well as non-nuclear damage. Consequently, it 
is difficult to make a clear distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear acci-
dents, or between nuclear and non-nuclear damage. The nuclear liability 
conventions therefore regarded all damage caused by a nuclear accident as 
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nuclear damage, if it is proved that the damage caused by a nuclear accident 
involved a nuclear substance, nuclear fuel, nuclear waste or radioactive 
products related to such a nuclear installation, provided that the damage is 
not separate.
223
 The reason for this approach is to provide further protection 
for the victims of a nuclear accident, and to avoid the complicated process of 
distinguishing nuclear damage from non-nuclear damage. Accordingly, 
where nuclear and conventional damage occur separately, the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions are not applicable to the conventional damage. As the Ex-
posé des Motifs of the Paris Convention states: 
‘[… I]t is clear that where both the occurrence and the damage are due to ra-
dioactivity, compensation may be claimed. Similarly, where the occurrence 
and the damage are conventional, there will be no claim. Compensation may, 
however, be claimed under the Convention either where an occurrence due to 
radioactivity causes conventional damage or injury or where an occurrence of 
conventional origin causes radiation damage or injury’.
224
  
Consequently, the liability of the operator for nuclear damage caused by nu-
clear sources which are not covered by the conventions, such as nuclear 
damage caused by isotopes, could be covered under this provision if a nu-
clear accident occurred causing nuclear as well as non-nuclear damage. 
Therefore the nuclear liability conventions are applicable if damage caused 
by a nuclear accident involves nuclear and non-nuclear damage. However, 
the rules of liability under ordinary law might be applicable, if the damage 
caused by a nuclear accident is conventional damage.
225
  
Personal and property damage are undoubtedly considered as direct nu-
clear damage. However, the costs of measures to prevent nuclear accidents 
are questionable because no damage has been caused, and the measures have 
been taken before the damage occurs. So far no provisions have been drawn 
up in the nuclear liability conventions regarding the type of compensable 
nuclear damage. This should be determined by the competent courts. This 
doubt was dismissed, since the costs of preventive measures taken in the 
case of a threat of a grave and imminent nuclear accident are covered by the 
Amended Vienna Convention and the Amended Paris Convention.
226
 Thus 
the idea of a distinction between actual and non- actual nuclear damage can-
not be totally considered under the nuclear liability conventions. In the 
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meantime, certain damage can be caused by a nuclear accident, which, as we 
shall see, is nevertheless excluded from the nuclear liability conventions.  
3.5.3 Proof of causality 
For the operator of a nuclear installation to be liable for nuclear damage 
caused by a nuclear accident, victims of the accident have to prove the 
causal link between the environmental nuclear damage and the accident.
227
 
Proof of causality determines the scope of liability for nuclear damage, and 
whether or not the victims are compensated, or are left to bear all the conse-
quences of the nuclear accident themselves. This is certainly very difficult for 
victims, particularly when the accident has many different consequences.
228
   
 It should be noted that the causal link involved here is different from the 
causal link which links the damage and the nuclear activity. The former is a 
condition for the liability of the operator under the nuclear liability conven-
tions, i.e., the occurrence of a nuclear accident which links the damage and 
the activity. The elements of nuclear damage, nuclear accident and nuclear 
activity are three essential elements required in the nuclear liability conven-
tions for the operator of a nuclear installation to be liable for nuclear dam-
age. The liability of the operator is linked to the source of the damage (nu-
clear installation). However, the second links the damage caused to the 
victims and the accident. If no causal link is identified, the victim of the nu-
clear damage cannot be compensated under the nuclear liability conventions, 
but can be compensated under national law if the damage is not the result of 
a nuclear accident as provided for under the nuclear liability conventions. 
 In general, the causal link is defined ‘as the connection between an event 
and the resulting effect’.
229
 This means that the nuclear damage has to be a 
natural consequence and typical result of the nuclear accident.
230
 The victim 
of the nuclear accident must provide the competent court with evidence 
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proving that the damage suffered is actual damage caused by the accident. 
The victim is also required to prove that the damage suffered is one of the 
elements of nuclear damage as provided for under the applicable nuclear li-
ability convention. However, it is not necessary to prove that the operator 
was at fault or negligent. This is because, as mentioned above, liability for 
nuclear damage under the nuclear liability conventions is based on the idea 
of strict liability. 
 The proof of causality is certainly one of the major problems in the nu-
clear liability conventions and must be resolved so that judges have clear 
rules of evidence to award compensation to victims of nuclear damage. The 
proof of causality is more difficult when the damage suffered by victims of a 
nuclear accident is the result of a nuclear and a non-nuclear accident or com-
prises nuclear and non-nuclear damage.
231
 In that situation, victims of a nu-
clear accident cannot easily prove the causal link between the damage and 
the accident. Other causes or factors can also be a contributing factor.
232
 This 
applies particularly to long-term damage caused by a nuclear accident, such 
as cancer. Such damage may appear either several years after the accident, or 
immediately after the victim’s exposure to radioactivity. The exposure to 
low levels of radioactivity may produce permanent changes in the cells of 
the victim’s body, which can cause cancer after a latency period of 3 to 40 
years.
233
 It was stated that: 
‘In relation to radiation exposure, causality is the unequivocal relation between 
the radiation health effects produced in an exposed individual or population 
and the presumed cause in terms of the amount of radiation exposure incurred 
by the individual and population. Causality can be quantified by the so-called 
probability of causation, which is a retrospective estimate of the likelihood 
that, among all the possible factors that could have caused a person’s diag-




This was recognized in the Report of the US Presidential Commission on 
Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents presented to the US Congress in 1990. Ac-
cording to that Report, ‘the latent illnesses […] are claims for cancer induc-
tion and benign thyroid nodules alleged to have been caused by exposure to 
radiation as a result of a nuclear incident, but delayed in manifestation for 
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some years or decades’.
235
 The Report also states that ‘[t]he central problem 
with claims for latent cancer induction by radiation exposure arising from a 
nuclear accident is proof of causation in fact. Cancers that could be radio-
genic also occur spontaneously or due to exposure to other carcinogens. 




 Furthermore, victims of a nuclear accident have to prove that it wholly or 
partly occurred in a nuclear installation in the territory of a Contracting Party 
if there is no certain proof that there has been a nuclear accident. The victims 
cannot determine which accident caused the damage. This applies in particular 
if a number of nuclear accidents occurred at the same time in different installa-
tions operated by different operators. It is difficult for the innocent victims 
who have no technical knowledge to prove the causal link with the damage, 
‘unless the operator liable or the States concerned can produce concrete 




 In addition, neither the nuclear liability conventions nor national legisla-
tion provide a particular standard for proving damage caused by a nuclear 
accident, or for determining the minimum level of radioactivity considered 
to be harmful.
238
 Under the nuclear liability conventions, the proof of causal-
ity is left to be determined by the regular rules of evidence under national 
legislation.
239
 However, it was noted that:  
‘If the regular rules of evidence of national laws were applied, proof of causa-
tion would be impossible and the victims would recover nothing. Therefore, in 
order to ensure that compensation will be paid, states must agree at an interna-
tional level to more lenient rules of evidence or alternative methods of estab-
lishing causation. Even so, local judges with no specialised scientific, medical, 
and technical knowledge working on their own would not be able to properly 
assess the evidence to determine whether any particular cancer or hereditary 
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If it is difficult for victims of conventional damage to provide proof of the 
damage suffered under the regular rules of evidence,
241
 it is even more diffi-
cult or even impossible for victims of nuclear damage to provide proof of 
damage caused by a nuclear accident according to the general rules of evi-
dence. It was noted that: ‘The difficulties in proving injury in cases of nu-
clear incidents in municipal law are well known. On the international level 
the complexity of the problem is even greater’.
242
 This applies particularly 
when the damage becomes apparent after a few decades, unless there is clear 
evidence to assist the victims of a nuclear accident in proving the causality. 
Otherwise they may not be compensated.  
 Moreover, under the nuclear liability conventions there are certain excep-
tions, cases in which damage cannot be compensated even if the victim has 
succeeded in providing proof of causality. These may include nuclear dam-
age caused by accidents in military nuclear installations, unknown causes of 
damage and unknown damage. Under the nuclear liability conventions, the 
operator is exempt from liability if the nuclear damage was caused in one of 
these situations, even if the victims of the nuclear accident have proved the 
causal link between the damage and its source.
243
   
 To reduce these difficulties, the nuclear liability conventions consider all 
the damage caused by a nuclear accident as nuclear damage, and consider a 
joint nuclear and non-nuclear accident as a nuclear accident.
244
 For example, 
nuclear damage caused by a collision of a nuclear ship or a ship carrying 
nuclear substances and a ship carrying non-nuclear material goods is caused 
by a nuclear accident. Moreover, the development of new scientific tech-
nologies makes it easier for the experts to provide the proof of causation, and 
to prove whether the cause of an illness is nuclear damage or whether there 
are other reasons. 
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 Finally, in its recommendation No. 4, the US Presidential Commission 
recommended the application of causation methodology to deal with such 
situations. It recommended establishing a system under which full compen-
sation is provided if this methodology indicates that it is more likely that a 
particular illness was caused by a nuclear accident. At the other end of the 
scale, it also recommended establishing a level indicating that an illness is 
extremely unlikely to have resulted from the accident, and therefore no pay-
ment is made. Finally, it recommended establishing some level of propor-
tionality for recovery related to the likelihood of causation for those illnesses 
which fall between the above two limits.
245
  
3.5.4 Significant damage 
As mentioned, under the nuclear liability conventions and the ILC Draft Ar-
ticles and principles of international liability, environmental damage is not 
compensable unless it is “significant”. It also refers to “serious”, “severe”, 
“grave” or “substantial” damage. Thus, significant damage is a condition for 
the reparation of environmental nuclear damage. Usually, significant envi-
ronmental damage results from activities involving high levels of risk which 
can be described as disastrous damage, while non-significant damage results 
from normal lawful activities.
246
 This is indicated by international case law
247
 
and numerous international instruments adopted with regard to the environment 
that emphasize that significant damage is a condition for compensation for 
damage caused by hazardous activities.
248
 In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the 
Tribunal stated that:  
‘The word “damage”, as used in this document shall mean and include such 
damage as the Governments of the United States and Canada may deem appre-
ciable, and for the purposes of paragraphs (a) and (c) hereof, shall not include 
occasional damage that may be caused by SO2 fumes being carried across the 
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In its judgment of 28 June 1937 between the Netherlands and Belgium in 
the case concerning “The Diversion of Water from the Meuse”
250
 the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice stated that: 
‘The Court has not found any reason in the documents submitted to it which 
would lead it to conclude that the water discharged through the Neerhaeren 
Lock has set up an excessive current in the Zuid-Willemsvaart, or has depleted 
the Meuse to such an extent as to prejudice navigation on that river.  
In the foregoing remarks, the question of the utilization of the side-channels of 
the Neerhaeren Lock for feeding the reach below the lock is not taken into 




Moreover, the Court also stated that ‘in the absence of evidence as to the 
effects which the use of the Neerhaeren Lock produces on the current in the 
Zuid-Willemsvaart, or on the Meuse itself, the Court does not consider that 
the normal use of this lock is inconsistent with the Treaty’.
252
   
 Under the ILC Draft Articles on international liability for injurious con-
sequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, liability is 
limited to hazardous activities not prohibited by international law which 
cause significant transboundary environmental damage by their physical 
consequences.
253
 This is because only significant damage can spread across 
the borders of the State in whose territory the activity is located or under 
whose jurisdiction or control it is carried out. It is prohibited under interna-
tional law because it ‘occurs within the territory of another State [and] 
breaches its real interests protected by international law’.
254
 The same ap-
plies with regard to the nuclear liability conventions which distinguish be-
tween major nuclear activities and minor nuclear activities, and major nu-
clear accidents and minor nuclear accident. Environmental damage caused 
by major nuclear activities and major nuclear accidents is covered by the 
conventions, while environmental damage caused by minor nuclear activities 
and by minor nuclear accidents is excluded.  
                                                     
249
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250
 The Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Judgment of 28 June 1937, the Government 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, 
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254
 Gadkowski, 1989, at p. 56. 
108 CHAPTER 3 
 
 This condition was described as important ‘to define legally significant 
harm because environmental interferences are so pervasive and numer-
ous’.
255
 On the other hand, it was considered that this condition is less pre-
cise and leaves room for subjective judgments and that it is impracticable 
and difficult to formulate as a general rule in precise terms.
256
 This is par-
ticularly true because there are no criteria to determine what is considered 
significant and non-significant environmental damage. In the end, the deci-
sion on this matter is in the hands of the judge who has to decide what is sig-
nificant and what is non-significant environmental damage according to the 
evidence that is presented and on the basis of his expertise.  
3.5.5 The damage may not be compensated twice  
As long as liability for nuclear damage is governed by the rules of civil and 
international liability, environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident 
can be compensated by national courts and international courts. Therefore, if 
the victim has claimed compensation for environmental damage caused by a 
nuclear accident from a national court, he is not entitled to sue for compen-
sation for the same damage from an international court, or to be compen-
sated twice for the same damage from national and international courts. This 
condition is based on the principle of justice.
257
 In the Chorzów Case be-
tween the Government of Germany and the Government of the Polish Re-
public, the Judgement of the Permanent Court of International Justice re-
jected Germany’s claims to prevent exports from the Chorzów factory in 
order to prevent damage caused by its competitors to Bavarian factories in 
future.
258
 The Court considered Germany’s claim to prevent the exports of 
the factory to be satisfactory, but it denied it because Germany also claimed 
for compensation for its loss caused by the factory. The Court considered 
that Germany was claiming twice for reparation of the same damage.
259
 It 
stated that: ‘The prohibition of exports asked for by the German Government 
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3.6 Conclusions  
This chapter showed that damage is the main object and reason for a State’s 
liability for environmental damage caused by nuclear activities. Liability 
cannot be attributed to the operator of a nuclear installation or to the State 
without damage being caused by a nuclear activity in its territory or under its 
jurisdiction or control. It also revealed that nuclear damage is a difficult is-
sue to define within the body of international law. The definition of nuclear 
damage is important to determine the rights of the victims who are protected 
by international law. The Chernobyl accident revealed that a major nuclear 
accident may cause not only personal and property damage inside the country 
in whose territory the accident occurred, but also transboundary damage be-
yond the borders of the State. Radioactive material resulting from the accident 
spread over a large number of countries and caused serious damage to man and 
the environment which would not be covered by the nuclear liability conven-
tions if they were applicable. This showed the important need for a broader 
definition of nuclear damage under international nuclear liability law to protect 
the rights of victims of a nuclear accident. 
 The concept of environmental nuclear damage has been developed along 
with the nuclear liability conventions and the work of the ILC on the codifi-
cation of international liability. Initially the nuclear liability conventions de-
fined the concept of nuclear damage as personal and property damage. Envi-
ronmental damage was not covered under these conventions, but was left to 
national law.  
 After the Chernobyl accident, the Amended Paris and Vienna Conven-
tions expanded the definition of nuclear damage to include, in addition to 
personal and property damage, environmental damage, costs of preventive 
measures, costs of the reinstatement of the impaired environment to its pre-
vious condition, and economic loss. This leads to an increase in the number 
of victims to be compensated under these conventions, at least in principle. 
On the other hand, it leads to a decrease in the amount of compensation for 
each victim. This is because the amount of liability under the conventions is 
limited on a “per nuclear accident” basis. A similar definition was developed 
in the 2006 ILC Draft principles on the location of loss with regard to envi-
ronmental damage caused by hazardous activities. Nevertheless, environ-
mental damage has not been adequately defined in the doctrine of interna-
tional law. Some jurists are in favour of a broader concept of environmental 
damage to include personal and property damage caused as a result of the 
impaired environment. However, others prefer excluding such damage from 
the concept of environmental damage because it is covered under a separate 
heading of nuclear damage. Moreover, reasonable costs of preventive meas-
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ures and the reinstatement of the impaired environment are covered where 
they are carried out by the persons appointed and approved by the competent 
authorities. The competent court according to national law has been left to 
evaluate reasonable measures to be compensated. Pure environmental dam-
age or pure ecological damage is excluded. Finally, economic loss is covered 
by the nuclear liability conventions and the ILC Draft principles on the loca-
tion of loss, and is only compensated after the original damage is remedied. 
Therefore it is difficult to compensate economic loss caused as a result of the 
impaired environment where environmental damage is not covered. How-
ever, pure economic loss to the environment is excluded from the cover of 
the nuclear liability conventions. Pure economic loss caused to the environ-
ment is not considered environmental damage. It is left to be decided by the 
competent court in accordance with national law.  
 A number of obligations have been adopted in the ILC Draft Articles on 
prevention of harm and the ILC Draft principles on the allocation of loss re-
garding State liability for lawful activities and prevention of damage. These 
obligations are significant to prevent, reduce and remedy nuclear damage 
caused to the environment by a nuclear accident. To prevent and to reduce 
such damage, the costs of preventive measures are covered by the regime of 
international liability. The violation of these obligations means that the State 
is responsible for a wrongful act. Damage caused as a result of a State’s li-
ability for a wrongful act is not a constitutive element in State responsibility 
for wrongful acts. It is so-called legal damage or moral damage.  
 Finally, not all environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident is 
subject to compensation. According to the nuclear liability conventions and 
other norms of international law, there are certain conditions required for the 
reparation of environmental nuclear damage. First, the environmental dam-
age must be caused by a nuclear accident or a nuclear activity. Secondly, the 
damage should be the actual and typical result of a nuclear accident. Thirdly, 
there must be causal link between the damage and the accident or the activ-
ity, i.e., proof of causality. Fourthly, environmental damage caused by a nu-
clear accident should not be compensated twice; environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident which has been compensated under the national 
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 The primary obligations for the prevention and reduction of environmental nuclear damage 113 
Introduction 
Like most hazardous activities, nuclear activities are permitted under inter-
national law, provided that the State prevents the potential damage that can 
be caused by such activities to other States. This is a general principle of in-
ternational law, and breaching this obligation incurs State responsibility. 
However, the classical rules of international liability impose responsibility 
upon the State only for damage caused to another State. This necessitated the 
development of the role of international liability so that damage caused by 
such activities could be prevented, rather than waiting until the damage oc-
curred, and then repairing it. It was considered that international liability 
should deal with the legal problems of liability for damage caused by using 
the new technology. It should not rely only on the classical function of liabil-
ity to provide compensation and repair the damage caused by a hazardous 
activity, but it should also have a preventive function aimed at preventing 
damage caused by the activity.  
This was recognized particularly after the Chernobyl accident which drew 
the attention of the international community as a whole to the need to estab-
lish a comprehensive international mechanism aimed at the prevention, miti-
gation and reparation of environmental damage caused by nuclear activities. 
During the past three decades the main features of this regime have been de-
veloped in the doctrine of international law and by the ILC in its Draft Arti-
cles on international liability. This regime involves three aspects: the rules 
and measures for the prevention of nuclear damage, such as international 
safety standards and measures to verify related compliance; the provisions 
for mitigating the consequences of nuclear accidents, such as providing in-
formation and assistance in the event of a nuclear accident; and finally, repa-
ration of environmental damage caused by the accident.
1
 
The reparative function of international liability will be examined later in 
Part III of the study. Part II focuses on an examination of the preventive 
functions of international liability. It examines the State’s obligation of pre-
                                                     
1
 In general, see David Hunter, Julia Sommer and Scott Vaughan, “Environment and 
Trade Concepts and Principles of International Law: An Introduction”, in: GELA, Vol. 
III, 1995, pp. 99-134; D’Amato and Engel (eds.), 1996, pp. 137-143; Katharina Kummer, 
“International Management of Hazardous Wastes: the Basel Convention and Related 
Legal Rules”, Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, at pp. 16-25; 
Nicolas de Sadeleer, “Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules”, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, at pp. 61-90; Johan G. Lammers, “Prevention 
of Transboundary Harm From Hazardous Activities: The ILC Draft Articles”, in: HYIL, 
Vol. 14, 2001, pp. 3-24. 
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vention and the procedural rules and obligations required for the safe opera-
tion of nuclear activities to prevent and reduce environmental damage 
caused to other States and other areas outside its territory. The procedural 
obligations are imposed upon a State to ensure that nuclear activities are car-
ried out with caution in order to avoid a nuclear accident and to reduce envi-
ronmental damage if a nuclear accident occurs despite this. These obliga-
tions are primary norms and principles which perform a preventive role in 
international responsibility. They will be studied in two chapters. Chapter 4 
examines the legal basis of the principle of prevention as an essential princi-
ple of international law for the prevention and reduction of environmental 
nuclear damage. Chapter 5 discusses the procedural obligations and norms 
required for the safe operation of a nuclear activity to prevent nuclear acci-
dents caused by nuclear activities and to prevent and reduce harmful conse-




4 THE OBLIGATION OF PREVENTION AND 
REDUCTION AS AN ESSENTIAL OBLIGATION 
FOR STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY 
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter argues for the obligation of prevention as a fundamental princi-
ple in contemporary international law, and its effectiveness in protecting the 
environment against damage caused by nuclear activities. Nowadays, the 
principle of prevention is one of the fundamental principles in contemporary 
international law, and is necessary to protect the environment against the 
hazards of nuclear activities. According to the principle, a State carrying out 
nuclear activities in its territory or under its jurisdiction or control is obliged 
not to cause environmental damage to other States. It must take precaution-
ary and preventive measures, and exercise due diligence to prevent environ-
mental damage caused by such activities, and to reduce any harmful conse-
quences if a nuclear accident does occur. These measures are mainly 
procedural and are aimed at controlling the activities. It also must cooperate 
with other States, particularly the affected States, in providing the necessary 
information regarding the activity. This helps to prevent and minimize envi-
ronmental damage caused by the activities.  
 The chapter focuses on an examination of the issues in the prevention and 
reduction of damage and other related issues, according to the general rules 
of international law, as a tool to prevent and reduce environmental damage 
caused by nuclear activities. An examination of these issues gives rise to cer-
tain questions which have to be answered in this study in order to determine 
the legal basis of the principle of prevention, and its effectiveness in prevent-
ing and reducing the environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident. 
These questions are: Does international law impose upon the State carrying 
out nuclear activities within its territory, or under whose jurisdiction or con-
trol they are carried out, any standard or obligation to ensure that these ac-
tivities do not cause environmental damage to other States or to the global 
environment? If so, what sort of obligation? Is it a general obligation, result-
ing in State responsibility for the violation of its environmental obligations, 
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or is it merely a non-binding principle? Is it a principle of customary interna-
tional law, or a general principle of international law? What is the legal basis 
of the principle? 
 The answer to these questions determines the legal basis of the obligation 
to prevent and minimize environmental damage caused by nuclear activities. 
The principle will be studied on the basis of the relevant sources of interna-
tional law. According to these sources, there is evidence for this principle in 
customary international law, general principles of international law,
1
 the 
doctrine of international law,
2
 international case law
3
 and it is also reflected 
in international legal practice.
4
 It has been embodied in a number of multi-
lateral, regional, and international declarations such as the UNEP Principles
5
 
and bilateral agreements dealing with the protection of the environment from 
hazardous activities in various areas of international law.
6
 It was recently 
                                                     
1
 Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, “Guide to International Environmental Law”, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2007, at p. 91; Birnie and Boyle, 1992, at p. 89; 
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Environment”, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York 2009, at p. 
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1988, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 266, paras. 103-111. 
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 The ICJ advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nu-
clear Weapons”, ICJ Reports, 1996, p. 226, at pp. 241-242, para. 29. The ICJ, Case Con-
cerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 20 April 2010 Judg-
ment, at pp. 56-59, paras. 199-202. The Judgment is available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf?PHPSESSID=f59011c4e4079882 (accessed on 
25.5.2010). 
4
 For State practice on international liability see two studies prepared by the UN Secre-
tariat, the first in 1984 on “Survey of State Practice Relevant to International Liability for 
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law”, UN 
General Assembly Doc., A/CN.4/384, 1984. The second on the same topic in 1995, UN, 
General Assembly Doc., A/CN.4/471, 1995. 
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 See Principle 1 of the 1978 UNEP Environmental Law Guidelines and Principles on 
Shared Natural Resources. The text of the Principles is available at: 
http://www.UNEPEnvironmental-Law-Guidelines-and-Principles.pdf (accessed on 
24.5.2010). 
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codified by the ILC in the Draft Articles on international liability for harm 
caused by lawful activities. It was embodied in the 2001 ILC Draft Articles 
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm Caused by Hazardous Activities
7
 and 
in the 2006 Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transbound-
ary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities.
8
 In addition, the 2001 ILC 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts apply if the princi-
ple is violated.
9
 These Articles codified the issues of prevention and interna-
tional liability in general terms to apply to environmental damage caused by 
nuclear activities in the absence of an inter-state treaty to cover them. 
 In the following section the chapter considers whether the principle of 
prevention is a general norm or a customary principle of international law or 
a general principle of international law, as distinguishing between them is 
very difficult in practice. Section 4.3 examines the legal basis of the obliga-
tion of prevention under the general rules of international law. This includes 
the obligation of a State not to cause environmental damage to other States, 
preventive measures, the principle of due diligence and the precautionary 
principle. Section 4.4 investigates the principle of cooperation and its impor-
tance with regard to the introduction of the procedural rules and obligations 
regarding the prevention and reduction of environmental damage caused by 
a nuclear accident. Section 4.5 concludes that the obligation of prevention is 
an essential principle in international law. It consists of a number of interna-
tional procedural obligations which must be implemented by the State of 
origin and other States in order to avoid environmental damage likely to be 
caused by nuclear activities. 
4.2 Is the obligation of prevention a general norm or a 
general principle or a principle of customary 
international law?  
In general, there is evidence in the doctrine of international law, international 
instruments and judicial decisions to support the distinction between general 
                                                     
7
  For the text of the 2001 draft Articles on prevention along with commentaries adopted 
on second reading by the ILC, see the Report of the International Law Commission on 
the work of its 53rd session, UNGA Official Records, Supplement No.10 (A/66/10), pp. 
370-436. 
8
 The 2006 Draft principles on the allocation in the case of transboundary harm arising 
out of hazardous activities, with commentaries in 2006, and submitted to the General 
Assembly (A/61/10), at p. 110, para. 67. 
9
 For text of the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with commentaries see, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Ses-
sion, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), ch. V.  
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norms and the principles of international law.
10
 According to Verschuuren, 
there are some differences between the rules of international law and the 
general principles of international law, but it is difficult to make a clear dis-
tinction between them. He argues: There is a sliding scale with a theoretical, 
abstract and indeterminate principle on [the] one [... hand] and a very con-
crete, highly practical rule on the other. Both principles and rules can range 
from [being] abstract to [being] more concrete’.
11
 However, other lawyers 
use the terms “rule”, “obligation” and “principle” with the same meaning to 




 In practice, the principles of law have a higher moral character than the 
rules of law and form the basis of their functions in national and interna-
tional law. According to Verschuuren, these functions include, inter alia: 
help with defining open or unclear statutory rules; strengthening the norma-
tive power of statutory rules; increasing legal certainty and enhancing the 
legitimacy of decision making, forming the basis for new statutory rules; 
providing guidelines for self-regulation and negotiation processes between 
various actors in society; creating flexibility in the law; playing an important 
role in the implementation of international obligations in national law; 
stimulating the integration of environmental considerations in other policy 
fields; creating the necessary links between ideals and concrete legal rules.
13
 
The functions of the principles were also addressed in the 1992 United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change.
14
 This referred to the im-
portance of these principles in the implementation of the provisions of the 
Convention. It considers them to be guidelines for its States Parties to 
achieve the objectives of the Convention, and to implement its provisions.
15
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 Sands, 2003, at p. 232; Ulrich Beyerlin, “Different Types of Norms in International 
Environmental Law: Policies, Principles and Rules”, in: Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey 
(eds.), 2007, pp. 425-448, at p. 432; Graefrath, RDC, Vol. 185, Part II, 1984, at p. 52. 
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lishers, The Netherlands, 2005, at p. 147. 
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 Verschuuren, 2003, at pp. 38-41. 
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 The text of the Convention is available at: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed on 31.8.2009). 
15
 Article 3 of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; see 
also Article 3 of the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity Convention, available at: 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml (accessed on 31.8.2009); the 2003 Con-
solidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the 
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In addition, in the definition of an internationally wrongful act, the ILC 
made a distinction between the terms “rule or norm” and “obligation”. It in-
dicated that a breach consisting of a wrongful act is a breach of an interna-
tional obligation of a State and a breach of a norm.
16
 Finally, this distinction 
was clearly made in the Gentini case in 1903 (Italy v. Venezuela). The Tri-
bunal stated that:  
“A ‘rule’… ‘is essentially practical and, moreover, binding …; there are rules 
of art [just] as there are rules of government’ while [the term] principle ‘ex-
presses a general truth, which guides our action, serves as a theoretical basis 




Furthermore, in relation to the application of the rules of general customary 
international law, Judge G. Morelli, in his separate opinion in the Case Con-
cerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Bel-
gium v. Spain, Judgment of 5 February 1970, argued that:  
‘[... T]he international rules concerning the treatment of foreigners, although 
they are rules of general international law and, as such, are binding on every 
State with regard to every other State, take concrete form in the shape of bilat-
eral legal relationships, so that a State’s obligation to accord the required 
treatment to a particular person exists solely towards the national State of that 
person and not towards other States’.
18
  
According to Cheng, ‘the general principles of law form the basis of positive 
rules of law’.
19
 Accordingly, the principles of law have a moral character and 
form the theoretical basis which guides States to implement rules of law. 
This is true, but in my view the rule of law is the foundation of any principle 
                                                                                                                            
European Community. Official Journal of the European Union, 29.12.2006, C 321 E/1, 
available at: http://eur-
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Tribunals”, Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge UK, 1953, reprinted 1987, at p. 
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of law. The rule of law is a provision which can be embodied in any agree-
ment, judicial decision, principle of law or any other source of law, and 
binds States to respect the rights of other States.  
 Thus customary and general principles of international law are composed 
of certain rules and provisions which constitute the basis of these principles. 
One of these principles which constitutes the basis of State responsibility for 
environmental damage is the principle of prevention.
20
 However, the appli-
cation of these principles is not transparent in practice because they are in 
some cases embodied in non-binding international instruments, while their 
scope and extent of application cannot be determined in other cases. For exam-
ple, the principle of notification has been recognized in practice but has not 
been applied by States in practice. The failure of the USSR to apply this princi-
ple in the Chernobyl accident necessitated the formulation of the principle in 
more detailed terms in conventional provisions.
21
 However, the unusual speed 
of the adoption of the 1986 Notification and Assistance Conventions,
22
 which 
were adopted within only one month of the negotiations, indicates that there 
was evidence for the existence of customary international law on the principle 
of notification prior to the formulation of the norms in these conventions. What 
emerged in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident necessitated the recognition 
and codification of the principles in specific norms.
23
 
 Nevertheless, there are some obstacles which stand in the way of devel-
oping customary international law in general for the protection of the envi-
ronment. For example, ‘[t]he renaissance of custom requires the articulation 
of a coherent theory that can accommodate its classic foundations and con-
temporary developments’.
24
 There is no theory to explain the role of custom-
                                                     
20
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22
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ary international law and its doctrine.
25
 Furthermore, the developing nations 
are still opposed to accepting customary international norms as a source of 
liability for the protection of the environment. They believe that the accep-
tance of these principles is an obstacle to their development. They accuse the 
developed nations of damaging the environment with harmful activities car-
ried out in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control after benefiting 
from these activities because their countries developed at the beginning of 
the twentieth century without any environmental standards. Now they argue 
that the developed countries should bear the responsibility for the protection 
of the environment.
26
 The principle of customary international law cannot 
constitute a principle of international law unless it has been accepted by both 
the developed and developing countries. To some extent, this highlights the 
difference between the principles of customary international law and the gen-
eral principles of international law which are adopted only by the developed 
nations. According to Dupuy: 
‘[T]he customary law status of a rule depends on whether the principle is in-
voked by a majority of states, comprising both developed and developing 
countries, by a regional group of states (as in the case of the support expressed 
by the members of the European Union), or even by the international commu-
nity, including international civil society. In addition, it depends on whether 
the principle has been referred to, or put into operation, in a treaty, in a soft law 
instrument, in judicial or semi-judicial decisions, or in other expressions of 
state practice. Therefore, the process of the formation of customary interna-
tional law, and that of its consolidation as a rules of positive international law 
are two sides of the same coin, which is suggested by the fact that the concept 
of ‘custom’ refers to both the lawmaking process and to the end result of that 




The general principles of international law adopted in Article 38 (1) (c) of 
the ICJ Statute are those adopted by the developed nations. Therefore those 
adopted by the developing nations are excluded. Moreover, some authors 
stipulate that the general principles of national law are not in themselves 
considered as general principles of international law, unless they have been 
accepted at the international level.
28
 In addition, in practice it is difficult to 
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 Andrew T. Guzman, “Saving Customary International Law”, in: MJIL, Vol. 27, Issue 
1, 2006, pp. 115-176, at p. 117. 
26
 D’Amato and Engel (eds.), 1996, at p. 15. 
27
 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “Formation of Customary International Law and General Princi-
ples”, in: Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey (eds.), 2007, pp. 449-466, at p. 451. 
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 Lammers, 1984, at pp. 161-164. In general, principles of law as a source of law are 
adopted in national law or in custom or in treaties. The latter, in some cases, also codify 
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customary rules. (John H. Currie, Craig Forcese and Valerie Oosterveld, “International 
Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory”, Published by Irwin Law, Toronto, 2007, at p. 136) 
The general principles of law of the civilized nations are adopted in Article 38 (1) (c) of 
the ICJ Statute to allow the courts to apply them in international cases besides other 
sources of international law or where there are no provisions in treaty law or customary 
international law to govern a specific matter. (Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. I, 
1996, at p. 36) ‘In thus opining the way for the operation as international law of general 
principles of municipal jurisprudence, it must be noted that such principles are in the 
municipal sphere applied against a background of national laws and procedures. Unless 
there is some sufficient counterpart to them in the international sphere, or sufficient al-
lowance is made for them in abstracting the principles from the various municipal rules, 
the operation of the principles as a source of particular rules of international law will be 
distorted’. (Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. I, 1996, at p. 37) 
 Nevertheless, there are some doctrinal differences about accepting the principles of 
the civilized nations as adopted in Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute to be principles of 
international law or as a source of international law. The majority of the doctrine of in-
ternational law argues that the courts should apply these principles where there are no 
applicable provisions in treaty or customary international law. This opinion considers 
that the general principles of law are an affirmation to the Natural Law. Others, follow-
ing a socialist doctrine, argue that they should be applied only when they were accepted 
at the international level as principles of international law. (Shaw, International Law, 
2008, at p. 99; John H. Currie, “Public International Law”, second edition, Irwin Law 
Inc. Toronto, 2008, at p. 101) Indeed, according to the supporters of the Natural Law 
approach, the principles include international norms and have value above the detailed 
provisions of the law. Thus, in that sense, as was stated, national law is more developed 
than international law. (Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law, Third Edition, 
OLD Balley Press, 2005) However, according to the second approach, not any principle 
can be regarded as a principle of international law. Only those included in treaty and 
customary international law and reflecting the consent and will of States are considered 
to be principles of international law, as only agreements or custom express the will of 
States. Accordingly, the principles adopted by customs or in treaties are only principles 
of international law and principles of the civilized nations are not considered principles 
of international law. 
 In my point of view, Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute must be amended to provide 
for the principles of law in all nations because there is no clear dividing line between the 
so-called civilized and uncivilized nations. On the other hand, these principles will apply 
to all cases and disputes in all States. Furthermore, the ICJ members are composed of 
judges from all the civilization and principal legal systems in the world. (Article 9 of the 
ICJ Statute) In this respect, it was stated that, ‘[a] better view of Art. 38 1 (c) is that its 
purpose is to ensure that international law includes rules and principles common to all 
legal systems because such rules are part of the structure of ‘the law’. If international law 
is to be accepted as a system of law, it must incorporate those procedural and administra-
tive rules which are inherent in the concept of every legal system and, therefore, part of 
the law of every state’. (Martin Dixon, “Textbook on International Law”, Sixth Edition, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, at p. 41) 
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see the sources of and differences between the customary and general princi-
ples of international law,
29
 as many principles of general rules have become 
principles of customary international law. In the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases, the ICJ stated that ‘[c]ustomary international law is evidenced by the 
practice of states by reference to published material, statements of the na-




 However, customary and general principles of international law play a 
significant role in the protection of the rights of the States and their subjects, 
including the protection of the environment against damage caused by haz-
ardous activities. These principles have gradually emerged and are still being 
developed. The essence of these principles is the principle of State sover-
eignty, which is aimed at protecting the political integrity of the State. This 
principle is complemented by other principles such as the principle of not 
abusing rights, neighbourliness, due diligence, and more recently, the pol-
luter pays principle and the precautionary principle. Other procedural princi-
ples, including the duty of cooperation and providing information, are also 
                                                                                                                            
 Indeed, principles of law ‘have a certain normative quality; for cases of non-
observance of and non-compliance with a legal principle immediately call for a condem-
natory statement. Principles of law would seem to constitute the inner sanctum of any 
legal order, delivering guidance to, and preferably steering the conduct of, lawyers, judg-
es, politicians, even the public –at-large’. (Henri de Waele and Eva Rieter, “Introduction: 
Evolving Principles of International Law-The Quest for Demarcation”, in: Eva Rieter, 
Henri de Waele (eds.), Evolving Principles of International Law: Studies in Honour of 
Karel C. Wellens”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 2012, at p.1) The thesis 
referred to Article 38 (1) (c) throughout the text and showed that the principles discussed 
in it are recognized in international law as general principles, i.e. due diligence principle, 
the principle of prevention, the polluter pays principle etc. at the same time environmen-
tal international law is a branch of public international law. Thus the word principle in 
general international law has the same meaning as in international environmental law. 
There are also some international principles established by international courts and tribu-
nals such as the principle of prevention of harm resulting from hazardous activities 
which its roots traced to the Trail Smelter Arbitration. On the other hand, there are some 
principles established by national law such as the polluter pays principle and later be-
came an international principle. Thus, there is overlap between general principles of law 
and general principles of international law. (Brownlie, Principles of International Law, 
2008, at p. 19) 
29
 Erik Jaap Molenaar, “Coastal State Jurisdiction Over Vessel Source Pollution”, Klu-
wer Law International, The Hague/Boston/London, 1998, at pp. 41-42. 
30
 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), 20 February 1969 Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, 
cited in Daud Hassan, “Protecting the Marine Environment from Land-Based 
Sources of Pollution: Toward Effective International Cooperation”, Ashgate Pub-
lishing Limited, England, USA, 2006, at p. 70. 
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significant. These principles impose certain obligations on States to prevent 
damage to the environment in the States and the global commons, when they 
carry out hazardous activities within their territories or under their jurisdic-
tion or control. International law requires States not to abuse the rights which 
they have been given by law to carry out hazardous activities, to exercise 
due diligence and take precautionary measures to protect the environment, 
and to pay the economic costs of pollution, if such pollution has nevertheless 
occurred.  
 In the MOX Plant Case the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
restored the importance of customary international law by protecting the en-
vironment against damage caused by nuclear activities.
31
 In that case, Ireland 
claimed that the UK had violated the duty of cooperation and the duty to pro-
vide the relevant information about the disputed activity, and had failed to as-
sess the potential risks and effects on the marine environment of the Irish Sea 
arising from the operation of the plant and international movements of radioac-
tive materials and wastes associated with the plant.
32
 The Tribunal therefore 
examined the duty of cooperation and other procedural obligations and their 
application in practice.  
 In addition, some of these principles are considered by some authors to 
apply to liability, and to serve as the basis for liability in national and inter-
national law. Some of these principles are also related to procedural obliga-
tions such as the principles of precaution and prevention, while others are 
obligations of customary law, such as the Stockholm and Rio principles. For 
example, these last two principles are embodied in the principle of sover-
eignty, the principle not to abuse rights and the principle of neighbourliness. 
In practice it is difficult to distinguish between the functions of these princi-
ples, as every principle and every theory has its uses and its own particular 
characteristics and must be applied separately in different cases. 
 In conclusion, the principle of prevention is related to other principles of 
general and customary international law. This reflects its status as an essen-
tial principle of general and customary international law. 
                                                     
31
 The International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, The MOX Plant Case, (Ireland v. 
United Kingdom), Request for provisional measures, 3 December 2001. The judgment is 
available at: http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (accessed on 25.4.2010). 
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 Order of 3 December 2001, para. 26. 
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4.3 The obligation of a State to prevent and reduce 
environmental nuclear damage 
The principle of prevention requires the Installation State not to cause envi-
ronmental damage to other States when it conducts nuclear activities, and to 
take all precautions and exercise due diligence to ensure that the activity 
does not cause environmental damage to other States. This includes all the 
preventive and necessary measures consistent with international law that are 
necessary to prevent, minimize and control damage which could be caused 
by a nuclear accident. These principles constitute the legal basis of the duty 
to prevent environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident.  
 The obligation of prevention also includes providing information and co-
operation between States, because environmental damage cannot be pre-
vented unless the relevant information is provided. The same applies with 
regard to cooperation between States, because it is difficult to prevent dam-
age without cooperation. This shows that the principle of providing informa-
tion and the principle of cooperation are interrelated. The two principles are 
aimed at controlling the activities in order to prevent and reduce damage. 
4.3.1 The obligation of a State not to cause environmental damage 
to other States 
When a State conducts hazardous activities such as nuclear activities, it must 
observe the rights of other States, take the necessary measures to protect the 
global environment, and carry out the hazardous activities in a reasonable 
way without causing damage to other States or the environment.
33
 The ra-
tionale behind this principle is that the absolute freedom of a State to con-
duct hazardous activities means that it could interfere with and harm the in-
terests of other States and the environment.
34
 The principle describes the 
legal rights of States to carry out hazardous activities and their responsibility 
for transboundary environmental damage under customary international 
law.
35
 Therefore the principle not to cause damage to other States is also 
linked to the State’s obligation to prevent and reduce damage to other 
States.
36
 Despite this, some lawyers have made a distinction between the ob-
ligation to prevent damage and the obligation to reduce damage. The first is 
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 Smith, 1988, at p. 72. 
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concerned with the prevention of new pollution caused by a hazardous activ-
ity, while the second concerns reducing the existing pollution.
37
 In the first 
case, the State has to take all possible care to prevent the event. However, in 
the second case, the event has already occurred, and the State should do all it 
can to reduce its harmful consequences in order to prevent damage that 
might be caused to the environment of other States. 
 The principle not to cause environmental damage to other States and ar-
eas beyond its national boundaries constitutes a principle of general and cus-
tomary international law
38
 which forms the basis for State responsibility for 
environmental damage.
39
 This was reflected in Principle 21 of the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration and affirmed by Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declara-
tion. The latter principle obliges States ‘to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of material jurisdiction’.
40
 This forms the 
basis of the principle of prevention in customary international law and de-
termines the scope and extent of its application. In this respect, Sands says: 
‘Closely related to the Principle 21 obligation is the obligation requiring the 
prevention of damage to the environment, and otherwise to reduce, limit or 
control activities which might cause or risk such damage. This obligation, 
sometimes referred to as the ‘principle of preventive action’ or the ‘preventive 
principle’, is distinguishable from Principle 21/Principle 2 in two ways. First, 
the latter arise from the application of respect for the principle of sovereignty, 
whereas the preventive principle seeks to minimise environmental damage as 
an objective in itself. This difference of underlying rationale relates to the sec-
ond distinction: under the preventive principle, a state may be under an obliga-
tion to prevent damage to the environment within its own jurisdiction, includ-
ing by means of appropriate regulatory, administrative and other measures’.
41
 
The principle of prevention was developed and codified by the ILC in its 
Draft Articles on international liability for damage caused by lawful activi-
ties. It was formulated by Quentin-Baxter and further developed by Barboza 
in their reports submitted to the Commission. In these Draft Articles the 
Commission adopted a number of articles related to the prevention of acci-
dents and their transboundary harmful effects. These Articles involve proce-
dural obligations which enable the affected States to protect themselves 
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 Kiss and Shelton, 2007, at p. 91. 
39
 Kummer, 1995, at p. 17; Michael G. Faure & André Nollkaemper, Symposium: Cli-
mate Change Risk, Vol. 26A/43A, 2007, pp. 123-179, at p. 144; Verheyen, 2005, at p. 
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against the risks of nuclear catastrophes.
42
 The principle is also embodied in 
a number of international instruments. According to the 1997 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Wa-
tercourses, the continued unreasonable utilisation and operation of an activ-
ity violates the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation.
43
 Thus a 
Watercourse State is prevented from carrying out an activity which could 
harm the environment in an unreasonable way. Article 21 (2) of this Conven-
tion requires the Watercourse State to prevent significant harm to the envi-
ronment and to harmonize its policies in this respect.
44
 This provision con-
tains a general obligation that obliges the Watercourse State to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution caused by an international watercourse which 
could cause significant transboundary harm to other Watercourse States or 
the environment.
45
 Similarly, Article 194 (1) of the 1982 UNCLOS contains 
a number of general obligations which require States, inter alia, to take all 
the necessary means at their disposal to prevent, reduce and control envi-
ronmental damage caused by a hazardous activity, to take all the necessary 
measures to ensure that such activities do not cause environmental damage 
to other States, and to take all necessary measures to ensure that environ-
mental damage caused by the activities does not spread beyond its territory.
46
 
Moreover, under the 1992 Biodiversity Convention,
47
 the principle expands 
the protection of the environment to areas beyond the sovereignty of the 
State. It restricts the sovereign right of the State to exploit its natural re-
sources in accordance with its own environmental policies.
48
 Nevertheless,  
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‘The principle does not impose an absolute duty to prevent all harm, but rather 
requires each state to prohibit those activities known to cause significant harm 
to the environment, such as the dumping of toxic waste into an international 
lake, and to mitigate harm from lawful activities that may harm the environ-
ment, by imposing limits, for example, on the discharges of pollutants into the 
atmosphere or shared watercourses’.
49
 
The principle of prevention has been embodied in a number of non-binding 
instruments on the protection of the environment. For instance, in 1985, the 
World Commission on Environment and Development established the Ex-
perts Group on Environmental Law to prepare “Legal Principles for Envi-
ronmental Protection and Sustainable Development” to support States in 
drafting international instruments on environmental protection and sustaina-
ble development.
50
 The Expert Group prepared these principles in 1986. 
Principle 10 sets out the general principle on prevention which requires 
States to prevent and reduce significant damage to the environment.  
 In relation to the application of the principle to prevent damage caused by 
nuclear activities, the principle of prevention is contained in the nuclear in-
struments. It finds support in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which prohibits any 
nuclear explosions and disposal of nuclear waste in Antarctica.
51
 Similarly, 
the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies prohibits placing objects carrying nuclear arms on or 
around the moon.
52
 The 1963 UN Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in 
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the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was also adopted
53
 to 
show that the parties wanted ‘to put an end to the contamination of man’s 
environment by radioactive substances’.
54
 This Treaty prohibits and prevents 
each party from conducting any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other 
nuclear explosion in any place under its jurisdiction or control if that explo-
sion could cause radioactive debris outside its territory.
55
 Nevertheless, not 
all damage caused to the environment by a nuclear activity is prohibited. A 
certain level of damage to the environment is allowed. International law al-
lows the discharge of certain levels of radioactive material into the environ-
ment. Therefore at present the disposal of low-level radioactive waste at sea 
is subject to regulation by international organizations.
56
 For example, the 
IAEA has developed scientific standards and guidelines to assist the national 
authorities of the member States in drawing up regulations for the disposal 
of radioactive waste at sea. However, there is a broad consensus among 
States that high level radioactive waste should not be disposed of at sea.
57
 
The 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Maritime Pollution by 
Dumping of Waste and Other Matter, for example, prohibits the disposal of 
high-level radioactive waste at sea.
58
 According to that Convention, ‘[h]igh-
level radioactive wastes or other high-level radioactive matter, defined on 
public health, biological or other grounds, by the competent international 
body in this field, at present the International Atomic Energy Agency, is un-
suitable for dumping at sea’.
59
 In 1996, the Protocol to Amend the London 
Convention was adopted to prohibit the dumping at sea of any radioactive 
waste above the permissible level of radioactivity, as defined by the IAEA 
                                                                                                                            
U.N.T.S. 3, (1984). The text is also available at: http://www.islandone.org/Treaties/ 
BH766.html (accessed on 28.9.2009); http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/ 
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and adopted by the Contracting Parties.
60
 In addition, the Protocol obliges 
the Contracting Parties to carry out a scientific study every year for a period 
of 25 years to review the prohibition on dumping low-level radioactive waste 
at sea.
61
 The Protocol allows the Contracting Parties conducting such a study 
to take into consideration all the factors which they may consider appropriate 
to review the prohibition on dumping low-level radioactive waste at sea, in-
cluding political, legal, social and economic considerations.
62
 Accordingly 
there is no State liability under international law for damage caused by a nu-
clear activity, unless significant damage has been caused to the environment.  
 Finally, the principle not to cause damage to other States has been applied 
in international case law. This was reflected in the 1941 Trail Smelter Case 
between Canada and the USA.
63
 In its judgment, the Tribunal stated that: 
‘Under the principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United 
States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the prop-
erties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the in-
jury is established by clear and convincing evidence’.
64
  
This was also affirmed by the ICJ in several decisions relating to trans-
boundary environmental damage. The principle was adopted in the Corfu 
Channel Case between Britain and Albania in 1949.
65
 The ICJ also affirmed 
the principle of prevention and protection of the environment in its judgment 
in the case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun-
gary/Slovakia) of 25 September 1997. It recognized the importance of the 
protection of the environment, not only to a particular State, but also to the 
whole of mankind.
66
 In its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the “Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” the ICJ recognized the principle 
of prevention and its importance for the protection of the environment. The 
advisory opinion states: 
                                                     
60
 The Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 and Resolutions Adopted by the Special Meeting, 
http://www.org/documents/lc72PROTOCOL.doc 
61
 Annex 1 (3) of the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. 
62
 Article 22 (2) of the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Ma-
rine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes. 
63
 RIAA, Vol. III, p. 1905. 
64
 RIAA, Vol. III, p. 1905, at p. 1965; AJIL, Vol. 35, 1941, at p. 716. 
65
 ICJ Reports, 1949, at p. 22. 
66
 ICJ Reports, 1997, p. 7, at p. 41, para. 53. 
 The obligation of prevention and reduction of environmental nuclear damage 131 
 
‘The Court recognizes that the environment is under daily threat and that the 
use of nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe for the environment. The 
Court also recognizes that the environment is not an abstraction but represents 
the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, includ-
ing generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation of States to en-
sure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of 
international law relating to the environment’.
67
 
Nevertheless, the Court hesitated to provide a decisive solution to the matter. 
It stated that there are no provisions in customary and conventional interna-
tional law that support either the authorization for or the prohibition on the 
use of nuclear weapons. However, it also stated that such use might be pro-
hibited by the existing rules of international environmental law.
68
 Accord-
ingly, the Court did not prohibit the manufacturing or the use of nuclear 
weapons. In fact, with regard to this sensitive issue, the Court adopted a nar-
row view and focused only on examining the legal evidence without consid-
ering other factors such the harmful consequences resulting from the use of 
nuclear weapons. The Court missed the opportunity to develop a legal prin-
ciple focusing on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It appeared reluctant to 
be accused of involvement in political matters. Finally, the Court also ad-
dressed the principle of prevention in its recent judgment in the Case Con-
cerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 20 April 
2010, and reaffirmed the principle as a general principle of international law 
necessary for the protection of the environment.
69
 
4.3.2 Preventive measures 
To implement the principle of prevention, the source State is obliged under 
international law to take the necessary preventive measures to avoid risk and 
loss or injury likely to be caused by a hazardous activity, and to protect the 
interests of the affected States.
70
 The nuclear liability conventions define the 
concept of preventive measures as any reasonable measures to be taken by 
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any person to avoid the occurrence of a nuclear accident and to prevent and 
reduce its harmful consequences.
71
 A similar definition is provided by the 
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dan-
gerous to the Environment
72
 and this is affirmed by the ILC Draft Articles on 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm.
73
 Thus these ‘[p]reventive measures aim 
to avoid harm and reduce or eliminate the risk of harm. As such, they con-
cern pollution or other environmental damage that is foreseeable through the 
normal operations of an activity or the use of a product, as well as measures 
that should be taken to mitigate or prevent harm in case of accidental dam-
age’.
74
 However, the concept of preventive measures under these provisions 
is still too vague and controversial. This is because there is no precise defini-
tion of the concept of preventive measures to determine which measures 
should be taken, as well as the scope of the measures and who can take them.  
 As a result, there are two different arguments to determine the scope of 
application of these preventive measures. The first considers the measures 
taken after the damage has occurred are not technically have a preventive 
character, and are only aimed at reducing the damage caused by the hazard-
ous activity. Thus they are considered to be measures of reparation.
75
 The 
second view, which was supported by the Special Rapporteur Barboza, con-
siders that the concept of prevention includes the measures taken to prevent 
an event before it happens, as well as those taken to reduce the damage 
caused and minimise the impact.
76
 Consequently, preventive measures taken 
after the accident to prevent or minimize its transboundary harmful effects 
are preventive measures.
77
 As Barboza stated, “preventive measures” means 
‘any measures intended to prevent or intercept that chain of cause and effect 
relationships which would prevent or reduce the harmful transboundary ef-
fects’.
78
 Accordingly, the measures taken to avoid an accident and those 
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taken after the accident to minimise its harmful consequences are both con-
sidered to be preventive measures. This is because an accident could be the 
result of a series of causes and effects, ultimately leading to transboundary 
environmental damage.
79
 The Special Rapporteur therefore makes a distinc-
tion between activities involving risks and those with harmful effects, and 
interprets the obligation of prevention in two ways. The first includes the 
measures to be taken before the accident occurs. This concerns activities in-
volving risks. The second includes the measures taken after the accident oc-
curs, to reduce the scope and degree of damage caused by the accident. This 
concerns activities involving harm.
80
 
 A similar view was taken with regard to covering the costs of preventive 
measures under the nuclear liability conventions. These measures are usually 
taken after the early notification of a nuclear accident by the Accident State 
and a request for assistance to prevent and reduce damage caused by the ac-
cident. They also cover the costs of measures taken to restore the environ-
ment to its previous condition. Therefore the measures taken before a nu-
clear accident are not covered. This led to disagreement about the doctrine of 
international law with regard to covering the costs of preventive measures 
taken before a nuclear accident. However, the Conventions cover the costs of 
preventive measures in the case of an imminent threat of a nuclear accident, 
if another State or the victims have taken such measures.
81
 Therefore the 
costs of preventive measures taken to prevent a nuclear accident are covered 
by the conventions. 
 This view was supported by the doctrine of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which dealt with the two 
concepts of preventive measures for the prevention and mitigation of envi-
ronmental damage caused to the maritime environment. This Convention 
obliges States to prevent, control, and reduce the damage caused by trans-
boundary pollution in the maritime environment.
82
 It provides that: 
‘States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their ju-
risdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to 
other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or 
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activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas 
where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention’.
83
 
In the MOX Plant Case, Ireland told the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS), with regard to the application of this Convention to nu-
clear activities that: 
‘[…] the United Kingdom has breached its obligations under Articles 192 and 
193 and/or Article 194 and/or Article 207 and/or Articles 211 and 213 of 
UNCLOS in relation to the authorisation of the MOX plant, including by fail-
ing to take the necessary measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of 
the marine environment of the Irish Sea from (1) intended discharges of radio-
active materials and or wastes from the MOX plant, and/or (2) accidental re-
leases of radioactive materials and/or wastes from the MOX plant and/or inter-
national movements associated the MOX plant, and/or (3) releases of 
radioactive materials and/or wastes from the MOX plant and/or international 




The obligation of a State to take preventive measures to prevent environ-
mental damage has also been supported by other international instruments.
85
 
For example, the Convention on the High Seas imposes an obligation upon 
States to take the necessary measures to prevent pollution and to cooperate 
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with the international organizations concerned to implement these meas-
ures.
86
 There are also a number of international instruments in the field of 
international civil liability and the environment which support this view.
87
 
 In short, there is no precise definition of the concept of preventive meas-
ures in the general rules of international law, and it is not clear whether that 
concept applies only to preventive measures taken after an accident or 
whether it also includes those taken before the accident. We believe that the 
notion of preventive measures should include measures taken before and 
after a nuclear accident. This is because according to the rules of interna-
tional law, the State in whose territory the nuclear activity is located or under 
whose jurisdiction or control the activity takes place, should issue, for exam-
ple, the authorization for the activity and should enact legislation before 
commencing the activity. These are seen as forms of preventive measures. 
Expanding the concept of preventive measures to cover measures to prevent 
and minimize the damage is reflected in the increased scope of the State’s 
liability. If the preventive measures cover only measures to reduce damage, 
then the State is not liable for the costs of other preventive measures.   
4.3.3 The principle of due diligence  
The principle of due diligence is an old and essential principle in all legal 
systems. It has its basis in the English common law of tort.
88
 It is one of the 
main elements for achieving the objectives of the duty of prevention and 
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serves as a basis for State responsibility in international law. In relation to 
nuclear activities, the principle of due diligence covers the obligation upon 
the State of origin to make every possible effort to prevent environmental 
damage caused by nuclear activity. This requires legislative and administra-
tive controls by the State on private and public conduct in order to protect 
other States and the global environment.
89
 In addition, the obligation of pre-
vention requires the State in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or 
control a hazardous activity is carried out to exercise due diligence, to act 
reasonably and in good faith, and to regulate these activities in order to avoid 
damage to other States and the environment.
90
 To assess whether or not a 
State has complied with the requirement of due diligence, the State’s con-
duct must be assessed in order to find out whether or not it corresponds with 
the existing rules and standards imposed for that conduct. This entails a 
comparison of the State’s conduct with the average standard of conduct of 
other States in similar environmental cases.
91
 For example, the presence or 
absence of proper environmental impact assessments carried out by the In-
stallation State can serve as a standard for determining whether or not due 
diligence has been exercised according to international law. Thus a State is 
responsible if it fails to ensure that its conduct corresponds with the average 
due diligence of other States to prevent significant transboundary environ-
mental damage by a nuclear activity.
92
 The State is also responsible for exer-




 The principle is supported by international instruments and by the doc-
trine of international law.
94
 According to the 1982 UNCLOS, the State is 
obliged to take ‘all measures consistent with this Convention that are neces-
sary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from 
any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal 
and in accordance with their capabilities […]’.
95
 Nevertheless, the standard 
of due diligence necessary to prevent environmental damage has been criti-
cized. It is argued that the State does not have an absolute obligation of due 
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diligence. In the Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project Hun-
gary claimed that:  
‘[T]he duty of prevention is not ... an absolute one, whether the state has ful-
filled its obligations in this regard is measured by the rules of due diligence ... 
In the context of [... this] case, due diligence is the means by which the general 
principle of the harmful use of territory [... should] be applied taking into ac-
count the specific elements of the situation’.
96
  
Moreover, this principle does not impose an obligation on the State of origin 
to achieve specific results. It only imposes the obligation to take reasonable 
care to prevent damage depending on the particular circumstances in a given 
case.
97
 Thus the standard of care for preventing harm under the duty of due 
diligence is flexible rather than absolute. Furthermore, the duty of due dili-
gence in customary international law requires effective national legislative 
and administrative controls. However, this standard is not efficient because 
the conduct of the States applying it remains undefined. More specific defi-
nitions of due diligence are needed, ranging from the best available technol-
ogy, best practicable means and best management practices to more elabo-
rate definitions.
98
 This view was expressed by the Institute of International 
Law in its Draft Articles on Responsibility and Liability under International 
Law for Environmental Damage. These Draft Articles provided that ‘[w]hen 
due diligence is utilized as a test for engaging responsibility it is appropriate 
that it be measured in accordance with objective standards relating to the 
conduct to be expected from a good government and detached from subjec-
tivity. Generally accepted international rules and standards further provide 
an objective measurement for the due diligence test’.
99
 
 Thus the duty of due diligence in relation to the prevention of environ-
mental damage caused by nuclear accidents is problematic. This is because 
the prevention of nuclear accidents requires strict standards of care as far as 
possible in order to meet the demands of the nuclear industry which involves 
the most hazardous activities. Nevertheless, nuclear safety standards estab-
lished by the IAEA are not binding on the States, and only provide guide-
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lines for national safety systems.
100
 In addition, the provisions of the 1994 
Nuclear Safety Convention and other related instruments are formulated in 
the form of recommendations, and do not impose specific obligations on the 
State to prevent nuclear accidents. Similarly, liability for damage caused by 
such activities requires strict standards of liability. This became apparent 
after the 1978 Cosmos 954 accident and the Chernobyl accident, which ne-
cessitated the reformulation of the existing rules of liability to be more spe-




4.3.4 The precautionary principle 
Like most hazardous activities, nuclear activities are usually conducted with 
caution and using precautionary measures. This is necessary to prevent nu-
clear accidents and to reduce the harmful consequences if there is an acci-
dent. Therefore precautions must be taken by the Installation State as well as 
by other States likely to be affected by the harmful consequences of a nu-
clear accident, even before the nuclear activity is carried out. As Wiener 
pointed out, ‘[p]recaution is a strategy for addressing risk. Risk of future 
harm is always uncertain’. Essentially, precaution entails thinking ahead and 
taking pre-emptive action to avoid uncertain future risks. This necessitates 
the capacity to identify hazards and opportunities, to predict scenarios and 
the related outcomes, and to take anticipatory measures against harmful sub-
stances.
102
 According to Van Dyke, the scenarios and strategies covered by 
the precautionary principle should include: the assessment of developments 
and initiatives affecting the environment before an activity is carried out; the 
establishment of new safe programs and standards; exploring alternative 
technologies; not limiting precautionary measures to protect the environment 
in the absence of complete scientific certainty; postponing or cancelling the 
activity whenever serious or irreversible damage is anticipated.
103
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 The precautionary principle is one of the general principles in interna-
tional law necessary for the protection of the environment.
104
 The rules gov-
erning this process constitute a principle of customary international law and 
form the basis of State liability for environmental damage caused by nuclear 
activities. Because of the urgent need to address the environmental problems 
that have emerged with the increasing use of hazardous activities, these rules 
were adopted in several international instruments and have been endorsed by 
some of the doctrine of international law and judicial bodies as a customary 
principle of international law. The principle was supported by the Stockholm 
and Rio Declarations and was included in a number of international instru-
ments. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration provides that: ‘In order to protect 
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental deg-
radation’. This principle presumes that the activity will cause serious harm-
ful consequences to the environment, and that this should be prohibited, and 
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precautions should be taken to reduce risk or injury, even if there is no guar-
antee that there will be risks or injuries.
105
 
 The precautionary principle has been adopted in various national and in-
ternational instruments.
106
 For example, it was adopted in the 1992 Maas-
tricht Treaty in Article 130 R (2).
107
 It was renumbered as Article 174 and 
Article 191 (2) in the Lisbon Treaty,
108
 and appears in German law, Swedish 
law and Swiss law. It was also adopted in the 1999 Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act, the French Environment Charter of 2004, Article 5 and the 
Preamble of the French Constitution of 2005.
109
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 The precautionary principle was addressed in certain individual opinions 
in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan) (Australia v. 
Japan) (Request for Provisional Measures, International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea, 27 August 1999).
110
 However, in this case, the precautionary 
principle was not discussed by the Tribunal, and therefore its recognition as 
a legal principle in international law is questionable. It was considered a pre-
cautionary approach and not a precautionary principle.
111
 The precautionary 
principle was discussed by the judges of the ICJ and received recognition, 
particularly in the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry on “Request 
for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand 
v. France)” Order of 22 September 1995.
112
 The international courts and tri-
bunals are still reluctant to allow the principle the status of customary inter-
national law.
113
 This is because the precautionary principle is still a novel 
principle, which emerged as a result of the increasing use of hazardous activi-
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ties and the ensuing serious environmental problems. This was observed by 
Judge Wolfrum in his separate opinion in the MOX Plant Case, in which he 
stated that: 
‘It is still a matter of discussion whether the precautionary principle or the pre-
cautionary approach in international environmental law has become part of 
customary international law. The Tribunal did not speak of the precautionary 
principle or approach in its Order in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases. Note 
should be taken of the fact, though, that the precautionary principle is part of 
the OSPAR Convention.  
This principle or approach applied in international environmental law reflects 
the necessity of making environment-related decisions in the face of scientific 
uncertainty about the potential future harm of a particular activity. There is no 
general agreement as to the consequences which flow from the implementation 
of this principle other than the fact that the burden of proof concerning the pos-
sible impact of a given activity is reversed. A State interested in undertaking or 
continuing a particular activity has to prove that such activities will not result 




In fact, it could be argued that the precautionary principle is an application 
of the due diligence principle, which imposes an obligation upon the Instal-
lation State to take all the necessary care to control a nuclear activity and to 
ensure that no environmental damage is caused by that activity. There is a 
great deal of literature which discusses the emergence of the precautionary 
principle in international law in general.
115
 However, like any new legal 
principle, it is still controversial and disputed by the doctrine of international 
law, and has not been accepted as a customary or general principle of inter-
national law. Furthermore, some authors doubt that the principle has an envi-
ronmental status. This is because there is scientific uncertainty and the 
straightforward application of the precautionary principle would have meant 
that it was impossible to proceed with any activity.
116
 But, whether it is 
called a precautionary principle or precautionary approach, it suggests the 
creation of a legal principle, which serves as the basis of State responsibility 
for the protection of the environment. It was argued that the precautionary 
principle is an attempt to codify the concept of precaution in law in general, 
and is the most prominent and controversial development in international 
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environmental law in the last two decades. Some authors predict that it could 
become a fundamental principle in policy and law in general for the protec-
tion of the environment.
117
 Brownlie argues that ‘[t]he point which stands 
out is that at least some applications of the precautionary approach, which is 
based upon the principle of foreseeable risk to other States, are encompassed 
within existing concepts of State responsibility’.
118
 Thus the precautionary 
principle will be an effective source of State responsibility to ensure that 
precautionary measures are taken by the State before a nuclear accident to 
prevent environmental damage caused by nuclear activity. 
4.4 The duty of cooperation to control nuclear activity 
In general, the principle of cooperation is a principle in international law
119
 
that is essential to strengthen the social, political and economic relations be-
tween States.
120
 The principle is particularly important with regard to the use 
of nuclear energy as a hazardous activity, and the protection of the environ-
ment.
121
 It is difficult to implement effective measures for the protection of the 
environment, and no State can protect its own environment without close coop-
eration with other States. According to this principle, the Installation State must 
cooperate with other States in good faith, and must provide the relevant in-
formation before and during the proposed activity to prevent any environ-
mental damage which could be caused by a nuclear accident. The States are 
also obliged to cooperate in the event of a nuclear accident, to overcome the 
harmful consequences of the accident, and to restrict its impact as far as pos-
sible. Thus the duty of cooperation has two aims: first, to prevent a nuclear ac-
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 It is clear that damage caused by a nuclear accident may cross the bound-
ary of the State, and that States must cooperate to develop a regulatory re-
gime aimed at the safe operation of a nuclear facility, and to limit the dam-
age as far as possible. This cooperation is mainly based on providing the 
relevant information related to the activity. Thus the obligation of cooperation 
is interrelated with other duties such as notification, consultation and negotia-
tion.
123
 Accordingly, the State must cooperate with other States – particularly 
the neighbouring States – by providing, for example, the relevant information 
for environmental impact assessments, notifications, consultation and negotia-
tions in order to avoid adverse effects on the environment.
124
 This is particu-
larly important because the source State has the right to exercise control not 
only over activities carried out within its own territory, but also when the 
activity is conducted under its jurisdiction or control in areas outside its terri-
tory. However, the concept of control in international law as used by some 
lawyers and in some instruments is still vague and ambiguous.
125
 
 Moreover, it should be noted that the objective of the principle of coop-
eration is incomplete without reference to the role of international organiza-
tions in enhancing the cooperation between States. The main purpose of 
these organizations is to promote cooperation between States for the pur-
poses for which they were established. They play an essential role in the as-
sistance and coordination between States during construction, operation and 
in emergency situations to prevent and reduce damage caused by industrial 
catastrophes.
126
 The IAEA, for example, plays an important role in coordina-
tion between States, and provides the technical assistance during the con-
struction and operation of a nuclear installation, as well as in the event of a 
nuclear accident. Thus the source State is required to cooperate with the af-
fected States and other States and international organizations. 
 The obligation to cooperate to prevent and reduce nuclear damage is 
based on the existing rules adopted by customary international law, interna-
tional conventions and decisions of international courts.
127
 It is reflected in a 
number of international instruments related to the protection of the environ-
ment. The principle has a soft legal status in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
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and the 1992 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development.
128
 Ac-
cording to the Stockholm Declaration: 
‘International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the envi-
ronment should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries, big and 
small, on an equal footing.  
Cooperation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate 
means is essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse 
environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in all spheres, in such 
a way that due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests of all States’.
129
 
The principle of cooperation was developed further with the adoption of the 
1992 Rio Declaration, which provides not only for cooperation between 
States to take effective measures for the protection of the environment, but 
also to develop a national and international regime for liability and compen-
sation for damage caused to the environment.
130
 In its session from 9-25 May 
1978, the Working Group of Experts of the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gram
131
 also prepared draft principles related to cooperation in the field of the 
environment where natural resources are shared by two or more States.
132
 On 
14 November 1974, the Council of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development adopted a Recommendation on Transfrontier Pollution.
133
 
This recommended that Member States cooperate to develop an international 
law regime for transfrontier pollution.
134
 
 The obligation of cooperation between States was further developed in 
the ILC Draft Articles on international liability for acts not prohibited by 
international law. In order to elaborate these draft articles, the Special Rap-
porteur Quentin Baxter proposed a duty of cooperation between States to 
reduce and prevent the damage caused by industrial catastrophes. States are 
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required to cooperate with each other to control the transboundary effects 
resulting from industrial catastrophes, which cause damage to people, prop-
erty and the environment. This was reflected in Article 7 of these Articles, 
which provides for the cooperation between States in good faith, in order to 
prevent and reduce damage caused by such activities. They must endeavour 
to minimise the effects as soon as possible. The Principle was affirmed by 
the ILC Draft Articles on preventing transboundary harm, which state that 
‘States concerned shall cooperate in good faith and, as necessary, seek the 
assistance of one or more competent international organizations in prevent-
ing significant transboundary harm or at any event in minimizing the risk 
thereof.’
135
 This duty was also reflected in the ILC’s codification of the law 
of international watercourses.
136
 Article 8 of the Draft Articles on the Law of 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses provides that ‘water-
course states shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity and mutual benefit in order to attain optimum utilisation and ade-
quate protection of an international watercourse’.
137
 The duty of cooperation 




 The duty of cooperation is also reflected in international practice.
139
 For 
example, it was adopted in Article 3 of the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States,
140
 and in Article 197 of the 1982 UNCLOS. Moreover, after 
the Chernobyl accident, the principle was adopted by the 1986 Convention 
on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. 
This Convention imposes a general duty on the Contracting States to cooper-
ate with each other and with the IAEA to facilitate prompt assistance in the 
event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.
141
 The 1992 Conven-
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tion on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents is aimed at the 
protection of people and the environment from industrial accidents by means 
of preventive measures to prevent industrial accidents, and by providing the 
necessary information and response to accidents in order to reduce the harm-
ful impact of such accidents, including the impact of accidents caused by 
natural disasters. It also provides for international cooperation and mutual 
assistance, research and development, exchange of information and technol-
ogy to prevent accidents caused by industrial technology.
142
 
 The principle of cooperation was also reflected in a number of bilateral 
agreements dealing with nuclear installations. These agreements require the 
full exchange of information between the Installation State and other States 
on the proposed nuclear installation, so that these States can review the deci-
sion-making process, and provide data and comments on safety and protect-
ing human health, and on the rules protecting the environment.
143
 In general, 
a number of bilateral agreements between States were concluded on the op-
eration of nuclear installations on the issues related to liability, radiation pro-
tection and safety of nuclear installations. The basic principles of these 
agreements are quite similar to those provided by multilateral nuclear 
agreements and national laws.
144
 
                                                     
142
 The Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents was adopted on 
17 March 1992 in Helsinki, available at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2006/teia/Convention%20E.pdf (accessed on 
25.01.2010); Article 14 of this Convention which was Article 18 of the draft of the Con-
vention; YILC, 1991, Vol. I, at p. 114, para. 3; Article 13 of the 1992 Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents of 17 May 1992, entered into force on 19 
April 2000, 2105 UNTS 457, (2000); Article 9 of the Barcelona Convention for the Pro-
tection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, signed in Barcelona on 16 February 
1976, and entered into force on 12 February 1978, 15, ILM, 1976, 290 (revised in Barce-
lona, Spain, on 10 June 1995 as the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Envi-
ronment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean, available at: 
http://www.unep.ch/regionalseas/regions/med/t_barcel.htm (accessed on 18.4.2012). 
143
 Alan E. Boyle, “The Principle of Co-operation: The Environment”, in: Colin War-
brick and Vaughan Lowe (eds.), The United Nations and the Principles of International 
Law, Essays in Memory of Michael Akehurst, Taylor & Francis, London, New York, 
2002, pp. 120-136, at p. 124. 
144
 In general, see State Practice Survey on “International Liability for Injuries and Con-
sequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law”, Study prepared by 
the Secretariat, United Nations, General Assembly, A/CN.4/384, 1984; Hardy, ICLQ, 
Vol. 10, 1961, at p. 739; Alley Allan, “Atomic Energy and World Trade”, in: Vand.LR, 
Vol. 12, 1958, pp. 51-80; Harry Street and F. R. Frame, “Law Relating to Nuclear En-
ergy”, Butter Worths, 1966, pp. 199-200; IAEA, “Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral 
Agreements Relating to Co-operation in the Field of Nuclear Safety”, Legal Series No. 
15, 1990; Lefeber, 1996, at p. 241. 
148 CHAPTER 4 
 
 A number of agreements were concluded between neighbouring countries 
on the operation of nuclear power plants. Some of these agreements were 
adopted with an exchange of letters. For example, the agreement between 
Belgium and France on Radiological Protection for the Operation of the Ar-
dennes Nuclear Power Station in French territory near the Belgian border 
was signed on 23 September 1966.
145
 The agreement between Denmark and 
the Federal Republic of Germany for the exchange of information regarding 
the construction of nuclear installations along the border was signed on 4 
July 1977.
146
 There was an exchange of letters on 16 July 1976 between 
France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the prevention of the 
accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons that might cause injuries 
to the other Contracting Party.
147
 The agreement between Germany and 
Switzerland for the reciprocal provision of information concerning the con-
struction and operation of nuclear installations in frontier areas was signed in 
Bonn on 10 August 1982.
148
 Although these agreements are not directly 
relevant to the question of liability, they contain obligations for the States 
parties to observe international standards of safety for the construction and 
operation of nuclear power plants. States would be subject to international 
liability in the case of a breach of these obligations. 
 The duty of cooperation was affirmed in the Lake Lanoux arbitration be-
tween France and Spain in 1957.
149
 It was applied by the ITLOS in the case 
concerning the MOX Plant, which was been brought by Ireland against the 
United Kingdom in 2001. Ireland requested the Tribunal to order provisional 
measures to oblige the UK to suspend the authorization of the MOX Plant, 
and to take the necessary measures to prevent its operation of the plant, and 
to ensure that there was no movement by water of radioactive substances or 
material or waste into or out of its sovereign territory.
150
 Accordingly, the 
Tribunal ordered the two States to cooperate and to consult on this matter for 
that purpose. The judgement stated:  
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‘Ireland and the United Kingdom shall cooperate and shall, for this purpose, 
enter into consultations forthwith in order to: (a) exchange further information 
with regard to possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the com-
missioning of the MOX plant; monitor risks or the effects of the operation of 
the MOX plant for the Irish Sea; devise, as appropriate, measures to prevent 




The same Tribunal pronounced a similar judgement in the Case Concerning 
Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor. In its 
judgment, the Tribunal ordered the two parties to consult and cooperate to 




 In conclusion, the Installation State must cooperate with other States 
which are likely to be affected by a nuclear activity, particularly with the 
neighbouring States and the competent organizations to prevent damage 
caused by such installations, and to provide assistance in the event of a nu-
clear accident. This cooperation must be pursued during the different phases 
of the nuclear activity both before and during the activity, and in the event of 
a nuclear accident. The cooperation may take different forms, including pro-
viding the relevant information about the proposed activity, environmental 
impact assessments, the exchange of information, providing information to 
the public, consultation, notifying other States in the event of a nuclear acci-
dent and providing assistance in the event of a nuclear accident. The coop-
eration on these issues is aimed at controlling the activity, and preventing 
environmental damage to other States. This requires close cooperation be-
tween the source State, the States likely to be affected by the activity and the 
international organizations concerned.  
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4.5 Conclusions  
This chapter investigated the legal basis of the principle of prevention as an 
essential principle of international law which is necessary when nuclear ac-
tivities are conducted to prevent and reduce damage caused by a nuclear ac-
cident. The investigation concludes that the principle of prevention is a fun-
damental principle which has emerged in the corpus of contemporary 
international law. It is aimed at the prevention and reduction of environmental 
damage by a hazardous activity. The principle is a general principle in interna-
tional law that can apply to environmental damage caused not only by nuclear 
activities, but also by other hazardous activities in general. In addition, there is 
evidence in international law that the principle of prevention has become a 
principle of customary international law. Moreover, the principle of prevention 
is based on cooperation between States to meet the numerous general and 
procedural obligations which are necessary to ensure the safe operation of a 
nuclear installation. These obligations constitute the core of the principle of 
prevention and should be fulfilled by the Installation State and other States 
to prevent and reduce environmental damage caused by a nuclear activity. 
Some of these principles emerged in international law a long time ago, e.g., 
the principle of due diligence, while others developed recently, e.g., the pre-
cautionary principle. These principles form the fundamental obligations 
which constitute the basis of the obligation of prevention, and are considered 
by some authors to form the basis for liability under international law in 
general, and for environmental damage in particular. However, some of the-
se principles are not accepted as customary international law, for example, 
the precautionary principle. These general conclusions lead to some other 
conclusions. 
 First, with regard to the principle of prevention, there are two main pro-
cedural duties on any State conducting a nuclear activity. These include the 
duties of the Installation State to control the nuclear activity and not to cause 
environmental damage to other States, and to cooperate with States likely to 
be affected by the activity and with international organizations. Control of 
the activity by the Installation State and close cooperation with States likely 
to be affected by the activity are necessary to avoid the occurrence of nuclear 
accidents and to prevent and reduce their harmful consequences. Therefore, 
the principle of cooperation between States is required for the principle of 
prevention to be effective in preventing a nuclear accident.  
 Secondly, these obligations form the content of the general obligation of 
prevention under international law to prevent and reduce environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident. This general obligation requires the 
Installation State to take precautionary measures, observe due diligence and 
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take preventive measures to prevent and reduce damage caused by a nuclear 
accident. However, a distinction has been made between the obligation of 
prevention and the obligation to reduce the harmful consequences. The obli-
gation of prevention obliges the Source State to take the necessary measures 
to prevent a nuclear accident as well as its harmful consequences. This 
means that under the principle of prevention, preventive measures must be 
taken before and after a nuclear accident. However, the obligation of reduc-
tion only obliges the source State to take the necessary measures to reduce 
the consequences after a nuclear accident. In other words, the principle of 
prevention applies in the event of new environmental damage caused by a 
hazardous activity, while the principle of reduction applies to reduce the ex-
isting damage caused by the activity. 
 Thirdly, the State is not allowed to carry out nuclear activities without 
observing due diligence or due care. In general, the principle of due diligence 
requires the State to impose legislative and administrative measures on private 
and public activities within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control. The 
State has to exercise due diligence, to act reasonably and in good faith, and to 
regulate such activities in order to avoid damage to other States and the envi-
ronment. Assessing whether or not a State has complied with the requirement 
of due diligence is subject to a comparison of its conduct with the conduct of 
other States in similar environmental cases. Thus the principle is based on a 
comparison of the State’s conduct with the average conduct of other States. The 
failure of a State to meet this standard, based on the existing legislation and 
regulations, constitutes State responsibility. Nevertheless, the prevention of a 
nuclear accident under the principle is not absolute because the duty of due 
diligence is not absolute. The principle does not impose an obligation upon the 
Installation State to achieve certain results. It only obliges it to take reasonable 
care to prevent a nuclear accident depending on the particular circumstances. In 
addition, the nuclear safety standards established by the IAEA in the existing 
instruments for the safety of nuclear installations are formulated in the form of 
recommendations. Thus the due diligence doctrine does not meet the require-
ments of nuclear energy, which needs strict standards and rules that can prevent 
nuclear accidents.  
 Finally, the application of the precautionary principle is important to pre-
vent environmental damage caused by nuclear activities. However, the status 
of the principle is still disputed. The precautionary principle is not consid-
ered a general principle or approach. The principle recently emerged and is 
still controversial as a principle of customary international law. It is based on 
the fact that the State must take all possible preventive measures to prevent a 
nuclear accident. The failure of a State to take such measures constitutes 
State responsibility. Therefore the precautionary principle is an application 
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of the principle of due diligence, which is considered as a general principle 
applicable in different cases. The precautionary principle is an efficient prin-
ciple for the protection of the environment, and has emerged as a legal princi-
ple forming the basis of State responsibility for environmental damage caused 





5 THE PROCEDURAL RULES AND OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR 
CONSTRUCTION OF A NUCLEAR 
INSTALLATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
OBLIGATION OF PREVENTION AND 
REDUCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
5.1 Introduction 
The protection of people and the environment from the hazards arising from 
nuclear power plants has been a matter of great concern since the very be-
ginning of the use of nuclear reactors.
1
 Therefore the construction and opera-
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tion of nuclear power plants have always been subject to strict conditions 
and procedures to ensure their safe operation.
2
 To prevent potential trans-
boundary environmental damage resulting from these installations, interna-
tional law prescribes that certain procedures be performed by the Installation 
State with the cooperation of affected States and the international organiza-
tions concerned prior to the construction, during the operation, and after the 
termination of a nuclear reactor installation.
3
 Though consistent with the 
rules of international law, the procedural obligations are determined by State 
authorities in accordance with national law and are implemented by the op-
erating body and competent authorities.
4
 
 Accordingly, the Installation State must establish a comprehensive regu-
latory regime to organize and to ensure the safe operation of nuclear installa-
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http://www.nea.fr/rp/reports/2010/nea6407-occupational-rp.pdf (accessed on 21.2.2012). 
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 Such procedures must be maintained and implemented by the State at the time of au-
thorization and while the activity is in progress or in case of a nuclear accident. The State 
should take preventive measures during planning, construction, operation, and decom-
missioning of a nuclear reactor installation. For instance, safety assessments of a nuclear 
facility must be continually implemented by the State throughout the lifetime of the facil-
ity. See Tromans and FitzGerald, 1997, at p. 72. 
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tion for other OECD Countries, available at: http://www.nea.fr/law/legislation/ (accessed 
on 19.2.2012). 




 and liability for nuclear damage caused by such installations.
6
 It 
should also determine the person responsible for the operation and imple-
mentation of the relevant safety standards
7
 and design a regulatory body to 
regulate and ensure the implementation of the legislative and regulatory re-
gime.
8
 The Installation State must also select the suitable site for the plant;
9
 
conduct environmental impact assessments before authorizing or licensing 
the construction of the plant;
10
 and ensure that the design, construction,
11
 and 
operation of the installation are performed in accordance with rigorous 
safety requirements.
12
 Moreover, it should inform and provide all relevant 
and available information to the public and the States likely to be affected by 
the activity.
13
 Finally, the Installation State is obliged to enter into consulta-
tion and negotiations at its own request, the request of the affected States, or 
both, and to cooperate to prevent and reduce damage caused by a nuclear 
catastrophe.
14
 These are general obligations of international law that also 
apply to other hazardous activities.
15
 They comprise the obligation of pre-
vention in international law and focus on the regulation of the activity and 
the obligation of a State to provide the relevant information about an activity 
to States likely to be affected so as to prevent and reduce potential damage.
16
 
Thus cooperation between States is an essential requirement in international 
law to implement these procedural obligations.
17
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view”, OECD Paris 2003, available at: http://www.nea.fr/law/legislation/nea4268-
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ternational Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005, pp. 241-280, at pp. 
248-249. 
14
 Farrajota, 2005, at p. 296. 
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 See generally, Veronica A. Santos, “The International Liability for Hazardous Ex-
ports”, in: PLJ, Vol. 61, 1986, pp. 349-362, at p. 355. 
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 Boyle, MP, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1992, at pp. 20-22. 
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 See Article 4 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities, See Report of the International Law Commission to the Gen-
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 These procedural obligations are considered to be customary and general 
principles of international law.
18
 They were embodied in the ILC Draft Arti-
cles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm and Principles of International 
Liability.
19
 They must be fulfilled in good faith by the Source State, the af-
fected States, other States, and the international organizations concerned.
20
 
The obligation of good faith is itself a fundamental principle of international 
law included in the pacta sunt servanda to ensure the fulfillment of treaty 
objectives.
21
 The violation of these obligations generates State responsibility 
for wrongful acts under the general rules of international law.
22
 According to 
Article 12 of the ILC 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, ‘[t]here is 
a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is 
not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of 
                                                                                                                            
eral Assembly, U.N. Doc A/56/10; GOAR, 56 Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in 
YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 146 and with commentaries, p. 148, Article 4, p. 
155, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2); Articles 5 (2) and 8 of the 1997 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigation Uses of International 
Watercourses, General Assembly Resolution 51/229, Annex, Official Records of the 
General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/51/49), 21 May 1997; 
Principle 24 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declara-
tion.  
18
 For customary and general international law principles, see Kiss and Shelton, 2004, 
pp. 175-223; Rosemary Rayfuse, “International Environmental Law”, in: Sam Blay, 
Ryszard Piotrowicz, and B. Martin Tsamenyi (eds.), Public International Law: An Aus-
tralian Perspective, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Melbourne-Oxford-
Auckland-New York, 2005, pp. 354-378, at pp. 358-362, see also 1997 edition, pp. 355-
381, at pp. 364-365.  
19
 The 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_7_2001.pdf (ac-
cessed on 25.2.2012). 
20
 See Article 4 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm; 
Article 8 (1) of the 1997 Convention of International Watercourses. 
21
 Articles 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded at Vi-
enna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980,S. TREATY DOC. No. 92-12, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, (1980), available also at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (accessed 
on 2.9.2009); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, “State Responsibility and the ‘Good Faith’ Obliga-
tion in International Law”, in: Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Dan Sarooshi (eds.), Issues of 
State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
and Portland Oregon, England, 2004, pp. 75-104, at p. 90. 
22
 A. E. Boyle, “Globalizing Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and In-
ternational Law”, in: JEL, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2005, pp. 3-26, at p. 3. See generally, Craw-
ford, Pellet and Olleson (eds.), 2010, (Discussing international law of State responsibility 
with a special focus on the work of the ILC).   
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its origin or character’.
23
 Thus, State responsibility is a means to ensure the 
fulfillment of international obligations by States.
24
 
 These procedural obligations play an important part in determining the 
content of a State’s due diligence obligation to ensure the safe operation of a 
nuclear installation. For example, if a State has failed to conduct an envi-
ronmental impact assessment or to notify the public and allow it to partici-
pate in the decision-making process, it cannot claim that it has effectively 
fulfilled its obligations and the broader duty of due diligence.
25
 This chapter 
seeks to thoroughly investigate these obligations and to clarify their applica-
tion in practice. It has been argued that:  
‘[V]ery little explicit attention has been paid to the legal implications of these 
obligations. A systematic treatment of this subject is omitted in most of the 
major works. In particular, the precise method of complying with the obliga-
tions in treaty instruments, as well as the legal consequences of non-
compliance, remain unclear... For instance, the construction of a nuclear reac-
tor, as the Chernobyl accident graphically demonstrates, could affect the terri-
tories of most States however far removed from the scene of an accident... Yet, 
it remains unclear which States are entitled to notification or consultation when 
nuclear installations are proposed or when accidents occur’.
26
 
Therefore the examination of these obligations has become an urgent matter 
in this study. 
 Because these procedural obligations are mainly based on conventional 
law, the examination of these obligations is based on existing provisions of 
nuclear conventions and other provisions in international instruments related 
to the environment. They can be examined in three phases, viz. the proce-
dural obligations of the Installation State before the operation of a nuclear 
installation, its obligations during the operation of a nuclear installation, and 
its obligations in the event of a nuclear accident. However, this chapter ex-
amines them from another perspective: Section 5.2 examines pre-accident 
obligations while Section 5.3 examines post-accident obligations. This is 
because the obligation of prevention does not distinguish between the obli-
gations of the State before and during the operation of a nuclear installation, 
while one can easily distinguish between the pre-accident obligations (i.e., 
                                                     
23
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session (23 
April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001), DOC. A/56/10, Article 12, the 2001 Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commen-
taries, U.N. Doc A/56/10 (2001). 
24
 Graefrath, RDC, Vol. 185, Part II, 1984, at p. 19. 
25
 Okowa, 2000, at p. 97. 
26
 Phoebe N. Okowa, “Procedural Obligations in International Environmental Agree-
ments”, in: BYIL, Vol. 57, 1996, pp. 275-335, at p. 276. 
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the duty of a State to control a nuclear activity) and post-accident obligations 
(i.e., notification and assistance in case of a nuclear accident).
27
 For example, 
the obligation to authorize a nuclear installation is a pre-operation obligation, 
while the obligation for an environmental impact assessment to be carried 
out by the Installation State may apply both before the construction of a nu-
clear installation and during its operation. Thus, both are more aptly charac-
terized as pre-accident obligations. However, the obligations to make early 
notification and to provide prompt assistance have to be fulfilled by the 
States after a nuclear accident occurs and are characterized as post-accident 
obligations. 
5.2 Pre-accident obligations: The duty of a State to control 
a nuclear activity 
This section examines certain procedural rules and obligations that must be 
fulfilled by the Installation State, potentially affected States, and the interna-
tional organizations concerned in order to control nuclear activity to prevent 
and reduce damage to people and the environment.
28
 These obligations are 
pre-nuclear accident obligations, which apply before the operation of a nu-
clear installation, during the preparation and construction, and during the 
operation by the Installation State; they apply before the occurrence of a nu-
clear accident. These obligations include: establishing a legislative and regu-
latory regime to organize the operation of a nuclear installation; carrying out 
an environmental impact assessment to ensure that the activity does not have 
a harmful impact on the environment; designating the operating body re-
sponsible for the operation of the installation; providing prior authorization 
to the operating body that determines the required conditions for the safe 
operation of a nuclear installation; taking care of nuclear reactor installation 
safety; and inspecting the application of these rules.
29
 These obligations con-
cern the sources of information to be provided by the Installation State to 
other States and the international organizations concerned.
30
  
 An Installation State, therefore, is obliged to provide potentially affected 
States and international organizations concerned with the relevant informa-
                                                     
27
 Sands, 1988, at pp. 34-40; Katia Boustany, “Chernobyl: Law and Communication by 
Philippe Sands, Grotius Publications Limited, Cambridge UK, 1988”, Book Review, in: 
CYIL, Vol. 27, 1989, pp. 497-501, at p. 501. 
28
 For procedural principle in international environmental law see, Nanda and Pring, 
2003, pp. 43-62. 
29
 David A. Wirth, “Hazardous Substances and Activities”, in: Bodansky, Brunnée and 
Hey (eds.), 2007, pp. 394-422, at p. 417. 
30
 Sands, 2003, pp. 827-868. 
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tion necessary to avoid environmentally harmful consequences that might be 
caused by such installations.
31
 It is obliged to give them prior notification 
before the construction of an installation and to consult, negotiate, and ex-
change information with them in order to establish a mechanism that guaran-
tees the safe operation of the installation.
32
 It must also provide the public 
with the relevant information with which to ensure the safe operation of the 
installation.
33
 These obligations, respectively, will be subject to examination 
in this Section in two parts. Section 5.2.1 deals with the procedural obliga-
tions and rules that are mainly performed by the Installation State to ensure 
the safe operation of a nuclear installation. Section 5.2.2 addresses the obli-
gations required for cooperation between the Installation State and the af-
fected States in providing the necessary information to prevent environ-
mental damage caused by a nuclear installation. 
5.2.1 Obligations of the State to ensure the safe operation of a 
nuclear installation 
This Section deals with the procedural obligations of the Installation State to 
maintain the safe operation of a nuclear installation in five subsections, re-
spectively: the establishment of a legislative and regulatory regime in Sec-
tion 5.2.1.1, designation of the person who is liable for the operation in Sec-
tion 5.2.1.2, environmental impact assessment in Section 5.2.1.3, prior 
authorization in Section 5.2.1.4, and the care of nuclear reactor installation 
safety in Section 5.2.1.5. 
5.2.1.1 The establishment of a legislative and regulatory regime 
One of the basic requirements for conducting hazardous activities is that the 
Installation State must establish a regulatory framework to organize the op-
eration of the proposed activity that meets international standards and obli-
gations.
34
 According to the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Trans-
                                                     
31
 These obligations have been embodied in different instruments of international law. 
See, e.g., Article 8 of the 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities. 
32
 Jon M. Van Dyke “The Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultra-hazardous 
Radioactive Materials”, in: ODIL, Vol. 33, 2002, pp. 77-108, at pp. 84-86, available at: 
http://www.hawaii.edu/elp/publications/faculty/JVD/Ultrahazardous_Radioactive_Mater
ials.pdf (accessed on 12.10.2010). 
33
 See Jonas Ebbesson, “Public Participation”, in: Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey (eds.), 
2007, pp. 681-703, at pp. 698-699. 
34
 Article 5 of the 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm for Haz-
ardous Activities. The Installations State conducting a nuclear activity usually creates 
nuclear legislation to organize the operation of the activity which embodies the princi-
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boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, ‘States concerned shall take the 
necessary legislative, administrative or other action, including the establish-
ment of suitable monitoring mechanisms to implement the provisions of the 
present articles’.
35
 However, the nature and scope of this regulatory regime 
have been left to be determined by the Source State according to the re-
quirements and circumstances of the activity.
36
 This gives the Source State 
more flexibility to expand or to limit the substance of the regulations in ac-
cordance with the Articles. In Europe, for example, Directive 85/337/EEC of 
June 27, 1985 obliges the Member States to enact national environmental 
impact assessment legislation based on the Directive by July 1988. Accord-
ingly, most of the Member States and some European non-Member States 
have enacted legislation that embodies the provisions of the Directive.
37
 
Similarly, the 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participa-
tion in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
provides that, ‘each Party shall take the necessary legislative, regulatory and 
other measures, including measures to achieve compatibility between the 
provisions implementing the information, public participation and access-to-
justice provisions in this Convention, as well as proper enforcement meas-
ures, to establish and maintain a clear, transparent and consistent framework 
to implement the provisions of this Convention’.
38
  
 This is also supported by Articles 207 and 213 of the UNCLOS.
39
 Article 
207 of this Convention obliges States to adopt laws and regulations and to 
take other measures in accordance with international standards to prevent, 
reduce, and control environmental damage from land-based sources.
40
 It also 
                                                                                                                            
ples provided for in international agreements. For instance, national nuclear liability leg-
islation includes the same principles and rules provided for in a nuclear liability conven-
tion which is party to it. 
35
 Article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities. 
36
 Lammers, HYIL, Vol. 14, 2001, at p. 10. 
37
 Kiss and Shelton, 1997, at p. 124. 
38
 Article 3 (1) of the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, June 25, 1998, 
2161 UNTS 447.  
39
 See also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded at Montego Bay 
on 10 December 1982, entered into force on 28 July 1994, [UNCLOS] Articles 211, 212, 
217, 222, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. Article 211 discusses the establishment of 
regulatory regimes to prevent, reduce and control pollution from vessels in the marine 
environment and Article 217 provides for enforcement of such rules by the flag States. 
Article 212 provides for the obligation of States to establish regulatory regimes to pre-
vent pollution from or through the atmosphere and Article 222 for the enforcement of 
such regulations. 
40
 Article 207 of the UNCLOS. 
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obliges States to ensure that these laws, regulations, and measures are de-
signed to reduce and control, to the fullest extent possible, the release of ra-
dioactive substances into the marine environment.
41
 However, Article 213 of 
the Convention merely obliges States to ensure that these measures are im-
plemented in accordance with international standards.
42
 
 Such a regulatory regime is needed to implement the rules and provisions 
of the relevant instruments established by the States to organize the activity. 
In the absence of such a regulatory regime, the operation of the activity is 
governed by the general rules of international law.
43
 The State is responsible 
if it has failed to enact and enforce international environmental obligations.
44
 
Thus the establishment of such a regulatory regime is an essential condition 
for the Installation State to conduct nuclear activities. 
 Despite the fact that most nuclear activities used for peaceful purposes 
are conducted by private enterprises, they are closely supervised and con-
trolled by the Installation State which determines the conditions and rules for 
conducting them in accordance with its national nuclear legislation.
45
 There-
fore specialized nuclear institutions have been established in nuclear States 
to regulate and implement these rules and to ensure that nuclear activities are 
conducted in accordance with the existing international obligations and stan-
dards.
46
 This is a general principle recognized in international law, which is 
included, for example, in the nuclear liability conventions that included the 




 Thus the Installation State is obliged to establish a regulatory regime and 
to enact legislative and administrative regulations before the authorization of 
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rine Environment of the Irish Sea”, Ireland v. United Kingdom, Vol. I, 26 July 2002, at 
p. 206-209, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1148 (accessed 
on 1.3.2012). 
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 Okowa, 2000, at p. 115. 
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in: AJH, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2008, pp. 221-252, at p. 232. 
45
 Helth and Safety Executive, “The Licensing of Nuclear Installations”, at p. 5, available 
at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/notesforapplicants.pdf (accessed on 26.2.2012). 
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 See, e.g., NEA, Nuclear Legislation in OECD Countries 2003, at p. 22. Legislation for 
other OECD Countries is available at: http://www.nea.fr/law/legislation/ (accessed on 
19.10.2010). 
47
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sion””, in: NLB, No. 61, 1998, pp. 39-53, at pp. 51-52. 
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a nuclear activity and to incorporate international rules and principles into 
national law.
48
 However, it is entitled to receive assistance from the IAEA in 
the drafting of such a regulatory regime.
49
 The IAEA and other international 
organizations enact nonbinding instruments, which are considered soft law 
and guidance for the States in enacting nuclear legislation.
50
 Therefore, the 
IAEA has a supervisory role to ensure that such regulations have been en-
acted and implemented in accordance with international standards.  
 Such a regulatory regime should comprehensively include all regulations 
organizing the activity, such as legislation for the protection of the environ-
ment, nuclear safety, liability, determining of the authorities responsible for 
implementing such regulations, and other regulatory regimes required for the 
safe operation of nuclear installations.
51
 The implementation of these regula-
tions by the Installation State is the cornerstone of the obligation of preven-
tion of nuclear accidents. 
5.2.1.2 Designation of the liable person 
According to the 2006 ILC Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the 
Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, the des-
ignation of the person who is liable for the operation, maintenance, and safe 
operation of a nuclear installation, as well as compensation for the victims in 
case of a nuclear accident caused by such activity is an essential obligation 
in international law.
52
 The Draft Principles establish the general framework 
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Doc. A/CN.4/423, YILC, 1989, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 141, para. 66, UN Doc. 
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for international regimes of liability for damage caused by hazardous activi-
ties.
53
 The Principles define the operator of a hazardous activity as ‘any per-
son in command or control of the activity at the time the incident causing 
transboundary damage occurs’.
54
 According to the Draft Principles, the per-
son liable for a hazardous activity is the operator of the activity.
55
 The ‘“Op-
erator” means any natural or legal person, including public authorities, in 
charge of an activity, e.g. supervising, planning to carry out or carrying out 
an activity’.
56
 The operator is obliged to ensure prompt and adequate com-
pensation to victims of transboundary damage caused by hazardous activi-
ties.
57
 The operator is also obliged to preserve and protect the environment 
from hazards and transboundary damage caused by such activities, to take 
the necessary preventive measures to mitigate damage caused to the envi-
ronment, and to restore and reinstate the environment to its previous condi-
tion.
58
 The Principles have freed the Installation State from liability for dam-
age caused by hazardous activities conducted within its territory or under its 
jurisdiction or control
59
 unless it has failed to perform due diligence, which 
may constitute international responsibility according to State responsibility 
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56
 Article 1 (e) of the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects by Industrial Acci-
dents, adopted in Helsinki on Mar. 17-18, 1992, entered into force on 19 April 2000, 
2105 U.N.T.S. 457, (2000), available also at: 
http://www.kimyasallar.cevreorman.gov.tr/docs/sozlesmeler/conventiontransboundaryeff
ectsonaccident.pdf (accessed on 3.9.2010). 
57
 Principle 3 (a) of the ILC Draft principles on the allocation of loss.  
58
 Principle 3 (a) of the ILC Draft principles on the allocation of loss; P. S. Rao, First 
Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, UN Doc. A/CN.4/531 (21 May 2003), at pp. 50-52, 
para. 153.  
59
 Foster, RECIEL, Vol. 14, Issue 3, 2005, at p. 265. 




 By holding the operator of the activity liable, the Princi-
ples have taken the same approach adopted by the “polluter pays” principle, 
which imposes the liability for environmental damage upon the polluter or 
the source of the damage, and the approach of the international civil liability 
conventions, which also imposes the liability for environmental damage 
caused by hazardous activities upon the operator of the activity.
61
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http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/HNS/Civil%20Liability%20offshore.pdf (accessed on 
13.4.2012); http://www.dipublico.com.ar/english/convention-on-civil-liability-for-oil-
pollution-damage-resulting-from-exploration-and-exploitation-of-seabed-mineral-
resources/ (accessed on 13.4.2012); Article 8 of the 1988 Convention on the Regulation 
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), 2 June 1988, 27 I.L.M. 859 (not 
in force), also available at: http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/acrc/cramra.txt.html (ac-
cessed on 3.9.2010); Articles 5-8 of the 1989 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage 
Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Ves-
sels (CRTD, adopted 10 October 1989, Doc. ECE/TRANS/79 (not in force), available 
also at: http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/crtd_e.html (accessed on 3.9.2010); 
Article 4 of the Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage of 29 November 1969, adopted at Brussels on Nov. 27, 1992, en-
tered into force on 30 May 1996, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255, (1997), available also at: 
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/protocivilpol1992.html (accessed on 
3.9.2010); Articles 17-19 of the 1999 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
International Carriage by Air, adopted in Montreal, May 28, 1999, entered into force on 
4 November 2003, May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309, (2004), available also at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/3/5/11624.pdf (accessed on 3.9.2010); The 
1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, adopted Dec. 10, 1999, 
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The State is obliged to take all necessary measures to ensure the avail-
ability of prompt and adequate compensation for victims of transboundary 
damage caused by hazardous activities carried out within its territory or un-
der its jurisdiction or control.
62
 These measures include imposing strict li-
ability upon the operator or other liable party
63
 and requiring the liable per-
son to maintain financial security, such as insurance or any other financial 
coverage, sufficient to cover his or her liability.
64
 Moreover, ‘these measures 
should include the requirement for the establishment of industry-wide funds 
at the national level’.
65
 Finally, these measures should include additional 
compensation provided by the State of origin to ensure the fulfillment of the 
liability of the operator in the event that the initial compensation is insuffi-
cient to cover all damage caused by the accident.
66
   
 Thus the Articles were adopted in the form of principles, similar to the 
principles of liability embodied in the nuclear liability conventions except 
that they are not binding on the States.
67
 The Contracting Parties to the nu-
clear liability conventions are obliged to enact national legislation which 
includes, of course, the nuclear liability principles adopted by the conven-
                                                                                                                            
Doc. UNEP/CHW .1/WG/1/9/2 (not in force), available also at: 
http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/06/6-07/liability-transboundary-
movements.xml (accessed on 3.9.2010); Article 3 (1) of the 2001 International Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Banker Oil Pollution Damage (BUNKER), adopted Mar. 23, 




cessed on 18.4.2012); Article 3 (1) of the 2009 Convention on Compensation for Dam-
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United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization, DCCD Doc. No. 42, 1/5/09, 
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http://www.icao.int/DCCD2009/docs/DCCD_doc_42_en.pdf (accessed on 18.4.2012); 
Article 7 (1) of the International Conference on the Revision of the HNS Convention: 
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Maritime Organization LEG/CONF.17/3 (not open for signature; not in force) available 
at: http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/HNS/LEG-CONF.17-3.pdf (accessed on 23.4.2012). 
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63
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 Matheson, AJIL, Vol. 99, No. 1, 2005), at p. 212.  




 In the absence of such legislation they are obliged to apply the nu-
clear liability conventions themselves to the issues of nuclear liability.
69
 
 Accordingly, designation of the liable person for the operation of a nu-
clear installation and compensation for the resulting nuclear damage from 
nuclear activities are governed by the nuclear liability conventions.
70
 These 
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bridge, Grotius Publications Limited, England, 1992, at p. 388. For nuclear liability leg-
islation see, OECD/NEA, “Nuclear Legislation: Third Party Liability”, OECD, Paris 
1990. The national nuclear liability regimes include the principles of nuclear liability 
adopted in the nuclear liability conventions, except some legislation such as the USA 
legislation which adopted the principles of the common law. However, the principles of 
liability under the nuclear liability conventions are different from those under the com-
mon law. The liability of the operator under the nuclear liability conventions, for in-
stance, is based only on the principle of absolute liability, while the liability under the 
common law may be based on the principle of absolute liability or any other liability 
principle such fault or negligence of the operator.  Consequently, it is easy to attribute 
the liability for damage caused by a nuclear accident to the operator according to the 
principle of absolute liability, while it is difficult to prove it according to the principle of 
fault liability because the proof of the operator’s fault is a difficult task in relation to 
nuclear damage which in some cases may take a few decades to develop. 
69
 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “La responsabilité internationale des États pour les dommages 
d’origine technologique et industrielle”, Paris, A. Pedone 1976, at pp. 118-120. 
70
 The 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, adopted 
July, 29 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of Jan. 28, 1964, by the Protocol 
of Nov. 16, 1982 and by the Protocol of Feb. 12, 2004, Nuclear Energy Agency 
NE(2002)6/REV1 (2004) available at: http://www.nea.fr/html/law/paris_convention.pdf 
[hereinafter Paris Convention]; Convention of Jan. 31, 1963 Supplementary to the Paris 
Convention of July 29, 1960, as amended by the additional Protocol of Jan. 28, 1964 and 
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conventions define the liable person as ‘any individual or partnership or any 
public or private body, whether corporate or not, any international organisation 
enjoying legal personality under the law of the installation State, including a 
State or any of its constituent subdivisions’.
71
 Thus the conventions defined the 
liable person as broadly as possible in order to overcome the differences in the 
definitions of the liable person under different national liability laws.
72
 The fact 
that, it was taken into account nuclear installations may be operated by either 
private operators or by the State itself. It is known that the majority of nuclear 
installations are operated by private operators, while in some cases a Contract-
ing Party to a nuclear liability convention may serve as a nuclear operator, as 
is often the case for research installations and in developing countries.
73
 For 
example, the 1962 Nuclear Ships Convention stipulates that a Contracting 
Party can serve as an operator of a nuclear ship.
74
 In one specific example, 
when the ship, the Savanna, was transferred from an agent of the US gov-
ernment (American Export Isbrandtsen Lines) to a private company (Fast 
Company), liability for any potential nuclear damage was also transferred 
from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to the private company.
75
 How-
ever, there are also international nuclear installations that are operated coop-
                                                                                                                            
Oct. 4, 2003); For the Consolidated Text of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage as Amended by the 1997 Vienna Convention Protocol, Article I (1) (a) 
and Article II, see IAEA Doc. GOV/INF822/Add.1; GC(41)/INF/13/Add.1 of 23 Sep-
tember 1997); Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, (Part I, 
SCNL/17.I/INF.7 and Part II, SCNL/17.II/INF.7), IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/822/Add.1-
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ence, Legal Series No. 2, Vienna, 29 April-19 May 1963, IAEA, Vienna 1964, at p. 72, 
para. 37. 
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74
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75
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8, 1972, pp. 125-129, at p. 127. 
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eratively by several States, such as “the Joint Institute in Dubna” and “the 
European Company for the Chemical Processing of Irradiated Fuels”, as well 
as research installations and laboratories operated by international organiza-
tions such as those operated by the IAEA.
76
 Such installations are considered 
nuclear installations under the Vienna Convention when they meet the defi-
nition of a nuclear installation given in Article I (j) of the Convention. 
Therefore, they are governed by the agreement concluded for the establish-
ment of the company or organization. In the absence of a provision in these 
agreements or of any agreement concluded with the host State that provides 
to the contrary, the matter in relation to civil liability is governed by the na-
tional legislation of the Installation State in whose territory the installation is 




 The liable person, as identified by the nuclear liability conventions, is the 
operator authorized by the Installation State to operate a nuclear installation 
or to carry out a nuclear activity.
78
 However, there are others involved in the 
nuclear industry, such as those who replenish nuclear installations with nu-
clear substances or who reprocess nuclear wastes. In the absence of a liable 
operator of a nuclear installation, the legislation of the Installation State may 
instead designate the carrier or the person handling radioactive waste as a 
liable operator.
79
 Furthermore, a person other than the operator of a nuclear 
installation may be designated as the liable operator according to any earlier 
transportation agreement in force before the adoption of a nuclear liability 
convention or in the case of means of transport.
80
 Moreover, in some cases, 
there are other persons who are designated jointly and severally liable with 
the operator for damage caused by a nuclear accident, particularly if no indi-
vidual liability is identified.
81
 Similarly, liability might be shared among 
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 IAEA, Legal Series No. 2, 1964, at p. 70, para. 31. 
77
 IAEA, Legal Series No. 2, 1964, at p. 70, para. 31. 
78
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79
 Article II (2) of the 1963 Vienna Convention. 
80
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81
 Article 5 (d) of the Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the 
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several consignments involved in an accident if the individual cause of an 
accident cannot be ascertained.
82
  
 The designated operator should maintain insurance or other financial se-
curity to cover his liability according to the applicable nuclear liability con-
vention.
83
 According to the Paris Convention, for example, circumstances 
such as bankruptcy ‘could not set aside the obligation of the operator under 
Article 10 or that of the State which is required to ensure that the operator 
always holds financial security up to this maximum liability. The Contacting 
Parties may therefore be led to intervene in such a situation to avoid their 
international responsibilities being involved’.
84
 Therefore in ‘the absence of 
any liable and insured operator required to compensate this damage by virtue 
of the Convention, [the damage] would be ascribable solely to the Contract-
ing Party responsible for designating this operator’.
85
 Thus the Installation 
State is obliged to either designate the liable person for nuclear damage and to 
comply with the obligations of the applicable convention or to accept liability 
itself.
86
 Such liability is imposed on the State, as “any private operator”, ac-




 Moreover, the Installation State and other contracting States are obliged 
to intervene to provide supplementary compensation for the victims if com-
pensation under the applicable nuclear liability convention is insufficient
88
 or 
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subsidiary compensation if the operator has failed to fulfill his financial ob-
ligations.
89
 This is a secondary liability because it is not performed by the 
State unless the liability of the operator has been exhausted.  In that case, the 
State is liable as a private person under national law rather than international 
law.
90
 Finally, in the case of State-operated nuclear installations used for 
non-peaceful ends
91
 and nuclear-powered spacecraft, the operating State is 
liable for damage caused by such installations under international law.
92
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5.2.1.3 Environmental impact assessment  
International law mandates that Installation States require an environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) of the environmental impact of the proposed activ-
ity.
93
 An EIA should consist of a comprehensive study of the proposed activ-
ity.
94
 The information helps the competent authorities decide about the au-
thorization of a nuclear activity and take preventive measures to avoid 
harmful environmental consequences which may result from the activity.
95
  
An EIA, therefore, is reported and directed to the national authorities to 
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 An EIA must be carried out by the operator and evaluated by the respon-
sible authorities.
97
  This assessment must include the nature of the activity 
and its possible impact on persons, property, the environment of other States, 
and the global environment in general.
98
 The competent authorities in the 
Installation State are obliged to ensure that the assessment of the risks likely 
to result from the operation of a hazardous activity has been undertaken by 
the operator before granting the authorization for the construction of the in-
stallation.
99
 However, an EIA can be carried out by the authorities them-
selves in the case of a nuclear facility operated by the State.
100
 This means 
that an EIA is an essential condition for the operator to obtain the licence for 
constructing and operating a nuclear facility. Therefore, conflicts often arise 
between the designers, the builder, the national authorities and the authoriz-
ing body.
101
 This requires close collaboration between the licensing authori-
ties and the operators of the plant. 
 Site selection is an important component of an EIA
102
 and is often one of 
the most difficult issues confronting the national authorities in the construc-
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tion of a nuclear power facility.
103
 The selection of the site of a nuclear 
power plant is subject to certain criteria and standards that are required for 
the protection of people, property, and the environment.
104
 This can be de-
cided by the competent authorities only after strict examination of certain 
considerations.
105
 There are three primary considerations.
106
 First, the loca-
tion of a nuclear power plant should be chosen to minimize adverse envi-
ronmental impact. It should be chosen far away from places likely to be af-
fected by natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes and floods, as well as 
industrial catastrophes, such as chemical explosions or aircrafts crashes.
107
 
Secondly, it should be located close to a supply of cooling water and have 
access to high voltage transmission lines. Thirdly, meteorological, geologi-
cal, seismic and hydro-geological factors should be taken into account.
108
  
 Accordingly, an EIA ensures that adequate and early information is ob-
tained regarding environmental damage likely to result from a hazardous 
activity and that measures to mitigate such damage are adopted.
109
 As men-
tioned in the MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. England): 
‘The objectives of a proper environmental assessment are, inter alia, to ensure 
that the activities comply with international environmental obligations, to en-
sure that the activities comply with the applicable international environmental 
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obligations, to ensure that appropriate protective and response measures may 
be taken, to ensure that alternative proposals have been fully considered, and to 
ensure that interested parties and concerned States are fully informed of the 
environmental implications of the project’.
110
  
Under customary international law, States are obliged to conduct an EIA and 
notify potentially affected States of activities conducted within their terri-
tory, or under their jurisdiction or control, and of potential transboundary 
harm.
111
 In the 2010 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, the 
International Court of Justice held that an EIA is, in fact, required under cus-
tomary international law when proposed industrial activity may pose a sig-
nificant transboundary environmental risk.
112
 
 This principle was also adopted by the ILC Draft Articles on International 
Liability for Lawful Acts and in other international instruments.
113
 Accord-
ing to Draft Article 12, Chapter II of the Draft Articles on International Li-
ability for Acts Not Prohibited by International Law:  
‘Before taking a decision to authorize an activity referred to in article 1, a State 
shall ensure that an assessment is undertaken of the risk of the activity causing 
significant transboundary harm. Such an assessment shall include an evalua-
tion of the possible impact of that activity on persons or property as well as on 
the environment of other States’.
114
  
This provision is reflected in the text of the ILC Draft Articles on the Preven-
tion of Transboundary Harm, which provide that ‘[a]ny decision in respect 
of the authorization of an activity within the scope of the present articles 
shall, in particular, be based on an assessment of the possible transboundary 
                                                     
110
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harm caused by that activity, including any environmental impact assess-
ment’.
115
 The Articles address this issue very generally
116
 and leave the content 
of risk assessments to be decided by the national law of the State carrying out 
the activity.
117
 This was indicated by the Stockholm and Rio Declarations. 
According to Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration, ‘[e]nvironmental impact 
assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activi-
ties that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment 
and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority’.
118
  
 This obligation of an EIA is also supported by most instruments related to 
the environment in international law.
119
 For example, Article 3(2) of Direc-
tive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament mandates that EIAs should be 
conducted for all projects listed in Annexes I and II of Directive 
85/337/EEC.
120
 The scope of this Directive is very broad, requiring assess-
ment of both the direct and indirect effects of the proposed public and pri-
vate projects likely to have significant harmful consequences on the envi-
ronment due to their nature, size or location.
121
 This includes an assessment 
of the impact of such projects on human beings, fauna and flora, soil, water, 
air, climate and landscape, and the interaction between them, as well as ma-
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terial assets and the cultural heritage.
122
 The purpose of these projects and 
plans is to integrate the environmental impact assessment process and exist-
ing plans and procedures adopted by the Member States.
123
 As Sands pointed 
out:  
‘The 1985 EC Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment led the way in 
providing international guidance on the nature and extent of an environmental 
impact assessment and the use to which it should be put, an approach subse-
quently adopted and extended in 1991 UNECE Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (1991 Espoo Convention)’.
124
  
The 1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context
125
 is the only convention that contains detailed pro-
visions on environmental impact assessments and applies to different haz-
ardous activities, including nuclear activities. It obliges the State of origin 
which conducts an activity listed in Appendix I of the Convention to ensure 
that an EIA is conducted prior to a decision to authorize or conduct the pro-
posed activity.
126
 Thus under this Convention, nuclear activities are subject 
to EIA procedures, with the exception of some activities, such as ‘research 
installations for the production and conversion of fissionable and fertile ma-
terials, whose maximum power does not exceed 1 [kilowatt] continuous 
thermal load’.
127
 Moreover, the assessment of risks and effects of pollution 
on the marine environment is provided for under Articles 204, 205 and 206 
of the UNCLOS.
128
 Article 206 of this Convention obliges States to report 
for assessment of potential effects of the planned activities.
129
 Support for 
the principle is also found in Article 14 (1) of the Convention on Biological 
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Diversity which provides for environmental impact assessment, minimizing 
the effects of that impact, and allowing public participation.
130
  
 In fact, the assessment of the environmental impact of a nuclear activity 
is not only required for the proposed activity, but also for related activities. 
An EIA of a nuclear activity is a continual procedural decision that should 
begin prior to the activity, continue over the economic life-time of the activ-
ity, and include an assessment of the possible consequences of the storage of 
radioactive waste.
131
 The responsible authorities should evaluate the existing 
risk before the operation and evaluate the possibility of damage which is 
likely to occur in the future as a result of a nuclear accident or the damage 




5.2.1.4 Prior authorization 
A State must ensure that any activity undertaken within its territory or under 
its jurisdiction or control which may cause transboundary harm has prior 
authorization.
133
 In its decision in the Corfu Channel case the ICJ referred to 
the authorization and monitoring of harmful activities with regard to pre-
venting industrial catastrophes, stating that it is ‘every State’s obligation not 
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
other States’.
134
 According to the ILC Draft Articles on International Liabil-
ity
135
 and the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary harm, prior 
authorization is required before hazardous activities are undertaken and if 
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any major change in or plan to change an activity brings it within the scope 
of the Draft Articles.
136
 Moreover, this authorization is also required for pre-
existing activities within the scope of the Draft Articles.
137
 Thus after the 
Draft Articles enter into force, the Source States have to review the authori-
zation of the pre-existing activities in its territory or under its jurisdiction or 
control and issue new authorization for these activities in order to comply 
with the provisions of the Articles.
138
 Finally, in case of a failure to fulfill the 
requirement of the authorization, the State of origin can take the necessary 
actions as appropriate, including termination of authorization.
139
  
Accordingly, Article 6 of the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Trans-
boundary Harm is a general provision and does not provide specific re-
quirements for the authorization.
140
 This leaves the determination of the re-
quirements for authorization to the competent authorities according to 
national law.
141
 This gives the competent authorities the flexibility to deter-
mine the conditions of the required authorization according to the circum-
stances.
142
 On the other hand, this flexibility may allow States to authorize 
an activity conflicting with the objective of the articles. Under these circum-
stances, the State concerned is subject to State responsibility for violation of 
its obligations under the Articles if the proposed activity poses a significant 
risk of environmental damage to other States. 
Due to the hazards associated with the use of nuclear energy, the authori-
zation for the use of nuclear energy for civilian ends has remained under the 
control of governments in order to ensure that the associated risks are ac-
ceptable.
143
 Thus before commencing the construction of a nuclear installa-
tion an authorization must be issued by the government authorities under the 
national law of the State in order to implement its obligations under interna-
tional law.
144
 This authorization is based on a preliminary description and 
safety analysis report provided by the applicant
145
 and is examined by the 
public authorities concerned.
146
 The licence conditions are established by the 
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regulatory body after consultation with the applicant.
147
 To issue a decision 
in the matter, the competent authorities must ensure that the rules concerning 
the radiological protection of workers and the permissible maximum limits 
of radioactive substances released into the environment are not violated and 
that an EIA has been carried out.
148
 The authorities must also review the re-
quired conditions for the selection of the installation site, reactor design, nu-
clear safety, operation of the installation, etc.
149
 The public authorities con-
cerned supervise and inspect the implementation of the license conditions by 
the operator of the installation during operation. For example, the 1962 Nu-
clear Ships Convention
150
 obliges a contracting State to implement the neces-
sary procedures to prevent the operation of any nuclear ship carrying its flag 
without registration or authorization.
151
 Accordingly, a State may not allow 
unauthorized nuclear activity vis-à-vis the procedures required or an activity 
that violates the conditions specified.
152
 In the MOX Plant Case, Ireland re-
quested the Tribunal to order the UK to immediately suspend the authorization 
or prevent the operation of the plant,
153
 because the process of the authoriza-
tion of the MOX plant was, according to Ireland, badly flawed by the UK 
and inconsistent with its obligations under the LOSC.
154
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5.2.1.5 Ensuring the safety of nuclear reactor installations 
Nuclear safety is a fundamental issue in relation to the construction and op-
eration of nuclear power plants.
155
 Every nuclear power plant is subject to 
supervision and inspection by national regulatory bodies to ensure the safety 
of the plant in every phase of the nuclear fuel cycle.
156
 This includes the 
processes of design, construction, commissioning, test operation, repair and 
maintenance, plant promotion, radiation exposure of workers, transport of 
nuclear substances, decommissioning of the installation and waste manage-
ment and disposal.
157
 The primary goal of nuclear safety is to keep the expo-
sure of workers, populations and the environment to radiation from a nuclear 
installation as low as reasonably possible during the normal operation of the 
installation as well as in the event of a nuclear accident.
158
 Therefore, every 
country operating nuclear installations is obliged to establish a legal frame-
work concerning nuclear safety to regulate the nuclear industry during the 
course of performing these processes.
159
 The operator of a nuclear installa-
tion is accountable for the safety of the installation in every phase of the nu-
clear fuel cycle.
160
 However, the implementation of these regulations is also 
subject to supervision and inspection by the competent authorities of the 
State.
161
 Thus the roles of the operating body and the licensing authorities are 
related and share the same purpose, i.e., the safe operation of the installation 
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for the protection of the installation itself, as well as the workers, the popula-
tion living outside the plant, and the environment.
162
  
 According to international law, the duty to control and maintain safety in 
a nuclear installation is aimed at avoiding nuclear accidents and the resulting 
damage.
163
 Nuclear installations are always constructed and operated under 
strict nuclear safety standards, but systems of nuclear safety and operating 
techniques vary from country to country according to the type of reactor.
164
 
An international system of inspection has therefore been established under 
the auspices of international organizations to ensure that safety measures for 
nuclear installations are implemented in accordance with international nu-
clear safety standards.
165
 Similarly, international standards for the design, 
construction and operation of nuclear installations have also been estab-
lished.
166
 The aim of these standards is to ensure that all nuclear installations 
are constructed and operated in accordance with uniform procedures and 
codes which ensure the safety of the installation.
167
 The regulatory body re-
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views and assesses the application of the nuclear safety standards and en-
sures that the installation complies with the applicable safety objectives and 
requirements for the setting, design, construction, manufacture, commission-




These international organizations also created programs establishing in-
ternational cooperation in the field of nuclear energy in order to impose uni-
fied rules of safety and operation of nuclear installations on the industrial-
ized countries.
169
 Under the IAEA Statute, the IAEA has the authority and 
responsibility to control nuclear installations that are in operation to ensure 
that the nuclear safety standards are applied
170
 and that these installations are 
not used for non-peaceful purposes.
171
 However, this is subject to an agree-
ment between the IAEA and the Installation State, and without that agree-
ment the IAEA does not have the right to inspect a nuclear installation.
172
 
This is because ‘governments are normally sensitive to authoritative fact-
finding missions given the credibility attached to their reports and the effects 
of any adverse publicity resulting therefrom. For this reason very few trea-
ties in international law, and more specifically in the environmental context, 
contain provisions for compulsory inspection’.
173
 Accordingly, safety regula-
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tion of nuclear installations is a national responsibility
174
 under which ‘States 
have an obligation of diligence and duty of care, and are expected to fulfil 
their national and international undertakings and obligations. International 
safety standards provide support for States in meeting their obligations under 




 Thus IAEA nuclear safety standards are considered to be the cornerstone 
of an international nuclear safety and security mechanism which provides 
the basis for States to perform their duties relating to nuclear safety.
176
 Nev-
ertheless, they are not binding on the Member States; they are only binding 
on the IAEA itself in relation to nuclear installations operated by it and on 
Member States in relation to IAEA-assisted operations.
177
 They become 
obligatory for the States in the event that these standards are included in an 
international agreement between the agency and the State which requested 
assistance from it.
178
 Therefore, in the 1986 Conference held after the Cher-
nobyl accident, IAEA Member States discussed the possibility of establish-
ing an obligatory regime for nuclear safety which entitles the IAEA to in-
                                                     
174
 IAEA, “IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and the Environment: Radiation 
Safety of Gamma, Electron and X Ray Irradiation Facilities”, Specific Safety Guide No. 
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pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1454_web.pdf (accessed on 23.2.2012). 
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 See “Background”, IAEA “IAEA Safety Standards for Protecting People and the En-
vironment: Compliance Assurance for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material”, 
Safety Guide No. TS-G-1.5, IAEA Vienna, 2009, at p. i, available at: http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1361_web.pdf (accessed on 19.2.2012). 
176
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Version 1-7 April 2010, at p. 11, available at: http://www-
ns.iaea.org/downloads/standards/spess.pdf (accessed on 23.8.2010).  
177
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spect nuclear installations and to apply nuclear safety standards.
179
 This was 
reflected in international conventions adopted after this Conference which 
involved similar obligations to those of the nuclear safety standards.
180
 As a 
result, nuclear safety has been strengthened and developed with the adoption 
of the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety
181
 and the 1997 Joint Convention 
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management.
182
 Both instruments were adopted under the auspices of 
the IAEA to supplement the IAEA nuclear safety standards and to make 
them binding on the Contracting Parties.
183
 According to the 1994 Nuclear 
Safety Convention, the Contracting Parties are obliged to provide annual 
reports to prove they have implemented the obligations of the Convention,
184
 
and to hold periodic meetings to discuss and review the content of the re-
                                                     
179
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at its first special session on 26 September 1986 and adopted resolution 
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http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/intlm33&id=1532&collection=jou
rnals&index=journals/intlm (accessed on 14.4.2012).   
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dioactive Waste Management, September 5, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1431 (1997), available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/intlm36&id=1447&collection=jou
rnals&index= (accessed on 14.4.2012).  
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clear Installations”, Periodical, IAEA Factsheets, at p. 2, available at: 
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 However, these Conventions do not contain any explicit obligations 
relating to the inspection of nuclear installations.
186
 Despite this, the respon-
sibility for the safety of nuclear installations and for preventing environ-
mental damage caused by these installations to other States remains the re-
sponsibility of the Installation State even if such installations are operated by 
private operators.
187
 This is indicated by the fact that the Convention States 
have provided that ‘responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the State having 
jurisdiction over a nuclear installation’.
188
 Therefore the possibility of bringing 
claims regarding State responsibility for a breach of the State’s obligation re-




 Finally, the existing nuclear liability conventions were designed to com-
pensate victims of nuclear accidents and were not intended to deal with nu-
clear safety and precautionary measures of nuclear installations.
190
 However, 
there is a growing trend for the nuclear liability conventions to deal with the 
issues of nuclear safety. According to the Exposé des Motifs of the 1960 
Paris Convention, there is a need for an international agreement setting up a 
regime of third party liability.
191
 This agreement supplements the measures 
applied in the related fields of public health and safety and the prevention of 




 Accordingly, the scope of the nuclear liability regime should be extended 
to apply not only in the event of damage caused by nuclear accidents, but 
also to apply in cases of the failure of the operator or the Installation State to 
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th
 1960, 
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clear Damage, preamble, March 20, 1996, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1996/inf500.shtml; Lefeber, 1996, 
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take measures for the prevention and mitigation of nuclear damage. In that 
case, the liability of the operator will remain in the domain of national law, 
while the liability of the State will be under international law. This point of 
view is coherent with the special nature of nuclear energy as a hazardous 
activity that requires extending the scope of nuclear liability to cover all nu-
clear activities. The failure of the nuclear regulations to cover liability for 
taking nuclear safety measures in nuclear installations within the scope of 
the nuclear liability regime is not coherent with the special nature of nuclear 
energy as well as the new amendments of the nuclear liability conventions 
and the function of nuclear liability law which are aimed at preventing and 
minimizing the damage before compensating it.
193
 This view is also reflected 
in the structure of nuclear liability law which indicates that the first line of 
defence against nuclear accidents is the prevention of a nuclear accident 
from occurring; the second line of defense is an emergency response that 
provides early notification and assistance; and finally, if the accident has 
occurred and damage cannot be prevented, then the persons liable must re-
pair the damage and compensate the victims.
194
 In fact, the application of 
liability regarding safety measures in nuclear installations will induce opera-
tors and States to take effective precautionary safety measures in nuclear 
installations in order to prevent and reduce the risk and consequences of nu-
clear accidents.
195
 This was reflected in the 1997 Convention on Supplemen-
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tary Compensation which encourages States to deal with the issues of nu-
clear safety and to establish ‘a worldwide liability regime [that] would en-
courage regional and global co-operation to promote a higher level of nu-
clear safety in accordance with the principles of international partnership and 
solidarity’.
196
  This will at least lead to the prevention or reduction of the 
risks and consequences of nuclear accidents.  
5.2.2 The obligations to provide information necessary to prevent 
and reduce environmental damage 
Prior notification, consultation, negotiation and exchange of information be-
tween States in the case of conducting hazardous activities are principles 
related to the cooperation between States in providing the necessary infor-
mation to prevent and reduce damage caused by the activity.
197
 These proce-
dural rules are endorsed by the writers of international law and international 
instruments as customary and general principles of international law.
198
 The 
Rio Declaration States that, ‘States shall provide prior and timely notifica-
tion and relevant information to potentially affected States on activities that 
may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall 
consult with those States at an early stage and in good faith’.
199
 This Section 
discusses these obligations in the following 5 subsections respectively: prior 
notification in Section 5.2.2.1, consultation in Section 5.2.2.2, negotiation in 
Section 5.2.2.3, exchange of information in Section 5.2.2.4, and providing in-
formation to the public in Section 5.2.2.5. 
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5.2.2.1 Prior notification  
Before conducting a nuclear activity the Installation State must provide prior 
notification to the States likely to be affected by the activity so that they can 
take precautionary measures to protect their environment from potential re-
sulting damage.
200
 This notification also gives the Installation State the op-
portunity to modify its own interests in the light of those of the notified 
States.
201
 However, this gives rise to certain questions. When should the no-
tifying State provide the notification to the notified State? When should the 
latter respond? Which States should be notified? What type of information 
should be provided by the notifying State? The answers to these questions 
must be accurate in relation to conducting hazardous activities and in par-
ticular with regard to the use of nuclear activities. The rationale behind these 
questions is that information concerning nuclear technology is important and 
not easy to provide or share with other States, because such information re-
lates to industrial secrets and national security.
202
 On the other hand, risks 
arising from the use of such technology are very high and damage caused by 
this industry can reach far beyond the border of States, potentially affecting 
distant States and their environments. As mentioned above, the radioactivity 
caused by the Chernobyl accident spread all over the world.
203
 Does this 
mean that the Installation State should notify the whole world to provide it 
with the necessary information about the planned activity or should it only 
notify the neighbouring States? 
 In fact, due to the importance of this matter many of the conventional 
regimes established to organize hazardous activities embodied provisions 
related to the information about the planned activity.
204
 It was presumed that 
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once the Installation State has planned to conduct a hazardous activity which 
has potential risks for other States, it should immediately notify the other 
States which might be affected by the activity.
205
 The Installation State 
should notify the affected States within a limited period of time when dam-
age resulting from the planned activity is foreseeable.
206
 The notification 
should include the available technical information about the primary assess-
ment of the activity.
207
 Also, ‘an essential condition for notification is the de-
termination of a certain degree of transboundary damage’.
208
 Accordingly, for 
example, ‘[e]very State should take the appropriate steps necessary to ensure 
that, subject to the relevant norms of international law, the international 
transboundary movement of radioactive waste takes place only with the prior 
notification and consent of the sending, receiving and transit States in accor-
dance with their respective laws and regulations’.
209
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 Thus, logically, notification should be provided to the surrounding and 
neighboring States. This is indicated in agreements concluded between In-
stallation States and their respective border States, such as the Agreement on 
Co-operation in Respect of the Safety of Nuclear Installations Located in 
Areas Near the Border between Spain and Portugal, signed in Lisbon on 31 
March 31 1980.
210
 According to that agreement, the competent authorities of 
the constructing State should notify and supply the neighbouring State, upon 
its request, with information regarding the authorization for the setting, con-
struction and operation of nuclear installations in the border area.
211
 The no-
tification should be accompanied by documentation concerning the nuclear 
safety and radiological protection of the authorized installation.
212
 It should 
be provided in sufficient time to permit any comments and observations 
from the neighbouring country before the relevant decision is made by the 
competent authorities of the constructing State.
213
 The competent authorities 
of the neighbouring State are obliged to examine the documentation received 
without delay.
214
 The agreement also establishes an obligation upon the au-
thorities of the neighbouring State to provide, in due time, any necessary 
information requested by the constructing State for the evaluation of the set-
ting, construction or operation of the installation, both while the authoriza-
tion is pending and during the operation of the installation.
215
  
 Another example of such an agreement is the Agreement between Den-
mark and the Federal Republic of Germany Relating the Exchange of Infor-
mation on Construction of Nuclear of Nuclear Installations Along the Bor-
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der, which was signed by the two parties on 4 July 1977.
216
 This agreement 
is aimed at the cooperation between the two parties regarding the safety of 
nuclear installations and the protection of the environment from damage 
caused by nuclear accidents, in the case of the construction of a nuclear in-
stallation within thirty kilometres of the border of either party. The agree-
ment also obliges the parties to provide and exchange the relevant informa-
tion and to consult each other when they decide to construct and operate 
nuclear installations for the purpose of the production, processing, reprocess-
ing, manufacture or fission of nuclear fuels between thirty and one hundred 
kilometers from their borders.
217
 The information must include plans and 
decisions on the setting, construction and operation of such installations and 
relevant documents and information.
218
 Similarly, the Memorandum on Ex-
change of Information and Consultation on Nuclear Installations Near Bor-
ders was adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands 
and entered into force on 27 September 1977.
219
  
 As long as these agreements apply only between the parties concerned, 
the fact remains that these installations can cause damage to other States far 
away from the Installation State, as happened in the Chernobyl accident, 
which had harmful effects on people, property and the environment world-
wide.
220
 This requires the application of the general rules of international 
law. The obligations of notification and providing information under these 
rules were discussed by the ILC during the codification of its Draft Articles 
on International Liability for acts not prohibited by international law.
221
 Ac-
cording to the Special Rapporteur Julio Bardoza, if the assessment of a haz-
ardous activity indicates a risk of significant transboundary environmental 
damage, the Installation State should notify other States which are likely to 
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be affected by the damage and send them the available technical and other 
relevant information resulting from the assessment.
222
 This was affirmed by 
the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm which declares 
that the State of origin is obliged to provide other States which are likely to be 
affected by damage caused by a hazardous activity with the relevant technical 
information and assessment of the risks.
223
 The notification should be pro-
vided by the State of origin within a limited period of time after the authori-
zation and the notified State must respond within six months of the notifica-
tion.
224
 This was also provided in the 1997 Watercourses Convention, which 
states that the notified State must study and evaluate the possible affects of the 
planned measures and reply within six months, though the period may be ex-
tended by another six months upon the request of the notified State.
225
 How-
ever, if the notified State has failed to reply within this period, any claim for 
compensation it makes may be settled by the costs incurred by the notifying 
State for action undertaken after exhausting the time required for a reply which 





In the case of the construction of a nuclear facility, the Source State must 
also consult the States likely to be affected by the activity to establish a 
mechanism and to reach acceptable solutions regarding the necessary meas-
ures to prevent potential environmental damage caused by these installa-
tions.
227
 Because nuclear damage may affect other States and the public, the 
Source State is obliged under international law to consult other States, par-
ticularly neighbouring States and the public and to supply them with the 
necessary information and prior notification of the proposed nuclear activity 
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225
 Article 13 of the 1997 UN Convention on Non-Navigation Uses of International Wa-
tercourses, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/ares51-229.htm (ac-
cessed on 18.4.2012). 
226
 Article 16 (2) of the 1997 UN Convention on Non-Navigation Uses of International 
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227
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, 
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with 
commentaries, 2001, Article 9, at p. 160, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_7_2001.pdf (ac-
cessed on 26.8.2010) For the report also see, YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two; Article 13 
of the 1997 UN Convention on Non-Navigation Uses of International Watercourses. 
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and to negotiate in good faith regarding the plans of the proposed activity.
228
 
For example, the rejection of the Government of Austria of the plans of the 
Swiss Government to construct a 900 megawatt nuclear power plant close to 
the Austrian border near Rüthi, in the Upper Rhine Valley, led to the Gov-
ernment of Switzerland consulting with the Government of Austria to reach 
an acceptable solution which satisfied both countries and to resolve the dif-
ferences between them regarding the construction of the plant.
229
  
 The ILC Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious Conse-
quences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law imply that 
the duty of consultation is an effective tool to prevent and minimize the risk 
of causing significant transboundary harm.
230
 The Draft Articles oblige the 
Source State to consult with other States regarding the necessary measures to 
prevent significant harm which might be caused by such activities.
231
 The 
provisions regarding consultation on preventative measures were consoli-
dated in the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm.
232
 The consultations must be conducted prior to the authorization and 
the commencement of the planned activity or during its performance.
233
 
These consultations should be based on the principle of an equitable balance 
of interests.
234
 To reach an equitable balance of interests, the parties must 
take into account all the significant factors and circumstances during the 
                                                     
228
 Nanda and Pring, 2003, at p. 55; Rosemary Lyster and Adrian J. Bradbrook, “En-
ergy Law and the Environment”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New 
York, 2006, at pp. 39-40. 
229
 International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited 
by International Law, 1985, YILC, 1985, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 26, para. 112, 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.l (Part 1/Add.l) 
230
 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session, 
Article 18 of the “International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts 
Not prohibited by International Law”, YILC, 1993, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 31, paras. 
175-176; Barboza, RDC, Vol. 247, Part III, 1994, at p. 336. 
231
 Article 18 of the ILC Draft Articles, see report of the ILC on the work of its forty-sixth 
session, 2 May-22 July 1994, to the General Assembly, Supplement No. 10 (A/49/10), at 
pp. 160 and 174, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/A_49_10.pdf (accessed on 24.10.2010), 
reprinted in YILC, 1994, Vol. II, Part Two, at pp. 160 and 174. 
232
 Article 9 (1) of the 2001 the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm. 
233
 YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 160. 
234
 See Article 9 (2) of the 2001 Draft Articles on prevention of transboundary harm; 
Article 20 of  the “International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts 
Not prohibited by International Law”, YILC, 1993, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 32. 




 However, if the consultations fail, the State of origin must 
take the interests of the State likely to be affected into account if it has de-
cided to authorize the operation of the proposed activity.
236
  
 However, to resolve the matter satisfactorily the consultation must be 
carried out in good faith.
237
 Special Rapporteur Barboza argues that consult-
ing in good faith is essential to regimes of that nature.
238
 It helps the States 
concerned to consult each other with the aim of finding a regime that will 
reconcile their interests.
239
 The consultation can take the form of bilateral 
meetings if there is only one affected State or of multilateral meetings if 
there is more than one affected State.
240
 Consultation between States is im-
portant regarding the construction and operation of border installations, par-
ticularly nuclear installations, to enable other States to enact legislation and 
to take precautionary measures to protect people, property and the environ-
ment. Thus the duty of consultation is interrelated with the duty of the bal-
ance of interests of States and enables the States concerned to establish a 
regime for the proposed activity which reconciles their interests.
241
 This was 
indicated by the ILC in its Draft Articles on International Liability for Acts 
Not Prohibited by International Law, which included provisions on protect-
ing the rights of States likely to be affected and the legitimate balance of in-
terests of States.
242
 These provisions also were embodied in Article 10 of the 
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237
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June 1998, New York, 27 July-14 August 1998, UN General Assembly doc. 
A/CN.4/487/Add.1, at p. 11, para. 4. 
240
 YILC 1990, Vol. II, Part One, at p.  93, para. 36; YILC, 1990, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 
97, para. 498.  
241
 YILC 1990, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 93, para. 36.  
242
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session, 2 May-22 July 1994, to the General Assembly, Supplement No. 10 (A/49/10), at 
pp. 160 and 174, available at: 
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ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, which provides 
for a number of factors involved in an equitable balance of interests.
243
 Ac-
cording to Barboza: 
‘There does not seem to be, then, any customary rule obliging a State to re-
quire the [… prior] consent of presumably affected States in order to conduct, 
or authorise private operators to conduct, such activities. However, interna-
tional practice has imposed some participation of the presumably affected 
States through certain procedures, particularly at the beginning of the devel-
opment of the activity’.
244
  
The duty of consultation is reflected in international practice and is embod-
ied in bilateral and multilateral agreements, as well as judicial decisions, in-
cluding, for example, the 1982 UNCLOS;
245
 the 1979 Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution;
246
 the Paris Convention for the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources;
247
 and the Agreement 
                                                                                                                            
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/A_49_10.pdf (accessed on 24.10.2010), 
reprinted in YILC, 1994, Vol. II, Part Two, at pp. 160 and 174. 
243
 Article 10 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities provides that:  
‘In order to achieve an equitable balance of interests as referred to in paragraph 2 of arti-
cle 9, the States concerned shall take into account all relevant factors and circumstances, 
including: 
(a) The degree of risk of significant transboundary harm and of the availability of means 
of preventing such harm, or minimizing the risk thereof or repairing the harm; 
(b) The importance of the activity, taking into account its overall advantages of a social, 
economic and technical character for the State of origin in relation to the potential harm 
for the State likely to be affected; 
(c) The risk of significant harm to the environment and the availability of means of pre-
venting such harm, or minimizing the risk thereof or restoring the environment; 
(d) The degree to which the State of origin and, as appropriate, the State likely to be af-
fected are prepared to contribute to the costs of prevention; 
(e) The economic viability of the activity in relation to the costs of prevention and to the 
possibility of carrying out the activity elsewhere or by other means or replacing it with 
an alternative activity; 
(f) The standards of prevention which the State likely to be affected applies to the same 
or comparable activities and the standards applied in comparable regional or interna-
tional practice’. 
244
 Barboza, RDC, Vol. 247, Part III, 1994, at p. 332. 
245
 See Article 142 of the 1982 UNCLOS. 
246
 See Article 5 of the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 
Nov. 13, 1979, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217. 
247
 Article 9 of the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Landbased 
Sources, concluded at Paris on 4 June 1974, entered into force on 6 May 1978, 1546 
U.N.T.S. 103, (I-26842), 1989. 
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between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Canada on Air Quality.
248
 According to Article 7 (2) of Directive 
2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 27, 2001 
on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes on the 
Environment, ‘the Member States concerned shall enter into consultations 
concerning the likely transboundary environmental effects of implementing 




 Nevertheless, with regard to the construction and operation of nuclear 
installations, the duty of consultation is still narrow in State practice because 





When prior notification has been made and consultation for the intended nu-
clear activity has been carried out, the Installation State must engage in ne-
gotiations with the States likely to be affected by the proposed nuclear activ-
ity. Under international law, the duty of negotiation requires the Source State 
that permits the operation of a hazardous activity within its territory or under 
its jurisdiction or control to enter into negotiations with other States or States 
likely to be affected by the activity in order to reach an agreement to estab-
lish a mechanism to deal with the situation to avoid the possible damage 
caused by this activity.
251
 The aim of the negotiations is to consider the sub-
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stance of a plan, as well as alternatives and possible compromises, which 
would oblige the negotiating parties in practice.
252
 The negotiations can be 
based on universal or specific agreements between the States concerned.
253
 
The principle of negotiation is common in practice.
254
 For example, the for-
mer Czechoslovakia planned to operate two Soviet-designed 440 megawatt 
nuclear reactors in Dukovany, close to the Austrian border, by 1980.
255
 This 
led the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs to demand negotiations with 
Czechoslovakia about the safety of the installations, which the government 
of Czechoslovakia accepted.
256
 Another example concerns the negotiations 
between the governments of Switzerland and Austria about the above-
                                                                                                                            
Not Prohibited by International Law, by Mr. Julio Barboza, Special Rapporteur, UN. 
Doc. A/CN.4/402, YILC, 1986, Vol. II, Part One, A/CN.4/SER.A/1986/Add.l (Part 1), at 
pp. 153-154, paras. 37-41. 
252
 Nanda and Pring, 2003, at p. 56. 
253
 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, “Comment: Trends in the Law applicable to 
Freshwaters”, in: Georg Nolte (ed.), Peace Through International Law: The Role of the 
International Law Commission. A Colloquium at the Occasion of Its Sixties Anniver-
sary, Springer, Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York 2009, pp. 157-172, at p. 159. 
254
 ‘In 1973, the Belgian Government announced its intention to construct a refinery at 
Lanaye, near its frontier with the Netherlands. The Netherlands Government voiced its 
concern because the project threatened not only the nearby Netherlands national park but 
also other neighbouring countries. It stated that it was an established principle in Europe 
that, before the initiation of any activities that might cause injury to neighbouring States, 
the acting State must negotiate with those States. The Netherlands Government appears 
to have been referring to an existing or expected regional standard of behaviour. Similar 
concern was expressed by the Belgian Parliament, which asked the Government how it 
intended to resolve the problem. The Government stated that the project had been post-
poned and that the matter was being negotiated with the Netherlands Government. The 
Belgian Government further assured Parliament that it respected the principles set out in 
the Benelux accords, to the effect that the parties should inform each other of those of 
their activities that might have harmful consequences for the other member States’. (Bel-
gian Parliament, regular session 1972-1973, Questions et responses, bulletin No. 31). 
YILC, 1994, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 163, para. 11, footnote 513. Also see the proposal at 
the Antarctica Minerals Convention for the protection of Antarctica environment, “Inter-
national Environmental Law: Protection of the marine environment - pollution by ships - 
dumping of wastes at sea - land-based pollution - international conventions - constitu-
tional arrangements”, in: AYIL, pp. 476-485, at p. 482, available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AUYrBkIntLaw/1988/27.pdf (accessed on 
8.5.2012). 
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th
 Session, May 2 – July 22, 1994, n. 
514, U.N. Doc. A/49/10; GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1994); YILC, 1994, Vol. II, 
Part Two, at p. 163, para. 11, footnote 514. 
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mentioned plans of the Swiss Government to construct a 900 megawatt nu-




 Negotiations can be carried out before or during the course of the activity as 
indicated in the Agreement on Co-operation in Respect of the Safety of Nu-
clear Installations Located in Areas Near the Border between Spain and Por-
tugal, signed in Lisbon on 31 March 1980.
258
 This Agreement provides that: 
‘If the competent authorities of either country have valid grounds for a com-
plaint regarding questions of nuclear safety and radiological protection, nego-
tiations shall immediately be initiated between such authorities and the compe-
tent authorities of the neighbouring country. The competent authorities of the 




The principle of negotiation also finds support in the 1997 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.
260
 
This Convention requires States to enter into consultation and negotiation in 
order to find an equitable solution to the situation.
261
 In order to reach an 
equitable solution negotiations must be carried out by the States concerned 
in good faith.
262
 During that period, the notifying State must refrain from 
implementing or permitting the implementation of the planned measures for 
a period of six months if so requested by the notified State.
263
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 In the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project Case, the ICJ urged Hungary and 
Slovakia to negotiate in good faith under the 1977 Treaty in accordance with 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda and to take all necessary measures to 
ensure that the purpose of the treaty was achieved.
264
 Other examples re-
ferred to the principle of negotiation are: the 1975 agreement between Can-
ada and the United States relating to weather modifications;
265
 the advisory 
opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1931 between 
Lithuania and Poland;
266
 and the Tribunal of Arbitration in its award in the 
Lake Lanoux case in 1957.
267
 Furthermore, in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf and the Fisheries Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Fed-
eral Republic of Germany/Netherlands, Judgment of February 20, 1969) the 
ICJ referred to the obligation of negotiation with the goal of reaching an 
agreement to resolve the differences between the parties.
268
  
5.2.2.4 Exchange of information 
The use of nuclear energy as a hazardous activity requires the exchange of 
information between the States and international organizations concerned, 
particularly the IAEA, the NEA and EURATOM, in an effort to prevent and 
reduce transboundary harm caused by a nuclear accident.
269
 Providing infor-
mation helps the international community assess whether or not the Source 
State has implemented its obligations regarding the protection of the environ-
ment.
270
 Such information also assists the State parties to understand the na-
ture, extent and harmful environmental consequences and enables them to 
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 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), November 16, 1957, 12 RIAA, 281; 24 
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(Ger./Den./Neth.), 1969 (Feb. 20). 
269
 For a discussion of the organizations, see Odette Jankowitsch-Prevor, “The Norma-
tive Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Legal Basis and Legal 
Sources”, in: NEA, 2010, pp. 13-30; Julia A. Schwartz, “The OECD Nuclear Energy 
Agency”, in: NEA, 2010, pp. 31-42; Wolfgang Kilb, “The European Atomic Energy 
Community and its Primary and Secondary Law”, in: NEA, 2010, pp. 43-90. 
270
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evaluate the effectiveness of preventive measures taken for the protection of 
the environment in the light of changing scientific evidence.
271
  
 The duty of exchange of information regarding conducting hazardous 
activities has become a general and customary principle in international 
law.
272
 The provisions of the principle were codified in the ILC Draft Articles 
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, which states that:  
‘While the activity is being carried out, the States concerned shall exchange in 
a timely manner all available information concerning that activity relevant to 
preventing significant transboundary harm or at any event minimizing the risk 
thereof. Such an exchange of information shall continue until such time as the 
States concerned consider it appropriate even after the activity is termi-
nated’.
273
   
The principle of exchange of information is further supported by the nuclear 
agreements and conventions.
274
 For example, according to the 1980 Conven-
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272
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legal experts which met between 1976 and 1978, available at: 
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(accessed on 24.2.2010). 
273
 Article 12 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm. 
274
 Memorandum on Exchange of Information and Consultation on Nuclear Installations 
Near Borders was adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands and 
entered into force on 27 September 1977, NEA, NLB, No. 22, 1978, at p. 35, See also, 
Safety and Siting of Nuclear Installations in NEA Member Countries, at p. 13, available 
at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/1979/csni79-35.pdf (accessed on 11.4.2012), 
Bernd Ruster, Bruno Simma and Michael Bock (eds.), “International Protection of the 
Environment: Treaties and Related Documents”, Vol. XXVII, Oceana Publications, INC. 
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August 10, 1982, [the text in Germany] Bundesgesetzblatt II, 1983, p. 734; Federal Re-
public of Germany-German Democratic Republic, Radiation Protection Agreement, 
Agreement on Exchange of Information and Experience in the Field of Radiation Protec-
tion, signed on 8
th
 September 1987, in: NLB, No. 40, 1987, p. 44; Agreement between 
the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of the People’s Re-
public of Poland Concerning the Exchange of Information and Co-operation in the Field 
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tion on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, ‘as appropriate, the 
States Parties concerned shall exchange information with each other or in-
ternational organizations with a view to protecting threatened nuclear mate-
rial, verifying the integrity of the shipping container, or recovering unlaw-
fully taken nuclear material’.
275
 However, the States must take preventive 




 The principle of exchange of information is reflected in almost all envi-
ronmental treaties which contain provisions on the exchange of information 
on a regular basis.
277
 These treaties contain provisions related to the exchange 
of information in general or in specific matters.
278
 For example, Article 200 of 
                                                                                                                            
of Nuclear Energy Safety and Radiation Protection, 22
nd
 December 1987, in: NLB, No. 
41, 1988, pp. 49-53. 
275
 Article 5 (2) (b) of the1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Mate-
rial, 3 March 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 24631, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/274/Rev.1, May 1980, 




 Article 6 of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. 
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 Article 6 of the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water-
courses and International Lakes, done at Helsinki, March 17, 1992, entered into force 6 
October 1996,  1936 U.N.T.S. 269 (1996); Article 8 of the ECE 1979 Convention on 
Lang-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, concluded at Geneva on Nov. 13, 1979, en-
tered into force on 16 March 1983,1302 U.N.T.S. 217 (1983); Articles VI and VII of the 
1991 US-Canada Air Quality Agreement, March 13, 1991, 1852 U.N.T.S.  p. 79; Article 
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the 1982 UNCLOS provides for the exchange of information related to the ma-
rine environment.
279
 Article 4 of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of 
the Ozone Layer facilitates the exchange of scientific, technical, socio-
economic, commercial data, and legal information between the Contracting 
Parties.
280
 Some conventions such as the 1994 Nuclear Safety Convention
281
 
obliges States Parties to provide the information related to the safety of a nu-
clear installation in periodic reports which have to be submitted in periodic 
meetings.
282
 This is important because the exchange of information in specific 
or periodic reports is one of the most important tools to assist the Contracting 
Parties to monitor the implementation of environmental obligations of States at 
                                                                                                                            
the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong 
River Basin,  Chiang Rai, Thailand, concluded and entered into force on Apr. 5, 1995, 
2069 U.N.T.S. 3, (1999); Article 6 of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty between the Govern-
ment of India, the Government of Pakistan and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, signed at Karachi, on 19 September 1960, entered into force on 12 
January 1961, 419 U.N.T.S. 125; Article 3 (6) of the Revised Protocol on Shared Water-
courses in the Southern African Development Community (SADC),  Aug. 7, 2000, 40 
I.L.M. 321; Article 17 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79; Article 4 (1) and Annex II, the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, entered into force on 22 September 1988, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293, (1988); Article 9 (1) of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, concluded at Montreal on Sept. 16, 1987, en-
tered into force on 1 January 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10 (1987), 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 
(1989); Article 4 (1) (h), the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, concluded at New York on 9 May 1992, entered into force on Mar. 21, 1994, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, (1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Ar-
ticle XXIX (1), “The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers”, 
adopted by the International Law Association at the fifty-second conference, held at Hel-
sinki on 20 August 1966. Report of the Committee on the Uses of the Waters of Interna-
tional Rivers (London, International Law Association, 1967), available at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/water/meetings/legal_board/2010/annexes_groundwater_pape
r/Annex_II_Helsinki_Rules_ILA.pdf (accessed on 26.4.2012) Article VII of the Resolu-
tion of the Institute of International Law on “The Pollution of Rivers and Lakes and In-
ternational Law”, adopted in Athens on 12 September 1979, available at: http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1979_ath_02_en.PDF (accessed on 26.5.2012). 
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 Article 200 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
280
 Article 4 of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. 
281
 For the Convention, see IAEA, “Convention on Nuclear Safety”, IAEA Legal Series, 
No. 16, IAEA, Vienna, 1994; Monica J. Washington, “The Practice of Peer Review in 
the International Nuclear Safety Regime”, in: NYULR, Vol. 72, No. 2, 1997, pp. 430-
469. 
282
 Article 20 of the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety. 




 Nevertheless, the exchange of information between States 
is usually not an easy task, particularly with regard to nuclear activities, be-
cause such activities involve nuclear and commercial secrets which are closely 
guarded by industrialized countries. To facilitate the exchange of information, 
some instruments therefore contain provisions to induce the States to cooperate 
to exchange information in good faith. For example, according to the ILC Draft 
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm:  
‘Data and information vital to the national security of the State of origin or to 
the protection of industrial secrets or concerning intellectual property may be 
withheld, but the State of origin shall cooperate in good faith with the State 




Accordingly, this Article limits the scope of the obligation of the State to 
provide information where such information is related to the national securi-
ty of the Origin State or to the protection of the industrial secret or the intel-
lectual property.
285
 However, this is in conflict with the obligation of the 
State for the protection of the environment from damage caused by hazard-
ous activities which requires providing all the available information by the 
Origin State regarding the activity in question. The drafters of the Articles 
were aware of that and therefore in the same Article require the Origin State 
to cooperate with the affected State as good faith as possible according to its 
circumstances, in order to make balance between the interests of these 
States. This exception is justified by the fact that such information is vital to 
the national security and an important issue for the State. Nevertheless, there 
is no definition of vital information for the national security. Accordingly, 
this will subject to the determination of the Origin State according to the 
specific circumstances. However, this gives the Origin State the chance in 
case of breach of the principle of providing information to plea that the un-
disclosed prevented information is vital for the national security. Also, the 
industrial secret and the intellectual property are protected by national law
286
 
which protects rights of individuals more than States. This exception is pro-
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 Hunter, Sommer and Vaughan, GELA, Vol. III, 1995, at p. 113. 
284
 Article 14 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm; also 
see Articles 20 and 21 of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Montreal on 29 January 2000, entered into force on 11 September 
2003, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208, (20030; Article 9 (5) of the 2001 Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants, adopted in Stockholm on 22 May 2001 and entered into 
force 17 May 2004, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119, (2004). 
285
 YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 167, para (1). 
286
 YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 167, para (1). 
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vided for under other conventions such as 1997 Convention on Watercourse 
in relation to information to the national defense or security.
287
 
 However, there is no uniform principle or customary rule for exchange of 
information. Rather, it is based on a relevant agreement which has its own 
terms and conditions.
288
 The principle is also part of the general duty of co-
operation and is useful to determine whether a State has breached the obliga-
tion to prevent transboundary harm.
289
  
 The obligation to prevent transboundary harm is different from the obli-
gation of a State to provide early notification in case of a nuclear accident or 
in an emergency situation, as discussed below. The latter is related to provid-
ing relevant information about the accident, so as to take preventive meas-
ures to avoid and to reduce its harmful consequences.
290 
The former, how-
ever, relates to providing information on the basis of cooperation between 
States during the construction and operation of a nuclear activity to control 
the potentially harmful consequences.
291 
It is aimed at the exchange of neces-
sary information about the activity between States to allow them to take the 
necessary measures to avoid the harmful consequences of a potential nuclear 
accident.
292 
This is indicated by the tribunal in the MOX Plant Case which 
ordered Ireland and UK to cooperate and exchange information regarding 
the commissioning of the plant, monitor risks and take the relevant measures 
to prevent potential environmental damage.
293
  
                                                     
287
 Article 31 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention. Also, Article 2 (8) of the 1991 of 
Espoo Convention states that ‘[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not affect the 
right of Parties to implement national laws, regulations, administrative provisions or 
accepted legal practices protecting information the supply of which would be prejudicial 
to industrial and commercial secrecy or national security’. 
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 Owen McIntyre, “Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under 
International Law”, Ashgate Publishing Company, USA, UK, 2007, at p. 336. 
289
 McIntyre, 2007, at p. 336. 
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 Daniel G. Partan, “The ‘Duty to Inform’ in International Environmental Law”, in: 
BUILJ, Vol. 6, 1988, pp. 43-88, at p. 44. 
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 Van Dyke, DJILP, Vol. 35, No. 1, at pp. 20-21. 
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 Van Dyke, DJILP, Vol. 35, No. 1, at p. 22. 
293
 The Tribunal ordered the two countries to take ‘the following provisional measure 
under article 290, paragraph 5, of the Convention [UNCOLS]: 
Ireland and the United Kingdom shall cooperate and shall, for this purpose, enter into 
consultations forthwith in order to: 
(a) exchange further information with regard to possible consequences for the Irish Sea 
arising out of the commissioning of the MOX plant;  
(b) monitor risks or the effects of the operation of the MOX plant for the Irish Sea;  
(c) devise, as appropriate, measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment 
which might result from the operation of the MOX plant’. Para. 89 (1), the 3 December 
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5.2.2.5 Providing information to the public 
In international law the public has the right to acquire information regarding 
high-risk activities.
294
 This increases public awareness and encourages peo-
ple to take action in the most important matters, such as the disposal of nu-
clear waste.
295
 It also enables the public to participate in making decisions, 
observe the compliance of the State in implementing the environmental obli-
gations and take action against the use of nuclear reactors if they are un-
safe.
296
   
                                                                                                                            
2001 Order. The Order is available at: http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (accessed on 
21.10.2010). 
294
 See in general, Jonas Ebbesson, Draft Paper: “Participatory and Procedural Rights in 
Environmental Matters: State of Play”, Stockholm University, High Level Expert Meet-
ing on the New Future of Human Rights and Environment: Moving the Agenda Forward, 
co-organized by UNEP and OHCHR, Nairobi, Kenya, 30 November – 1 December 2009, 
available at: 
http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=vZU4Z-
_S4Vo%3D&tabid=2046&language=en-US (accessed on 22.2.2012); Libor Jansky and 
Juha I. Uitto (eds.) “Enhancing Participation and Governance in Water Resources Man-
agement: Conventional Approaches and Information Technology”, United Nations Uni-
versity Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris, 2005. 
295
 Sands, 2003, at p. 826; OECD/NEA, “Information Policies of Nuclear Regulatory 
Organizations”, Paris (France) Seminar 6-8 December 1993, OECD Paris 1994; 
O’Connor, M., “Prospects for Public Participation on Nuclear Risks and Policy Options: 
Innovations in Governance Practices for Sustainable Development in the European Un-
ion”, in: JHM, Vol. 86, No. 1-3, 2001, pp. 77-99, at p. 82. 
296
 As a result of the pressure of public opinion after the Chernobyl accident, nuclear 
programs in several countries were interrupted. For instance, the development of the 
nuclear program of the former USSR was stopped. (O’Connor, M. “Prospects for Public 
Participation on Nuclear Risks and Policy Options: Innovations in Governance Practices 
for Sustainable Development in the European Union”, in: JHM, Vol. 86, No. 1-3, 2001, 
pp. 77-99, at p. 82) Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, “Gorbachev: Heretic in Kremlin”, 
Futura Publications, London, United States, 1990, pp. 129-141, at p. 134-135) The au-
thorities closed two nuclear power plants in Armenia and cancelled other plants that were 
under construction; the United States deferred the construction of more than one hundred 
nuclear power plants; the Netherlands cancelled the construction of two new nuclear 
power plants; and other countries such as Austria, Denmark and Ireland also cancelled 
the construction of nuclear power plants. Washington, NYULR, Vol. 72, No. 2, 1997, at 
p. 439.) Moreover, the Government of Egypt concluded several bilateral agreements in 
the early 1980s with other States, such as the United States (United States of America 
and Egypt: Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 
(with annex and agreed minute), Signed at Washington on 29 June 1981, UNTS, Vol. 
1529, No. I-26518, (1989), p. 144) , France (France and Egypt: Agreement on Co-
operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (Accord de coopération relatif aux 
utilisations pacifiques de l’énergie nucléaire), signed at Paris on 27 March 1981, 1298 
U.N.T.S. 89), and Canada, (Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
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 In general, public participation in environmental issues is increasing.
297
 
At the moment, media and communications technology facilitate the dis-
course between States, as well as among the public and increase interaction 
regarding environmental issues.
298
 As mentioned in conferences, for exam-
ple, the public is playing a vital role in urging governments to change their 
political agenda in favour of the environment.
299
 Therefore it is not surpris-
                                                                                                                            
Energy, Can.-Egypt, signed at Ottawa on 17 May 1982 and came into force on 8 No-
vember 1982, 1470 U.N.T.S. 319 (1987), 21 ILM 710 (1982)), These agreements were 
aimed at cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, supply of nuclear sub-
stances and equipment for the construction of new nuclear power plants. However, after 
the Chernobyl accident Egypt suspended its nuclear program. One of the reasons for 
suspending the program was due to the domestic opposition and pressure for the safety 
of the public and the environment. See Barbara M. Gregory, “Egypt’s Nuclear Program: 
Assessing Supplier-Based and Other Developmental Constraints”, The Non-proliferation 
Review/Fall 1995, pp. 20-27, at p. 25, available at: 
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/gregor31.pdf (accessed on 28.2.2012). Finally, after the 2011 
Fukushima nuclear accident, as a result of the public pressure, the German Government 
announced that it was decommissioning all nuclear reactors in Germany by 2030. Last 
year it amended its Atomic Energy Act to specify a shorter economic life of nine newer 
nuclear power plants and the rapid shutdown of eight older plants. Michael Sailer (ed.), 
“Fukushima-A Year After the Disaster”, in eco@Work-April 2012, published by Oeko 
Institute e.V., available at: http://www.oeko.de/e-paper-
eng/dok/470.php?id=26&haupt=2 (accessed on 1.5.2012). 
297
 Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke (eds.), 2007, at p. 438. 
298
 Boustany, CYIL, Vol. 27, 1989, pp. 497-501, at p. 501. 
299
 See in general, Thomas Dietz and Paul C. Stern (eds.), “Public Participation in Envi-
ronmental Assessment and Decision Making”, Panel on Public Participation in Environ-
mental Assessment and Decision Making, Committee on the Human Dimensions of 
Global Change, Division of Behavioural and Social Sciences and Education, National 
Research Council of the National Academies, The National Academies Press, Washing-
ton, D. C. 2008, available at: http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12434 (ac-
cessed on 24.2.2012). Reference should be made to the role of the NGOs in guiding and 
directing the governmental policies in taking action, drawing up policies and implement-
ing the national and international standards established for the protection of people and 
the environment from the adverse affects of the use of nuclear energy. Several NGOs 
have been established worldwide for the purposes of environmental protection. These 
organizations play a significant role in the establishment and enforcement of the global 
environmental priorities. Protection of the global environment is in fact the most difficult 
problem facing the international community. This is due to the fact that most of the envi-
ronmental problems arise from political issues and States address them in the context of 
their own self-interest. Reference should be made to three non-governmental organiza-
tions, the British/European Insurance Committee, Greenpeace International and 
UNIPEDE which were represented by observers during the negotiations on the revision 
of the Vienna Convention and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation which 
were adopted in 1997. IAEA, “Measures to Strengthen International Cooperation in Nu-
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 Although the 1992 Rio Declaration was not the first instrument to grant 
the public the right to obtain information and participate in decision making 
regarding hazardous activities, it incorporated a customary international 
principle which is embodied in other international instruments.
301
 According 
to the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, 
‘States concerned shall, by such means as are appropriate, provide the public 
likely to be affected by an activity within the scope of the present articles 
with relevant information relating to that activity, the risk involved and the 
harm which might result and ascertain their views’.
302
 The duty to provide 
information to the public has been reflected in State practice and introduced 
in many environmental instruments.
303
 According to Article 6 (1) of the 1998 
                                                                                                                            
clear, Radiation and Waste Safety”, at p. 1, IAEA Doc. GC(40)/INF/9 (Sept. 13, 1996), 
available at: 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC40/GC40InfDocuments/English/gc40inf-
5_en.pdf (accessed on 24.4.2012); (SCNL/14/INF.5: 1). These organizations presented 
important proposals which had significant outcome in the development of the draft arti-
cles of the negotiating conventions, the 1997 Protocol to amend to the 1963 Vienna Con-
vention on Civil Liability for Nuclear damage and the 1997 Vienna Convention on Sup-
plementary Compensation for nuclear Damage. As a result of these proposals 
environmental damage was covered by the Conventions.  
300
 Many environmental conventions currently in effect provide for the right of the public 
to acquire the necessary information about the presumed hazardous activity and to par-
ticipate in making decisions relating to such activities. Henri Smets, “The Right to In-
formation on the Risks Created by Hazardous Installations at the National and Interna-
tional level”, in: Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (eds.), International 
Responsibility For Environmental Harm, International Environmental Law Policy Series, 
Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, London, 1991, pp. 449-492, at p. 452. 
301
 Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration provides that ‘[e]nvironmental issues are 
best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the 
national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning 
the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous 
materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in deci-
sion-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and par-
ticipation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and ad-
ministrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided’.  
302
 Article 13 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm. 
303
 Article 3 (8) of the 1991 Ecpoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in 
a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention), available at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/about/eia_text.htm#article3 (accessed on 22.10.2010); 
Article 16 of the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water-
courses and International Lakes, available at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/water/pdf/watercon.pdf (accessed on 3.4.2012); Article 17 of 
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Aarhus Convention, for example, every State party must allow the public to 
participate in making decisions in relation to the nuclear activities listed in 
Annex I when deciding to permit such activities.
304
 This Convention links the 
protection of the environment and human rights by focusing on the democratic 
interaction between the public and the governments and the accountability of 
                                                                                                                            
the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area, available at: http://www.helcom.fi/stc/files/Convention/Conv0704.pdf (accessed 
on 11.1.2011); Article 14 (1) of the Convention on Biological Diversity; Articles 6 and 
12 (10) of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, avail-
able at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed on 22.10.2010); 
Article 9 and Annex VIII of the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of In-
dustrial Accidents, available at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2006/teia/Convention%20E%20no%20annex%20I
.pdf (accessed on 22.10.2010); Article 9 of the 992 Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, signed in Paris on 22 September 1992, 
entered into force on 25 March 1998, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67, (2006), as amended on 24 July 
1998, updated 9 May 2002, 7 February 2005 and 18 May 2006, available at: 
http://www.ospar.org/html_documents/ospar/html/OSPAR_Convention_e_updated_text
_2007.pdf (accessed on 11.4.2012), L.104/2, Official Journal of the European Communi-
ties, 3.4.98, also available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=137
3 (last visited 11.1.2011); Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Coun-
cil and Commission documents, Official Journal of the European Communities L 145/43, 
31.5.2001, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/PDF/r1049_en.pdf (ac-
cessed on 26.4.2012); Directive 2003/4/EC of European Parliament and the Council of 
28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and replacing Council 
Directive 90/313/EEC, Official Journal of the European Union L 41, 26, 14.2.2003, 
available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:041:0026:0032:EN:PDF (ac-
cessed on 26.4.2012). 
304
 These activities include, ‘[n]uclear power stations and other nuclear reactors includ-
ing the dismantling or decommissioning of such power stations or reactors 1/ (except 
research installations for the production and conversion of fissionable and fertile materi-
als whose maximum power does not exceed 1 kW continuous thermal load); Installations 
for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel; Installations designed: For the production 
or enrichment of nuclear fuel; For the processing of irradiated nuclear fuel or high-level 
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in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, concluded in Aar-
hus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998. The text of the Convention is available at: 
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 This is particularly important with regard to a nuclear acci-
dent which may have a serious impact on the public. In 1985, the IAEA Group 
of Experts recommended that providing information to the public in case of a 
nuclear accident is the responsibility of the competent authorities in each 
State.
306
 However, the 1986 Early Notification and Assistance Conventions, as 
discussed below, were adopted without any provisions regarding providing in-
formation to the public and their right to acquire such information in case of a 
nuclear accident. The 1986 Assistance Convention only provides that ‘[t]he 
assisting party shall make every effort to coordinate with the requesting State 
before releasing information to the public on the assistance provided in con-
nection with a nuclear accident or radiological emergency’.
307
 At the same 
time, the right of the public to acquire information is one of the basic rights 
in international law.
308
 In case of a nuclear activity, it helps the public to pro-
tect themselves from the harmful consequences of a nuclear accident and 
also helps the States to overcome the consequences of the accident. Accord-
ing to the nuclear liability conventions, preventive measures can be taken by 
the State or by any person after the occurrence of a nuclear accident to pre-
vent or reduce its harmful consequences.
309
 As a result of the failure of the 
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 Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke (eds.), 2007, at p. 438. 
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 IAEA “Guidelines on Reportable Events, Integrated Planning and Information Ex-
change in a Transboundary Release of Radioactive Materials”, INFCIRC/321, IAEA, 
Vienna 1985, at p. 6, available also at: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc321.pdf (accessed on 
25.2.2012). 
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 Article 2 (2) of the 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/335 (Sept. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Convention on Early Notification 
1986]. 
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 Articles 10 and 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (accessed on 22.10.2010); Articles 14 
and 25 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopt-
ed by the General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16 December 1966, entered 
into force on 23 March 1976, available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art25 (accessed on 22.10.2010); and Arti-
cle 13 of the 1981 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted June 
27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 
21, 1986 available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm (accessed on 
11.4.2012). 
309
 Article I (1) (n) of the 1997 Amended Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nu-
clear Damage; Article 1 (a) (ix) of the 2004 Amended Paris Convention on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. Also see Article 2 (9) of the 1993 Convention 
on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, 
opened for signature on 21 June 1993, 150 CETS21.VI.1993. 
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USSR to inform the public, the harmful consequences as a result of the acci-
dent severely affected the public and the environment of the USSR and other 
States as well. If the USSR had provided early information about the acci-
dent, the public could have contributed to preventing or reducing its harmful 
consequences by taking preventive measures such as evacuating people from 
the affected areas. 
5.3 Post-accident obligations: Notification and assistance 
in event of a nuclear accident  
Early notification and assistance in the event of a nuclear accident have been 
emphasized since the early use of nuclear energy and now constitute princi-
ples in international law.
310
 These two principles impose certain obligations 
upon the Source State to notify, inform, and cooperate with other States and the 
international organizations concerned in the event of a nuclear accident or 
emergency situation. The information provided after a nuclear accident is 
important for the prevention and reduction of damage caused by the acci-
dent. These two principles enable the affected States and other States which are 
likely to be affected by a nuclear accident to take preventive measures to pre-
vent and reduce the harmful consequences of the accident.
311
 In practice, these 
principles are included in a number of international treaties and agreements 
between States in various areas of international law, particularly in the law 
of the sea,
312




 and nuclear 
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 Weiss (ed.), 1992. 
311
 Okowa, 2000, p. 145. 
312
 See, Articles 198 and 211 (7) of the 1982 UNCOLS; Articles 14 and 25 of the 1997 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (July 8, 1997). 
313
 Montreal Conference Resolutions on “Legal Aspects of the Conservation of the Envi-
ronment”, International Law Association, Report of the 60
th
 Conference, August 29-
September 4 1982, Canada 1983; Article 7 of the “ILA Montreal Rules on Water Pollu-
tion in An International Drainage Basin”, in: Munro and Lammers, 1987, pp. 189-191; 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, Annex VI, 
Helsinki 22 March 1974, came into force on 3 May 1980, 13 ILM 544 (1974), 1507 
U.N.T.S. 168, (1988); Article 9 of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Barcelona 16 February 1976, 15 ILM 290 (1976), 
1102 U.N.T.S. 27, (1978); Article II of the Cartagena Convention for the Protection and 
Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, concluded at 
Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, on Mar. 24, 1983, Mar. 24, 1983, 1506 U.N.T.S. 157, 
(1988) and other treaties in the UNEP Regional Seas series. Also see Article 13 of the 
Basil Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal, adopted at Basel on 22 March 1989, entered into force on 5 May 1992, 
28 ILM 649 (1989), available at: www.basel.int (accessed on 4.4.2012). 
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law. They are reflected in customary international law and are widely accepted 
as general principles of customary international law.
315
  
 The USSR’s delay in announcing the Chernobyl accident drew the atten-
tion of the international community to the need for an obligation of the State 
to notify and warn the neighbouring States and other States in the event of a 
nuclear accident.
316
 As a result of the USSR’s failure to provide immediate 
notification about the Chernobyl accident, the two principles of early notifica-
tion and assistance were codified in the 1986 Convention on Early Notification 
of a Nuclear Accident and the 1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a 
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, which were adopted under the 
auspices of the IAEA.
317
 These two conventions were adopted because the 
practical application of the international customary norms regarding the issues 
of notification was not clear.
318
 The international community realized there was 
a need to strengthen and improve the legal regime of international law regard-
ing nuclear energy to control transboundary environmental damage and to pre-
vent and reduce consequences of nuclear accidents.
319
 After codification, these 
                                                                                                                            
314
 Council Decision of 14 December 1987 on Community arrangements for the early 
exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency. (87/600/Euratom). OJ, 
L-371 of 30/12/87, at p. 76, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/radioprotection/doc/legislation/87600_en.pdf (ac-
cessed on 26.4.2012). 
315
 Lyster and Bradbrook, 2006, at p. 39. 
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 Immediately after the Chernobyl accident the IAEA held an international conference 
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obligations of notification and assistance in the case of a nuclear accident be-




 This Section discusses certain aspects of the basis of the obligation of a 
State to provide early notification and assistance in the case of a nuclear ac-
cident, i.e., post-accident obligations. Section 5.3.1 will examine the princi-
ple of notification and assistance in general rules of international law, while 
Section 5.3.2 will examine the 1986 Notification Convention, and Section 
5.3.3 will examine the 1986 Assistance Convention.  
5.3.1 The principles of notification and assistance in general rules 
of international law 
In its judgment in the 1949 in Corfu Channel case, the ICJ set out a general 
principle for the early notification of a catastrophe caused by hazardous ac-
tivities.
321
 In its decision, the court stated that: 
‘The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notify-
ing, for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Alba-
nian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the 
imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them.
 
Such obligations are 
based... on certain general and well-recognised principles, namely ... every 
State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts con-
trary to the rights of other States’.
322
  
This judgment held Albania accountable for its failure to notify Britain be-
fore, rather than after, the accident, but most importantly, it set up a prece-
dent which is considered a principle in international law: A State is obliged 
to notify other States when conducting hazardous activity in general and to 
provide the necessary information to prevent environmental damage caused 
by such activity. The principle received wide support after its recognition in 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. According to Principle 20 of this Declara-
                                                                                                                            
pp. 10-23; Sharon McBrayer, “Chernobyl’s Legal Fallout-The Convention on Early No-
tification of a Nuclear Accident”, in: GJICL, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1987, 303-319; IAEA, Le-
gal Series No. 14, 1987; Peter Cameron, “The Vienna Convention on Early Notification 
and Assistance”, in: Cameron, Hancher and Kühn (eds.), 1988, pp. 19-32; IAEA, “Emer-
gency Planning and Preparedness”, in: IAEA, Nuclear Safety Review, 1992, pp. 97-98, 
at p. 97; Pelzer, ADV, Vol. 25, 1987, at p. 303; Peter P. C. Haanappel , “Some Observa-
tions on the Crash of Cosmos 954”, in: JSL, Vol. 6, 1978, 147-149. 
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 IAEA Doc., GC(SPL. I)OR.4, Mar. 1987, p. 8.); Sands, RECIEL, Vol. 5. Issue 3, 
1996, at p. 200; Boyle, BYIL, Vol. 60, 1989, at p. 281.    
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 ICJ Reports, 1949, at p. 4. 
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tion, the relevant information must be provided by the State in whose terri-
tory, jurisdiction, or control a hazardous activity is carried out.
323
 Such in-
formation is needed to avoid the risk of significant adverse effects on the 
environment beyond a State’s national territory.
324
 This was also affirmed in 
Principle 18 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, which states that ‘States shall im-
mediately notify other States of any natural disasters or other emergencies 
that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on the environment of those 




 The 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm con-
tain two articles specifically relating to the emergency situations: Article 16 
on “emergency preparedness” and Article 17 on “notification of an emer-
gency”.
326
 The obligation of notification is also reflected in international 
practice. For example, Article 198 of the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea provides that ‘[w]hen a State becomes aware of cases 
in which the marine environment is in imminent danger of being damaged or 
has been damaged by pollution, it shall immediately notify other States it 
deems likely to be affected by such damage, as well as the competent inter-
national organizations’.
327
 The duty to notify was also adopted by the Con-
vention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context
328
 
and by the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Acci-
dents.
329
 In addition, a number of decisions and recommendations were 
adopted by international organizations.
330
  Moreover, in 1992 the UN Gen-
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eral Assembly adopted principles relevant to the utilization of nuclear energy 
in outer space and its use in operating space objects and satellites.
331
 The 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space examined 
these principles and adopted measures and principles concerning the preven-
tion, mitigation and redress of damage caused by the use of nuclear power 
sources in outer space.
332
 According to these principles, the State launching a 
space object using nuclear power sources has to notify any States concerned 
and provide them with relevant information related to the launched object.
333
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 plenary meeting, 14 
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It also has to offer assistance to the affected State to reduce and eliminate 
damage caused by such nuclear power sources.
334
 The Launching State is 
responsible for preventing such damage and for compensating the injured 
State for damage caused by a space object carrying nuclear power sources.
335
  
 Therefore the Source State must develop emergency plans to respond to 
emergency situations.
336
 It is also obliged to inform the affected States and 
international organizations concerned and cooperate to provide them with all 
relevant and available information concerning the prevention and reduction 
of risks which may arise from industrial activities located within the source 
State’s territory, jurisdiction, or control.
337
 The required information must 
include all the necessary data and information that will enable the affected 
State to evaluate the situation. Such information may also include character-




5.3.2 The 1986 Notification Convention 
The Early Notification Convention
339
 requires the State in whose territory, 
jurisdiction, or control a nuclear accident has occurred to quickly notify 
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States likely to be affected by the accident, as well as the IAEA, and to pro-
vide the relevant information about the accident.
340
 This constitutes the duty 
to notify and the duty to inform. The two duties have different meanings, as 
the duty to notify is related to the announcement of the accident, while the 




 The scope of notification includes nuclear accidents caused by nuclear reac-
tors; nuclear fuel cycle facilities; radioactive waste management facilities; 
the transport and storage of nuclear fuels or radioactive wastes; the manufac-
ture, use, storage, disposal and transport of radioisotopes for agricultural, 
industrial, medical and related scientific and research purposes; and the use 
of radioisotopes for power generation in space objects.
342
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p. 35 and in: EPL, Vol. 17, 1987, p. 41; Agreement Between the Government of the Re-
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 The information that is supplied should be relevant to the accident, and 
should help to reduce and minimize the harmful consequences of the acci-
dent. The information is supplied directly to the States likely to be affected by 
the accident or via the IAEA.
343
 The information must also be provided to all 
States likely to be affected by the accident, including Non-Contracting States 
to the Convention.
344
 The information provided should include the time, exact 
location and nature of the accident; the facility or activity concerned; the cause 
of the accident; and the general characteristics of the radioactive release among 
other relevant information.
345
 In addition, each State Party should inform the 
IAEA and other States Parties of its responsible authorities and points of 
contact responsible for issuing and receiving the notification and informa-
tion.
346
 Furthermore, the IAEA should investigate the feasibility and estab-
lishment of an appropriate monitoring system to achieve and facilitate the 
aims of the Convention.
347
  
The Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention were 
applied for the first time in the Goiânia accident which took place in Brazil 
in October 1987
348
 and in the Japanese Tokaimura nuclear accident in 
1999.
349
 During these two accidents, the Accident State notified the IAEA of 
the accident and requested assistance from it.
350
 Finally, they were applied in 
the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident.
351
 
                                                     
343
 Article 2 of the 1986 Notification Convention. 
344
 Cameron, 1988, at p. 25. 
345
 Article 5 of the 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 1439 
U.N.T.S., at p. 277. For notification for military facility see, Adede, 1987, pp. 37-38. 
346
 Article 7 of the 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 1439 
U.N.T.S., at p. 278. 
347
 Article 8 of the 1986 Notification Convention. 
348
 Cameron, 1988, at p. 29; Sands, 1988, footnote, at p. 40. On September 13, 1987, a 
radiological accident occurred in the city of Goiânia, Brazil. The accident was one of the 
most serious radiological accidents to occur after the adoption of the Early Notification 
Convention and the Assistance Convention. At the end of 1985, a private institute for 
radiotherapy moved out of their clinic building, leaving behind a machine that was a 
source of radioactivity (137 Tele-Therapy United) without notifying the competent au-
thorities. Two people entered the building and, thinking that the machine was valuable 
and not knowing it was radioactive, took it one of their homes. They then broke the ma-
chine into parts and spread it to surrounding areas, causing four deaths and 249 injuries 
due to exposure, as well as radioactive environmental contamination. IAEA, “The Radio-
logical Accident in Goiânia”, Vienna, 1988, at pp. 1-2, IAEA Doc. STI/PUB/815 
349
 For the Tokaimora accident, see chapter 2 of the study. 
350
 The Goiânia accident was the first accident in which the IAEA acted in accordance 
with the Assistance Convention. IAEA, “The Radiological Accident in Goiânia”, 1988, 
at p. 111. 
351
 For the Fukushima accident, see chapter 2 of the study. 
218 CHAPTER 5 
 
 The failure of the State Parties to fulfil the obligations of the Notification 
Convention may incur State responsibility under the general principles of 
international law for damage suffered by other States as the result of a nu-
clear accident.
352
 Nevertheless, the Convention contains certain gaps which 
should be addressed in future amendments of the Convention. The Convention 
leaves a large margin of discretion to the Accident State and this reduces the 
effectiveness of the principle of notification.
353
 It was argued that 
‘The Convention leaves it to the source State to decide whether an accident is 
significant and is likely to cause an international transboundary release. In the-
ory, a failure to notify may therefore be excused on the ground that the State in 
which the accident occurred did not appreciate the gravity of the situation. 
Moreover, a purely domestic release (or, in any case, a release not necessarily 
the consequence of an accident [as] implied by the Convention) does not come 
within the scope of the Article, nor do releases over areas, such as the high 
seas, which are not subject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of any State. 
Nonetheless, Article 3 permits States to interpret the Convention broadly and 
to notify in a potentially wide range of circumstances, left undefined...’
354
  
Moreover, the scope of the Convention covers nuclear accidents caused by 
nuclear activities used for peaceful purposes but excludes accidents caused 
by military activities.
355
 A nuclear accident caused by a military activity may 
be subject to the voluntary commitment of nuclear weapon States to apply 
the provisions of the Convention.
356
 
                                                     
352
 Boyle, BYIL, Vol. 60, 1989, at p. 285. 
353
 Krateros Iōannou, “Nuclear Energy, Peaceful Uses”, in: EPIL, Vol. 3, 1997, pp. 700-
705, at p. 704. 
354
 M. Pohtim, “The Vienna Convention of 1986 Early Notification and Assistance in the 
Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency”, unpublished paper given at 
Nuclear Inter Jura’86, International Nuclear Law Association Conference, Antwerpen, 
21-25 September, 1987, p. 6, cited in Cameron, 1988, at p. 24.  
355
 See, Article 1 of the 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 
1439 U.N.T.S., at p. 276. 
356
 El Baradei, Nwogugu and Rames, 1993, p. 1247. It was also argued that, ‘[t]he Noti-
fication Convention has been described as going no further than pre-existing customary 
international law and in some cases less far. Moreover, it applies only to non-military 
nuclear accidents; it fails to require that intervention levels for the introduction of protec-
tive measures (e.g. sheltering and evacuation) be set in advance by national authorities; it 
leaves it to the discretion of the State in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or 
control the accident has occurred to determine what is or is not of radiological safety 
significance and what are the chances that another State would be affected, and accord-
ingly whether notification is required; and it does not establish any obligation on States 
giving or receiving information to make it available to the members of the public. In 
comparison to other international instruments adopted since the Chernobyl accident on 
 The Procedural Rules and Obligations under International Law for Construction of a Nuclear Installation 219 
 
 The Convention, as mentioned above, does not include provisions for 
providing information to the public about an accident.
357
 Furthermore, al-
though the Convention indicates that the information provided about an ac-
cident should be accurate and transparent,
358
 it does not provide an objective 
definition of the obligation of notification, nor does it require States to ac-
quire and use monitoring equipment for notification.
359
  
 Finally, the Convention states that a State Party should directly notify the 
State likely to be affected by a nuclear accident or the IAEA, but it does not 
specify which State Party should give notification of the accident.
360
 The 
term “State Party” is too broad, because it could include each State Party to 
the Convention, the State in whose territory or jurisdiction the accident has 
occurred, the State Party affected by the accident, and a State Party not af-
fected by the accident. The Convention should specify the State responsible 
for notifying and providing information about a nuclear accident. It should 
mandate that the Accident State promptly notify and provide the relevant 
information about the accident. This is because it is in the best position to 
obtain information about a nuclear accident caused by a nuclear activity 
conducted within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control and must 
provide the relevant information related to the activity which caused the ac-
cident.
361
 Accordingly, it is responsible for its failure to fulfil that obligation. 
5.3.3 The 1986 Assistance Convention 
It should be noted that the original rule of mutual assistance in the case of a 
nuclear accident or emergency situation prior to the Assistance Convention 
was an international moral and social rule. According to this social rule, a 
State was obliged to assist other States and their citizens when they suffered 
damage caused by natural catastrophes. However, this rule has been trans-
formed from a moral rule into an obligatory legal rule following the need to 
apply it after the development of new technology.
362
 After the Chernobyl 
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accident this obligation was codified in the Assistance Convention.
363
 This 
Convention developed an international framework to facilitate prompt assis-
tance and co-operation in the event of a nuclear accident or a radiological 
emergency.
364
 It obliges the State Parties to co-operate with other States and 
the IAEA to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or 
radiological emergency in order to minimize its consequence and to protect 
life, property and the environment from the resulting radioactivity.
365
 The 
assistance can be provided through bilateral or multilateral arrangements or 
with a combination of both where appropriate.
366
  
 The Convention adopted certain obligations governing the assistance and 
cooperation between States in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological 
emergency. These obligations must be fulfilled by the State requesting the 
assistance, the State Parties, and the IAEA.
367
 The State Parties are obliged 
to provide assistance whether or not the accident occurred within the terri-
tory, jurisdiction, or control of the State requesting the assistance. The assis-
tance can be requested directly from any State Party, the IAEA, or any inter-
national governmental organization.
368
 The Convention obliges the State 
requesting the assistance to specify the scope, type, nature and extent of the 
assistance and to provide the necessary information to the State receiving 
such a request.
369
 This information enables the receiving State to promptly 
evaluate its capability as regards providing the required assistance. Thus the 
State receiving the request is obliged to promptly decide and notify the re-
questing State if it is in a position to provide the assistance as well as the 
scope and terms of any provided assistance.
370
 In addition, the States Parties 
are obliged, within the limit of their capabilities, to identify and notify the 
IAEA of the available experts, equipment and material, and financial assis-
tance as well as the terms of assistance that should be provided to other State 
Parties in case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.
371
 Finally, 
the IAEA is obliged to allocate appropriate resources for the emergency as-
sistance, to transmit information and necessary resources, and to coordinate 
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the available assistance at the international level.
372
 This increased the role of 
the IAEA as a channel of communication, providing information and pro-




 There are also other provisions necessary for providing assistance. These 
include provisions relating to: the direction and control of the assistance; 
competent authorities and points of contact; functions of the Agency; confi-
dentiality and public statements; reimbursement of costs; privileges, immu-
nities and facilities; transit of personnel, equipment and property; claims and 
compensation; termination of assistance; relationship to other international 
agreements; and settlement of disputes.
374
 
 Despite the fact that the Assistance Convention, like the Early Notifica-
tion Convention is considered an innovation in international law and clari-
fied the issues of assistance and cooperation between States in the rules of 
customary international law, it was criticized by some jurists.
375
 It was ar-
gued that the State receiving the assistance is responsible for all damage 
caused to the assisting State, while the later is not responsible for damage 
caused to the former.
376
 As Boyle remarked:   
 ‘No explicit obligation to render assistance is placed on other States, however, 
even where an installation within their territory is the cause of harm, nor is 
there any provision for joint contingency planning comparable to that found in 
many maritime treaties. 
Thus, in general, the Convention facilitates, but does not require, a response to 
nuclear accidents or emergencies. Its main achievement is to give assisting 
States and their personal immunity from legal proceedings brought by the re-
questing State, and an indemnity for proceedings brought by others. However, 
these provisions are open to reservation’.
377
 
Moreover, the Convention includes no clear provisions to oblige the States 
Parties to render or to accept assistance in case of a nuclear accident or ra-
diological emergency.
378
 The scope of the Convention has a wider application, 
but does not create a right to assistance for the requesting State.
379
 Also, the 
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State party from which assistance is requested is only obliged to decide 
promptly whether it is in a position to provide the assistance requested.
380
 Fi-
nally, the provisions of the Convention have not been accepted by all the 
Member States, as there are a number of reservations by States, particularly 




An examination of this chapter reveals that the Installation State must com-
ply with certain procedural obligations under international law before com-
mencing a nuclear activity.
382
 The State is obliged to establish a regulatory 
regime to organize the operation of the activity. Such a regime must contain, 
for example, regulations for nuclear safety, nuclear waste and liability for 
damage caused by the activity. It must determine the person liable for the 
operation of the activity and issue a prior authorization for the operation of 
the activity.
383
 The State is also obliged to make sure that an assessment of 
the potential risks which might arise from the operation of the activity has 
been carried out and continues to be taken during the operation.
384
 This as-
sessment must be carried out by the operating body and supervised by the 
competent authorities of the Installation State.
385
 Moreover, the Installation 
State is obliged to inspect nuclear installations and apply nuclear safety stan-
dards. The regulatory body in the Installation State is the competent nuclear 
institution responsible for drawing up these standards, usually in line with 
those adopted by the IAEA, and ensuring the compliance of the operating 
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381
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 Article 5 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities. 
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body with the regulations that have been drawn up.
386
 In addition, the Instal-
lation State is obliged to cooperate with other States and international institu-
tions in good faith, particularly with neighbouring States, and to provide 
them with the necessary information regarding the operation of the activ-
ity.
387
 If a nuclear accident occurs, the Installation State must quickly notify 
other States likely to be affected by the accident and the competent interna-
tional organizations.
388
 Furthermore, other States are required to cooperate 
with the Source State to provide international assistance if a major nuclear 
accident occurs.
389
 This requires close cooperation between the Source State, 
the States likely to be affected by a nuclear accident and the international 
organizations concerned, as without such cooperation, it is difficult to pre-
vent damage caused by a nuclear accident. Thus the principle of cooperation 
is a fundamental principle in international law required to prevent a nuclear 
accident and damage caused to the environment by nuclear activities con-
ducted within the territory, jurisdiction, or control of the State.
390
 It is also an 
inherent element and a direct consequence of States’ sovereign responsibility 
for damage caused by such activities.
391
 
 These procedural obligations have been embodied in a large number of 
international instruments and in the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Prevention 
of Transboundary Harm which are considered a progressive development in 
international law. The Articles include a number of obligations related to the 
management of risks caused by hazardous activities and the involvement of 
the State of origin and the States likely to be affected by such risks. Some 
progressive developments include, for example, the obligation to inform the 
public
392
 and the obligation to allow victims access to national and interna-
tional legal systems. These obligations were adopted in the 2006 ILC Draft 
Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising Out of Hazardous Activities.
393
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 Moreover, the Articles reveal that preventing a nuclear accident is based 
on the provision of the necessary information by the Source State, States 
likely to be affected by a nuclear accident and the international organizations 
concerned.
394
 The information is also necessary to increase the public aware-
ness concerning nuclear issues and to participate in decision making.
395
 
Moreover, it gives the international community the chance to observe and 
ensure the implementation of international obligations by the Source State.
396
 
The violation of these obligations incurs State responsibility, even if no envi-
ronmental damage has been caused by the activity.
397
   
 Nevertheless, the MOX Plant Case showed that the implementation of 
these obligations is still vague and difficult to apply in practice,
398
 particu-
larly as the information necessary to prevent and reduce damage caused by 
nuclear activities is related to nuclear technology. Such information is often 
not provided by the Source State to other States because information related 
to nuclear technology and national security is considered to be secret.
399
 The 
drafters of the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
were aware of this and included an article obliging the Source State to coop-
erate in providing information related to the national security of the State, 
industrial secrets, and intellectual property.
400
 Moreover, in the 1986 Con-
ventions on Assurance it remains unclear which State must provide assis-
tance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, and 
which State is entitled to receive assistance. Finally, there is no obligation on 
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the State from which assistance is requested to render that assistance and no 
obligation on the State requesting assistance to accept assistance.
401
 
 In conclusion, nuclear installations are very hazardous and nuclear activi-
ties must be conducted with caution. International law has therefore estab-
lished a regulatory mechanism which includes certain procedures and rules 
to ensure the safe operation of such installations and to prevent and reduce 
damage caused by such installations to people and the environment. These 
obligations must be fulfilled by the Installation State, the affected States and 
the international organizations concerned during the economic lifetime of a 
nuclear installation. They apply during the preparation, operation and de-
commissioning of nuclear installations. Before the construction of a nuclear 
installation, the Installation State must establish a comprehensive national 
nuclear regime to organize the operation of nuclear activities. This must in-
clude regulations for nuclear safety, transport of nuclear material, decom-
missioning, disposal of waste, and liability for damage caused by such ac-
tivities. The Installation State must also establish a regulatory body to 
supervise the application of the regime and to designate the operator respon-
sible for the operation of the installation. It must select the site of the instal-
lation in a place which does not pose any risk to people and the environment 
and perform an environmental impact assessment of the site and continue to 
carry out such assessments during the lifetime of the installation to ensure 
that the installation does not pose risks to the environment. It should also 
deal with the issues of nuclear safety and inspect the installation to ensure 
that the operating body has correctly applied nuclear safety standards. The 
application of the standards of nuclear safety is an important aspect for the 
prevention of nuclear accidents. Moreover, the Source States should cooper-
ate with States affected by these activities from the planning of the activity 
through the operation of the activity. Source States should provide prior noti-
fication, consult, negotiate, and exchange information with potentially af-
fected States, particularly neighbouring States, in order to establish an ac-
ceptable regime to avoid and reduce environmental consequences caused by 
the activity. They should ensure that conducting the activity is acceptable to 
the public by providing the necessary information to make the public aware 
of the activity and allow participation in decision making related to nuclear 
activities. Finally, they must inform other States and international organiza-
tions in the event of a nuclear accident and cooperate with them to recover 
from such an accident. These obligations must be carried out by the Installa-
tion State with the cooperation of other States and international organiza-
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tions, particularly the IAEA which plays an important role in assisting States 
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Introduction 
As indicated, international responsibility in the context of environmental 
nuclear damage has two functions: the preventive function, aimed at the pre-
vention and reduction of environmental damage caused by a nuclear acci-
dent, and the reparative function, aimed at the reparation of the damage 
caused by such activities.
1
 Part II of the study presented the primary obliga-
tions of international liability as a preventive function. These primary obliga-
tions are basically procedural, aimed at organizing nuclear activities, which 
are hazardous activities not prohibited by international law in order to pre-
vent and minimize environmental damage caused by nuclear accidents. If 
these obligations are violated, the State incurs responsibility for wrongful 
acts, regardless of whether such a violation entails physical environmental 
damage across borders. According to the ILC Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility for Wrongful Acts, the legal consequences of such responsibility 
are an obligation for the State to stop the illegal activities causing the viola-
tion,
2
 and to repair the material and moral damage caused by such a viola-
tion.
3
 This is particularly important in relation to the prevention of environ-
mental damage caused by nuclear activities in the case of a violation of 
environmental obligations. The cessation and guarantee of non-repetition of 
the wrongful act is a secondary obligation incurred by the responsible State 
as a preventive measure against environmental damage. The preventive 
function of international liability is evident in this obligation. In addition, 
State liability may give apply when environmental damage caused by a nu-
clear accident in a particular country affects several countries. Under interna-
tional law, the reparative function of international liability compels a State 
responsible for damage caused by a wrongful act or by a lawful activity to 
repair such damage.
4
 The reparative function is the main focus of the current 
part of the study. 
 To examine State responsibility and liability as a reparative function, this 
part of the study attempts to answer the following questions: Who is liable 
for damage caused by a nuclear activity? Is it the State in whose territory the 
                                                     
1
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2
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installation is located or under whose jurisdiction or control is operated, or is 
it the operator of the installation? What is the applicable regime as regards 
liability? Does international law impose upon the State certain standards of 
responsibility? If so, what sort of standards? Is the State responsible for any 
breach of an international obligation or only for damage, or for both? In the 
case of State responsibility, is the State responsible for the reparation of the 
damage? What is the basis of the liability incurred by the State? Is it based 
on the concept of responsibility for a wrongful act or absolute liability? 
What are the consequences of liability? 
 Answering these questions elucidates the applicable rules of international 
liability and reparation for a wrongful act resulting from the violation of en-
vironmental obligations and environmental damage resulting from a nuclear 
accident caused by a nuclear reactor installation. As indicated, State respon-
sibility for violating its obligations is based on responsibility for a wrongful 
act, while State liability for environmental damage caused by nuclear activi-
ties as lawful activities is based on risk liability or absolute liability. How-
ever, State liability for nuclear damage is essentially based on the absolute 
liability which would apply to environmental damage caused by a nuclear 
accident, even if such damage is caused as a result of a violation of interna-
tional obligations. This is because ‘the relevance of state responsibility falls 
behind the relevance of state liability, when the cause of contingent damages 
is a lawful act as a rule’.
5
 
 Three elements are necessary for State responsibility for a wrongful act, 
viz. the fact that the State has committed a wrongful act, attributing the act to 
the State, and damage caused as a result of the act.
6
 However, the absolute 
liability of the State for environmental damage is based on the element of 
damage resulting from a nuclear accident caused by a nuclear activity with-
out the need to prove fault or negligence or a wrongful act by a State. Under 
international liability theories, State responsibility and liability for environ-
mental damage caused by nuclear activities is based on at least one of the 
sources of international law. The element of damage was examined in chap-
ter 3, while other elements of State liability will be examined in this part of 
the study on the basis of sources of international law.
7
 These sources of in-
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ternational law serve as the origin and basis of State liability under interna-
tional law for environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident. As long 
as there is no inter-state treaty to govern international liability for nuclear 
damage, related issues are examined on the basis of the general rules and 
customary principles of international law and other State practices. The gen-
eral rules of international liability have been embodied in the ILC Draft Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts
8
 and Principles on the Allo-
cation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous 
Activities,
9
 which apply to environmental damage caused by nuclear activi-
ties in the absence of an inter-state treaty. Therefore, international liability, 
as a reparative function for environmental damage caused by such activities, 
will be examined in the light of these Draft Articles and Principles.
10
 
 This part of the study is divided into four chapters. Chapter 6 identifies 
the liable person and the applicable regime of liability for environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident. It identifies whether the liable person 
is the State or the operator of the installation or both, and whether the appli-
cable regime is a civil or international nuclear liability regime or both. Chap-
ter 7 analyses State responsibility for wrongful acts and the relevant condi-
                                                                                                                            
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations. However, this 
Article does not refer to other valuable sources of international law that can contribute to 
develop international law, e.g. the unilateral acts of international law, decisions and reso-
lutions of international bodies and principles of equity and justice. See The ICJ, “The 
International Court of Justice, 1946-1996”, fourth edition, ICJ, The Hague, ICJ, 1996, at p. 
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 Despite the fact that the liability of a State for environmental damage caused by a nu-
clear accident is based on the principle of absolute liability, this part of the study will 
commence by examining the issues of State responsibility for wrongful acts and then 
absolute liability. This is because it is assumed that before the occurrence of a nuclear 
accident, the State should conduct the nuclear activity under certain duties and proce-
dural obligations in order to prevent nuclear accidents. Under international law, the State 
is responsible for the violation of these duties, even if no a nuclear accident has occurred. 
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tions for State responsibility for the violation and omission of its environ-
mental obligations under international law in the light of the recent rules of 
international liability as adopted by the ILC Draft Articles on State responsi-
bility for wrongful acts. Chapter 8 investigates the concept of strict or abso-
lute liability of a State for environmental damage caused by a nuclear acci-
dent under the general rules of international law. Finally, Chapter 9 ex-
examines the legal consequences of international liability for environmental 
nuclear damage and forms of reparation according to the general rules of 
international law. This determines which form of reparation can be imposed 
upon the State and is relevant to prevent, reduce and repair environmental 










6 THE LIABLE PERSON AND APPLICABLE 
REGIME OF LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
DAMAGE CAUSED BY A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 
6.1 Introduction 
The main aim of any liability regime is to provide financial protection to re-
pair damage caused by an act or activity to the injured persons, natural or 
legal persons, States or individuals, regardless of the applicable regime, 
whether it is an international or national regime.
1
 This aim is particularly 
difficult to achieve in respect of environmental damage caused by a nuclear 
accident. The Chernobyl accident demonstrated that neither the existing in-
ternational nuclear civil liability regime nor the regime of liability under the 
general rules of international law were appropriate and adequate to repair 
environmental nuclear damage, if each regime is applied on its own.
2
 There-
fore, during the amendment of the nuclear liability conventions it was sug-
gested combining and integrating the rules governing liability for nuclear 
damage under international and civil liability in one unified global nuclear 
liability regime.
3
 The ILC made a similar proposal in the codification of in-
ternational liability for hazardous activities in general. The proposals were 
aimed at filling the gaps in the two liability regimes with the adoption of 
some liability principles from the nuclear civil liability regime in the interna-
tional liability regime and vice versa, or to apply both regimes in case of en-
vironmental nuclear damage.
4
 Indeed, civil liability was given priority in li-
ability for environmental damage caused by nuclear activities. This is due to 
the fact that most hazardous activities are operated by private enterprises. Fur-
thermore, the application of the nuclear civil liability regime is in the interests 
of victims who suffer environmental damage caused by nuclear activities be-
cause it minimises the time and effort taken for victims to be compensated.
5
 
Accordingly, the ILC included certain elements of civil liability in its Draft 
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Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Aris-
ing out of Hazardous Activities.
6
  
 Nevertheless, the two liability systems remain distinct from each other 
and each one has its own characteristics. The distinction between interna-
tional liability and civil liability questions may obscure the essence of the 
issue.  
 The concept of international liability as adopted by the ILC is com-
posed of two mechanisms of liability, i.e. responsibility of a State for 
its wrongful acts
7




 The international nuclear civil liability regime9 imposes the obliga-
tion upon the State to provide public funds in addition to the opera-
tor’s liability amounts and where the operator of a nuclear installa-
tion is unable to fulfil his financial obligations.
10
 
These differences render any regime of liability composed of elements of the 
two liability regimes all the more complicated.
11
 Following the Chernobyl 
accident, the IAEA Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage 
(hereinafter the “Standing Committee”) examined the existing nuclear liability 
regime and reached the conclusion that the regime is incapable of governing 
liability for nuclear damage without the integration of international and civil 
liability regimes in a single unified regime.
12
 The Standing Committee there-
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fore examined the relationship between the international nuclear third party 
liability regime and the international liability regime. However, it could not 
arrive at any concrete conclusions.
13
 The same view was expressed by the ILC 
during the codification of international liability for harmful consequences aris-
ing out of hazardous activities not prohibited by international law.
14
 
 Indeed, the issue of the combination of civil nuclear liability and 
international liability regimes gives rise to certain questions which will be 
analysed in this chapter. Most importantly: is there a relationship between the 
two liability regimes that facilitates their integration in one regime? What is 
the basis of that integration? If such integration appears feasible, is the State 
liable under national or international law? 
 The answer to these questions will determine which regime and type of 
liability would be applicable to environmental damage caused by nuclear 
activities, whether or not the existing international nuclear civil liability re-
gime is sufficient to govern liability for nuclear damage, if there is still a 
need to apply the regime of liability under the general rules of international 
law or the combination of both in one unified regime. These questions are 
worth looking at given that the revised international nuclear third party li-
ability regime adopted a broad definition of “nuclear damage”, including 
environmental damage,
15
 which has led to various problems related to the 
extent and insurability of such damage.
16
  
 Although there is a separation between the international and civil liability 
regimes, there remains, to some extent, a relationship between them,
17
 par-
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ticularly with regard to liability for environmental damage in the field of nu-
clear energy. Indeed, the obligation of a State to intervene and compensate 
nuclear damage caused by major nuclear accidents has been under discus-
sion by the authors of the nuclear liability conventions and the nuclear liabil-
ity law doctrine since the very establishment of the regime. This issue is con-
troversial bringing forward four different opinions over the nature and extent 
of the State intervention to compensate nuclear damage. The first trend re-
jects any involvement of the State to compensate environmental nuclear 
damage, and does not accept the principle of State intervention as a legal 
obligation in the nuclear liability regime. It places liability for nuclear dam-
age only upon the operator of a nuclear installation. The second trend, which 
was adopted in the nuclear third party liability conventions, supports State 
intervention as a public entity to compensate nuclear damage. The third 
trend calls for State intervention as an international entity to compensate nu-
clear damage under the general rules of international law. This trend gained 
strong support after the Chernobyl accident, which revealed that the amount 
of compensation furnished by the State under the nuclear liability conven-
tions is not sufficient to compensate all transboundary environmental nuclear 
damage caused by a major nuclear accident. Finally, another approach 
emerged after the accident, calling for the combination and integration of 
civil and State liability in one unified regime to compensate nuclear damage. 
This approach was supported by the IAEA Standing Committee and the ILC. 
 Under both the general rules of international law and the nuclear liability 
conventions, there are three possibilities to hold the operator and/or the State 
liable: first, the primary liability which is imposed on the operator of a nu-
clear installation or the State when it acts as an operator; secondly, compen-
sation provided by the State in addition to the operator’s liability and finally, 
the residual liability of the source State for damage caused by activities con-
ducted within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control. These issues 
will be examined in the following four sections of this chapter respectively. 
Section 2 argues for the approach which rejects State intervention to repair 
environmental nuclear damage. Section 3 examines intervention by the State 
as a public entity under the nuclear liability conventions. Section 4 examines 
intervention by the State as an international entity under the general rules of 
international law. Section 5 argues for the integration of civil and interna-
tional nuclear liability regimes. Finally, section 6 concludes that environ-
mental damage caused by major nuclear accidents should be covered by the 
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civil nuclear liability and international liability regimes, which should be a 
single unified regime. 
6.2 Primary liability of the operator: Rejection of State 
intervention 
At the beginning of the drafting of the nuclear liability conventions, several 
States refused to be involved or to intervene in any way in any kind of liabil-
ity for nuclear damage caused by nuclear activities.
18
 Thus the primary li-
ability for nuclear damage under these conventions was imposed upon the 
operator of a nuclear installation. It was argued that there is no legal justifi-
cation for the intervention of the State to compensate nuclear damage where 
the amount of the operator’s liability is insufficient to cover all the nuclear 
damage caused by a nuclear accident. The operator is the only person liable 
for nuclear damage caused by his installation and should secure his liability 
with insurance or other financial security in order to fulfil his financial obli-
gations. It was also argued that there is no reason to distinguish between 
risks involved in the nuclear industry and other industrial activities involving 
similar hazards, such as gas plants and industrial explosions.
19
 As Kaufmann 
argues: 
‘The state does not [... compensate] the victims of an accident caused by pri-
vate enterprise. If the damages exceed the amount of the insurance [... taken 
out] by the liable persons, the victims may press claims against the assets of 
the enterprise. If the assets are not sufficient, the enterprise goes into bank-
ruptcy and all the creditors must be satisfied with their share. There is no rea-
son to make an exception in the case of the private [... nuclear] industry. All 
the state has to do is to exercise a correct supervisory control. [... I]f a factory 
manufacturing explosives explodes and causes havoc, the state is not liable for 
the damages. Involvement of the state in the liability for non-insurable dam-
ages of the [... nuclear] industry would mean the socialization of a risk for 
which individual insurance should be carried by everybody. The fact that the 
state gives permission [...] to start a new industry [in the public interest and this 
...] presents certain risks cannot justify [... the] financial involvement of the 
state, should an accident [... occur] at a later time’.
20
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Moreover, it was argued that State intervention to compensate nuclear dam-
age is inconsistent with the general principles established under the nuclear 
liability conventions. According to one of these principles, i.e. exclusive li-
ability, the operator of a nuclear installation is the only entity legally liable 
for damage regardless of whose act or omission was the actual cause of the 
accident. The intervention of the State would mean that liability for nuclear 
damage caused by the operator’s installation would be borne by the whole 
community.
21
 In other words, the burden of liability for nuclear damage 
would be, at least partly, taken from the operator and would be shared by 
every individual in the community via taxes.
22
 As Perolo argues:  
‘[T]he obligation on the part of the state to intervene is a new feature in the 
field of law. Intervention of the state means a shifting and redistribution of the 
damages of nuclear origin on the whole community. The state would simply 
play the role of a mutual company for the nuclear field. Once we start on such 
a road we don’t know where it will lead. […T]he intervention of the state is 
not considered by us as an insurance which would warrant conditions able to 
overcome any competition; rather it is proposed in the form of a social guaran-
tee available to the whole community of citizens’.
23
  
Therefore, according to these arguments, ‘[i]ntervention of the state under 
any other form than insurance is nonsensical because ultimately it will 
threaten the solidity of the legal structure of nuclear agreements’.
24
  
 Ultimately, these arguments were not supported by either the interna-
tional law doctrine or the majority of States, because it is not possible to 
compare the hazards involved in nuclear activities with other industrial ac-
tivities. Nuclear energy has special characteristics and involves special haz-
ards greater than those involved in other hazardous activities such as the oil 
industry. Nevertheless, the State has agreed to intervene and to compensate 
damage caused by those hazardous activities which caused less extensive 
environmental damage. Moreover, the principle of State intervention was not 
the only new legal liability principle introduced in the nuclear liability con-
ventions. Other principles also were new but were nevertheless integrated in 
the same regime of the conventions. For example, the principle of liability 
channelling was new and was included in the legal regime of nuclear liabil-
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 Furthermore, there is no sufficient financial protection under the gen-
eral principles of civil liability in the ordinary law to protect victims of nu-
clear damage and the operator of a nuclear installation where these principles 
are applied.
26
 For example, victims of a nuclear accident may have to prove 
the fault of the operator if the general principles of civil liability are applied. 
This is a difficult task in case of the damage caused by nuclear energy. 
Moreover, the operator may be at risk of bankruptcy in the case of his unlim-
ited liability under the general principles of liability. 
 Therefore, another approach emerged which does not reject intervention 
by the State to compensate nuclear damage caused by the nuclear industry, 
but which rejects any legal obligation on the part of the State in the case of 
such intervention and considers that the State has only a social or moral duty 
towards the victims.
27
 This approach accepts the State’s intervention in order 
to protect its citizens, but in a limited way and basically as a result of its ob-
ligation to supervise and control nuclear safety in nuclear installations. It is 
obliged to ensure that the nuclear safety measures are taken by the operator 
in accordance with international standards. The intervention of States is con-
sidered as a form of social guarantee and social solidarity to compensate not 
only the nuclear damage in the case of a major nuclear accident, but also the 
damage caused by catastrophes in other hazardous activities.
28
  
 However, this approach has not gained the support of the majority of 
States either, because the intervention of States to compensate nuclear dam-
age as a type of social security does distinguish between the victims of a nu-
clear accident. While some victims of the accident would obtain compensa-
tion on the basis of the legal liability of the operator, others would depend on 
the social security provided by the State. Consequently, the amount of com-
pensation received by victims of the accident would vary from one victim to 
another. Victims of a nuclear accident compensated under the legal regime 
of liability would have all the rights to compensation, while other victims 
would have only a social guarantee or social assistance from the State.
29
   
 Finally, at the present time, there is no support for such arguments, since 
the principle of State intervention has already been concluded in the nuclear 
liability conventions and national legislations. Thus under the nuclear liabil-
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ity conventions the State is obliged to provide additional compensation to 
compensate nuclear damage, including environmental damage, and also to 
protect the nuclear industry, as we will see below.  
6.3 Secondary liability: Intervention by the State as a 
public body 
According to this widely used approach, the State commits to provide addi-
tional funds to compensate victims of a nuclear accident.
30
 This type of State 
intervention was introduced in the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Conven-
tion,
31
 the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage
32
 and the 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage.
33
 Under these conventions, the State provides compensation in ad-
dition to the liability of the operator when the maximum liability amount 
imposed on the operator (if there is such a limitation) is reached, when the 
amount of the operator’s liability is insufficient to compensate all the dam-
age caused by a nuclear accident or when the operator is unable to fulfil his 
financial obligations. This is a secondary liability which cannot be attributed to 
the State until the financial means of the sole liable operator have been ex-
hausted. However, as mentioned above, the liability of the State is still gov-
erned by national law and victims of a nuclear accident have to bring their 
claims for compensation before the national competent courts.
34
 Such interven-
tion is necessary in the absence of a conventional regime based on State li-
ability for nuclear damage. 
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 There are several legal, political and economic considerations which jus-
tify the obligation of the State to contribute to the compensation for nuclear 
damage caused by nuclear activities.
35
 Regarding the legal considerations, 
the State is empowered and has the legal authority to pursue or allow nuclear 
activities. It is entitled to enact legislation and regulations to govern all ac-
tivities related to nuclear energy. The nuclear liability regime was estab-
lished by the contracting parties with the aim of creating a developed and 
comprehensive liability framework which is able to compensate nuclear 
damage effectively. Therefore liability for nuclear damage is guaranteed by 
the Installation State in the absence of a nuclear liability regime applicable to 
nuclear damage caused by nuclear activities. It ensures that all victims of a 
nuclear accident are fully compensated by the operator. The balancing of in-
terests between potential victims and the operator was also one of the grounds 
to justify State intervention as part of the nuclear liability regime. If the State 
allows the construction and operation of nuclear installations for its economic 
and social progress, it should contribute to the compensation of potential vic-
tims of nuclear damage caused by such installations where they cannot be 
compensated by the operator.
36
 The State also has the right to licence and su-
pervise the operation of nuclear installations within its territory or under its 
jurisdiction or control.
37
 Although the prime responsibility rests with the op-
erator of a nuclear installation, the State remains obliged to ensure the safe 
operation of nuclear installations and to ensure that such installations do not 
cause nuclear damage to innocent people and the environment.
38
 If the State 
has allowed the operation of a nuclear activity, it should bear liability for 
nuclear damage caused by that activity.
39
 Consequently, the State is obliged 
to intervene to compensate nuclear damage uncompensated by the operator 
where victims of a nuclear accident have not received compensation or have 
only been partly compensated.
40
 
 On the other hand, State intervention is necessary to promote the nuclear 
industry. This is because the amount of the operator’s liability for nuclear 
damage is limited and State intervention is necessary to ensure that the op-
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erator is able to meet his financial obligations. This applies particularly in 
the case of environmental nuclear damage caused by a major nuclear acci-
dent which spreads over wide areas of the territory of the Contracting Party 
to the nuclear liability conventions. The damage, especially environmental 
damage, will almost certainly far exceed the financial capacity of the opera-
tor. As a result, many victims of a nuclear accident are left uncompensated. 
The Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents demonstrated that the operator of a 
nuclear installation is not able to cover all the damage caused by a major 
nuclear accident. Even if the liability of the operator is unlimited, there is no 
insurance which can financially secure such unlimited liability.
41
 The rejec-
tion of any State responsibility would hinder the development of the nuclear 
industry. Thus States parties to the above-mentioned conventions have un-
dertaken to provide supplementary compensation to victims who suffer nu-
clear damage where the amount of the operator’s liability is limited in order 
to protect the operators and to encourage them to take part in the nuclear in-
dustry.
42
 It is also ‘justified by the need to reconcile the normal process of 
technological development, including the risks it involves, and the public 
authority’s duty to guarantee the security of everyone’.
43
 The State and its 
citizens are also beneficiaries of the production of nuclear energy which is 
reflected in their economic development and growth.
44
 Consequently, the 
State shares the liability with the operator or at least bears part of the com-
pensation in cases of nuclear damage caused by such activities.
45
 In our 
view, limiting the operator’s liability is not the main reason for intervention 
by the State to compensate nuclear damage. This is because the State agrees 
to intervene in the case that the operator’s liability is unlimited. From the 
legal point of view, the State is obliged to intervene to compensate the inno-
cent victims of a nuclear accident because, as a result of authorizing its op-
erators to carry out nuclear activities, they were prevented from exercising 
their rights to live a normal life and enjoy a clean environment.
46
 This right 
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is one of the principles which are recognized in constitutions of States
47
 and 
the general principles of international law.
48
 Intervention by the State is nec-
essary to remove damage caused to victims of a nuclear accident and restore 
a level equivalent to the previous situation before the accident occurrence. 
 As regards the political considerations, State intervention to compensate 
nuclear damage might help the public to accept the nuclear industry.
49
 Li-
ability and compensation issues have always had an impact on the public’s 
opinion, as the existence of sound financial protection mechanisms could 
help the public fear about the possible risks and damage involved. Although 
the nuclear industry has evolved and has become a strong economic player, 
the public interest in a developed economy and the corresponding public re-
sponsibility based on additional funds can be justified to the public.
50
 The 
public will reject the nuclear industry if there is no financial protection and 
this will obviously impede the development of the nuclear industry. The 
State has realised that the development of the nuclear industry cannot be 
achieved without encouraging private investment and ensuring the protection 
of the public.
51
 The political obstacles must be removed
52




 Finally, economic and social considerations justify State intervention be-
cause the State is interested in investments on its territory for which it has to 
provide certain incentives. One of the main incentives in this respect is the 
limitation of the operator’s liability. In order to encourage investment and to 
protect potential victims at the same time, the State is bound to pay the dif-
ference between the maximum liability of the operator and the actual dam-
age.
54
 Furthermore, if the State does not intervene to compensate such dam-
age in the case of a major nuclear accident, some of the victims cannot be 
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compensated. This creates discrimination among victims of a nuclear acci-
dent, and subsequently creates social instability in the State.
55
 Therefore, the 
State and the operator share the compensation for damage caused by nuclear 
accidents. 
6.4 Residual liability: Intervention by the State as an 
international entity 
Since the early negotiations of the nuclear liability conventions, it was real-
ised that these conventions cannot cover all liability for nuclear damage 
caused by a nuclear accident and the burden of the residual liability must be 
incurred by the State. To justify that liability it was stated that: 
‘[I]n the case of the reactors, no private law, not even special legislation, can 
resolve the problem. The State, awarding the authorizations to construct a reac-
tor, knows in advance that there might be victims who cannot be sufficiently 
protected by the principles of civil liability even if a compulsory insurance is 
required. So, if the State wants to have reactors constructed, it must take care 
of the problems in the law by means of an accessory liability of the State’.
56
 
Under the existing nuclear liability conventions, the State has a limited role 
in comparison to its role under the general international liability regime.
57
 
The status quo is not a comprehensive solution to the problems of compen-
sation, unless international liability has been recognised by the States and 
adopted in an international instrument.
58
 This is mainly because liability for 
damage caused by nuclear installations under these conventions is governed by 
international private law,
 59
 and the amount of compensation is limited.  
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 There are certain cases, such as transboundary environmental nuclear 
damage, the failure to identify the operator, exoneration of the operator from 
liability, a State not party to any nuclear liability convention etc.
60
 where the 
source State is liable under international law for environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident and where claims for compensation must be 
brought before international courts because they cannot be settled under the 
civil liability regimes.
61
 However, in these cases ‘in order to hold the source 
State liable, a causal link must be established between the source State and the 
harm’.
62
 It could be argued that the causal link which justifies the State’s li-
ability is the activity that has been carried out within its territory or under its 
jurisdiction or control, with its authorisation and that the accident has taken 
place as a result of such activity. Thus if it can be proven that the damage was 
caused by the activity, the liability must be attributed to the State without the 
need to prove fault or negligence. This is consistent with the absolute liability 
of the State which is attributed to it in the case of proof of a causal link be-
tween a hazardous activity and the injury.
63
 However, if the State has failed to 
pursue due diligence with regard to the activity, this supports State responsibil-
ity for wrongful acts.  
 Such a liability of the source State for damage caused by hazardous ac-
tivities under international law is supported by the international law doc-
trine.
64
 It argues for the settlement of disputes under international (inter-
state) procedures before international courts.
65
 Where damage cannot be 
compensated under the existing nuclear liability conventions, the Source 
State should bear the residual liability for environmental damage caused by a 
nuclear accident, rather than the innocent victims.
66
 This approach gained 
increasing support, particularly after the Chernobyl accident.
67
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 Nevertheless, States accepted full liability only for damage caused by space 
objects. Article II of the 1972 Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects
68
 states that ‘[a] launching State shall be 
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object 
on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight’. Consequently the Source 
State is liable for damage caused by a space object under international law,
69
 
even if it was operated by a private enterprise. This convention is the only 
instrument in international law which provides for the liability of a State for 
damage caused by hazardous activities, including nuclear activities. It is an 
important instrument to cover environmental damage caused by space ob-
jects operated by nuclear power reactors, particularly because the nuclear 
liability conventions take a narrow view in this regard by excluding damage 
caused by space objects.
70
 Furthermore, on 14 December 1992, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution No. 47/68 concerning 
Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space.
71
 The 
resolution establishes non-binding principles on the use of nuclear power 
sources in outer space which provide a system of prevention, minimization of 




 After the Chernobyl accident, the debate on this issue was intensified. As 
mentioned above, the accident demonstrated, irrespective of the fact that the 
former USSR was not party to any nuclear liability convention, that the 
amount of compensation provided by the operator’s liability and the addi-
tional compensation provided via State intervention under the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions was insufficient to fully compensate environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident.
73
 It was argued that: 
‘Since the accident at Chernobyl, it has become evident that the existing nu-
clear civil liability regime is seriously deficient and must be replaced and that 
states must make a public commitment to nuclear safety, including the preven-
tion of accidents and the mitigation of their consequences. The civil liability 
system suffers from flaws that are so fundamental that they cannot be remedied 
through a mere revision of the three main conventions involved. Instead, they 
should be replaced by a new convention on state responsibility for nuclear ac-
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A debate on State intervention to compensate nuclear damage caused by a 
nuclear accident according to the general rules of international law took 
place during the amendment of the Vienna Convention. An inter-state treaty 
for nuclear damage was suggested
75
 in order to create a comprehensive re-
gime of international liability that includes rules on prevention, reduction and 
reparation of nuclear damage.
76
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prevent or minimize the risk of transboundary harm or, where necessary, to contain or 
minimize the harmful transboundary effects of nuclear activities carried out in their re-
spective territory or under their jurisdiction or control. Contracting Parties shall also en-
courage the application of the best available technology to ensure that nuclear activities 
are conducted safely. 
3. Contracting States shall cooperate in good faith, with one another and with the 
Agency, to develop agreed rules aimed at avoiding, reducing and controlling the harmful 
transboundary effects of nuclear activities. Such cooperation shall relate, in particular, to 
aspects of nuclear activities such as nuclear safety and radiation protection; scientific 
research and exchange of information on new safety-related technologies; physical pro-
tection of nuclear material; environmental impact assessments; radioactivity monitoring; 
contingency emergency planning; notification of emergency situations; emergency assis-
tance and other mechanisms for mitigation of nuclear damage’.  
Article X. B 
‘1. Every Contracting Party shall take immediate steps, in respect of any nuclear incident 
occurring in its territory or in areas within its jurisdiction or control, to prevent the re-
lease of radiation and minimize nuclear damage. 
2. Every Contracting Party affected, or likely to be affected, by a nuclear incident occur-
ring in the territory, or in areas within the jurisdiction or control of another State, shall 
take immediate steps to prevent nuclear damage in its territory or in areas within its ju-
risdiction or control, and minimize such damage. 
3. In the event of a nuclear incident (or the serious likelihood of a nuclear incident), the 
Contracting State in the territory of which or under the jurisdiction of control of which 
the incident occurs (or may occur), shall: 
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 Similarly, international liability for environmental damage caused by 
hazardous activities was subject of debate in the United Nations General As-
sembly (UNGA) Six Committee and the ILC during the codification of in-
ternational liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohib-
ited by international law. The question was whether the liability of the State 
should replace the liability of the operator or whether the State should only 
bear the residual liability. Naturally, there were different points of view on 
which type of liability should be attributed to the State. There are three 
forms of State liability for damage caused by hazardous activities, full liabil-
ity, residual liability or joint liability, as expressed by Mahiou in the follow-
ing terms:  
‘The issue of reparation involved determining whether the victims should seek 
compensation from the State on the territory of which the harmful activity was 
taking place or from the operator, i.e. the person carrying out the activity. 
There were, in theory, three possible solutions: (a) sole liability on the part of 
the State; (b) sole liability on the part of the operator; or (c) joint liability, 
                                                                                                                            
(a) forthwith notify, directly or through the Agency, those States, whether Contracting 
Parties or not, that may suffer nuclear damage, and the Agency, of the nuclear incident, 
its nature, the time of its occurrence and its exact location; and 
(b) promptly provide the States referred to in sub-paragraph (a), directly or through the 
Agency, with such information as is relevant to minimizing nuclear damage in those 
States’.  
Article X. C 
‘1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that adequate reparation is provided if an incident 
involving a nuclear activity carried out in its territory or within its jurisdiction or control 
has caused significant damage within the territory or in areas within the jurisdiction or 
control of another Contracting Party. Such reparation shall be provided to the affected 
States (or States) regardless of other provisions of the present Convention concerning 
limits of liability of the operator, limits of intervention of supplementary funding, special 
exonerations, or definitions of compensable nuclear damage. 
2. Compensation or other forms of reparation under para. 1 shall be determined by way 
of negotiations between the Installation State and the affected State (or States) or, in the 
absence of an agreement between the States concerned, by the International Tribunal 
established by the present Convention. However, an action under para. 1 can be brought 
in the Tribunal by the affected State (or States) against the Installation State only when-
ever the other mechanisms set forth by the present Convention to compensate nuclear 
damage cannot operate as a result of limits of liability of the operator, limits of interven-
tion of supplementary funding, special exonerations, or definitions of compensable nu-
clear damage’. Proposal for Additional Provisions and Amendment to the Vienna Con-
vention Submitted by the Delegations of Italy, 11 April 1991, Standing Committee on 
Liability for Nuclear Damage, Third Session, 8-12 April 1991, SCNL/3/INF.2/Rev.1, 23 
April 1991. 
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Accordingly, it was viewed that the State ought to be fully liable for damage 
caused by hazardous activities. The Source State would be primarily liable 
for such damage, even if the liability of the operator can be proven. As the 
delegate of Australia stated:  
‘States were free to enter into agreements under which such compensation 
would be provided in whole or part by the operator through a civil liability re-
gime, but that did not alter the basic legal position that a State was liable to 
provide full compensation for damage caused by other States or their citizens 
by activities within its jurisdiction or control… A State should ensure through 
its regulatory system that activities were carried out in a way that would ensure 
that private operators had funds available to cover any compensation payment 
that the State would otherwise be obliged to meet’.
78
 
According to this view, the Source State is subject to primary liability, resid-
ual liability and joint liability (together with the operator). This argument is 
consistent with the purposes of liability for damage caused by hazardous ac-
tivity. Due to the importance of civil liability in remedying nuclear damage, 
liability must be directed to the operator of the nuclear installation. However, 
it should be attached to the State where for some reason the operator is ex-
onerated from liability.
79
 Also, some States support full liability of the State, 
but only in the case of a violation of its international obligations and if the 
absolute liability of a State for hazardous activities is included in a specific 
instrument.
80
 According to this opinion, the liability should be assigned to 
the Source State where the obligation of due diligence has been breached. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the liability of a State is necessary for the 
protection of victims of nuclear damage, at the present time these arguments 
fail to convince the nuclear power States which do not accept any kind of 
liability for damage caused by hazardous activities.
81
 In addition, it is diffi-
cult, in some cases, to replace the liability of the operator by the liability of 
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 YILC, 1991, Vol. I, at p. 99, para. 15. 
78
 UN. Doc. A/C.6/46/SR. 32, at p. 14, para. 52.  
79
 Alan E. Boyle, “Remedying Harm to International Common Space and Resources: 
Compensation and Other Approaches”, in: Wetterstein (ed.), 1997, pp. 83-100, at p. 91. 
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 As observed by the delegation of the United Kingdom: ‘State responsibility should be 
engaged for failure by the State to provide adequate civil remedies’. UN. Doc. 
A/C.6/46/SR.32, p. 16, para. 61. ‘Strict or residual liability should not be imposed on 
States not in breach of obligations, unless by virtue of other instruments designed to deal 
with specific problems’. UN Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.32, p.17, para. 61. 
81
 Sands, 2003, at p. 909. 
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the State, because in principle the State is not liable under international law 
for acts of private persons. Also, the victims will face some difficulties if 
they have opted for international procedures to be compensated, for exam-
ple, because of the long period of time required for international cases. 
Therefore it is preferable not to resort to State liability to compensate victims 
of environmental damage, as long as they can be compensated via civil pro-
cedures against the operator.    
 Finally, another point of view argues for the residual liability of the State 
after exhausting the compensation under the civil liability conventions, i.e., 
the liability of the operator and the additional amount of compensation pro-
vided by the State.
82
 The State only bears residual liability, while the primary 
liability must be assigned to the operator.
83
 If the primary liability of the op-
                                                     
82
 Blay and Green, Vol. 25, No. 1 and 2, 1995, at pp. 30-31; See notes by Brazil, UN 
Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.32, p. 10, para. 35; Bulgaria, UN Doc. A/C.6/45/SR.38, p. 6, para. 22; 
China, UN Doc. A/C.6/45/SR.30, p. 14, para. 59; Cyprus, UN Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.23, p. 
17, para. 81; India, UN Doc. A/C.6/48/SR.23, p. 12, para. 52; Iran, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/46/SR.32, p. 22, paras. 87-88; Italy, UN. Doc. A/C.6/44/SR.32, p.15, para. 77; 
Morocco, UN Doc. A/C.6.46/SR.37, p. 2, para. 6; The Netherlands, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/46/SR.33, p. 10, para. 40; Switzerland, UN Doc. A/C.6/47/SR.28, p. 8, para. 31; 
Uruguay, UN Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.35, p. 8, para. 28; Yugoslavia, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/45/SR.30, p. 23, para. 102; Frances stated that ‘with regard to liability, the State 
should… have only residual liability’, YILC, 1991, Vol. I, p. 102, para. 10; Njenga: ‘The 
draft should assign civil liability to operators and residual liability to States, either where 
the operator could not be identified or where compensation was not adequate’. YILC 
1991, Vol. I, p.111, para. 26; Pellet: ‘[T]he principle of the primary liability of the opera-
tor, regardless of the definition of that term, should be stated very strongly. The liability 
of the State could only be residual’. YILC, 1991, Vol. I, p. 107, para. 41. Also it was 
stated that the operator should be held primarily liable, while the State of origin should 
bear subsidiary liability. France, UN Doc. A/C.6/45/SR.30, p. 7, para. 25; Spain, UN 
Doc. A/C.6/45/SR.38, p. 12, para. 43; Austria, UN Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.33, p. 2, paras. 4-
5; Mahiou, YILC, 1991, Vol. I, p. 99, paras. 15-18; Frances, YILC, 1991, Vol. I, p. 102, 
para. 10; Jacovides, YILC, 1991, Vol. I, pp. 97-98, para. 6; McCaffrey, YILC, 1991, 
Vol. I, p. 127, para. 7; Graefrath, YILC, 1990, Vol. I, p. 249, para. 63; Njenga, YILC 
1991, Vol. I, p. 111, para. 26; Pellet, YILC, 1991, Vol. I, p. 107, para. 41; Ogiso, YILC, 
1991, Vol. I, p. 115, paras. 15-16. See also, Kecskés, AJH, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2008, at p. 
234. 
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 It was mentioned by the delegation of Sweden that ‘[…] in extremely grave situations, 
civil liability regimes would prove inadequate with respect to compensation of victims. 
Civil liability regimes were valuable complements to State liability. The Nordic coun-
tries wished to see the interrelation between State liability and civil liability regimes 
clarified in the text, and considered that a system should be created in which a State li-
ability regime and a civil liability regime complemented each other. States should also be 
encouraged to use existing civil liability regimes. It would be advisable to introduce into 
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erator cannot be established, then the residual liability should be imposed 
upon the source State.
84
 It was considered unjust that the innocent victims of 
a nuclear accident should have to bear their loss themselves.
85
 On the other 
hand, it is not just either to inflict full liability for transboundary environ-
mental damage on the State and at the same time privilege the operator who 
is the main beneficiary of the activity. Thus the State should only bear a lim-
ited role of liability
86
 when the civil liability regime cannot be applied, for 
example, if the liability of the operator cannot be determined or the local 
remedy has been exhausted or the victims cannot access the local remedy.
87
 
This trend is a moderate view in order to attract the power States to admit 
liability by imposing the residual liability upon the Source State only where 
the third party liability regime cannot be applied. For example, if a nuclear 
accident has occurred, the Source States will not be liable for the resulting 
damage, unless the amount of liability under the applicable nuclear liability 
convention is insufficient to compensate the total damage caused by the ac-
cident.  
                                                                                                                            
the text a recommendation to States to elaborate, on a domestic or international level, 
corresponding civil liability systems’. UN Doc. A/C.6/44/SR.31, at p. 13, para. 54.  
84
 See the Seventh report on international liability for injurious consequences arising out 
of acts not prohibited by international law, by Mr. Julio Barboza, Special Rapporteur, 
YILC, 1991, Vol. II, Part One, doc. A/CN.4/437, at p. 85, paras. 50-51; P. S. Rao, “Sec-
ond Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts 
Not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention of Transboundary Damage from Haz-
ardous Activities), ILC, Fifty-first session, Geneva, 3 May-23 July 1999, UN. Doc. 
A/CN.4/501 (5 May 1999), at p. 16, para. 54 and at p. 18, para. 58, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_501.pdf (accessed on 22.4.2012). 
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 P. S. Rao, Second Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in Case of 
Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, ILC, Fifty-sixth session, Ge-
neva, 3 May-4 June and 5 July-6Augst 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.4/540 (15 March 2004), at 




 Ibid, at pp. 9-10, para. 25. 
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 Mahiou YILC, 1991, Vol. I, p. 99, para. 16. ‘The equitable solution was therefore a 
type of joint liability…the State of origin was liable only if harm had actually occurred 
and the operator was assigned residual responsibility’. YILC, 1991, Vol. I, p. 99, para. 
17. ‘Where there was no failure by the State to respect its obligations, primary responsi-
bility should be assigned to the operator. The State should then assigned residual respon-
sibility, in particular in the case of partial or total insolvency on the part of the operator. 
In general, it was for States to take any additional measures necessary to regulate the 
relationship between the State and operators with respect to liability’. YILC, 1991, Vol. 
I, p. 99, para. 18. See also, Cyprus, UN Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.23, p.17, para. 81; Sweden, 
UN Doc. A/C.6/44/SR.31, p. 13, para. 53; YILC, 1991, Vol. II, Part One, p. 88, para. 60. 
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 Unfortunately, the draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of 
transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities, adopted by the ILC in 
2006, are disappointing in that they do not reflect the need for the protection 
of victims of environmental damage. The drafters did not consider these ar-
guments and included only, as mentioned, the principles of civil liability, 
similar to those adopted in the nuclear liability conventions. Furthermore, 
they remain residual and optional and cannot be considered as a codification 
of customary international law of international liability.
88
 The principles are 
residual because they are part of the original draft articles on international 
liability and complementary to the draft articles on prevention of harm, and 
because they are not included in a convention and are considered as optional 
for the States, they are considered soft law. Therefore the liability of the 
State for environmental damage caused by hazardous activities is still sub-
ject to the rules of customary law and the general principles of international 
law.  
 Thus the primary responsibility of States lies in the areas of prevention of 
damage by supervising dangerous activities and by guaranteeing that ade-
quate money is available to compensate victims under the existing liability 
regimes.  
 As indicated, under the general principles of international law, the State is 
liable only if it has committed a wrongful act by violating its obligations to 
prevent, reduce and redress environmental damage caused by hazardous ac-
tivities.
89
 In the event of an act or omission by the State itself or by its organs 
or other entities deemed to act on its behalf or failing to carry out its obliga-
tions to prevent such damage,
90
 the nuclear liability conventions do not af-
fect the rights and obligations of a contracting party under the general rules 
of public international law.
91
 Thus a contracting State may claim compensa-
                                                     
88
 Boyle, JEL, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2005, at pp. 25-26. 
89
 Alexandre Kiss, “State Responsibility and Liability for Nuclear Damage”, in: Stock-
inger, Van Dyke, Geistlinger, Fussek and Machart (eds.), 2005, at p. 61. 
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 See in general, Willisch, 1987, pp. 261-297; Hermann Mosler (ed.), “Liability of the 
State for Illegal Conduct of Its Organs: National Reports and Comparative Studies”, in-
ternational colloquium held by Max Planck Institute of Foreign and International Public 
Law, Heidelberg Germany, 1964, C. Heymanns Publisher, Verlag, Cologne and Berlin, 
1967; Smith, 1988; Lammers, 1984, at pp. 587-661; Lucas Bergkamp, “Liability and 
Environment: Private and Public Law Aspects of Civil Liability for Environmental Harm 
in an International Context”, Publisher Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2001; 
Kiss and Shelton, in Ndiaye and Wolfrum (eds.), 2007, pp. 1131-1151, at p. 1140, avail-
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 Article XVIII of the Amended Vienna Convention; Annex II of the Paris Convention; 
Article XV of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation. 
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tion vis-à-vis other contracting parties.
92
 The State, for instance, would be 
responsible under international law if it dumped radioactive waste at sea 
contrary to rules of international law, nuclear safety standards and the provi-
sions of control and management of radioactive waste. The State might also 
be liable for the violation of its obligations established under national law, 
for instance, if the State did not implement the provisions of the nuclear li-
ability conventions, enacted nuclear legislation or regulations contrary to the 
nuclear liability conventions, operated a nuclear installation against nuclear 
safety rules, tolerated the operation of a nuclear reactor without prior au-
thorisation or ignored a prior notification or consultation with the States 
which are likely to be affected by damage caused by a nuclear facility. In 
these cases, the operator of a nuclear installation is liable for damage caused 
by the installation and the State is liable for other consequences arising out 
of the violation of the “due diligence” requirement.
93
 The State is subject to 
liability under the general principles of international law in the event of its 
failure to pursue due diligence for activities conducted within its territory or 
under its control and to implement preventive measures.
94
 It has the obliga-
tion to perform due diligence in the authorisation of the activity, in maintain-
ing of the activity and in case of damage caused by the activity.
95
 Due dili-
gence is considered the basis of liability of the State for damage caused by 
nuclear facilities carried out by private persons.
96
 It was argued that ‘due 
diligence is no longer equated with fault, such that […] failure to observe 
due diligence will [now] amount to a violation of the substantive obligation 
under primary rules and hence engage responsibility regardless of fault. An 
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important consequence of this development is that it will often provide the 
basis of responsibility for the activity of private operators’.
97
  
 Imposing liability on the Source State in case it violates its obligations is 
justified by the fact that the State is obliged to ensure compliance with its 
international obligations.
98
 This induces and prompts it to meet its obliga-
tions and to ensure, for instance, that the rules of nuclear safety have been 
applied by the operator. Negligence of the Installation State in the supervision 
and implementation of international safety standards by the operator of the nu-
clear installation increases the possibility of a nuclear accident. State liability 
induces it to take all preventive nuclear safety measures to avoid a nuclear ac-
cident and to establish an effective response mechanism to minimise damage 
caused by nuclear activities.
99
 In addition, the supervision of a nuclear installa-
tion is a special matter related to the sovereignty of the State which imposes on 
it the responsibility of ensuring the implementation of international safety stan-
dards even if the nuclear installation is operated by a private operator.
100
 Fi-
nally, it ensures that the liability of the operator and his financial obligations 




6.5 Combination and integration of State and civil liability 
6.5.1 Interrelationship of the two regimes: The need for 
combination  
In the absence of direct State liability, discussions are currently being held 
on the elaboration of rules governing liability for damage caused by hazard-
ous activities composed of international and civil liability norms.
102
 This 
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1992, pp. 124-158, at p. 152. 
98
 Okowa, 2000, at p. 170. 
99
 Rao, Third Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss, UN Doc. A/CN.4/566, 
(6 March 2006), at p. 22, para. 32. 
100
 As Tomuschat stated: ‘In most fields of life today, international multilateral standards 
had become the relevant yardstick for measuring the acceptability of a given activity that 
might cause harm. Nuclear power plants, for example, had to comply with the IAEA 
standards. If they failed to do so, a neighbouring State could rightly complain and re-
quest remedial action’. YILC, 1991, Vol. I, at p. 109, para. 12. 
101
 Rüdiger Wolfrum, “Means of Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement of Interna-
tional Environmental Law”, in: RDC, Vol. 272, 1998, pp. 9-154, at p. 92. 
102
 Kecskés, AJH, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2008, at p. 1; Birnie and Boyle, 1992, at p. 147; Lefe-
ber, 1996, at p. 231; See, e.g., Report of the Technical Group of Experts on Liability and 
 The liable person and applicable regime of liability for environmental nuclear damage  255 
 
should lead to a comprehensive regime of liability composed of elements of 
both civil and international liability.
103
 It can be viewed from two perspec-
tives: (a) civil liability to cover nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident 
suffered within the country under national law;
104
 and (b) international liability 
to cover transboundary environmental nuclear damage.
105
 As points out: 
‘International State liability is an essential complementary element of any 
global and comprehensive nuclear compensation system. Civil liability alone 
will not be able to fully compensate victims of a nuclear accident and will 
therefore, not fully internalize the costs of nuclear activities. To make it effec-
tive and politically acceptable, State liability must be fully integrated proce-
durally with any civil liability system as a last tier of compensation following a 
simple process for handling together both civil and State liability claims at the 
international level, with individuals being able to sue Installation States’.
106
  
The same point of view was expressed by Dupuy, who argues for the inte-
gration of the rules of liability under private and public international law in 
one unified liability regime.
107
 The combination of these rules of liability 
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would create a comprehensive nuclear liability regime which complements the 
existing civil nuclear liability rules in the aspects which need improvement.
108
  
 There are certain cases that justify the integration of the norms of civil 
and international liability under one unified regime to govern liability for 
environmental damage caused by nuclear activities.
109
 In these cases, the 
liability of the State and the liability of the operator are interrelated. How-
ever, the primary liability would be assigned to the Installation State and not to 
the operator. These cases apply: 
 
(1) for inter-state claims and transboundary damage.  
(2) in a case where, despite the fact that such damage is caused by a private 
enterprise, other States and their subjects are affected and thus the State, as an 
international subject, would be held liable according to the rules of international 
liability before international courts.  
(3) Where according to the nuclear liability conventions there is an 
obligation upon the State to intervene to compensate nuclear damage or where 
an obligation under international law has been violated.
110
  
(4) Where the State is not a contracting party to any nuclear liability 
convention and the operator cannot be held liable.
111
  
(5) Where the State is subject to liability under the rules of national civil 
law because it acted as a private person.
112
 Nuclear installations might be 
operated by the State as a public authority, by the private sector or by both. 
Liability for nuclear damage will be imposed on the State where it runs the 
nuclear installations as a private entity because such action is not related to 
the administrative sovereignty of a State. The State is held liable under the 
nuclear liability conventions for damage caused by nuclear installations 
operated under its authority.
113
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(6) Where the nuclear liability conventions oblige the operator of a 
nuclear installation to maintain financial security or any other guarantee to 
ensure the availability of the compensation amount for victims
114
 and where 
the State could be called upon if it authorises the operation of a nuclear 
installation without the operator having fulfilled this obligation. 
(7) Where the State is held liable according to national and international 
law for environmental nuclear damage: the primary liability for nuclear 
damage can be explicitly or implicitly established in an agreement between 
States on civil liability. As indicated, there are a number of bilateral treaties 
concluded in the area of the operation of nuclear power plants and the 
passage of nuclear ships through the ports of other States. Usually, these 
agreements impose liability for nuclear damage caused by these ships to the 
authorising State. Disputes which arise are settled under national law and 
before the national competent courts.
115
 On the other hand, these agreements 
give the host States the right to enter into negotiations with the source State 
to settle the disputes which arise by diplomatic procedures under 
international law. Thus ‘the question of liability and amount of damage shall 
be subject to the mutual agreement of the two Governments in accordance 
with the general principles of international law’.
116
 Consequently, the 
disputes that arise from these agreements can be settled by international law 
or national law. The liability of the State may arise in the event that it has 
failed to comply with its obligations. 
(8) Where the State has the right under international law to bring actions 
for compensation before international courts on behalf of its citizens if they 
have suffered nuclear damage as a result of a nuclear accident occurring in 
another State.
117
 The nuclear liability conventions give States the right to 
bring an action for compensation on behalf of its citizens before national 
courts.
118
 Although the nuclear liability conventions do not contain direct 
provisions concerning international liability for nuclear damage, they do 
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provide for the possibility of resort to the general rules of international liability 
under public international law.
119
 For example, under these conventions the 
Contracting Parties can make mutual claims under international law in the 




 Nevertheless, the two liability regimes are distinct and each has its own 
substantive and procedural rules.
121
 Claims for nuclear damage are governed 
by the provisions of the nuclear liability conventions which provide for civil 
law rules and apply within the national legal system. However, claims that 
fall under State liability are governed by the general rules of public interna-
tional law
122
 and disputes arising out of the State’s liability should be 
brought before international courts. As such, ‘[m]unicipal law governs the 
domestic aspects of government and deals with issues between individuals, 
and between individuals and the administrative apparatus, while interna-
tional law focuses primarily upon the international relations between States. 
Nevertheless, there are many instances where problems can emerge and lead 
to difficulties between the two systems’.
123
  
 Sources of liability under international law are those recognised as being 
provided for in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
i.e. international conventions, international custom, general principles of law 
as recognised by civilised nations, judicial decisions and ‘teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists’. On the other hand, treaty law, i.e., the nu-
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clear third party liability conventions, is the only basis of liability for dam-
age under the international nuclear liability regime.  
 In addition, the general principles under the two liability systems are dif-
ferent since State liability might be based on different grounds, including 
wrongful acts, absolute liability, the polluter pays principle, etc. On the other 
hand, the liability under the nuclear liability conventions is based on abso-
lute or strict liability of the operator. 
 Finally, the consequences of liability under international law are broader. 
There are several forms of remedy i.e. satisfaction or secession of illegal 
acts, restitution, restitution in kind or compensation of nuclear damage. The 
adoption of these legal consequences in the nuclear liability regime may help 
to achieve the liability objectives more effectively, namely to prevent, re-
duce and repair the harmful consequences caused by nuclear activities. 
However, the regime of State intervention under the existing nuclear third 
party liability regimes is mainly adopted to compensate nuclear damage 
caused by a nuclear incident, including providing subsidiary and supplemen-
tary compensation. The State must intervene under the nuclear liability re-
gime to compensate nuclear damage i.e. to provide money if there is an obli-
gation provided for under a nuclear liability convention.  
 This leads to the question of how to integrate the substance of civil and 
international liability when they have different characteristics and a different 
nature. One solution could the integration of principles governing liability 
for nuclear damage under national and international law in one international 
instrument. As Zemanek pointed out: 
‘The [concerns about ...] the nature of liability, apparently overlook that all li-
ability, whether civil or State liability, is a legal tool to balance the benefits 
which a private party-and the national economy of the relevant State-derive 
from the hazardous activity. There is, therefore, no difference in the “nature” 
of civil or State liability, but only [... the fact that it is governed] by a different 




Thus the common grounds of civil and international liability may facilitate 
the integration of the two regimes and achieve the common liability goals.
125
 
For instance, the nuclear liability conventions contain a number of nuclear 
liability principles.
126
 One of the main purposes of these principles is to unify 
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and harmonise the national liability legislation of the various States.
127
 The 
adoption of these principles in the conventions and their implementation into 
national legislation contributes to the development and improvement of the 
relationship between rules of international and civil liability because, follow-
ing the harmonisation of the legislation, these principles objectively become 
indirect rules of international law.
128
 This also creates some flexibility be-
tween the international and civil liability rules which could help to create a 
comprehensive regime of liability for nuclear damage. This is particularly the 
fact that the origin of the two systems of liability stems from common sources 
of legal rules which determine the relationship between them.
129
 For example, 
the principle of absolute liability which was adopted by international law and 
the nuclear liability conventions was originally derived from the national 
legal systems. At present, the principle of absolute liability is one of the gen-
eral principles of international law recognised by the civilised nations which 
are considered as a source of international law according to Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
130
 Consequently, the introduc-
tion of international principles and principles of civil liability adopted in the 
nuclear liability conventions as an international instrument would create a 
comprehensive regime of nuclear liability which applies to environmental 
damage inside and outside the national territory of the Installation State. 
6.5.2 Introduction of international liability elements into the 
nuclear liability regime 
After the Chernobyl accident, IAEA member States committed themselves 
to improve the existing regime of civil liability for nuclear damage.
131
 The 
IAEA General Conference recognised the fact that the existing nuclear li-
ability conventions were inadequate to cover nuclear damage caused by a 
major nuclear accident.
132
 Shortly after the Chernobyl accident, the IAEA 
General Conference convened in special sessions to examine the conse-
quences of the accident. At its first special session, the USSR submitted a 
‘[p]rogramme for establishing an international regime for the safe develop-
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ment of nuclear energy’.
133
 In this session the USSR called for the estab-




‘A possible multilateral international legal instrument could envisage the liabil-
ity of States for international damage in terms of the transboundary effects of 
nuclear accidents, as well as for material, moral and political damage caused 
by unwarranted action taken under the pretext of protection against the conse-
quences of nuclear accidents (the spreading of untrue information, introduction 
of unjustified restrictive measures, etc.)’.
135
  
On 23 September 1988, the IAEA General Conference convened to consider 
the revision of the issues related to liability for nuclear damage. As a result, 
a resolution was adopted by the conference to request the IAEA Board of 
Governors to study all issues of nuclear liability, including the question of 
State liability for nuclear damage. On 23 February 1989, the IAEA estab-
lished a working group to review the existing regime of nuclear liability for 
the purpose of reforming the liability regime. During the negotiations, it was 
proposed to establish an international convention on liability for nuclear 
damage based on the principles of liability under international law.
136
 In 
1990, the working group was replaced by the IAEA Standing Committee on 
Liability for Nuclear Damage to study the issues of international and civil 
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 During the negotiations in the Standing Committee, it was pro-
posed that all questions of nuclear liability under civil and international li-
ability regimes be covered by one single instrument.
138
 As observed by the 
Polish delegation in the Standing Committee during the amendments to the 
Vienna Convention: ‘The problem of compensation for nuclear damage can-
not be solved within the regime of private international law only. It seems 
that a system of compensation based on a combination of the private law 
regime supplemented by the international State liability regime applicable to 
transboundary nuclear damage, may provide a satisfactory solution’.
139
 Fur-
thermore, many delegations in the Standing Committee called for the inte-
gration of the rules of civil and international liability related to nuclear dam-
age in one single instrument.
140
 Accordingly, several proposals by States 
were submitted to the Standing Committee to create an international instru-
ment for nuclear damage.
141
 As proposed by Italy, such a convention would 
be based on the concept of both State liability and the concept of civil liabil-
ity of the operator of a nuclear installation,
142
 the operator bearing the pri-
mary liability. The Installation State has the responsibility to ensure that nu-
clear activities carried out within its territory or under its jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to other States or to the global commons.
143
 
Consequently, the Installation State has an obligation to prevent and reduce 
damage caused by its nuclear installations in accordance with the 1986 Con-
ventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on Assistance in 
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the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.
144
 Italy based its 
proposal on the existing rules under the general principles of international 
law and international law cases.
145
  
 Consequently, the definition of the relationship between the two regimes 
became a significant issue which needed to be determined particularly with 
regard to the issue of procedures in order to establish a harmonised interna-
tional nuclear liability regime.
146
 Therefore this issue was included in the 
Agenda of the Standing Committee.
147
 However, despite the extensive ex-
amination which had been carried out by the Committee in order to find a 
way of harmonising the two liability regimes, a conclusion could not be 
reached.
148
 Therefore due to the lack of political agreement, the Committee 
decided to end the discussion on the issues of State liability and focused on 
the issues of the revision of the Vienna Convention and the adoption of the 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.
149
 As 
Sands states, ‘[t]he slow progress of the Standing Committee’s work re-
flected political and economic sensitivities, and illustrated the difficulties in 
developing liability rule in other areas. A number of important nuclear 
power States, including France, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
strongly opposed rules of State liability in the amendments’.
150
 The Commit-
tee failed to include in the 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention 
direct liability of a State for nuclear damage. Therefore, the 1997 Conven-
tion on Supplementary Compensation was adopted to supplement the liabil-
ity of the operator in order to reduce gaps in the absence of inter-state liabil-
ity instrument for nuclear damage.
151
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6.5.3 Introduction of civil liability elements in the international 
liability regime 
In contrast, there is a positive movement in terms of the integration of civil 
liability elements into the international liability regime to govern environ-
mental damage caused by hazardous activities.152 As mentioned above, the 
elements of civil liability have been adopted in the Draft Principles on the 
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Haz-
ardous Activities which were adopted by the ILC in 2006 and include ele-
ments of civil liability rather than elements of international liability.  
 The ILC continued examining the question of liability for damage caused 
by lawful acts after the adoption of the Draft Articles on the Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm Caused by Hazardous Activities in 2001. At the begin-
ning, the Commission debated the possibility of creating an international 
instrument on the liability of a State for transboundary damage. However, ‘it 
was noted that different types of hazardous activities will require different 
solutions, different legal systems may require different methods, and States 




 In his first report to the ILC in 2003 the Special Rapporteur Rao intro-
duced the principles of civil liability into the regime of international liability. 
He wished to create a model of a liability and compensation mechanism ac-
cording to which the operator of the activity would be liable for environ-
mental damage caused by his activity when there is a causal link between the 
damage and the activity. The operator would also be obliged to maintain fi-
nancial coverage for his liability. However, the role of the State would be to 
guarantee such liability and to provide additional compensation to victims of 
damage caused by a hazardous activity. This model is based on the same 
principles adopted in the nuclear liability conventions and other instruments 
related to liability for hazardous activities.
154
  
 In 2004, the Special Rapporteur submitted to the ILC his second report, 
which included recommendations to set up general principles and guidelines 
to deal with liability issues. The second report was not very different from 
the first: it emphasised the same ideas and provided explanations for the no-
tions introduced in the first report. It also supported the idea of imposing 
liability for damage caused by hazardous activities on the operator of the 
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activity according to the “polluter pays” principle which the Rapporteur had 
already introduced in his first report.
155
 The report also indicated that the role 
of the State is to exercise due diligence when supervising the activity within 




 Both reports emphasised that the liability issues for damage caused by 
hazardous activities would be dealt with in the form of principles rather than 
in a separate mechanism of liability which was endorsed by the Commis-
sion.
157
 The Commission adopted non-binding principles of liability for haz-
ardous activities, which impose liability for damage caused by such activities 
upon the operator of the activity and oblige the Installation State to provide 
additional compensation and to ensure prompt and adequate compensation 
for victims of transboundary damage. (Principles 3 and 4) Thus the Commis-
sion failed to adopt an international binding liability instrument that intro-
duces State liability for damage caused by hazardous activities. 
 The civil liability elements were also introduced in the 1997 International 
Law Institute’s Resolution on “Responsibility and Liability under Interna-
tional Law for Environmental Damage”. This resolution integrates the prin-
ciples of State responsibility and liability on the one hand, and civil liability 
on the other hand, in one single instrument to apply to transboundary envi-
ronmental damage.
158
 According to this resolution, both the State and the 
operator of a hazardous activity are liable for environmental damage caused 
by the activity.
159
 The State is also responsible for breaches of its environ-
mental obligations according to its duty of due diligence.
160
 It is also strictly 
liable for damage caused by hazardous activities under international law 
when the damage is caused by the activity alone.
161
 However, the operator of 
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 These two instruments are the only ones in general international law 
composed of international and civil liability elements. However, other inter-
national instruments which cover international and civil liability elements 
have been created to govern liability in a specific field. For instance, the nu-
clear liability conventions cover only liability for nuclear damage and do not 
cover damage caused by other activities. In contrast, the 2006 ILC Draft 
principles and the 1997 International Law Institute’s Resolution apply to 
nuclear damage as well as damage caused by other hazardous activities. 
6.5.4 Procedural integration 
The integration of civil and international rules governing liability for nuclear 
damage in an international instrument raises the question of which proce-
dures would be followed and which law would be applied. Usually, civil li-
ability procedures are followed in the case of civil liability claims and inter-
national procedures in the case of international claims. However, this 
solution leads to the result that claims for environmental damage caused by a 
single accident are brought before two different courts and systems. There-
fore, the effective solution to this problem could be to establish an interna-
tional ad hoc forum which has the competence to decide on civil and interna-
tional claims and to give both individuals and States the right to bring their 
actions for compensation before this international body.
163
 This was the solu-
tion that was suggested during the revision of the Vienna Convention. 
6.5.4.1 International ad hoc forum 
An ad hoc international forum (court or tribunal) for nuclear damage would 
facilitate resolving disputes that arise, e.g., from the interpretation or appli-
cation of the nuclear liability conventions to litigation for nuclear damage. 
At the present time, there is a strong interest in many areas in the world in 
extending their existing or starting a new nuclear power programme which 
will not only increase the number of nuclear power plants, but will increase 
all the activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle. The significant increase of 
such activities, including transport, will obviously lead to an increased risk 
of transboundary environmental damage.
164
 Consequently, litigation for 
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transboundary environmental nuclear damage would also increase. The crea-
tion of such an international forum would have several advantages. For ex-
ample, it would internationalise the procedures of claims for nuclear damage 
in case of transboundary consequences caused by a nuclear accident; it 
would simplify jurisdictional procedures concerning claims for nuclear dam-
age where the victims of a nuclear accident are foreigners; it would reduce 
difficulties such as understanding the legal order of a foreign country or the 
translation and interpretation of the language used in that country where the 
victims have to bring their claims for compensation in a foreign country; and 
finally, it could avoid suspicion of impartiality of national courts on the part 
of the foreign victims. Such a forum would ensure equity for the victims of 




6.5.4.1.1 The European Nuclear Energy Tribunal 
In 1959, the European Nuclear Energy Tribunal was established to deal with 
international disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the 
Paris Convention and the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention. This 
Tribunal was created by the Convention on the Establishment of a Security 
Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the Protocol on the Tribunal es-
tablished by that Convention of 20 December 1957.
166
 It is composed of 
seven judges appointed by the OECD Council for a five-year term. The pro-
ceedings before the Tribunal are governed by the Rules of Procedure of the 
European Nuclear Energy Tribunal which were adopted on 11 December 
1962.
167
 The applicable law before the Tribunal is the 1957 Convention, the 
Paris Convention and the Brussels Convention.
168
 The competence of the 
Tribunal includes any dispute between the contracting parties arising from 
the interpretation or application of the Eurochemic Convention,
169
 the Paris 
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Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention in the absence of an 
amicable settlement.
170
 However, the Tribunal lost many of its functions af-
ter the suspension of the Security Control Regulations by the Steering Com-
mittee’s Decision of 14 October 1976.
171
 The Security Control Regulations 
were aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This compe-
tence of the Tribunal was suspended in order to avoid the duplication of 
competence with the European Atomic Energy Community and the IAEA, 
since non-proliferation is dealt with by these organizations.
172
 Although this 
Tribunal is a regional tribunal, it was used as a model for the creation of an 
international ad hoc tribunal as a judicial body for the settlement of disputes 
arising from transboundary nuclear damage. 
6.5.4.1.2 The International Claims Tribunal 
The establishment of an international tribunal for nuclear damage had been 
discussed in the Standing Committee during the course of the revision of the 
1963 Vienna Convention. A proposal was made by the delegation of the 
Netherlands to establish a permanent international tribunal for the settlement 
of disputes arising from nuclear damage caused by nuclear accidents.
173
 The 
draft of the amended Vienna Convention therefore included an article to 
amend Article XI of the Vienna Convention to establish a special tribunal for 
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Comprehensive Guide to International and European Law”, Intersentia, Antwerpen-
Oxford, 2005, at p. 539. 
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the settlement of claims arising from nuclear damage.
174
 This proposal was 
justified by the fact that the concentration of all claims for nuclear damage 
caused by a nuclear accident before one tribunal was seen as the only way to 
achieve a uniform interpretation of the rules governing nuclear liability and 
an equitable distribution of the limited funds available under the conven-
tion.
175
 Unfortunately, this proposal was rejected by the majority of State 
parties to the convention. It was considered unrealistic that the victims 
would bring their claims before a tribunal located several thousand miles 
away, and it was thought to be difficult for one tribunal to cope with a large 
number of claims for damage resulting from a nuclear accident. It was also 
stated that some countries are discouraged from joining the convention when 
their citizens benefit from the regime of the Convention.
176
 It was considered 
urgent because political aspects are not sufficiently regulated in the Vienna 
Convention. As a result, the existing system of jurisdiction continues to es-
tablish the jurisdiction of national courts.
177
 
 Reference should also be made to the fact that a similar proposal was 
previously made for the establishment of an international environmental 
court to deal only with damage caused to the environment and to settle inter-
national environmental disputes.
178
 Unfortunately, that proposal did not ma-
terialize.  
 Nevertheless, in another field of law, the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea, which was established following the 1982 Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, can be mentioned as a successful example of the estab-
lishment of such an international tribunal. This Tribunal has general compe-
tence for any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and any international agreement re-
lated to the purposes of the convention.
179
 It also has competence with regard 
to disputes arising from environmental damage caused to the sea as a result 
of the dumping of radioactive nuclear waste and nuclear accidents occurring 
during the transport of nuclear substances or caused by the means of trans-
                                                     
174
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 An important case dealt with by the Tribunal in the field nuclear en-
ergy is the 2001 “Dispute Concerning the MOX Plant, International Move-
ments of Radioactive Material, and the Protection of the Marine Environ-
ment of the Irish Sea” (Ireland v United Kingdom). In this case, as 
mentioned, Ireland asked the Tribunal to order provisional measures accord-
ing to the UNCLOS. It requested the UK to suspend the authorisation of the 
MOX plant and to stop international movements of radioactive materials 
resulting from the operation of the MOX plant and to prevent serious harm 
to the marine environment of the Irish Sea.
181
 
6.5.4.1.3 International Claims Commission 
Similarly, a proposal was made by the delegation of Egypt during the revi-
sion of the Vienna Convention for the creation of an International Claims 
Commission to settle claims for compensation for nuclear damage.
182
 There-
fore, a new article for the establishment of an International Commission to 
settle the disputes arising from nuclear damage caused by nuclear accidents 
was included in the draft of the amended Vienna Convention. According to 
this proposed article, the contracting parties affected by a nuclear accident 
could agree, within six months from the accident’s occurrence, to establish a 
Claims Commission. This Commission would have had exclusive jurisdic-
tion in resolving the disputes arising from nuclear damage brought by vic-
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tims of the contracting parties which had accepted the establishment of the 
Commission.
183
 The composition of this Commission, the costs of its opera-
tion, its rules of procedure etc. would have been subject to the agreement of 
those contracting parties which established the Commission. It was also sug-
gested that the procedures and rules for the functions of the Commission 
would be based upon those of a generally accepted law model of commercial 
arbitration.
184
 Moreover, in order to ensure neutralities of the Commission, 
proposal was made to compose such Commission of two or three expert 
judges designated by each of the Contracting Parties affected by a nuclear 
accident.
185
 Further, the Commission would have an optional claim settle-
ment procedure and the competent court should be bound by the final 
judgement of the Commission if an action was brought before the Commis-
sion and the competent court.
186
 In addition, the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Commission would be extended to cover claims by any State not involved in 
the establishment of the Commission which declares its desire to accept the 
jurisdiction of the Commission and agrees to cover part of the cost of the 
operation of the Commission. This also includes extending the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Commission to deal with claims for nuclear damage 
caused by nuclear accidents brought by any victim within that State.
187
 Fi-
nally, the Commission would apply the Vienna Convention and the law of 
the national court having jurisdiction.
188
 Unfortunately, for the reasons men-
tioned in regard to the International Claims Tribunal, this proposal was also 
rejected. 
 It appears that this Commission was intended to be similar to other ad 
hoc international claims commissions which were created under interna-
tional law. Mention should be made of the 1972 Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects which provides for the estab-
lishment of a Claims Commission to resolve disputes arising from damage 
caused by space objects. According to this convention, if the disputes that 
arise cannot be settled by negotiation ‘within one year from the date on 
which the claimant State notifies the launching State that it has submitted the 
documentation of its claim, the parties concerned shall establish a Claims 
                                                     
183
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Commission at the request of either party’.
189
 The Claims Commission is 
entitled to decide on the merits of the claim and to determine the amount of 
compensation to victims of damage caused by space objects.
190
 This Com-
mission has exclusive jurisdiction over claims for compensation for damage 
caused by space objects, including environmental nuclear damage, when 
these objects are operated by nuclear power sources, such as nuclear isotopes 
or nuclear reactors. According to the 1972 Space Convention, a Claims 
Commission was established to settle the dispute between Canada and the 
former USSR for environmental damage caused by the Satellite Cosmos 954 
accident of January 1978. The dispute was settled according to the 1981 Pro-
tocol, which was concluded between Canada and the USSR for the Settle-
ment of Canada’s Claim for Damages Caused by “Cosmos 954”.
191
 The Pro-
tocol obliged the Government of the USSR to pay the Government of 




 Another example is the fund which the Commission established in the 
Security Council Resolution 687 on 3 April 1991. This was created to ad-
minister the fund after the war between Iraq and Kuwait. This resolution in-
cluded the liability of Iraq under international law for the direct loss, envi-
ronmental damage, depletion of natural resources, injury to foreign 
Governments, nationals and corporations suffered as a result of its unlawful 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
193
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6.5.4.2 Applicable law 
Finally, reference should be made to the applicable law if a nuclear liability 
regime is established combining the rules of international and civil liability 
norms.
194
 In that case, the rules of international liability would only apply 
when the regime of State intervention under the civil nuclear liability regime 
is exhausted and where there is still uncompensated transboundary nuclear 
damage caused by a nuclear accident.
195
 In other words, under the nuclear 
liability conventions the operator’s financial resources must first be ex-
hausted up to the liability limit (if any) or the actual available limit (if liabil-
ity is unlimited). Secondly, the regime of State intervention will apply, and 
thirdly, State liability under the general rules of international law will come 
into play where the additional compensation provided by State intervention 
under the nuclear liability conventions is inadequate to compensate all nu-
clear damage caused by a major nuclear accident.
196
 It was also suggested 
that the collective contributions provided by the contracting States could be 




 The laws and procedures under the international civil liability regime are 
applicable where damage by a nuclear accident is caused only within the 
territory of a State. Civil liability, as mentioned above, is an effective means 
to settle disputes where there is no transboundary nuclear damage.
198
 It is in 
the interest of the victims because it is easy and faster for them to bring their 
claims for compensation before a national court according to the domestic 
nuclear third party liability law.
199
 Usually the procedures before interna-
tional courts take longer and are more complicated. However, international 
liability is more convenient and effective for the compensation of trans-
boundary environmental nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident where 
the civil liability regime is not able to compensate all the damage suffered 
because in the end the State is in a better position to bear full liability for the 
damage. The State also has the right to make a claim against another State 
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for a violation of its obligations under international law according to State 
responsibility for wrongful acts. 
 Thus State liability under the regime of international liability should be 
seen as a subsidiary liability where the victims cannot be fully compensated 
for the damage claimed in national courts. Victims of environmental nuclear 
damage should request compensation for the damage suffered as a result of a 
nuclear accident under the regime of State intervention under the applicable 
nuclear liability convention before making a claim against the State for such 
damage under the regime of international liability. Nevertheless, the applica-
tion of State liability for damage caused by activities in the territory of the 
State or under its jurisdiction or control does not prevent victims of a nuclear 
accident from choosing between national and international procedures to 
bring actions for compensation. They can opt to bring their claims for com-
pensation before national courts under the rules of private law.
200
  
6.6 Conclusions  
The chapter reveals that when nuclear energy was first used, States rejected 
the possibility of intervening to compensate nuclear damage, and liability for 
such damage was attributed to the operator of a nuclear installation. How-
ever, at a later stage, they agreed to provide additional compensation in the 
case that the amount of the operator’s liability was insufficient to meet the 
claims of victims of a nuclear accident, or the operator was unable to fulfil 
his financial obligations. They did not go so far as to bear full and direct li-
ability under international law for environmental nuclear damage except in 
limited cases where the obligations under the nuclear liability conventions, 
or under the general rules of international law, had been violated. They only 
accepted liability for environmental damage caused by space objects under 
the 1972 Space Liability Convention. International liability for environ-
mental damage caused by other nuclear activities is subject to the general 
rules of international law which are vague and difficult to apply to environ-
mental nuclear damage. Therefore, there is a growing argument for the State 
to assume liability for environmental damage according to the rules of inter-
national law and to codify such rules in an international instrument. This 
view was expressed more strongly following the Chernobyl accident, which 
revealed that transboundary environmental damage cannot be covered by 
civil liability alone. The arguments remain valid, given the anticipated in-
crease of nuclear power plants and the increase of nuclear- related activities 
all over the world.  
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 This chapter shows that there is an interrelationship between the princi-
ples on which national, international civil liability and international liability 
rules are based on. Thus the recent doctrine is in favour of integrating the 
two regimes of liability in one unified regime. The advantages and risks of 
nuclear energy on the one hand, and the rights and obligations of States and 
private enterprises on the other hand, justify the liability and intervention of 
both private operators and the State at different levels and to a different ex-
tent, following the rules of primary, secondary and residual liability as pre-
sented in this chapter. According to this approach, the primary liability for 
nuclear damage is, in principle, assigned to the operator of a nuclear installa-
tion under the existing regimes of liability. There are some nuclear activities 
which are not covered by the civil liability regime and nevertheless entail the 
liability of the State, such as military installations, which are connected with 
sovereignty of the State. However, the secondary liability is imposed upon 
the State under the civil liability regime. The State is obliged to provide ad-
ditional compensation in addition to the liability of the operator up to the 
limit provided for under the applicable nuclear civil liability regime. Finally, 
after exhausting the liability of the operator of a nuclear installation and the 
additional compensation provided by the State, the residual liability for nu-
clear damage and responsibility for violation of rules of international law is 
assigned to the State under the general rules of international law. Thus 
claims for compensation for environmental nuclear damage must be brought 
first before national courts according to the civil liability regime. The civil 
liability regime governs liability of individuals as private subjects, the opera-
tor and the victims, under national law and courts. However, after exhausting 
the civil remedy, claims can be brought before international courts according 
to the rules of international law, as international liability relates to the liabil-
ity of a State as an international subject. The liability of the State under the 











7 STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATING 
ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO 
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES 
7.1 Introduction 
A State’s failure to fulfil its commitments under international law in relation 
to a nuclear activity may incur State responsibility for damage caused to 
other States in accordance with the general principles of international law.
1
 
A wrongful act committed by a State vis-à-vis another State may cause dam-
age to that State which must be repaired under international law.
2
 As the 
former president of the International Court of Justice, Judge Higgins, stated: 
‘If what is required for something to fall within the law of state responsibil-
ity is an internationally wrongful act, then what is internationally wrongful is 
allowing (even without culpa) the harm to occur. A nuclear plant is a lawful 
activity; but failure to meet a strict-liability or due-diligence standard of 




 The rules of State responsibility, as recently developed and codified by the 
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts, embody cus-
tomary international law on State responsibility for wrongful acts.
4
 They 
constitute a general principle in international law that applies to wrongful 
acts of the State in general,
5
 including a State’s violation of international ob-
ligations in respect of organizing nuclear activities in its territory or under its 
jurisdiction or control.
6
 The Articles apply to all violations of international 
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obligations because no other regime has been developed for State responsi-
bility, even in relation to environmental issues.
7
 Imposing responsibility on 
the State for a breach of its environmental obligations induces it to exercise 
greater control over hazardous activities to prevent damage and comply with 
the existing international standards and conduct of international law.
8
 How-
ever, the Articles do not apply to State responsibility for wrongful acts in the 
case of special rules of international law that exist or specific agreements to 
cover a specific issue,
9
 such as those related to maritime environmental is-
sues
10
 or to issues of State responsibility not regulated by the Articles,
11
 or in 
the case of other special regimes that are applicable, including those govern-
ing the responsibility of international organizations or State matters related 
to the conduct of an international organization,
12
 or individual responsibility, 
such as criminal or civil liability
13
 or the Charter of the United Nations.
14
 In 
addition, the Articles are still complicated and do not define the content of 
international obligations because they are considered primary rules embod-
ied in the ILC Draft Articles on prevention and international liability for acts 
not prohibited by international law.
15
 As the Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session states, ‘[t]he articles do 
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not attempt to define the content of the international obligations, the breach 
of which gives rise to responsibility. This is the function of the primary 
rules, whose codification would involve restating most of substantive cus-
tomary and conventional international law’.
16
 This is because the function of 
the primary rules, as noted in the previous part of the study, is to create the 
rules organizing the activity, and the function of the secondary rules or State 




 The chapter mainly examines the essential aspects of State responsibility 
for its wrongful acts and its application to environmental damage caused by 
nuclear activities, particularly because there are ample examples from the 
literature regarding State responsibility in general.
18
 Furthermore, the spe-
cific aim in this chapter is to examine the issues of State responsibility for 
wrongful acts as a subject of international law and excludes those applying 
to responsibility of international organizations for wrongful acts.  
                                                     
16
 The 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with commentaries, p. 32, para. 1. The Articles are available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (ac-
cessed on 19.6.2010). 
17
 The 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, commentaries, p. 32, para. 3.  
18
 See in general, Crawford, Pellet and Olleson (eds.), 2010; Thomas D. Grant, “Interna-
tional responsibility and the Admission of States to the United Nations”, in: MJIL, Vol. 
30, Issue 4, 2009, pp. 1095-1185. The article is also available at: 
http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/grant.pdf (accessed on 4.5.2010); Ralph 
P. Kröner, “Transnational Environmental Liability and Insurance”, Graham & Trotman, 
London 1992; Kiss, DJILP, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2006, pp. 67-83; Francisco Orrego Vicuña, 
“Current Trends in Responsibility and Liability for Environmental Harm under Interna-
tional Law”, in: Kalliopi Koufa (ed.), Protection of the Environment for the New Millen-
nium, Athens, Sakkoulas Publications, 2002, pp. 127-182; David D. Caron, “The ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship between Form and Au-
thority”, in: AJIL, Vol. 96, 2002, pp. 857-873; Robert Rosenstock, “The ILC and State 
Responsibility”, in: AJIL, Vol. 96, Issue 4, 2002, pp. 792-797; Per Malm, “State Respon-
sibility in Relation to Transboundary Environmental Damage”, Master Thesis, Gregor 
Nall, International Law, Faculty of Law University of Lunds, spring 2007, available at: 
http://www.essays.se/essay/066d34eee2/ (accessed on 22.2.2012); Gordon Linsly and 
Wolfram Tonhauser, “An Expanding International Legal Regime: Environmental Protec-
tion & Radioactive Waste Management”, IAEA Bulletin, 42/3/2000, pp. 24-29, available 
at: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/87957688/AN-EXPANDING-INTERNATIONAL-
LEGAL-REGIME (accessed on 22.2.2012); Voigt, Christina, “State Responsibility for 
Climate Change Damages”, in: NJIL, Vol. 77, No. 1-2, 2008, pp. 1-22; Tol and Ver-
heyend, EP, Vol. 32, 2004, pp. 1109-1130; Patrick Daillier, Mathias Forteau, Alain Pel-
let and Daniel Müller, Droit international public, 8e édition, L.G.D.J., lextenso editions, 
Paris, 2009, pp. 847-915; Jiménez de Aréchaga, “International Law in the Past Third of 
a Century”, in: RDC, Vol. 159, Part I , 1978, pp. 1-344. 
280 CHAPTER 7 
 
 Section 2 of the chapter defines the principle of State responsibility for 
wrongful acts and its application in case of violations of environmental obli-
gations. Section 3 defines the concept of an internationally wrongful act and 
its elements. Section 4 discusses the required conditions for State responsi-
bility and its application for the violation of environmental obligations and 
other obligations related to a nuclear activity. Finally, Section 5 concludes 
that a State’s violation of its environmental obligations under international 
law during a nuclear activity constitutes State responsibility. 
7.2 State responsibility as a general principle and its 
application to environmental nuclear obligations:  
The ILC approach 
The principle of State responsibility for wrongful acts was formulated at an 
early stage by the Third Committee of the 1930 Conference on Codification 
of International Law in Article 1 of the Articles on State responsibility 
adopted by the Conference. This Article provides that ‘[i]nternational re-
sponsibility is incurred by a State if there is any failure on the part of its or-
gans to carry out the international obligations of the State which causes 
damage to the person or property of a foreigner on the territory of the 
State’.
19
 Such definition of the principle adopted the classical view of State 
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negligence constitutes a violation of international duty resting upon the State to which 
the said authorities belong’. YILC, 1969, Vol. II, p. 141, document A/CN.4/217 and 
Add.1, Annex II;  
Draft treaty concerning the responsibility of a State for internationally illegal acts, pre-
pared by Professor Strupp in 1927. Article 1 states that ‘[a] State is responsible to other 
States for the acts of persons or groups whom it employs for the accomplishment of its 
purposes (its “organs”), in so far as these acts conflict with the duties which arise out of 
the State’s international legal relations with the injured State. If the act consists of an 
omission, the employing State is responsible only if it is chargeable with fault’. YILC, 
1969, Vol. II, p. 151, document A/CN.4/217 and Add. 1, Annex IX;  
 State responsibility for violating of environmental and nuclear obligations 281 
 
                                                                                                                            
Article I of the Draft on “International Responsibility of States for Injuries on Their Ter-
ritory to the Person or Property of Foreigners”, Draft prepared by the Institute of Interna-
tional Law (1927), states that ‘[t]he State is responsible for injuries caused to foreigners 
by any action or omission contrary to its international obligations, whatever be the au-
thority of the State whence it proceeds: constitutional, legislative, governmental, admin-
istrative, or judicial’. See YILC, 1956, Vol. II, at pp. 227-228, document A/CN.4/96, 
Annex 8; Article 1 of the Draft Convention on “Responsibility of States for Damage 
Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, Prepared by Harvard 
Law School (1929) provides that [a] State is responsible, as the term is used in this con-
vention, when it has a duty to make reparation to another state for the injury sustained by 
the latter state as a consequence of an injury to its national’. See YILC, 1956, Vol. II, p. 
229, document A/CN.4/96, Annex 9; 
Draft convention on the responsibility of States for injuries caused in their territory to the 
person or property of aliens, prepared by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 
(German International Law Association) in 1930. Article 1(1) of this draft convention 
states that ‘[e]very State is responsible to other States for injury caused in its territory to 
the person or property of aliens as a consequence of the violation by that State of any of 
its obligations towards the other State under international law’. YILC, 1969, Vol. II, p. 
149, document A/CN.4/217 and Add. 1, Annex VIII;  
Draft convention on the responsibility of States for international wrongful acts, prepared 
by Professor Roth in 1932. Article 1 of this draft states that ‘[a] State is responsible for 
the acts contrary to international law of any individuals whom or corporations which it 
entrusts with the performance of public functions, provided that such acts are within the 
general scope of their jurisdiction’. YILC, 1969, Vol. II, p. 152, document A/CN.4/217 
and Add. 1, Annex X;  
“Draft convention on the international responsibility of States for injuries to aliens”, pre-
pared by the Harvard Law School, 1961. Article 1 (1) (Basic principles of State Respon-
sibility) states that  ‘[a] State is internationally responsible for an act or omission which, 
under international law, is wrongful, is attributable to that State, and causes an injury to 
an alien. A State which is responsible for such an act or omission has a duty to make 
reparation therefore to the injured alien or an alien claiming through him, or to the State 
entitled to present a claim on behalf of the individual claimant’. YILC, 1969, Vol. II, p. 
142, document A/CN.4/217 and Add.1, Annex VII;  
Principles of international law that govern the responsibility of the State in the opinion of 
Latin American countries, prepared by the Inter-American Juridical Committee in 1962. 
Article I states that ‘[i]ntervention in the internal or external affairs of a State is not ad-
missible to enforce the responsibility of said State. On the contrary, intervention estab-
lishes the responsibility of the intervening State’. YILC, 1969, Vol. II, p. 153, document 
A/CN.4/217 and Add.1, Annex XIV;  
Principles of international law that govern the responsibility of the State in the opinion of 
the United States of America, prepared by the Inter-American Juridical Committee in 
1965. Article I (General standard of responsibility) states that ‘[w]hen a State admits 
foreigners to its territory, it has an international duty to protect their life and property 
according to a minimum standard of rights determined by international law. Neither the 
receiving State nor the foreigner’s State can by its own law determine this international 
standard. It is determined by international law. A State that fails to comply with the ap-
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responsibility in which the liability is based on three elements: conduct, 
damage and causal link between the committed act and the damage.
20
 This 
comprehensive definition includes the subjective and objective elements of 
international law liability. The comprehensive character of this definition 
possibly resulted from its adoption before the principle of international li-
ability was divided into two, i.e., State responsibility for wrongful acts and 
international liability for lawful activities not prohibited by international law. 
Therefore, it was necessary to combine the elements of the two aspects of 
international liability in one definition. 
 The principle of State responsibility was affirmed and developed in inter-
national case law.
21
 The Phosphates in Morocco case was one of the earliest 
cases in international law in which the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice formulated the principle of State responsibility for wrongful acts. It 
stated that: ‘[I]t is in this decision that we should look for the violation of 
international law – a definitive act which would, by itself, directly involve 
international responsibility. This act being attributable to the State and de-
scribed as contrary to the treaty right of another State, international respon-
sibility would be established immediately as between the two States’.
22
 
There are also some judgments in environmental and nuclear cases, includ-
ing the Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and Canada in 
1941,
23
 the Lac Lanoux arbitration between France and Spain in 1957, 
24
 the 
Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
v. Albania) in 1949,
25
 the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 
                                                                                                                            
plicable international law, as regards the person or property of foreigners in its territory, 
incurs international responsibility and must make reparation in such form as may be ap-
propriate’. YILC, 1969, Vol. II, p. 153, document A/CN.4/217 and Add. 1, Annex XV; 
Article 1 of the Institute of International Law Draft Articles on “Responsibility and Li-
ability under International Law for Environmental Damage” Session of Strasbourg – 
1997. 
20
 Brigitte Stern, “The Elements of an internationally Wrongful Act”, in: Crawford, Pel-
let and Olleson (eds.), 2010, pp. 193-220, at p. 194. 
21
 YILC, 1971, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 205, para. 30. 
22
  PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 74, 1938,, at p. 28. 
23
 UNRIAA, Vol. III, p. 1905, at p. 1965; AJIL, Vol. 35, 1941, at p. 716. For the Trail 
Smelter case, see Günther Handl, “Trail Smelter in Contemporary International Envi-
ronmental Law: Its Relevance in the Nuclear Energy Context”, in: Bratspies, Miller 
(eds.), 2006, pp.125-139; Mark A. Drumbl, “Trail Smelter and the International Law 
Commission’s Work on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts and State 
Liability”, in: Bratspies and Miller (eds.), 2006, pp. 85-98; Neil Craik, “Transboundary 
Pollution, Unilateralism, and the Limits of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Second Trail 
Smelter Dispute”, in: Bratspies and Miller (eds.), 2006, pp. 109-121. 
24
 ILR, 1957, at pp. 123-124, para. 6. 
25
 ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 22; Brownlie, 1983, at p. 43. 




 the MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), in 2001,
27
 
and the Pulp Mills Case (Argentina v. Uruguay) in 2010
28
 which applied the 
principle of State responsibility for wrongful acts, though they did not define 
it.  
 These developments of the principle of State responsibility are reflected 
in the current definition of the principle in the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on 
State responsibility for wrongful acts. The Articles consider that ‘[e]very 
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility 
of that State’.
29
 This provision constitutes a general principle of State re-
sponsibility that applies when a State violates the environmental rights of 
another State according to international law.
30
 The application of the princi-
ple relies on the definition and interpretation of the concept of an interna-
                                                     
26
 Reports of the ICJ, 1997, at p. 82, para. 155; Gerhard Loibl, “Environmental law and 
Non-Compliance Procedures: Issues of State Responsibility”, in: Fitzmaurice and 
Sarooshi (eds.), 2004, pp.201-217, at p. 205. 
27
 The International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, the MOX Plant Case, (Ireland v. 
United Kingdom), Request for provisional measures, 3 December 2001, para. 26 (3). The 
judgment is available at: http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html 
28
 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 20 April 
2010, at p. 79, para. 282, avalaible at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf  
(accessed on 30.11.2011). 
29
 Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
30
 Tol and Verheyend, EP, Vol. 32, 2004, pp. 1109–1130, at p. 1113, available also at: 
http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/tol/enpolliability.pdf (accessed 
on 15.4.2010). The general rules of State Responsibility as adopted by the ILC 2001 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility apply in the case of the violation of the State to 
environmental and nuclear obligations and nuclear damage caused as a result of the vio-
lation. These Articles codified the general rules of State Responsibility for wrongful acts 
under the general rules of international law. This is because, as mentioned above, there is 
no regime on State Responsibility included these rules. Indeed, there are several interna-
tional environmental and nuclear conventions which generate State responsibility. How-
ever, these conventions do not determine the content and elements of State responsibility 
for wrongful acts. They are considered primary rules necessary to organize a nuclear 
activity and their violation needs the application of secondary rules of State responsibil-
ity as codified by the ILC Articles. The latter indicate, for instance, the conditions of 
State responsibility and under which system a wrongful act can be described, under na-
tional law or international law, considering a wrongful act a serious breach of an interna-
tional obligation or international crime, which acts of an organ of the State can be at-
tributable to the State, etc. These rules are not provided for under the environmental and 
nuclear liability conventions. Therefore, the Court has to apply the general rules of inter-
national law and see whether any convention or international custom or a general princi-
ple of international law or judicial decision or any other source refers to these issues. The 
ILC codified the general rules on State responsibility in order to be clear about their ap-
plication in practice.  
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tionally wrongful act and international responsibility. This is particularly 
because the principle does not include any other necessary elements to con-
stitute State responsibility such as fault, damage or consequences of respon-
sibility. 
 Accordingly, invoking State responsibility with regard to this principle 
requires determining what is considered a wrongful act and attributing that 
act to the State. The definition of the concept of wrongful conduct and its 
attribution to the State are two essential elements to determine State respon-
sibility for wrongful acts, violations of its environmental obligations while 
conducting nuclear activities. The wrongful act, in the case of a violation of 
environmental obligations, is defined under the general rules of international 
law. This is because environmental and nuclear agreements do not define the 
wrongful act. Thus the internationally wrongful act is a source of interna-
tional liability. This is because international liability can be established on 
the basis of wrongful act liability or on the basis of any other liability such as 
fault liability and absolute liability. It was stated that ‘for the definition of 
the principle stated in article 1 of the present draft, a formulation which, 
while indicating that the internationally wrongful act is a source of interna-
tional responsibility, does not lend itself to an interpretation that might 
automatically exclude the existence of another possible source of “responsi-
bility”.’
31
 Consequently, the principle of State responsibility is interrelated 
with other fundamental principles of international law which are considered 
a source of State responsibility, including the principle of State sovereignty, 
good neighbourliness and the principle of prevention. The basic duty of State 
responsibility, according to these principles, imposes an obligation upon the 
State not to act in conflict with the rights of other States. It imposes State 
responsibility upon the Installation State not to cause environmental damage 
to the neighbouring State, or to other States or to the global environment, 
when it conducts nuclear activities or any other hazardous activities within 
its territory or under its jurisdiction or control. A breach of this principle 
constitutes State responsibility.  
 If a wrongful act is committed, this creates a new legal relationship in 
international law between the offending State and the injured State.
32
 This 
new legal relationship constitutes the content of international responsibility 
‘by reason of the internationally wrongful act of a State’.
33
 The establish-
                                                     
31
 YILC, 1974, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 273, para. 110. 
32
 YILC, 1971, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 206, para. 32 and at p. 210, para. 40. 
33
 Commentaries to the ILC draft articles on “Responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful acts” adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session 
(2001), (extract from the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 
Fifty-third session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Sup-
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ment of international responsibility also establishes mutual rights and duties 
in international relations between States, viz. it imposes a duty upon offend-
ing State which caused the damage, and on the other hand, it gives a right to 
the injured State and vice versa. The right of one State creates a duty for the 
other State. Accordingly, the Installation State of a nuclear activity has the 
obligation to repair legal and material damage caused as a result of its viola-
tion of environmental and nuclear obligations to the injured State, and the 
latter has the right to the claim reparation of the damage.  
 The nature of this new relationship was discussed by the ILC during the 
codification of the principle of State responsibility. As expected, there were 
some differences of opinion between the members of the Commission in de-
termining the nature of this new relationship. Some considered that the new 
legal relationship creates an obligation for the State to make reparation for 
the harmful consequences arising from a wrongful act of a State.
34
 Thus, this 
view considers State responsibility as a reparative function of responsibility, 
as in the classical view of international liability that obliges the State only to 
repair the damage resulting from its wrongful act. Others considered it as a 
sanction on the State.
35
 This view is consistent with the preventive function 
of State responsibility that is aimed at preventing and minimizing the harm-
ful consequences of a nuclear accident. Other moderate views adopted by the 
ILC combined both opinions, considered that the new relationship involved 
the legal consequences of State responsibility for wrongful acts, i.e., the ces-
sation of the wrongful act, and the reparation of damage. From this point of 
view, sanctions consist of taking measures to impose penalties, whereas re-
parative measures compel the offending State to redress the consequences of 
its wrongful act.
36
 This view is consistent with the modern view of State re-
                                                                                                                            
plement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.2), at p. 63. The Commentaries are also available at: 
http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup06/basicmats2/DASRcomm.pdf (accessed on 
11.5.2010) (hereinafter the 2001 Commentaries on State Responsibility). 
34
 YILC, 1971, Vol. II, Part One, at pp. 206-207, paras. 33-34. 
35
 It was stated that: ‘Starting from the idea that the legal order is a coercive order, this 
view sees in an act of coercion not only the sole possible form of sanction, but also the 
sole legal consequence following directly from the wrongful act. The obligation to make 
reparation is – and this, according to this view, is true in any system of law – no more 
than a subsidiary duty placed between the wrongful act and the application of measures 
of coercion, by the law in municipal law, and in international law by a possible agree-
ment between the offending State and the injured State. Accordingly, general interna-
tional law would not regard the wrongful act as creating any obligatory relationship be-
tween the offending State and the injured State, but would authorize the latter to react to 
the wrongful act of the former by applying to it a sanction in the proper sense of the 
term’. YILC, 1971, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 208, para. 35. 
36
 YILC, 1971, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 208, para. 36. 
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sponsibility that combines both the preventive and reparative functions of 
international liability. The State has to bear the consequences of international 
responsibility, i.e., to cease its illegal act and to guarantee that such an act is 
not repeated or to make reparation to the injured State including restitution, 
compensation and providing acceptable satisfaction. These consequences are 
addressed in Part Two of the 2001 Draft Articles on State responsibility for 
wrongful acts.
37
 This view as adopted by the ILC supports the protection of 
the environment. Indeed, State responsibility as defined in contemporary 
international law is aimed at the prevention, mitigation and reparation of the 
harmful consequences arsing from hazardous activities not prohibited by 
international law. The combination of the cessation and non-repetition of a 
wrongful act, considered as a sanction and reparation of the damage in terms 
of correcting matters to return to the initial situation prior to the damage, 
means that the principle of State responsibility is more effective for the pro-
tection of the environment from damage caused by nuclear activities. For 
example, it obliges a State to cease the operation of a nuclear reactor instal-
lation if it violates the nuclear safety criteria, and to guarantee non-violation 
of such criteria in order to be allowed to operate the reactor again. The State 
is also obliged to compensate other States for costs of preventive measures 
taken to protect themselves from potential damage caused by such an unsafe 
nuclear installation.  
 Another issue relates to the applicable rules of State responsibility in this 
new relationship. What are the applicable rules for State responsibility? Are 
they the rules which apply between the offending State and the injured State, 
or the rules of international law in general? In other words, should a State be 
responsible for violating its bilateral obligations or also for violating obliga-
tions of international law in general? In our opinion, the applicable rules of 
State responsibility in relation to the violation of environmental obligations 
include not only bilateral relations between the offending State and the in-
jured State, but also rules of international law in general. The applicability of 
the rules of State responsibility to environmental cases arising from a breach 
of environmental obligations does not rely only on the breach of interna-
tional obligations between States relating to a nuclear activity, but also on 
the violation of the general rules of international law. This is because the 
Articles codified the general rules of international law on State responsibil-
ity. Treaties are not the only sources of international law and only apply to 
                                                     
37
 The 2001 Commentaries on State Responsibility, at pp. 211-212; Crawford, 2002, at p. 
77; F. V. García Amador, Louis B. Sohn and R. R. Baxter, “Recent Codification of 
the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens”, Oceana Publications, INC, 
Dobbs Ferry, New York, A. W. Nijhoff, Leiden, 1974, at p. 11. 
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the States Parties. Environmental damage caused by a major nuclear accident 
does not only affect the neighboring States, but may also affect other States 
or the whole of the international community. Therefore the general rules of 
international law should be applied to prevent such damage. In addition, 
most international agreements include one or more provisions that provide 
for State responsibility for wrongful acts. The breach of a treaty constitutes a 
wrongful act and thus entails the international responsibility of the State 
committing the breach. As mentioned above, the principle of State responsi-
bility has been supported by a number of international judicial decisions by 
international courts and tribunals. It is also supported by customary interna-
tional law principles and instruments. Customary international law involves 
a number of fundamental international obligations that impose responsibility 
upon States for the protection of the environment, such as Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. This was in-
dicated by the ILC during its examination of the Articles. The 1973 Report 
of the ILC stated that: 
‘The Commission is proposing to codify the rules governing the responsibility 
of States for internationally wrongful acts in general, and not only in regard to 
particular sectors such as responsibility for acts causing injury to the person or 
property of aliens. The international responsibility of the State is a situation 
which results not just from the breach of certain specific international obliga-
tions, but from the breach of any international obligation, whether established 
by the rules governing another matter. The draft articles accordingly deal with 
the general rules which govern all the new legal relationships which may fol-
low from an internationally wrongful act of a State, regardless of the particular 
sector to which the rule violated by the act may belong’.
38
  
This can also be deduced from the ICJ judgement of the 1996 Advisory 
Opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” when it 
stated that there is a general obligation in international law upon States to 
ensure that activities carried out within their territories or under their juris-
diction or control do not cause transboundary damage to the environment.
39
 
The breach of that obligation incurs State responsibility under the general 
rules of international law, including the rules in treaties among States. Thus 
the internationally wrongful act is a source of State responsibility for the vio-
lation of its environmental obligations under international law. The State is 
                                                     
38
 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Twenty-Fifth Session, 
7 May-13 July 1973, General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Eight Session, Sup-
plement No. 10 (A/9010/Rev.1), at p. 8, para. 42; YILC, 1971, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 
219, para. 61; YILC, 1974, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 274, para. 113. 
39
 ICJ Reports, 1996, p. 226, at pp. 241-242, para. 29. 
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responsible for the violation of its international obligations based on any 
source of international law.
40
 
7.3 An internationally wrongful act as a source of State 
responsibility for the violation of environmental and 
nuclear obligations 
7.3.1 The definition of an internationally wrongful act 
There is no specific definition in the doctrine of international law or in prac-
tice of the concept of a wrongful act, or even for the term “wrongful act”.
41
 
Mention is only made of the elements that constitute an internationally 
wrongful act of a State. According to Article 2 of the 2001 ILC Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility, there is an internationally wrongful act when 
conduct consists of an action or omission that: (1) is attributable to the State 
under international law; and (2) constitutes a breach of an international obli-
gation of the State.
42
 These two elements are recognized by international ju-
                                                     
40
 A/CN.4/246 and Add.l-3 Third report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, 
Special Rapporteur—The internationally wrongful act of the State, source of interna-
tional responsibility (YILC, 1971, Vol. II, Part One, pp. 219-220, paras. 61, 62 and 63. 
41
 The term “wrongful act” has been used in different terms which differ from system to 
another and from one jurist to another. As the Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago men-
tioned in his second report on State Responsibility to the ILC, the term wrongful act is 
used differently in different languages: in the French system and doctrine of international 
law it is expressed as “fait internationalement illicite” or “délit international” or “acte 
illicite”; in the English system as “illegal conduct” or “delict” “tort” “delinquency” 
“unlawful act” or “wrongful act” or “act or omission”, etc.; in the Spanish system, “de-
lito” or “hecho internacionalmente ilícito”; and in the Italian doctrine as “delitto” or “atto 
illecito” or “fatto illecito”. (YILC, 1970, Vol. II, at pp. 185-186, para. 26; YILC, 1971, 
Vol. II, Part One, at pp. 212-213, para. 45.) Nevertheless, he preferred the expression 
“fait internationalement illicite” as used in the French language, “wrongful act” as used 
in the English language, and the term “hecho internacionalmente ilícito” as used in the 
Spanish language. However, he did not mention to other expressions because they may 
have a special meaning in internal law other than wrongful act. (YILC, 1970, Vol. II, at 
p. 186, para. 27) Thus the term “internationally wrongful act” in the English language 
has been utilized by the doctrine of international law and in practice. This approach was 
also endorsed by James Crawford in the final draft articles on State Responsibility for 
wrongful acts of 2001. Crawford, 2002, at p. 80; YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 34, 
para. 8. 
42
 See also, Draft Articles on State Responsibility for wrongful acts adopted the ILC at 
its sessions twenty-fifth to twenty-eighth, see Report of the International Law Commis-
sion on its twenty-eighth session, YILC, 1976, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 73; Third report 
on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur on The internationally 
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dicial decisions, State practice and by the doctrine of international law. In 
the Phosphates Morocco case, the PCIJ stated that if an ‘act being attribut-
able to the State and described as contrary to the treaty right of another State, 
international responsibility would be established immediately as between the 
two States’.
43
 This indicates that two important terms should be defined, the 
term “conduct”, in terms of positive and negative conduct (commission and 
omission) and the term “attribution”, as the attribution of a conduct is only 
applied to human beings. This requires the link of a human conduct, positive 
or negative to the State.
44
 This distinguishes the conduct as a source of State 
responsibility for a wrongful act from the conduct as a source of liability un-
der the absolute liability of a State, as discussed above, which usually con-
cerns a hazardous activity. However, the conduct of a State is not sufficient 
to incur State responsibility for a wrongful act, unless it is described as 
unlawful under international law. Accordingly, the State commits a wrongful 
act when its conduct, consisting of an act or omission, constitutes a breach of 
an international obligation according to the rules of international law. The 
wrongful act is attributed to the State when one of its representatives, i.e., the 
legislative, judicial, or executive power or any other agent of the State or any 
other person who, under the actual control of the State, has committed or 
omitted such conduct.
45
 As Stern states: ‘[I]t is first necessary to ensure that 
an act is attributable to the State before examining whether that act is con-
formity with what is required from that State under international law’.
46
 If 
the act is not attributable to the State, but is attributed to an individual, it 
should generate civil liability and not international responsibility. The ILC 
Draft Articles on State responsibility do not define when a State is in breach 
of international law and left this to be determined according to the primary 
rules and sources of international law.
47
 The nuclear and environmental con-
ventions do not define a breach of an international obligation, but they pro-
vide for the cases which constitute a beach of an international obligation. 
                                                                                                                            
wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility, Doc. A/CN.4/246 and 
ADD.1-3, YILC, 1971, Vol. II, Part One, pp. 199-274, at p. 214 and at p. 234.  
43
 PCIJ, Phosphates in Morocco (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of June 14 1938, 
Series A/B, No. 74, p. 28. 
44
 Willisch, 1987, at p. 32. 
45
 Hashim, 1993, at p. 289.  
46
 Stern, 2010, at p. 201. The ILC explained why it should investigate the subjective 
element before the objective one. It stated that: ‘As regards the order in which these two 
elements appear, it seemed more logical to mention the subjective element before the 
objective element, because it is necessary to determine whether State conduct exists be-
fore it can be determined whether or not it constitutes a breach of an international obliga-
tion’. YILC, 1973, Vol. II, at p. 184, para. 13. 
47
 Aust, 2010, at p. 379. 
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 According to the Arbitral Award in the Dickson Car Wheel Company 
case: 
‘Under international law, apart from any convention, in order that a State may 
incur responsibility it is necessary that an unlawful international act be imputed 
to it, that is, that there exist[s] a violation of a duty imposed by an international 
juridical standard. The above cited Convention requires further the existence of 
damage suffered by a national of the claimant Government. It is indispensable 
therefore, in order that a claim may prosper before this Commission, that two 
elements coexist: an unlawful international act and a loss or injury suffered by 
a national of the claimant Government. The lack of either of these two ele-
ments must necessarily be fatal to any claim filed with this Commission’.
48
  
Thus the elements of attribution and violation define the concept of State 
responsibility. However, two other elements need to be investigated to as-
sign responsibility to the State: the element of damage and circumstances 
precluding the wrongfulness.
49
 The element of damage as discussed in chap-
ter 3 of the thesis is still controversial. The definition in the ILC Draft Arti-
cles of an internationally wrongful act does not refer to the concept of fault 
and damage as a condition of wrongful act liability. The doctrine of interna-
tional law, as mentioned, remains divergent on these issues, which consider 
these elements as part of the definition of State responsibility.
50
 The ILC did 
not address the elements of fault and damage since it views them as primary 
rather than secondary norms.
51
 The ILC also failed to answer the question of 
which elements are required for State responsibility and to define whether 
fault and damage are elements in an internationally wrongful act or State 
responsibility.  
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 RIAA, Vol. IV, at p. 678. 
49
 ‘The Articles do not define when a state will be in breach of international law […]. 
That has to be determined by applying the primary rules (the law of treaties, customary 
international law and other sources of international law) to the facts of each case. 
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7.3.2 Characterization of an internationally wrongful act 
The definition of State responsibility for wrongful acts under Article 1 of the 
ILC Draft Articles on State responsibility raises the question of the charac-
terization and classification of a State act as an internationally wrongful act 
and of whether it should be considered under the rules of national or interna-
tional law. As nuclear activities are organized in accordance with norms of 
national and international laws, the conduct of a State when organizing such 
activities should be in conformity with the norms of both laws. The State 
conducts its activities through its representatives according to its national 
law, but also in accordance with the norms of international law. However, in 
some cases, conduct can be considered a breach under international law and 
not in national law, or vice versa.
52
 This contradiction poses the problem of 
the characterization of the rules for a wrongful act and its attribution to the 
State. In other words, if the conduct of a State is considered to be lawful un-
der national law, but unlawful under international law, under which type of 
rules should a wrongful act of a State be classified? Should the wrongful act 
be established according to the rules of international or national laws?  
 In general, a distinction is made between a State’s breach of an obligation 
under international law and under national law. It is considered that a breach 
of an international obligation should be subject to the interpretation of the 
rules of international law and courts, while a breach of a national obligation 
should be subject to the interpretation of national law and courts. For in-
stance, in commercial cases, the State is subject to national law and courts, 
like any private person. Despite this, there is an interrelationship between 
international law and national law. In commercial claims, for example, ‘in-
ternational law helps to determine what is the extent of the defendant State’s 
immunity from jurisdiction and from measures of enforcement, but the un-
derlying claim will derive from the applicable law of the contract’.
53
 In con-
trast, ‘in some cases individuals and corporations are given access to interna-
tional tribunals and can bring State responsibility claims in their own right, 
[...] Whether such international claims could also be enforced in national 
courts depends on the approach of the national legal system to international 
law in general [...] as well as on the rules of international community’.
54
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 Nevertheless, an internationally wrongful act should be considered ac-
cording to international law and not national law.
55
 It is only considered ac-
cording to the existing evidence in international law without given any con-
sideration to wrongfulness in national law,
56
 in the sense that what is 
considered a wrongful act in internal law does not necessarily reflect interna-
tional law.
57
 This was indicated in Article 3 of the Draft Articles on State 
responsibility which states that ‘[t]he characterization of an act of a State as 
internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characteriza-
tion is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by inter-
nal law’. This has been considered a general principle of international law 
under which a State cannot claim the application of the provisions of its na-
tional law or its constitution as grounds to justify its failure to fulfil its inter-
national obligations.
58
 This was emphasized by the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice in the Advisory Opinion of 4 February 4 1932 on 
“Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or 
Speech in the Danzig Territory”, which stated that: 
‘[A]ccording to generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as against 
another State, on the provisions of the latter’s constitution, but on international 
law and international obligations duly accepted, on the other hand and con-
versely, a State cannot adduce as against another State its own constitution 
with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international law 
or treaties in force. Applying these principles to the present case, it results that 
the question of the treatment of Polish nationals or other persons of Polish ori-
gin or speech must be settled exclusively on the bases of the rules of interna-
tional law and the treaty provisions in force between Poland and Danzig’.
59
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 Thus an internationally wrongful act cannot be illegal unless it is illegal 
under international law. The State cannot escape its responsibility for the 
violation of international environmental obligations with the plea that the 
conduct of its organ is in conformity with its national law. Despite this, in-
ternational law gives the State the freedom to determine its national legal 
system and organs.
60
 The State is considered as a legal unit and it has to ac-
cept the conduct of its organs as its own conduct. The conduct of private in-
dividuals or corporations cannot be considered as conduct of the State and 
cannot incur State responsibility.
61
 However, this complex relationship be-
tween international law and national law may create a difficult problem 
where the obligations have to be established. Therefore a balance has to be 
struck between internal freedom of action of a State and international liabil-
ity which often limits the exercise of sovereign rights of the State in order to 
ensure equal rights of other States.
62
 
 Accordingly, the rules of national law are still dominated by the rules of 
international law. This is because the rules of international law can be ap-
plied by national law and not vice versa.
63
 In our opinion, the superiority of 
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the rules of international law over those of national law is reflected in the 
agreements and conventions which have been concluded and which must be 
applied by the States parties in their national legal system. Often provisions 
of an agreement that has been concluded are inserted in the national law of a 
State party in order to be consistent with the international obligations. Ac-
cordingly, the Installation State which carries out a nuclear activity has to 
enact nuclear legislation and regulations to implement its international com-
mitments embodied in international instruments. 
7.4 The required constitutive elements for State 
responsibility for a wrongful act related to a nuclear 
activity   
This section concentrates on an examination of the required constitutive 
elements of State responsibility for an internationally wrongful act under the 
general rules of international law and their application to violations of an 
environmental obligation by the State in relation to a nuclear activity. Three 
conditions apply for State responsibility for wrongful acts: (1) a wrongful act 
committed by the State (breach of an international obligation); (2) the attri-
bution of a wrongful act to the State; (3) no other circumstances precluding 
the wrongfulness can exist.
64
 In the absence of any one of these conditions, 
the State would not be responsible for its wrongful act. The responsibility of 
the State has to be based on least one of the sources of international law. 
These elements will be examined comprehensively in three subsections. Sec-
tion 7.4.1 considers the subjective element of State responsibility for an in-
ternationally wrongful act, i.e., the attribution of an international obligation 
to the State. Section 7.4.2 examines the objective element, i.e., the breach of 
an international obligation. Finally, section 7.4.3 discusses the circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness, i.e., exoneration from State responsibility.  
7.4.1 Attribution of a wrongful act to the State for its violation of 
environmental and nuclear obligations: the subjective 
element 
State responsibility is attributable only to subjects of international law, a 
State or an international organization.
65
 Thus the State is responsible for a 
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wrongful act attributed to it when it conducts a nuclear activity.
66
 According 
to international law, attribution of a wrongful conduct to the State is the so-
called subjective element of State responsibility. The State is responsible for 
wrongful acts of its organs when they perform their duties, the so-called 
original or direct responsibility. The State may also be responsible for acts of 
other persons when they perform their functions if such acts have been at-
tributed to it, the so-called indirect or vicarious responsibility. More specifi-
cally, direct responsibility is incurred by the State when a wrongful act is 
committed against another State by its organs. However, indirect responsibil-
ity is incurred by the State when a wrongful act is not committed by its or-
gans but by another State or another natural person. The latter is not respon-
sible for a wrongful act because it is not free to determine its conduct. The 
conduct is attributed to the State because it is free to control the act of the 
person committing the act.
67
 As Kelsen stated, it is not a true sense of re-
sponsibility. The State is responsible for the wrongful acts of those persons 
because it has an obligation to repair the wrongful acts of those persons.
68
 
 Articles 4 to 11 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility estab-
lished a general standard of attribution of an act to the State that can be ap-
plied in the case of the violation of environmental obligations. These Arti-
cles determine which conduct should be attributable to the State.
69
 In 
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general, the provisions of attribution under the Articles reflect a codification 
of the traditional rules of attribution of acts to the State rather than any sig-




 Therefore attribution of a wrongful act to the State as an element of State 
responsibility acquires particular importance because not all conduct is at-
tributable to the State. At the same time the State must be responsible for all 
the activities under its control, irrespective of whether these activities are 
performed by State organs or private persons.
71
 Therefore, attribution of a 
wrongful act to the State still gives rise to the question of whether or not the 
State is responsible only for its own acts or also for the acts of its subjects, 
groups and individuals, other States and international organizations, as well 
as the extent of responsibility. This is particularly important in order to de-
termine the dividing line between acts of the State and acts of those entities. 
In some cases it is difficult to attribute the conduct of persons who are not 
organs to the State. As mentioned, nuclear activities conducted within the 
territory or under the jurisdiction or control of a State can be conducted by 
the State itself, i.e., the public authorities, or by private operators or interna-
tional organizations. At the same time, the State has some duties under inter-
national law which it must observe, such as the prior authorization of a nu-
clear installation and taking care of nuclear safety issues.  
 This section discusses the attribution of a wrongful act to the State for the 
violation of environmental and nuclear obligations. This includes two issues: 
(1) the attribution of the conduct of the organs and representatives of the 
State (section 7.4.1.1.), i.e., acts of the officials and non-officials and ex-
ceeding their competence; and (2) the attribution of private conduct to the 
State (section 7.4.1.2). 
7.4.1.1 Conduct of the organs, agents and representatives of a State 
7.4.1.1.1 Acts of the officials 
A State performs its activities through its officials, i.e., organs, agents and 
representatives. Under international law, the acts of the State’s officials are 
attributed to it.
72
 The ICJ stated that ‘[a]ccording to a well-established rule of 
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international law, the conduct of any organ of a State must be regarded as an 




 Accordingly, the conduct of any State organ, including any person or en-
tity with that status as determined in the internal law of the State, is consid-
ered as an act of the State according to international law. Therefore it is im-
portant to define the term ‘organ of the State having the right to perform an 
act’. According to Ago, the term organ involved in the organization of the 
State is defined in general as a human being or collection of human beings.
74
 
It not only includes the organs of the central government and high- ranking 
officials and persons responsible for the external relations of the State, but 
also other organs of the government of any kind or classification, exercising 
any functions at any level in the hierarchy including, those acting at provin-
cial and local level.
75
 Thus the scope of State responsibility for acts of offi-
cials under the Articles is too broad to include acts of any legislative, execu-
tive or judicial organ or any other function, irrespective of the position it 
holds in the organization of the State and irrespective of its character as an 
organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State or any 
person with a link with these authorities.
76
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 However, under international law, the State is free to determine its repre-
sentatives according to its national law, but ultimately acts by those persons 
are attributed to it.
77
 This was indicated by the ILC in Article 5 of the earlier 
Draft Articles on State responsibility mentioned in the third report by Ago. 
According to this Article, ‘the conduct of a person or group of persons who 
according to the internal legal order of a State, possess the status of organs of 
that State and are acting in that capacity in the case in question, is considered 
as an act of the State from the standpoint of international law’.
78
 The acts of 
those persons are attributed to the State because they are expressing its 
will.
79
  This includes acts of those persons related to a nuclear activity. How-
ever, in nuclear issues, acts performed by the organs of the State and ex-
pressing its will are issued in most cases or ordered at a high level, including 
the three powers of the State, i.e., the legislative, judicial and executive pow-
ers, even if these acts are implemented by local authorities. Thus standards 
for the attribution of an act by an organ of the State relate to the organ’s per-
formance of its functions in a manner which expresses the will of the State. 
Chapter 5 discussed numerous examples of conduct attributed to the State, 
such as enacting a regulatory regime to organize a nuclear activity or coop-
eration with a State affected by a nuclear accident.  
7.4.1.1.2 Acts of non-officials 
The general rule under international law is that acts of officials are attribut-
able to the State. Thus acts of non-officials related to nuclear activity are not 
attributed to it. By way of exception, acts of non-officials are attributable to 
the State when they have been authorised to carry out elements of govern-
ment activities which need to be carried out by them, for example, some ad-
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ministrative works or in case the State has a duty to control their acts.
80
 Thus 
acts of private persons performing official acts related to nuclear activities 
are attributable to the State where such acts are in accordance with an 
authorised function. The 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
limits the attribution of acts by non-officials to the State to certain specific 
cases. The first includes the conduct of persons or entities authorised to carry 
out government activities endorsed by the law of the State and not an organ 
of that State as determined in Article 4 of the Articles, provided that the per-
son or entity is acting in that capacity in that particular instance.
81
 According 
to the commentaries, the term “entity” is a general term to reflect different 
bodies to include those non-organs, which are authorised by the law of the 
State to exercise governmental authority including, for example, private se-
curity companies.
82
 Thus acts of security firms which guard a nuclear power 
plant, for example, are attributable to the Installation State. The scope of 
governmental authority concerning the attribution of the conduct of an entity 
to the State is not specified either and is left to be determined by each par-
ticular society according to its history and traditions.
83
 Therefore, in the fore-




 The second includes conduct of State organs placed at the disposal of a 
State by another State. According to Article 6 of the Articles, such conduct 
shall be attributed to the former State under international law, if that organ is 
acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the for-
mer State.
85
 However, there are four conditions required to attribute the acts 
of the organ of the sending State to the receiving State. The first is that the 
organ should act as an organ of the receiving State rather than as an organ of 
the sending State. This implies that the organ should act with the consent and 
under the authority of the receiving State to perform functions mandated to 
him by the authorities of that State. Secondly, the organ should act under the 
regime and control or jurisdiction of the receiving State and not the sending 
State. If the organ’s acts are under the control of its own State, such acts are 
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attributable to its State.
86
 Thirdly, the organ should have the status of an or-
gan of the sending State. Acts of experts and advisors, for instance, who 
have no status of the sending State are not attributable to the receiving State. 
Finally, the acts of the organ should be performed by the officials of the 




 This Article was introduced in the Articles because it was realized that 
the States must share the expertise with each other and thus it should be in-
dicated which State should be responsible for conduct of the organs perform-
ing such acts.
88
 Nuclear technology is monopolized by the developed coun-
tries. The developing countries always rely on the developed countries to 
conduct their nuclear industry and import expertise to train personnel, par-
ticularly at the start of these activities. Furthermore, nuclear activities may 
be carried out in the territory of another State or in the territory of a State 
under trusteeship, or there may be a special relationship, e.g., in the former 
USSR, nuclear installations were operated in different member States.  
 Nevertheless, Article 6 of the Articles does not refer to the acts of the 
organ of an international organization placed at the disposal of a State to ex-
ercise governmental elements of the authority of that State. As stated above, 
‘Article 57 makes it clear that the Articles do not affect any question of the 
responsibility of an international organization. An international organization 
has international legal personality separate from its member States, and there 
can no longer be any doubt that the organization responsible in international 
law for its own acts’.
89
 However, according to the commentaries, this limits 
the scope of the Article.
90
 This provision is important in relation to the at-
tribution of the conduct of the organs of nuclear organizations, particularly 
the IAEA, which provide technical and legal assistance to all the member 
States conducting nuclear activities. Furthermore, as mentioned above, some 
nuclear activities are carried out by international organizations, such as in-
ternational projects and laboratories and other related nuclear activities such 
as the transport of nuclear substances. This raises the issue of whether the 
conduct of these organizations is attributable to the organization itself or to 
its member States, where there is a violation of environmental obligations by 
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the organization or damage caused by a nuclear accident as a result of such a 
violation. Consequently, the acts of an international organization regarding 
the violation of environmental obligations related to a nuclear activity car-
ried out by it or environmental damage caused as a result of such a violation 
are not governed by the Articles. In addition, a general framework is being 
codified to govern the responsibility of international organizations for 
wrongful acts. Thus the conduct of an international organization is attributa-
ble to the State if there is a specific agreement in a specific sector which 
provides this.
91
 For example, the conduct of an international organization in 
relation to space activities can be attributable to the State under the 1966 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of the Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
92
 This 
treaty provides for responsibility of the States Parties for national space activi-
ties carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, 
including those carried out in the moon and other celestial bodies, and en-
sures that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions 
of the Treaty.
93
 This provision imposes wrongful State responsibility for 
wrongful acts to protect the environment from damage caused by space ac-
tivities. This provision was reflected in the Principles Relevant to the Use of 
Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space.
94
 
 Thirdly, there is conduct directed or controlled by a State. The Installa-
tion State is responsible for wrongful acts of persons when they act under its 
direction or control to perform nuclear activities. According to Article 8 of 
the Articles, ‘[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall be consid-
ered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of per-
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sons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control 
of, that State in carrying out the conduct’.
95
 The aim of the control test is to 
ensure that the entity or person or group of persons are acting under the in-
structions of the State and its competent organs even if the status of the or-
gan has not been recognized in national law.
96
 This was also indicated by the 
ICJ in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro case. The Court 
stated that the ‘persons, groups of persons or entities may, for purposes of 
international responsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status 
does not follow from internal law, provided that in fact the persons, groups 
or entities act in “complete dependence” on the State, of which they are ul-
timately merely the instrument’.
97
 Thus the requirement of “direction or con-
trol” of a State under this Article as applied by the ICJ in Nicaragua and 
Genocide cases is the “effective control” test.
98
 There are two situations in 
which it is possible to attribute the conduct of a person or group of persons 
in the case of wrongful acts involving violations of environmental and nu-
clear obligations. The first is the attribution of the conduct of private persons 
acting on the instructions of the State to carry out the conduct. The second is 
the attribution of the conduct of private persons acting under the State’s di-
rection or control. This assumes that there is a factual relationship and a real 
link between the person conducting the act and the regime of the State, and 
that effective control does exist.
99
  
 Fourthly, there is conduct carried out in the absence or default of the offi-
cial authority. Article 9 of the ILC Articles provides that ‘[t]he conduct of a 
person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under inter-
national law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements 
of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official au-
thorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those ele-
ments of authority’. According to this Article, there are three conditions re-
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quired to attribute the conduct to the State. The first is that the conduct 
should be effectively related to the exercise of elements of governmental 
authority. The second is that the conduct should be performed in the absence 
or default of the official authorities. The last is that the circumstances should 
require calling for the exercise of those elements of authority.
100
 The Fuku-
shima nuclear accident is an example which applies to nuclear issues. The 
Japanese authorities called national and international experts, not officials, to 
help to cope with the damage caused by the accident. Acts of those persons 
which cause environmental damage should be attributed to the State. 
 Fifthly, there is the conduct of an insurrectional or other movement. At-
tribution of acts of those movements to the State under international law in 
relation to the violation of environmental and nuclear obligations varies de-
pending on the situation. In general, acts of insurrection are not attributed to 
the State unless it has failed to carry out due diligence to control the insur-
rectionists and to prevent, crush and punish them for damage caused to for-
eigners.
101
 However, in the case of a revolution, the acts of revolutionists are 
attributable to the State. According to the Articles, the conduct of an insur-
rectional movement is in general not attributable to the State unless it is suc-
cessful or covered by other provisions in chapter II of the Articles.
102
 How-
ever, if the movement has succeeded in achieving its aims and becomes part 
of the existing government, its acts will be attributable to the State. If it has 
succeeded in establishing a new State on the whole territory of the existing 
State or on part of its territory, the previous acts of the movement and the 
previous acts of the government are attributable to the new State.
103
 Accord-
ingly, the new State is bound by the conduct of the previous agreements re-
lated to nuclear activities and other related acts.  
 Finally, there is conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own 
conduct. This was recognized under Article 11 of the 2001 ILC Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility. This Article was introduced by the Special 
Rapporteur James Crawford. It considers conduct not attributable to a State 
to be attributable to it under international law if the State has acknowledged 
and adopted the conduct as its own. This was emphasized by the ICJ in the 
Tehran Case. The Court considered that the approval and welcoming attitude 
of the Iranian Government regarding the acts of militants and students, en-
                                                     
100
 The 2001 Commentaries on State Responsibility, YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 
49, para. 3. 
101
 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), “Oppenheim’s International Law”, ninth 
edition, Part 1, Longman, London and New York, 1996, at p. 552. 
102
 The 2001 Commentaries on State Responsibility, YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 
50, para. 2. 
103
 Article 10 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
304 CHAPTER 7 
 
couraging them to expand their acts to attack the US embassy as an authori-
zation to attack the embassy and therefore considered these acts as acts of its 
own.
104
 Accordingly, the conduct of a private operator of a nuclear installa-
tion can be attributable to the State under international law if it has accepted 
such conduct as its own, even if it has carried out due diligence and the con-
duct is not attributable to it. It appears that this Article was adopted as a 
compromise in order to allow, as we will see later, conduct of private per-
sons to be attributable to the State. 
7.4.1.1.3 Exceeding the competence 
Another related issue is the attribution of acts of the State organ to the State 
when the organ has exceeded its mandate in the case of breach of interna-
tional environmental and nuclear obligations. In the LaGrand Case, the ICJ 
stated that ‘the international responsibility of a State is engaged by the action 
of the competent organs and authorities acting in that State, whatever they 
may be’.
105
 The acts of the organ or any other entity are also attributable to 
the State when the organ has exceeded the competence given to it by na-
tional law or has contravened instructions related to its acts. Thus acts of the 
organ outside its competence are not attributable to the State. It should be 
remembered that all acts of the State organ were attributable to the State, 
including those carried out in its private capacity. The State is indirectly re-
sponsible for acts of individuals when it fails to prevent or repress the organ 
when it is not performing its official duty or is attempting to establish an os-
tensible relationship between its acts and its official duty.
106
 In the Caire 
case, the French-Mexican Claims Commission did not distinguish between 
the responsibility of the acts of the officer outside his competence based on 
his function and his acts in his personal capacity. All the acts of the organ 
were attributable to the State. In this case, two Mexican officers killed a 
French citizen after they detained him in their camp because he refused to 
pay them money. According to the Commission’s decision, ‘[…] the act of 
the officer outside his competence does not relieve the State of its interna-
tional responsibility as long as the officer is authorized by his official capac-
ity, even if the act had no connection with his official function and is in real-
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ity an individual act’.
107
 However, this view changed and the acts of the or-
gan considered attributable to the State are those exercised by the organ 
within its competence. According to Article 46 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion of the Law of Treaties, the acts of the organ which express the consent 
of State to be bound by a treaty are not attributable to the State if the consent 
was manifestly expressed by the organ in breach of national law concerning 
the competence of the organ. This view also was expressed by the ILC,
108
 
which stated that: 
‘In the opinion of the Commission such a notion is not only vague, but inaccu-
rate. Either the organ is competent under the legal system to which it belongs, 
or it is not: there is no such thing as “general” or “generic” competence, as op-
posed to “special” or “specific” competence. And it would be even more erro-
neous to envisage a “general competence” attributed by international law in 
cases where municipal law denied its existence. A limitation thus formulated 
should therefore not be accepted’.
109
 
This view was reflected in the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State responsibil-
ity, which established a strict rule of responsibility to avoid escaping respon-
sibility by arguing that the act concerned was not authorized.
110
 According to 
the Articles, acts of a State organ or person or entity empowered to exercise 
elements of governmental authority are considered acts of the State if such 
an organ or person or entity acted in that capacity, even if it exceeded its au-
thority or contravened instructions.
111
 Accordingly, acts of State organs and 
other non-official persons related to nuclear activities are attributable to the 
State where these acts were conducted within their competence, while other 
acts conducted in their personal capacity are excluded.  
7.4.1.2 Conduct of private operators and individuals related to a 
nuclear activity 
It should be noted that State responsibility for wrongful acts by private per-
sons or private conduct of its citizens or conduct of individual polluters in 
the case of private nuclear activities is different from the direct State respon-
sibility for private activities carried out within its territory or under its juris-
diction or control. In the last case, the State is obliged to pursue due dili-
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gence to control the activity and plays the role of the guarantor of private 
conduct.
112
 For instance, in the case of conducting a nuclear activity or any 
other hazardous activity, the State has the duty to regulate and control the 
activity to prevent and reduce environmental damage caused by a nuclear 
accident.
113
 The State is responsible in the case of the breach of environ-
mental agreements and for acts of private parties if it has failed to comply 
with the rules of international law and fulfil its duties under the primary rules 
of international liability to prevent and reduce damage caused by the activi-
ties.
114
 However, in the case of State responsibility for the conduct of an in-
dividual polluter or private person, the State has not breached its duty of 
diligence or failed to fulfil its duties to control the activity according to the 
rules of international law and has no duty to control the acts of the private 
individual. The private conduct itself is not consistent with the rules of inter-
national law. For instance, if nuclear substances have been stolen by a citi-
zen of the State and caused environmental damage to another State, the State 
is not responsible for that conduct. Thus the separation of attribution of pri-
vate conduct to the State from the obligation of the State to guarantee private 
conduct is difficult. There are some areas in international law one where 
there is State responsibility for guaranteeing the conduct of individuals, in-
cluding those related to the environment and nuclear energy. However, ‘[…] 
at present there is no specific system for the implementation of individual 
responsibility under international law, except for criminal responsibility’.
115
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Therefore, responsibility for private conduct remains in the domain of na-
tional law which determines the rights and duties of individuals.
116
 The di-
viding line in this relationship is to establish a link between private conduct 
and State conduct. This is an important issue in relation to determining State 
responsibility for the protection of the environment from hazards arsing out 
of the use of nuclear activities. 
 Three essential factors mean that the conduct of private persons must be 
attributed to the State in case of nuclear activities. Firstly, the conduct of a 
private operator may be in violation of international obligations. As men-
tioned above, several nuclear installations operating within the territory of a 
State or under its jurisdiction of control are operated by the public authorities 
of the State,
117
 while the majority are operated by private operators. The vio-
lation of environmental and nuclear obligations by the operator may contrib-
ute to a nuclear accident and transboundary damage to the environment of 
other States. In the case of the Chernobyl accident, the USSR attributed the 
cause of the accident to the fault and negligence of the operating staff. If the 
Chernobyl plant had been operated by a private operator, it would have been 
difficult to attribute the conduct of the operator to the State, unless it had 
failed to pursue due diligence over the activity. It could have attributed the 
conduct to the State if it had failed in its due diligence and to control the ac-
tivity. However, if the plant had been operated by the public authorities of 
the State, a connection between the conduct of the staff and the government 
may establish under Article 4 of the Articles.  
 Secondly, some of the obligations of the State related to a nuclear activ-
ity, such as environmental impact assessments or the safety of nuclear instal-
lations or regulations to organize the activities are implemented by both the 
State and the operator. The State is responsible for the safety of nuclear in-
stallations because it should regulate, monitor, inspect and enforce the regu-
lations for the operation of the installation by private parties. If it fails to do 
so, or to do so sufficiently, and an accident occurs as a result, and damage is 
caused to another State, then the State is responsible under international law, 
even if it was the operator who violated the obligations of nuclear safety. 
This is because it is difficult to separate the conduct of the State and the con-
duct of the operator, both of which are aimed at the safe operation of the in-
stallation. 
 Thirdly, the attribution of private conduct to the State may apply in the 
case of terrorist activities.
118
 Nuclear installations are susceptible to sabotage 
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by a terrorist act or nuclear material may be stolen. If such an attack has oc-
curs it will cause an environmental catastrophe if the State has failed to en-
sure the safety of the installation. This necessitated the establishment of the 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention in 2005.
119
 According to this Convention, any 
person who unlawfully and intentionally uses radioactive material or a de-
vice in any way or uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner which re-
leases or risks the release of radioactive material with the intent to cause 
substantial damage to property or to the environment is committing an of-
fence.
120
 Furthermore, nuclear substances can fall into the hands of terrorists 
or be stolen during transport if the State has failed to provide the necessary 
security. The Nuclear Terrorism Convention considers that any person who 
threatens to commit an offence with the use of nuclear material or a nuclear 
installation with the intent to cause damage to the environment or unlawfully 
and intentionally demands radioactive material, a device or a nuclear instal-
lation with threats or the use of force, is committing an offence.
121
 Therefore 
the Convention obliges the States Parties to adopt measures in their national 
law to criminalize and establish appropriate penalties for such offences and 




 According to international law, in principle, the State is responsible only 
for acts of its organs and officials and is not responsible for acts of private 
persons.
123
 In my opinion, there are historical reasons why States are reluc-
tant to accept the attribution of acts of individuals to them. Before the mod-
ern State emerged, the responsibility for acts of individuals was based on 
collective responsibility. Acts of an individual were attributed to the group to 
which the individual belonged, based on the social solidarity of the group 
which had the duty to protect its individuals and to bear responsibility for 
their acts.
124
 Accordingly, the whole of society or group was considered 
guilty of the acts of any member of the group. However, in modern society 
collective responsibility has been removed and replaced by the responsibility 
of the State and thus no longer of the social group in the society, or the State 
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is responsible for acts of its individuals.
125
 Since then, there has been a sepa-
ration between the responsibility of individuals and the responsibility of a 
State. Thus the doctrines of international law and international case law are 
still cautious about this sensitive issue and about attributing all private con-
duct to the State. In classical society it was conceivable to attribute acts of 
individuals to the social group because they considered themselves as one 
family. However, this has become difficult in the modern State that has 
taken on the role of pursuing due diligence to control its subjects and main-
tain law and order. After the industrial revolution and the evolution of haz-
ardous activities operated by private enterprises, particularly nuclear activi-
ties, the relationship between States and individuals became complicated and 
it was difficult to separate the responsibility of State from the responsibility 
of individuals in some cases. This is because not all the acts of a State are 
conducted by its officials, and some governmental activities are performed 
by individuals who have no official capacity.  
 Therefore, attributing the acts of an individual to the State became topical 
once again during the codification of State responsibility by the League of 
Nations Conference of 1930 and its preparatory work which codified the 
rules of international law.
126
 However, the Conference failed to agree on this 
issue because of the disagreement on standards to govern the protection of 
the interests of foreigners in the territory of a State.
127
 Later this topic was 
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addressed by the ILC during the codification of State responsibility.
128
 Nev-
ertheless, the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State responsibility did not include 
an explicate provision attributing private conduct to the State. Thus the attri-
bution of private conduct to the State is subject to the interpretation of Arti-
cles 8 and 11, where the acts of private persons fall under these articles. 
However, under Article 11 ‘the acts of private parties are not attributable to 
the state unless they are attributable to it under the other articles of Chapter 
II’.
129
 The latter are related to acts of the State under international law. 
Therefore, the attribution of private conduct to the State is a still a controver-
sial issue. 
 Nevertheless, the doctrine of international law does not exclude the pos-
sibility of attributing private conduct to the State under international law in 
the light of the interpretation of the Articles.
130
 Accordingly, the State may 
be responsible for acts of private persons, its citizens and foreigners who live 
in its territory under two conditions. The first is if the State has failed to ex-
ercise due diligence to control the conduct of private persons. The second is 
if the State has not punished those persons and forced them to pay damages 
for reparation of the resulting damage caused by their actions if that is possi-
ble.
131
 These two conditions were affirmed by international case law. One 
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clear example is the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Te-
hran Hostage Case.
132
 On 4 November 1979, the United States Embassy in 
Tehran was attacked and occupied by Iranian militants. The United States 
claimed that Iran had violated its duties under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations,
133
 and the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and 
Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran,
134
 to protect 
the embassy. In its Judgment of 24 May 1980, the ICJ found that the attack 
on the US Embassy by the militants could not be attributable to Iran, but it 
found it responsible for the violation of the Diplomatic and Consular Con-
ventions for its failure to protect the Embassy.
135
 Iran was also held respon-
sible for acts of the militants because they had become its agents after the 
occupation of the Embassy and because of its endorsement and approval of 
their acts.
136
 Similarly, in the Cotes Worth and Powell case of 5 November 
1875, the British-Colombian Mixed Commission was established under the 
Convention of 14 December 1872. In its decision, the Commission stated 
that the State is not responsible for acts of its subjects unless it has approved 
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or ratified such acts.
137
 These two cases are considered to be applications of 
Article 8 of the Articles under which the State is responsible if the private 
person is acting under its direction or control and Article 11 of the Articles 
under which the State is responsible for acts of private persons if it has ac-
knowledged and approved these acts as its own. 
 In conclusion, under international law, the State is not responsible for 
private conduct. However, according to the current interpretation of the rules 
of international law by the doctrine of international law, international juris-
prudence and international decisions, the State is not responsible for private 
conduct when it has observed the due diligence and did not approve or ratify 
such conduct. Thus, the State is not responsible for private acts or acts of its 
citizens in relation to a violation of environmental obligations related to nu-
clear activities, unless it has failed to pursue due diligence to control the 
conduct of individuals in its territory or under its jurisdiction of control or 
has approved and ratified their acts. This is important in relation to nuclear 
activities because if the State has carefully observed due diligence and con-
trolled private conduct and activities, it could avoid – or at least reduce – the 
occurrence of nuclear accidents and avoid responsibility for environmental 
damage caused by such accidents. However, this is not sufficient in relation 
to the issue of nuclear safety, as most of the nuclear installations are oper-
ated by private operators and the nuclear safety has to be ensured by the op-
erator of a nuclear installation and the State. Nuclear safety is the corner-
stone to prevent a nuclear accident and environmental damage to other 
States, and should entirely be the responsibility of the State. 
7.4.2 A breach of nuclear and environmental obligations:  
The objective element 
This section discusses the most important issues that indicate a breach of an 
international obligation as an element of State responsibility for wrongful 
acts resulting from the violation of nuclear and environmental obligations,
138
 
including different sorts of violations of international obligations (section 
7.4.2.1), standards to consider the conduct of a State as a breach of rules of 
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international law (section 7.4.2.2), serious breaches of peremptory norms of 
international law (section 7.4.2.3), and the time and extent of the violation of 
an international obligation (section 7.4.2.4).  
7.4.2.1 Forms of violation: The commission and omission of an act 
The breach of an international obligation can be in the form of a commission 
or omission of an act by the legislative, judicial and executive authorities or 
any high-ranking person or person with a lesser rank, such as the Head of 
State or the prime minister or any other person entitled to act on behalf of the 
State. The State’s conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation 
when one State has committed or omitted an act against international law.
139
 
An act of the State is described as a wrongful act when it is not in confor-
mity with what is required by the obligation under international law.
140
 In the 
Corfu Channel Case, Judge Winiarski stated in his dissenting opinion that: 
‘In international law, every State is responsible for an unlawful act, if it has 
committed that act, or has failed to take the necessary steps to prevent an 
unlawful act, or has omitted to take the necessary steps to detect and punish the 
authors of an unlawful act. Each of these omissions involves a State’s, respon-
sibility in international law, just like the commission of the act itself.’
141
 
Thus a wrongful act of a State may have a positive or negative character. It 
has a positive character when a State commits an act against the rules of in-
ternational law. For example, if the State has disposed of nuclear waste at 
sea contrary to international law obligations. However, it has a negative 
character when a State has omitted to carry out actions which are required 
according to an international obligation.
142
 There are several primary obliga-
tions included in chapters 4 and 5 which have to be performed by the State. 
The failure to meet these obligations constitutes a wrongful act of the State. 
For instance, the State commits a wrongful act when it has failed to provide 
the relevant information about the construction of a nuclear installation to 
the State affected by the activity or failed to cooperate with them or did not 
inform them of a nuclear accident according to a convention that has been 
concluded. According to Article IX of the Space Treaty, ‘States Parties to 
the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful 
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contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth re-
sulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, 
shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose’.
143
 
 Accordingly, State responsibility is incurred as a result of an act by the 
legislative authority when, for instance, it has enacted legislation contrary to 
the international obligations of the State or it has failed to enact legislation 
required to implement the obligations of the State. To apply this rule in the 
case of nuclear activities, the State is obliged to enact legislation that is nec-
essary to regulate the use of nuclear energy conducted within its territory or 
under its jurisdiction or control, such as nuclear liability legislation and nu-
clear safety legislation to apply to the nuclear liability conventions and nu-
clear safety conventions. On the other hand, it is prohibited to enact any leg-
islation to dispose of high-level radioactive substance at sea contrary to the 
existing rules of international law. 
 Similarly, conduct of the judicial authority constitutes a wrongful act and 
entails State responsibility if it has failed to apply a national law or applied it 
contrary to international law or if it has denied foreigners the opportunity to 
bring their claims before national courts, so-called, “denial of justice”. The 
breach of this principle constitutes State responsibility. This principle 
evolved with the principle of ‘the international minimum standard of treat-
ment’ which requires a minimum treatment of foreigners by the host State.
144
 
The principle of the denial of justice has a broader concept which applies to 
the judicial, legislative and administrative acts.
145
 
 Finally, an act of the executive authority constitutes State responsibility if 
it has acted against international law. For example, the State is in breach of 
international law if it has not given notification of a nuclear accident or has 
refused to cooperate with other States in providing the necessary information 
about a nuclear activity or a nuclear accident. One specific example is Arti-
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cle 23 of the 1982 UNCLOS concerning foreign nuclear-powered ships and 
ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances. 
According to this Article, ‘[f]oreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carry-
ing nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances shall, when 
exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, carry 
documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such 
ships by international agreements’.
146
 The State is responsible for violation 
of this obligation if it has refused the right of innocent passage of a ship via 
its territorial sea when the ship is in compliance with the rules of interna-
tional law. In the case of the Chernobyl, the USSR failed to provide informa-
tion immediately after the accident to the States that were affected or the in-
ternational organizations concerned.
147
 This refusal was a failure on the part 
of the State to act to prevent environmental damage caused to other State 
under the principle of prevention in international law. 
7.4.2.2 Standard of conduct: Obligations relating to conduct and 
obligations relating to results 
There is no definition of the breach of either international environmental and 
nuclear obligations or breaches in general by a State. A relevant standard to 
determine when a State is in breach of an international obligation has there-
fore been established by the doctrine of international law and the ILC. This 
standard relies on the distinction between obligations relating to conduct or 
methods and obligations relating to results.
148
 This standard is applied in na-
tional law. It is aimed at making it easier to prove that a State is in violation 
of an international obligation. Obligations relating to conduct rely on the due 
diligence standard which requires the State to observe certain procedural 
rules in order to comply with its obligations.
149
 It determines the degree of 
due diligence required by the State to fulfil its obligations. In the case of 
conducting a nuclear activity, for instance, it determines whether or not envi-
ronmental obligations correspond to what is required for the obligation to be 
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fulfilled according to international law. However, the obligations relating to 
results require the State to prevent an event.
150
 In the case of a nuclear activ-
ity, the State is obliged to prevent a nuclear accident and its harmful conse-
quences for other States.  
 There are specific examples in practice which can be considered as an 
application of obligations relating to conduct and obligations relating to re-
sults and which are also relevant for the classification of primary obligations. 
In relation to the obligation relating to conduct, for example, the 1994 Nu-
clear Safety Convention provides for a number of procedural obligations and 
certain acts to be undertaken by the Contracting States which are necessary 
for the safety of nuclear installations. Among these procedural obligations is 
the obligation of the State to establish a legislative and regulatory framework 
to govern the issue of nuclear safety
151
 and to establish a regulatory body to 
ensure that this mechanism is implemented.
152
 Similarly, Article 210 of the 
1982 UNCLOS obliges States to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, re-
duce and control pollution of the marine environment as a result of dumping. 
The State is in compliance with the rules of international law if it has ful-
filled these obligations, even if environmental damage is caused despite the 
fulfilment of these obligations. The damage, of course, must be repaired un-
der the principle of absolute liability, but not under responsibility for a 
wrongful act. 
 However, in relation to obligations relating to results, Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration obliges a State which carries out hazardous activities 
within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control to ensure, for example, 
that the activities do not cause damage to the environment of other States. 
Furthermore, in the Corfu Channel Case the ICJ considered that a State com-
mits an internationally wrongful act when it uses or allows its territory to be 
used in such a way as to cause harm or injury to the territory of another State or 
to persons or property in that State.
153
 Thus the Court obliges the State to reach 
a particular result, i.e., not to cause damage to another State. Similarly, obliga-
tions relating to results can also be seen in the Trail Smelter Case, in which the 
Tribunal argued that a State should use its best efforts to achieve a specific re-
sult, i.e., the prevention of environmental damage to a neighbouring State.
154
 
 Accordingly, distinguishing between obligations relating to conduct and 
obligations relating to results corresponds to the distinction made between 
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procedural obligations and the obligation of prevention which were dis-
cussed in chapters 4 and 5. The procedural obligations are aimed at ensuring 
certain conduct to prevent a nuclear accident and its harmful consequences. 
To fulfil these obligations, the State is required to act in a particular way. 
Therefore the State is in breach of an international obligation if it has failed 
to fulfil of any of these obligations and there was no need for the occurrence 
of a nuclear accident or environmental damage. However, the obligation of 
prevention aims at the prevention of a nuclear accident and its harmful con-
sequences. The principle of prevention, as mentioned, is an essential obliga-
tion upon the State under international law to prevent environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident. Accordingly, the State is not responsible for a 
breach of the obligation of prevention, unless environmental harmful conse-
quences have taken place. The breach of the obligation of prevention corre-
sponds to the obligation relating to results which requires the State to pre-
vent a particular event, i.e., a nuclear accident and its harmful consequences. 
These obligations are primary obligations. The breach of these obligations 
requires the application of secondary rules of State responsibility to repair 
the legal and harmful consequences caused as a result of the breach of these 
obligations. The State is not only responsible for preventing a nuclear acci-
dent by taking all the procedural obligations to prevent such an accident, but 
it is also responsible for environmental consequences caused by the accident. 
As Handl stated, ‘may be considered [… to have occurred] not when the 




 Accordingly, the distinction between the procedural and prevention obli-
gations is not quite clear in determining a breach of a State and its environ-
mental obligations. The procedural obligations require a State to perform 
specific actions to verify whether or not it has complied with the obliga-
tions.
156
 This indicates the relationship between primary and secondary rules 
of State responsibility. Thus under obligations relating to conduct, the State 
is only obliged to act, and not to achieve a result (prevention of harm). How-
ever, under obligations relating to results the State must act to prevent the 
harm. This indicates why some of the doctrine of international law considers 
that the element of damage is not a constituent element in State responsibil-
ity for wrongful acts and the obligation of prevention is not absolute. The 
State is obliged to act to prevent all damage caused by the presumed activity, 
although some damage caused to the environment is tolerable. 
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 Some endeavours have also been made in the doctrine of international 
law, the ILC and in practice to draw a line between obligations relating to 
conduct or means and obligations relating to results. It was stated that the 
‘obligations of conduct require a state to adopt a particular course of con-
duct, whereas obligations of result leave states free to select the means of 
their own choice to achieve the result desired’.
157
 It was also argued that ‘[i]n 
contemporary international law we witness a steadily growing number of 
affirmative obligations, obligations to ensure a certain result or to prevent a 
certain result. This leaves the choice of means to the State but entails State 
responsibility even if private activities have produced the prohibited result or 
if the State was hindered by private activities to ensure the prescribed re-
sult’.
158
 Similarly, it was argued that the ‘[o]bligations of means impose on a 
State the obligation to do the best they can in furtherance of a specific goal, 
but without the guarantee that this goal will be reached. By contrast, obliga-
tions of result require a State to guarantee the achievement of the prescribed 
result’.
159
 Nevertheless, these arguments involve a theoretical basis to distin-
guish between obligations of conduct and obligations of result, although they 
are not relevant in practice to define the breach of an international obliga-
tion. 
 Furthermore, a distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations 
of result was made by the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for 
Wrongful Acts adopted on the first reading.
160
 The Articles were included 
four articles dealing with provisions of obligations of conduct and obliga-
tions of result. These include Article 20 related to obligations of conduct and 
Articles 21, 22 and 23 respectively related to obligations of result to achieve 
a particular result, exhausting local remedies and preventing a particular 
event.
161
 These provisions were discussed by the Commission during the 
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adoption of the Articles on the second reading. However, this distinction was 
subject to criticism by some writers and by the Commission itself.
162
 The 
Special Rapporteur Crawford argued that the distinction between obligations 
of conduct and obligations or result is not useful and also makes the applica-
tion of the Articles complex in practice.  Therefore there is no value in draw-
ing distinction and categorizing these obligations.
163
 He also stated that a 
distinction between obligations relating to conduct and obligations relating 
to results, as presented in the ILC, is relevant only to classification of the 
primary obligations in international law of responsibility.
164
 Moreover, the 
ILC Articles did not state which standard applies to determine the breach of 
an international obligation by the State. Thus this standard could be the stan-
dard of conduct or the standard to achieve a result. The Draft Articles on in-
ternational liability for acts not prohibited by international law included pro-
visions related to both standards. For example, they provide for the State to 
give prior authorization for a hazardous activity. This applies for the stan-
dard of conduct. It also obliges the State to prevent the damage caused by the 
activity. This applies for the standard of result. This result, in the case of a 
nuclear activity, is the prevention of a nuclear accident and environmental 
damage caused by the accident. Furthermore, other instruments such as the 
1986 Conventions on early notification and assistance in case of a nuclear acci-
                                                                                                                            
‘1. There is a breach by a State of an international obligation requiring it to achieve, by 
means of its own choice, a specified result if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not 
achieve the result required of it by that obligation.   
2. When the conduct of the State has created a situation not in conformity with the result 
required of it by an international obligation, but the obligation allows that this or an 
equivalent result may nevertheless be achieved by subsequent conduct of the State, there 
is a breach of the obligation only if the State also fails by its subsequent conduct to 
achieve the result required of it by that obligation’.   
Article 22: Exhaustion of local remedies   
‘When the conduct of a State has created a situation not in conformity with the result 
required of it by an international obligation concerning the treatment to be accorded to 
aliens, whether natural or juridical persons, but the obligation allows that this or an 
equivalent result may nevertheless be achieved by subsequent conduct of the State, there 
is a breach of the obligation only if the aliens concerned have exhausted the effective 
local remedies available to them without obtaining the treatment called for by the obliga-
tion or, where that is not possible, an equivalent treatment’.   
Article 23: Breach of an international obligation to prevent a given event   
‘When the result required of a State by an international obligation is the prevention, by 
means of its own choice, of the occurrence of a given event, there is a breach of that ob-
ligation only if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not achieve that result’.   
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dent also combine and apply both standards. These conventions involve proce-
dural obligations which apply to obligations relating to conduct. Thus the State 
is not in violation of its obligations, for example, once it has notified the occur-
rence of a nuclear accident. At the same time these conventions apply to obliga-
tions of result, as they are aimed at the prevention and reduction of environ-
mental damage caused by a nuclear accident. Accordingly, because of 
criticisms voiced by the Governments and in the literature, the articles re-
lated to obligations of conduct and obligations relating to results were re-
moved from the 2001 Draft Articles.
165
  
7.4.2.3 Serious breaches of peremptory norms: International 
environmental crime  
The peremptory norms of international law are the so-called jus cogens 
norms. These norms are mandatory in international law because they contain 
the fundamental values and principles which are aimed at the protection of 
the legal order and interests of the international community as a whole, as 
well as the fundamental interests of individual States.
166
 The Articles pro-
hibit any action considered to be a violation of peremptory norms of interna-
tional law. Nevertheless, neither the Articles nor the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties determines or provides an exhaustive list of these 
norms. The peremptory norms of international law, therefore, are determined 
according to customary international law, state practices and international 
case law.
167
 Under customary international law, a violation of these norms is 
a serious breach of the obligations for the protection of the whole commu-
nity or an international crime against the whole international community.
168
 
The commentaries referred to some examples of peremptory norms which 
‘are clearly accepted and recognized include the prohibitions of aggression, 
genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, 
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and the right to self-determination’.
169
 In my opinion, a violation of the 
norms for the protection of the environment of the international community 
as a whole, particularly those related to the use of nuclear energy, is an in-
ternational crime against humanity.
170
 The violation of these norms could 
cause a nuclear catastrophe which could affect the environment of the inter-
national community as a whole.  
 However, there is no definition in international law for criminal responsi-
bility in general
171
 so that an environmental disaster can be considered as an 
international crime against humanity. Therefore the ILC discussed the possi-
bility of adopting an article in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility to 
consider a breach of international obligations related to safeguarding and 
preserving the human environment of the international community as a 
whole, as an international crime.
172
 This was enshrined in Article 19 of the 
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted on first reading in 
1996.
173
 This Article considers that an act of a State which constitutes a 
breach of an international obligation is an internationally wrongful act.
174
 
The breach of an international obligation by a State must be of essential im-
portance for the protection of the interests of the international community as 
a whole to be considered as an international crime.
175
 The Article listed a 
number of acts which constitute international crimes.
176
 However, an act 
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committed by a State which does not constitute an international crime was 
described as an international delict.
177
 Thus Article 19 considers ‘[t]hose acts 
which are more serious, and which give rise to an aggravated degree of state 
responsibility toward the international community as a whole, qualify as “in-
ternational crimes” affecting all states, and would create new rights and ob-
ligations for all states’.
178
  
 However, in 1998, Article 19 was omitted because it was one the obsta-
cles to the Draft Articles being approved by the States.
179
 The idea of the 
criminalization of a State was not accepted by the States.
180
 States did not 
                                                                                                                            
(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safe-
guarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive 
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accept being described as criminal. The Special Rapporteur Crawford 
reached the conclusion that the only criminal responsibility under current 
international law is individual responsibility, because the term as adopted in 
Article 19 is not different from the ordinary meaning in international law.
181
 
Thus the concept of international criminal responsibility of the State was 
excluded from the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State responsibility.
182
 Caus-
ing environmental damage to the environment is no longer considered a 
crime in international law.  
 Therefore Article 40 relating to a serious breach by a State of its obliga-
tions was adopted as an alternative to Article 19, to apply instead of criminal 
responsibility.
183
 It ensures the respect of international obligations by the 
States and the reparation or compensation for damage caused by the State to 
other States. It considers a serious breach of an international obligation by a 
State to be an internationally wrongful act and thus it does not impose crimi-
nal responsibility on the State. According to this Article, ‘[a] breach of such 
an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the re-
sponsible State to fulfil the obligation’.
184
 To determine the scope of serious 
breaches of international obligations, the ILC established two criteria that 
distinguish between serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms 
of international law and other types of breach. The first relies on determining 
the character of the breached obligation which must derive from a peremp-
tory norm of general international law, and the second qualifies the intensity 
of the breach which must be serious in nature.
185
 However, these criteria are 
not clear in practice, and it is rather difficult to draw a line between serious 
breaches of international obligations and a normal breach of such obliga-
tions. It was argued that ‘[a]lthough the term “crime” was removed from the 
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 Nevertheless, the scope of Article 19 was stricter and broader than Article 
40 of the Articles.
187
 This guarantees that the State cannot escape its respon-
sibility. The criminal responsibility of the State as defined in Article 19 is 
certainly an important instrument for the protection of the environment, par-
ticularly from damage caused by nuclear activities which need strict rules of 
State responsibility to ensure the protection of the environment. In our opin-
ion, individual criminal responsibility can be attributed to the organ of the 
State which committed the wrongful act under international criminal law if 
the act constituted one of acts listed under Article 19. Originally, the State 
cannot be held responsible as an international entity, but wrongful acts of its 
organs are nevertheless attributed to it. Similarly, criminal responsibility 
should be attributed to the State, but the organ which committed the wrong-
ful act should pay the penalty if it committed the act intentionally. At pre-
sent, international criminal law has wider applications, particularly since the 
establishment of the ad hoc international criminal courts, including the ICC, 
and the establishment of an ad hoc forum of the environment. 
7.4.2.4 The existence and duration of the breach  
The State is responsible for a wrongful act under international law when 
there is a breach of an international obligation and for the duration of the 
breach of that obligation on the part of the State.
188
 The State is in breach of 
an international obligation if that obligation is not in conformity with what is 
required by the State to fulfil its obligation under international law irrespec-
tive of its origin or character.
189
 The origin and basis of State responsibility 
for the breach of an international obligation are derived from obligations in a 
treaty, international custom, international principle, judicial decision or any 
other source of international law. However, the character of an international 
obligation can be determined according to the facts of each case in the light 
of the source of the obligation.
190
  
 The State is also responsible for a wrongful act if the obligation con-
cerned is in force and valid as regards the State. However, in my opinion, 
this issue only applies in the case of a breach of an international obligation 
arising from a treaty, including environmental and nuclear treaties. This is 
because in the case of applicable sources of international law other than 
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treaty law, it is difficult to determine when an international obligation is in 
force and valid as regards the State. According to the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, the provision of a treaty enters into force when 
the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty has been established and after 
the treaty comes into force. The Contracting States are bound by the treaty 
from that time.
191
 Thus the breach of a treaty starts from the moment at 
which a treaty is valid as regards the State that committed the act. According 
to the Articles: ‘An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an interna-
tional obligation unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the 
time the act occurs’.
192
 Thus the breach of an international obligation must 
be considered at the time the act occurred and the dispute took place. Ac-
cording to the Articles, an act of a State which constitutes a beach of an in-
ternational obligation which took place before the obligations of the State 
applied is not considered a wrongful act. Furthermore, the preparatory con-
duct prior to the act is not considered a wrongful act. This was recognized by 
the ICJ in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case. In its Judgment the Court 
stated that: 
‘A wrongful act or offence is frequently preceded by preparatory actions which 
are not to be confused with the act or offence itself. It is as well to distinguish 
between the actual commission of a wrongful act (whether instantaneous or 
continuous) and the conduct prior to that act which is of a preparatory charac-
ter and which ‘does not qualify as a wrongful act’.
193
 
However, in some cases, a breach of an international obligation occurs in the 
form of a continuing wrongful act and in other cases it occurs as a series of 
wrongful acts. Therefore the Articles determine when a breach of an interna-
tional obligation by an act begins and ends, particularly in cases in which the 
breach consists of a series of wrongful acts. Accordingly, an act of a State 
that does not have a continuing character is considered a breach of an inter-
national obligation at the moment in which the act is performed, even if its 
harmful effects are still continuing.
194
 The continued harmful effects of a 
wrongful act by a State after it has been completed are related to the conse-
quences of State responsibility which should be repaired or compensated.
195
 
Thus ‘[t]he accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant may by characterized as 
an instantaneous breach, since the delictual conduct took place at a specific 
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time and place even if the effects remain of a continuing character’.
196
 How-
ever, it is considered as a breach of an international obligation as an act of a 
State that has a continuing character, even if it was taken to prevent a given 
event. The breach applies for the entire period that the wrongful act contin-
ues.
197
 Finally, the breach of an international obligation which consists of a 
series of acts of a State is a wrongful act while it continues, even if these acts 
occurred when other acts or omissions occur.
198
 These acts are considered as 
a continuing breach of an obligation and the responsibility of the State con-
tinues to apply during the entire period of the breach until the conduct is in 
conformity with the obligation.
199
 The procedural obligations for the con-
struction of a nuclear installation are considered have a continuing character. 
The failure of the State to comply with the obligations of consultation, noti-
fication, cooperation, etc. applies until the State complies with the conditions 
required for the fulfilment of the obligation.
200
 
 Accordingly, the State is in breach of an environmental obligation with 
regard to a nuclear activity if that obligation exists according to any source 
of international law and is not in conformity with the conditions that must be 
fulfilled by the State according to international law. A breach of an interna-
tional obligation applies while the obligation applies and not before its exis-
tence. It occurs at the moment that the act is not conformity with the obliga-
tion and continues until the act is in conformity with the obligation. A State 
is in breach of an international obligation for dumping nuclear wastes at sea 
as long as it is continues to dump such wastes, regardless of whether the 
dumping has taken place in one or several acts.  
7.4.3 Circumstances precluding wrongfulness: Exoneration from 
responsibility for the violation of environmental and nuclear 
obligations 
Despite the fact that the State commits a wrongful act in the case of conduct-
ing a nuclear activity when this act is attributed to it and constitutes a viola-
tion of an international obligation, it is not in all cases a wrongful act attrib-
uted to the State and State responsibility is invoked in all cases. International 
law allows for certain circumstances which preclude a wrongful act commit-
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ted by the State.
201
 This concerns the third element of State responsibility for 
a wrongful act that has a negative character. These circumstances have been 
described by the ILC and are listed in Chapter V of its 2001 ILC Draft Arti-
cles on State responsibility. They include the consent of a State, self-
defence, counter-measures, force majeure and fortuitous events, distress and 
necessity.
202
 The existence of one of these circumstances justifies waiving 
State responsibility for a wrongful act and considers it as lawful, even if the 
act of the State per se constitutes a wrongful act.
203
 The grounds for preclud-
ing a wrongful act of a State in the case of the existence of these circum-
stances is the consent of the injured State which, for example, allowed the 
border State to construct a nuclear reactor along the border, knowing in ad-
vance that such a reactor might cause a nuclear accident and damage to its 
environment. It is also precluded if damage is caused by a nuclear reactor as 
a result of the violation of international obligations in the case of other cir-
cumstances out of the hands of the State. However, this does not mean that 
the existence of such circumstances automatically waives a State’s responsi-
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bility for violating environmental and nuclear obligations. Under interna-
tional law, these circumstances preclude a wrongful act of the State under 
certain conditions. In other cases, they do not preclude a wrongful act of a 
State at all, as in the case of the violation of peremptory norms of interna-
tional law,
204
 including those related to the protection of the environment 
from damage caused by nuclear activities where such obligations are related 
to the protection of the environment of the international community as 
whole.  
7.4.3.1 Definition of circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
7.4.3.1.1 State consent  
The consent of the State has a special importance with regard to nuclear ac-
tivities, as these activities are always conducted on the basis of agreements 
between the Installation State and other States on different issues related to 
nuclear activities. These agreements involve obligations which constitute 
State responsibility in the case of their violation by any State. Under interna-
tional law, the consent of the injured State precludes wrongful acts commit-
ted against it by the offending State within the limits of the consent.
205
 The 
wrongful act of the State is precluded when it is given consent to carry out 
activities in a particular case. The consent precludes wrongfulness because 
of the agreement between two subjects of international law which removes 




 The consent precludes wrongfulness only from the moment at which the 
consent was given. Accordingly, the valid consent must be given prior to 
committing the act when there was no violation of the obligation committed. 
This consent considers the wrongful act committed by the State is in con-
formity with international law. The consent of the State after committing a 
wrongful act does not change the nature of the conduct from a wrongful to a 
lawful act, but only serves as a waiver to the State’s right to invoice respon-
sibility and to claim responsibility of the State for the wrongful act,
207
 for 
example, if a State constructed a nuclear installation contrary to an agree-
ment conducted with another State, but the latter accepted the new situation. 
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This consent precludes the responsibility of the former for violating the 
agreement. The violation of the treaty has already occurred, but the consent 
removes the State’s responsibility for violating the agreement. However, if 
the injured State has agreed to preclude the responsibility of another State 




 The consent must also be valid within the limit of the content of the con-
sent. This means that if a State has permitted another State to construct a nu-
clear installation along its borders, it cannot claim that the Installation State 
has committed a wrongful act as long as the latter does not violate the condi-
tions of the agreement. Therefore, agreements with neighbouring States are 
always concluded for border installations in specific cases, such as the 1977 
agreement between Denmark and Germany on providing the relevant infor-
mation about the proposed nuclear installations along the border, which 
specifies the activities about which States have to provide information.
209
 
Therefore in most cases the consent as a practical instrument for precluding 
wrongfulness is related to the law of treaties which determines the conditions 
that apply in the case of a violation of environmental and nuclear treaties.  
 Moreover, the State is free to give its consent to precluding a wrongful 
act on the basis of certain conditions as long as these conditions are accepted 
by the other State party, such as payment of compensation by the offending 
State for damage suffered by the wrongful act. These conditions must be 
subject to the agreement of the two States and they are not considered to be a 
form of responsibility of the State for a wrongful act.
210
 
 Finally, the consent only precludes the wrongfulness with regard to a par-
ticular State. However, if the obligations that are violated concern more than 
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one State, the consent only precludes the wrongfulness of the act as regards 




In contrast to consent, self-defence is not relevant in precluding State re-
sponsibility in the case of a violation of nuclear and environmental obliga-
tions. Even so, it is certainly one of the legitimate rights in international law 
which justifies precluding a wrongful act of a State for a breach of an inter-
national obligation, provided that it is consist with the United Nations Char-
ter.
212
 Article 51 of the Charter determines the conditions for the right of 
self-defence of a State within the limits of the Charter. However, not all acts 
of self-defence are relevant in precluding a wrongful act of a State.
213
 This 
was indicated by the ICJ in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons which considered that nuclear weapons are pro-
hibited per se by treaty law and custom.
214
 The Court referred to certain 
rights which must be protected even in the case of self-defence, particularly 
those related to human rights which should be protected by the principles of 
humanitarian law
215
 and those related to the protection of the environment 
from damage caused by nuclear activities.
216
 Moreover, there are no circum-
stances which justify the use of nuclear activities for non-peaceful purposes 
or nuclear weapons for self-defence.
217
 Thus self-defence is not one of the 
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circumstances which precludes a wrongful act and removes responsibility in 
the case of nuclear activities. A wrongful act of a State resulting from the use 
of nuclear energy for nuclear weapons or for the use of a nuclear civilian 
installation for the enrichment of nuclear material for the production of nu-
clear weapons cannot be precluded. The use of a nuclear weapon causes an 
environmental catastrophe which may be considered as genocide or a crime 
against humanity. Under the Articles such acts are a violation of peremptory 
norms of international law which are not precluded.
218
 It is difficult to accept 
the argument for using nuclear weapons for self-defence, when other peace-
ful options have not been used, or for the use of nuclear substances produced 
by a nuclear installation for self-defence. Therefore all the instruments relat-
ing to nuclear activities provide for the use of nuclear materials for peaceful 




According to Article 22 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibil-
ity: ‘The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an interna-
tional obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that 
the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State in accor-
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dance with chapter II of part three’.
220
 The latter determines the conditions 
required for limitations on invoking countermeasures by the injured State 
against a State responsible for a wrongful act.
221
 The most important of these 
conditions is that the countermeasures must be legitimate and must meet 
other conditions which limit invoking countermeasures, including the ex-
haustion of international remedies and proportionality.
222
 Accordingly, ‘the 
temporary non-performance of an unconnected treaty obligation may be jus-
tified as a response to the breach by a state of one of its obligations, subject 
to fulfilment of the requirement of proportionality and the other conditions 
set out in the Articles’.
223
 These conditions limit the right of a State to use 
countermeasures to preclude its wrongful acts in the case of a violation of 
environmental obligations. This is in the interests of protecting the common 
environment. 
 In the Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun-
gary/Slovakia), the Court admitted that the breach of a treaty justifies taking 
countermeasures. Both Slovakia and Hungary claimed that invoking coun-
termeasures precluded their wrongful acts. The Court examined the condi-
tions of the countermeasures and dismissed the claims of both States because 
they were not entitled to apply countermeasures. The Court found that Slo-
vakia did not meet the condition of proportionality based on its claim to uni-
lateral control of shared natural resources.
224
 The Court also rejected Hun-
gary’s claim based on the breach of environmental obligations under the 
general rules of international law and the material breach of the 1977 Treaty 
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because its claims did not constitute the conditions for termination of the law 
of treaties under international law.
225
 
7.4.3.1.4 Force majeure and fortuitous events  
Force majeure and fortuitous events are circumstances which preclude a 
wrongful act of a State in the case of a violation of environmental and nu-
clear obligations. This is because the conduct of the State in such circum-
stances is not under control, or is involuntary or unintentional.
226
 They jus-
tify the non-performance of international obligations during the period of the 
existence of the event, but they cannot terminate a treaty. This is left to be 
decided by the State parties.
227
 Force majeure creates a situation which 
makes it impossible for the State to meet its international obligations and 
avoid breaching them. However, force majeure cannot preclude a wrongful 
act of a State if the situation that was created made it difficult for the State to 
meet its obligations.
228
 This was recognized in Article 23 of the 2001 ILC 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
229
 This Article precludes the wrong-
fulness of an act of a State if the act is due to the ‘occurrence of an irresisti-
ble force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making 
it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation’.
230
 
Furthermore, a wrongful act of a State cannot be precluded if the force ma-
jeure or an unforeseen event is due to the conduct of the State invoking it, or 
if the State has foreseen the risk of such a situation occurring.
231
 This can be 
linked to the sitting of a nuclear installation and the occurrence of a nuclear 
accident.
232
 For example, the non-compliance of a State with the obligation 
of due care or the safety obligations of a nuclear installation in the case of an 
earthquake can be justified, and the responsibility of the State for this viola-
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tion can be precluded. The 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, caused as a 
result of an earthquake and tsunami, is an example of such a situation.
233
 
Wrongful acts committed by Japan as a result of the violation of its envi-
ronmental and nuclear obligations can be precluded. The breach of the 1986 
Convention on early notification and assistance in relation to the earthquake 
is justified by the fact that the earthquake was a case of force majeure and 
fortuitous event. However, the wrongfulness of an act of the State cannot be 
precluded if the violation of the State of its international obligations is the 
reason for the occurrence of the nuclear accident.   
7.4.3.1.5 Distress 
The situation of distress precludes a wrongful act of a State if the perpetrator 
of the act has no other reasonable way of saving his life or the lives of other 
persons entrusted to his care.
234
 However, this exemption does not apply if 
the situation of distress is due to the conduct of the State invoking it, or if the 
act is likely to create a comparable or greater peril.
235
 It was pointed out that 
these two conditions are linked to those related to force majeure and the state 
of necessity. There is also a link between the state of distress and circum-
stances of force majeure and necessity
236
 because of their similar charac-
ter.
237
 However, distress can be distinguished from force majeure and is 
more similar to the state of necessity because the wrongful act committed by 
the State is not involuntary. Furthermore, the object of the distress is differ-
ent from that of the state of necessity, as the protected interest is not the 
same. In the case of distress, the conduct of the organ is attributed to the 
State if the interest concerned is an immediate concern to save one’s life or 
the lives of others, irrespective of their nationality, while in the case of the 
state of necessity, the State has to choose between respect for its interna-
tional obligations and safeguarding a legitimate interest.
238
  
 In practice, a number of conventions provide for exemptions which de-
fine the state of distress as a relevant condition for precluding wrongful acts 
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in the case of environmental damage.
239
 For example, the 1992 OSPAR 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic is not applied in the case of distress to save human lives or in the 
case that a vessel or aircraft has been threatened and allows dumping at sea 
to reduce potential damage.
240
 However, it should be noted that the examples 
of the state of distress referred to above preclude a wrongful act of a State in 
state practice related to maritime ships and vessels. The argument behind 
this seems to be that saving the ship and the lives on it is better than leaving 
to sink. This is because the ship will sink in the situation of distress, the sea 
will be polluted and the situation will be out of hand. The argument is in fa-
vour of saving the ship and the lives on it because the sea will be polluted in 
any case in that situation. 
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7.4.3.1.6 Necessity 
According to international law, the state of necessity serves as grounds for 
precluding wrongful acts of a State.
241
 A wrongful act committed by a State 
becomes lawful in the case of necessity if the act is aimed at avoiding danger 
that might be caused and there is no other way to avoid such danger. The 
State which has committed such an act must prove that the act was necessary 
to remove the danger in order to preclude a wrongful act and consequently 
its responsibility. However, in my opinion, this does not mean that the act 
has become lawful. It is still unlawful; the state of necessity only justifies 
removing the responsibility of the State for a wrongful act. Article 25 of the 
Articles determines the conditions required for invoking a state of necessity 
to preclude a wrongful act of a State, including two positive and other nega-
tive conditions. According to the positive conditions, the state of necessity 
can be invoked if the act of the State is the only way open to the State to 
safeguard an essential interest in the face of a grave and imminent peril
242
 
and this act does not seriously harm an essential interest of the State or 
States for which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a 
whole.
243
 However, according to the negative conditions, the state of neces-
sity may not be invoked if the obligation concerned excludes invoking ne-
cessity,
244




 In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case, the ICJ recognized that a 
state of necessity constitutes customary international law for precluding 
wrongful acts of the State.
246
 In its judgement the ICJ stated: ‘The Court 
considers, [...], that the state of necessity is a ground recognized by custom-
ary international law for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in con-
formity with an international obligation. [But...] can only be accepted on an 
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 In this Case, Hungary asked the Court invoking the 
state of necessity to preclude its wrongful acts and avoid responsibility for 
the suspension of the project in 1989 and the termination of the 1977 treaty 
in 1992
248
 because it suspended the project in order to avoid an environ-
mental disaster. The Court investigated the conditions of the state of neces-
sity and dismissed the claim because it did not meet the conditions of the 
state of necessity. It acknowledged that the state of necessity is a valid rea-
son for the State to protect an essential interest and justified not acting in 
conformity with international obligations, but the imminent threat did not 
exist.
249
 In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons” the ICJ also stated that ‘States must take environ-
mental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and 
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the 
environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is 
in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality’.
250
 Never-
theless, the state of necessity does not lead to the termination of a treaty be-
cause it is a temporary circumstance related to a wrongful act and not a mat-
ter independent of the obligations that have been breached.
251
 It only justifies 
the State’s non-compliance with international obligations, while the state of 
necessity is in existence and during the period of emergency. 
7.4.3.2 Consequences of invoking a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness  
When the circumstances precluding wrongfulness no longer exist, the State 
must comply with the rules of international law and fulfil its environmental 
obligations as long as these obligations have not been terminated.
252
 This 
was indicated by the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case. The 
Court stated that ‘[a]s soon as the state of necessity ceases to exist, the duty 
to comply with treaty obligations revives’.
253
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 Moreover, even in the case that wrongful acts are precluded, the State is 
still obliged to pay compensation for material loss suffered as a result of the 
wrongful act committed by it.
254
 However, according to the commentaries, 
the compensation mentioned in Article 27 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility is not related to the compensation for reparation for a 
wrongful act as provided for under Article 34 of the Articles. It is only re-
lated to compensation for material loss directly suffered by the State as a 
result of a circumstance precluding a wrongful act.
255
 The commentaries also 
stated that the concept of material loss referred to in Article 27 is narrower 
than the concept of damage referred to elsewhere in the Articles. It only re-
lates to the adjustment of losses drawn up by the State invoking a circum-
stance precluding a wrongful act.
256
 Finally, Article 27 does not determine in 
which circumstances compensation is required and leaves this to be decided 
in the agreement between the State invoking a circumstance precluding a 
wrongful act and the affected States. They can agree on the possibility and 
extent of the required compensation for material loss suffered by such a cir-
cumstance.
257
 Thus precluding a wrongful act cannot justify damage caused 
to the environment; it only serves to defend a State against the responsibility 
for a wrongful act. Environmental damage must be repaired according to the 
rules of absolute liability as we shall see later in the next chapter. State li-
ability for environmental damage is absolute, but under the nuclear liability 
conventions certain circumstances exonerate the operator of a nuclear instal-
lation from liability.  
7.5 Conclusions 
The chapter examined the essential aspects of State responsibility for wrong-
ful acts in the light of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for 
Wrongful Acts and its application to violations of environmental and nuclear 
obligations. It revealed that there is a general principle of State responsibility 
under the Articles applicable in the case of a violation of international obli-
gations in general, including those related to environmental and nuclear ac-
tivities. After the codification of customary and general rules of State re-
sponsibility in the Articles, a claim for environmental damage is now much 
less difficult to determine than it was only one decade ago. The principle ap-
plies to all violations of international obligations unless there is a regime of 
State responsibility governing a particular sector. Such a regime does not exist 
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either in the area of the protection of the environment or with regard to nuclear 
regulations and therefore the principle applies to these issues. Admittedly there 
are some conventions related to the nuclear and environmental fields, but they 
do not deal with State responsibility for wrongful acts in the case of a violation 
of environmental and nuclear obligations.  
 The principle has already been applied in environmental cases, e.g., the 
case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia). 
There is sufficient evidence in international law to support the principle as a 
source and basis of State responsibility for wrongful acts as a result of the vio-
lation of environmental and nuclear obligations. The establishment of State 
responsibility creates a new relationship between the offending State and the 
injured State. The consequence of this relationship in relation to nuclear activi-
ties is that the offending State is obliged to respect its international obligations 
to prevent a nuclear accident and to repair legal and environmental damage 
caused as a result of its wrongful act. Nevertheless, Article 1 of the ILC Arti-
cles, which defined the principle, does not refer to the consequences of interna-
tional liability as an element in the definition of the principle of State responsi-
bility for wrongful acts. 
 Furthermore, there is no specific definition of the concept of an interna-
tionally wrongful act in the ILC Draft Articles. The Articles only set forth 
two conditions for a wrongful act of a State to exist, i.e., the attribution of 
conduct to the State, and the fact that that conduct (commission or omission) 
must constitute a violation of an international obligation which must be de-
scribed as a wrongful act in international law. Thus the existence of an inter-
nationally wrongful act is determined according to the existing rules of in-
ternational law, regardless of whether the conduct is described as being 
lawful in national law. The State cannot rely on a national rule or its consti-
tution to describe an act as an internationally wrongful act. It cannot justify 
such an act by arguing that that act is in conformity with the existing na-
tional law or that it should apply its own national law. 
 Accordingly, in order for the State to be responsible for wrongful acts 
related to a violation of environmental obligations in the case of nuclear ac-
tivities, an act should be attributable to it and be considered contrary to in-
ternational law. In principle, under international law, acts attributable to the 
State are those carried out by the officials, organs, agents and representatives 
of the State, who act as legislative, judicial or executive authorities or other 
persons who have a real link with those authorities irrespective of their rank. 
This is the normal standard for attributing conduct to a State. Furthermore, in 
certain cases the acts of non-officials with real links to the State can be at-
tributed to the State. The ILC Draft Articles determined that the conduct of 
non-officials can be attributed to the State. This includes the conduct of per-
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sons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority; the conduct 
of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State; the conduct of a 
person or group of persons acting on the instructions or under the direction 
or control of the State; the conduct of persons or entities acting in the ab-
sence of the official authorities or if they are in default; the conduct of insur-
rectionists or other movements; and conduct recognized and adopted by the 
State as its own.  
 The conduct of officials and other entities is attributable to the State as 
long as they have an official status and acted within their competence. Thus 
acts related to a nuclear issue carried out in their personal capacity are not 
attributable to the State. However, it is not clear how the Articles apply in 
the case of the conduct of private persons. This is an important issue in rela-
tion to the application of the general rules on State responsibility in the case 
of a violation of environmental obligations, because most nuclear activities 
for peaceful ends are carried out by private operators. Furthermore, a nuclear 
installation may be exposed to sabotage by a terrorist attack or the theft of 
nuclear substances by private persons. In practice it is difficult to attribute 
such acts to the State, unless it is proved that the State has been negligent in 
observing due diligence to control the conduct of those persons.  
 In addition, the attribution of conduct to the State does not by itself con-
stitute State responsibility, unless that conduct is considered to be a violation 
of an international obligation. The conduct of the State is considered a 
breach of international law if the conduct in question is not in conformity 
with the obligations of the State according to a treaty or custom or general 
principle of an international judicial decision or any source of international 
law. There is a difficult issue in relation to determining the peremptory 
norms of international law or jus cogens. These norms include the principles 
and values which protect the essential interests of the international commu-
nity as a whole, including those related to the protection of the human envi-
ronment. In my opinion, the obligations of the State to protect the human 
environment of the international community as a whole from damage caused 
by nuclear activities are related to those of the peremptory norms of interna-
tional law. This is because nuclear activities are the most hazardous activi-
ties and damage caused by such activities may damage not only the envi-
ronment of a particular State, but the international community as a whole. 
Under the ILC Articles, a breach of peremptory norms is considered a seri-
ous breach of international law and not an international crime. Unfortunately 
Article 19 was eliminated from the final Draft Articles. This had considered 
a breach of environmental obligations which concerns the international 
community as a whole to be an international crime. It was excluded from the 
Articles because the idea of criminalising the State in international law was 
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rejected. Nevertheless, the adoption of the criminal responsibility of the 
State is in the interests of the protection of the environment, particularly 
from damage caused by nuclear activities as one of the most hazardous ac-
tivities. Strict rules for State responsibility are needed to observe and protect 
the environment and avoid an environmental catastrophe affecting the whole 
international community if a major nuclear accident occurs. 
 However, this new definition of an internationally wrongful act is not 
consistent with the classical definition which requires, in addition to the pre-
vious two elements, i.e., attribution and violation, the element of damage and 
the causal link between the conduct and the damage. It also revealed that the 
elements of an internationally wrongful act are interrelated with the elements 
of State responsibility. The existence of a wrongful act of a State does not 
mean that there is State responsibility in all cases. The existence of the ele-
ments of attribution and breach constitutes only an international wrongful act 
of the State, i.e., the State may nevertheless not be responsible. The State is 
responsible once it has been shown that a wrongful act caused damage to 
another State or to a subject of international law. This is the third element of 
State responsibility. Finally, the fourth element required to constitute State 
responsibility for a wrongful act is that there should be no circumstances 
precluding the wrongful act.  
 This demonstrates that the regime of State responsibility for wrongful 
acts under international law is not absolute because there are certain circum-
stances precluding a wrongful act of a State. These circumstances include 
State consent, self-defence and countermeasures in self-defence, force ma-
jeure and fortuitous events, distress and necessity. The existence of one of 
these circumstances precludes responsibility on the part of the State in the 
case of a violation of environmental and nuclear obligations. A wrongful act 
of the State is considered to be lawful and the injured State cannot claim re-
sponsibility. However, in my opinion, the act of State itself is still unlawful 
and these circumstances may exonerate the State from responsibility but do 
not remove the wrongfulness of the act. This is because an act of the State is 
considered a wrongful act when it is attributed to the State and constitutes a 
breach of an international obligation. These two conditions do not change in 
normal or abnormal situations. Not all these circumstances are relevant in 
the case of wrongful acts committed by the State in relation to nuclear activi-
ties, such as self-defence, as it is difficult to accept the use of nuclear weap-
ons for self-defence.  Furthermore, certain conditions are required for these 
circumstances to apply, which limit their application and are in the interests 
of protecting the environment. Indeed, circumstances precluding a wrongful 
act of the State are not in favour of nuclear activities which must be con-
ducted under strict conditions in order to prevent and reduce environmental 
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damage caused by nuclear activities which are amongst the most hazardous 
activities. Therefore wrongful acts of a State which breach the peremptory 
norms of international law are not precluded under international law. Finally, 
a wrongful act of a State must be suspended once the circumstances preclud-
ing the wrongful act come to an end, and the offending State must pay com-
pensation to the injured State for injuries and loss caused by precluding a 





8 THE ABSOLUTE LIABILITY OF A STATE FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY A 
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 
8.1 Introduction 
The preceding analysis indicates that State responsibility for wrongful acts 
governs responsibility arising out of the performance of a nuclear activity as 
a lawful activity under international law. It ensures that a nuclear activity as 
a hazardous activity carried out within the territory of a State or under its 
jurisdiction or control is conducted in accordance with the required standards 
for the operation of nuclear activities in order to avoid causing a nuclear ac-
cident and its harmful consequences to the environment. Responsibility is 
attached to the State in the case of the violation of international obligations 
imposed upon it to prevent a nuclear accident and its harmful consequences 
for other States. Nevertheless, if a nuclear accident has occurred as a result 
of the State’s violation of its obligations, or if a nuclear accident has oc-
curred accidentally without any violation of international obligation, and has 
caused environmental damage to other States, this damage must be repaired. 
The basis of liability is different in the two cases as in the first case liability 
is based on wrongful act liability, while in the second it is based on risk li-
ability. As chapter 2 showed, a number of major nuclear accidents have oc-
curred in nuclear reactor installations causing a considerable amount of envi-
ronmental damage to other States. Liability for that damage is based on the 
principle of risk liability. Thus the basis of liability is determined according 
to the function of liability. As Judge Higgins argued: ‘In the case of envi-
ronmental matters, no doubt some activities would be on the one basis, and 
some on the other–that would develop and change as the substantive law on 
the environment develops and changes. Responsibility would attach to harm, 
coupled with a failure to meet the required standard of care’.
1
  
 State responsibility for the failure to meet the required standards for the 
operation of a nuclear activity was discussed in chapter 7. However, State 
liability for environmental damage resulting from a nuclear accident based 
on the principle of absolute liability will be discussed in this chapter. Strict 
liability for environmental damage caused by a nuclear activity is attached to 
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the State or the operator of a nuclear installation once damage has been 
caused by the accident, regardless of any fault or negligence.
2
 Thus the ele-
ment of damage is the main object of liability under the principle of absolute 
liability, imposing liability upon the liable person to compensate and repair 
the environmental damage caused by these activities.
3
 As discussed in chap-
ter 3 of the study, in risk liability the element of damage is a constituent 
element which is necessary to link the liability of the State or the operator to 
a hazardous activity.
4
 Without the occurrence of nuclear damage by a nu-
clear accident, there is no liability for the State or the operator. Liability for 
environmental damage caused by a nuclear activity is incurred once the 




 It should be noted that the concept of strict liability was developed before 
the emergence of international law. Strict liability had its roots in national 
legal systems before it was adopted in the nuclear liability conventions. It 
was applicable in the systems of liability of early societies,
6
 Roman law and 
other national systems, before it appeared in international law.
7
 Before the 
industrial revolution, the origins of strict liability could be found in national 
liability legislation, but after the industrial revolution it was incorporated 
into international law to govern liability for damage caused by hazardous 
activities.
8
 The concept of strict liability has been further developed since the 
industrial revolution as a result of the development of hazardous activities, 
particularly nuclear activities.
9
 It was embodied in several legal liability re-
gimes in the place of fault liability, particularly in treaties dealing with dif-
ferent areas of hazardous activities, including the nuclear liability conven-
tions.
10
 There is also evidence in customary international law and 
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international case law for the existence and application of risk liability to 
environmental damage caused by hazardous activities. 
 This chapter focuses mainly on the examination of the origins and basis 
of liability under the existing provisions of international law and its applica-
tion to environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident in accordance 
with contemporary international law. Unfortunately the 2006 ILC Draft 
Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising out of Hazardous Activities
11
 imposes liability for damage caused by 
such activities only upon the operator of the activity and excludes the abso-
lute liability of the State.
12
 The Installation State is only obliged to ensure 
that prompt and adequate compensation is provided to victims of environ-
mental damage.
13
 In the case of a violation of this obligation, the Installation 
State will be subject to State responsibility for a wrongful act and compensa-
tion by the State will be provided on that basis.
14
 Therefore this chapter ex-
amines the absolute liability of the State and the operator of a nuclear instal-
lation and its connection with the general rules of State responsibility under 
international law. The absolute liability of the State is governed by the gen-
eral rules of international law, while the liability of the operator is governed 
by the nuclear liability conventions and other relevant environmental instru-
ments which are also considered as a source of international liability.  
 To investigate these issues, the chapter is divided into seven sections. 
Section 8.2 identifies the general principle of risk liability and the justifica-
tion for its application to environmental damage caused by nuclear activities. 
Section 8.3 examines the basis and applications of risk liability of the State 
according to sources of international law as provided for in Article 38 (1) (c) 
of the ICJ. Section 8.4 discusses the basis of the strict liability of the opera-
tor of a nuclear installation according to sources of international law. Section 
8.5 examines the Polluter Pays Principle and its role in nuclear liability. This 
is because the concept of strict liability is similar to the concept of the Pol-
luter Pays Principle, which channels the economic cost of damage caused by 
an activity to the source of the damage. Section 8.6 investigates the relation-
ship between the civil liability regime under the nuclear liability conventions 
and other civil liability regimes with the general rules of international law. 
This demonstrates the scope for discretion available under international law 
to decide on claims between two States arising out of a nuclear accident 
when an international obligation under the nuclear liability conventions or 
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under international law has been breached by a State. Section 8.7 concludes 
that the principle of absolute liability is an essential principle in international 
law. It applies to environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident, even 
if State responsibility for wrongful acts has been proven. The existence and 
application of the strict liability rules under the general rules of international 
law constitute the original basis of liability applicable to environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident. It is applicable to the Installation State 
and the operator of a nuclear installation. As a result of the increasing use of 
hazardous activities, the concept of risk liability is expanding to apply and 
govern liability for environmental damage caused by these activities. 
8.2 The principle of strict liability as a basis of nuclear 
liability 
This section discusses the concept of the principle of strict liability as a legal 
basis for nuclear liability under the nuclear liability conventions and the gen-
eral rules of international law. It begins by looking for the reason that fault 
liability was rejected as a basis of nuclear liability (8.2.1) and then why strict 
liability is justified (8.2.2). Finally, it identifies the different notions related 
to strict liability, viz., non-fault liability, absolute liability, strict liability and 
objective liability (8.2.3). 
8.2.1 The rejection of fault liability as a basis of nuclear liability 
In national law fault liability relies on the personal liability of the author of 
the damage.
15
 The actor is held liable if he has intentionally breached an ob-
ligation or has failed to fulfil a duty and his conduct did not corresponding 
with the requirements of a standard of conduct.
16
 According to this standard, 
the actor is held liable for damage caused by his conduct to others if he has 
not behaved in accordance with reasonable conduct. Fault liability is com-
posed of two elements, viz. the psychological attitude of the individual and 
the objective conduct or material act. The psychological attitude of the indi-
vidual means that the author of the damage believes that his conduct corre-
sponds to the existing rules of law and normal human behaviour. The objec-
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tive conduct means that the conduct of the individual has caused damage. 
However, this concept of fault is different from the concept of fault in inter-
national law which relies on the objective element, i.e., wrongful intent or 
negligence on the part of an organ of the State.
17
 Thus the State is held re-
sponsible for damage caused by a fault of its organs without the need to 
prove the psychological failure of the organ that caused the damage
18
  
 It should be noted that as a result of the social commitment to the devel-
opment of the industrial revolution and the individual tolerance that emerged 
in the nineteenth century, fault liability increased very rapidly and dominated 
the field of civil liability law in the national legal systems.
19
 However, it 
later passed from national into international law and at the present time still 
has many applications in the arena of international law.
20
  
 However, because of the increase in the negligence of individuals, a great 
deal of serious damage is caused by the use of new technologies where there 
is no proof of the fault or negligence on the part of the owner of the machine 
or the operator of the activity.
21
 Furthermore, the use of new technologies in 
outer space and the use of nuclear energy have caused transboundary dam-
age through no fault of the State conducting the activity.
22
 This has led to the 
rejection of fault liability as a subjective liability to govern liability for dam-
age caused by the new technology, particularly for environmental damage 
caused by nuclear technology.
23
 This raises the question of who pays the 
costs of injuries suffered by victims of environmental damage which were 
caused by these activities where the fault of the owner or the operator cannot 
be proved.
24
 It was realized that: 
‘The negligence concept was suitable in an era of extreme individualism. After 
industrialization became a “fait accompli,” [and therefore] strict liability was 
imposed as a solution to the harsh concepts of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk [followed]. Modern technology has greatly advanced since 
the concept of strict liability and its limitations were originally adopted. There 
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 Aréchaga, 1968, at p. 534. 
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 Aréchaga, 1968, at p. 535. 
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20
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Therefore, strict liability was given a limited role in national and interna-
tional law to govern liability for damage caused by new activities such as 
nuclear activities, electricity, etc. It was applied only in exceptional cases. 
However, the majority of cases were based on fault. As Lauterpacht ob-
served: ‘[I]f necessities of international life lead us to the adoption, in certain 
instances, of the principle of absolute liability, such cases will nevertheless, 
as they do in private law, constitute an exception to the generally recognized 
principle of responsibility based on fault’.
26
 Furthermore, according to a 
resolution adopted by the International Law Institute in 1927, the State is not 
liable ‘if the lack of observance of the obligation is not a consequence of a 
fault of its organs, unless in the particular case, a conventional or customary 
rule, special to the case, admits of responsibility without fault’.
27
 
 However, as a result of the industrial revolution in the middle of the 
twentieth century many industrial activities developed, most notably, nuclear 
activities, space activities, and other industrial activities, and more recently 
the information revolution. These activities are hazardous activities, but they 
have been tolerated by law because they are useful for the community, and 
have become an essential part of life.
28
 At the same time, these activities in-
volve considerable hazards which cannot be ignored, and therefore it is 
probable that they will cause damage where there is no fault or negligence 
on the part of the owner or the operator of the activity. Even if the damage 
has been caused through the fault or negligence of the author of the damage, 
it is very difficult for the victims to provide proof that he was at fault or neg-
ligence and consequently they have to bear their loss themselves. This 
showed that fault liability cannot provide sufficient protection for victims of 
damage caused by these hazardous activities.
29
 As a result, the social attitude 
regarding acceptance of fault liability to govern liability for damage caused 
by these new activities has changed. This demonstrated the need for another 
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basis of liability for damage caused by the new industrial activities.
30
 There-
fore strict liability was given a wider role to govern liability for damage 
caused by ultra-hazardous activities, particularly in the field of product li-
ability, to protect consumers from the growing negligence of producers.
31
 In 
the case of the application of fault liability to damage caused by a nuclear 
accident, victims of environmental damage have a smaller chance of being 
compensated. This is because of the complicated procedures involved in 
proving the fault of the State which conducted the nuclear activity or the 
fault of the operator of a nuclear installation. It is also because environ-
mental damage caused by a nuclear accident can spread to other States and 




 The drafters of the nuclear liability conventions and national nuclear leg-
islation were aware of these facts from the very beginning of the nuclear li-
ability regimes. They decided to base liability for nuclear damage on the 
principle of strict or absolute liability.
33
 It was argued that: 
‘From the beginning, there was no doubt that the nuclear industry was a perfect 
example of the sort of activity in which the concept of strict liability for risk 
should be applied. Governments, jurists, operators and insurance companies, 
all agreed. Due to the unusual hazards posed by nuclear activities, it was ac-
knowledged that permission to operate nuclear installations could not be 
granted unless the operator agreed to accept full responsibility for any injurious 
consequences. For, despite the utmost precautions, an accident could always 
occur and it was only just that the cost should be borne by the person who cre-
ated the risk and not by the innocent victim. 
Therefore, in all nuclear liability legislation (except that of the United States 
[…]), the basis of liability is not fault, but strict liability for risk. Strict liability 
relieves the victim of the burden of [... providing proof of] fault or negligence, 
requiring the payment of compensation on [the] mere proof of a causal link be-
tween the damage and the nuclear accident [... concerned]. Since it would be 
virtually impossible for any victim to have detailed knowledge of what had 
taken place in the nuclear installation or [... during] the [... transportation] 
when the accident occurred, strict liability is necessary for justice’.
34
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Accordingly, absolute liability has been adopted as the only basis of liability 
for nuclear damage, including damage to the environment, in bilateral, multi-
lateral and national nuclear liability regimes. Therefore, as will be discussed 
below, the principle of absolute liability has been explicitly included in all 
nuclear liability conventions. It was also adopted by the 1972 Convention for 
damage caused by space objects. 
 Nevertheless, in practice, fault liability is not totally excluded as a basis 
of liability to govern liability for ultra-hazardous activities, but it only ap-
plies in exceptional cases.
35
 There are some applications of fault liability 
governing liability for environmental nuclear damage caused by nuclear ac-
tivities. For example, fault liability was adopted to govern liability for dam-
age caused by space objects as well as absolute liability as a basis of liability 
under the 1972 Convention for damage caused by space objects.
36
 This Con-
vention is the only convention in the field of international liability that ap-
plies to nuclear damage caused by space objects. According to this Conven-
tion, the launching State of a space object is not responsible for damage 
caused by the object where the damage is caused in places other than the 
Earth, unless the fault of the State or the fault of other responsible persons 
has been proved.
37
 Therefore, if nuclear damage is caused by a space object 
to persons, the property of others or to the environment in outer space, the 
launching State is not responsible for that damage unless the State is at 
fault.
38
 In addition, there are some arguments that consider the principle of 
absolute liability is not existed in international law and derived from national 
law, particularly from common law systems, though they do not consider it 
as a general principle of liability in international law.
39
 Furthermore, some 
national laws do not consider the principle of absolute liability as a general 
principle of law. For example, the American nuclear liability law does not 
recognize this principle as a general rule for the legal basis of liability. Li-
ability under this law is based on the general rules and principles of common 
law. Liability under these rules may be based on absolute or fault liability in 
accordance with the law of the State in whose territory a nuclear accident has 
occurred.
40
 Moreover, the nuclear liability conventions exonerate the opera-
tor of a nuclear installation from liability where the injured person has inten-
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tionally caused the damage.
41
 Therefore fault liability may be applicable to 
environmental nuclear damage in cases when the operator is not liable under 
the applicable nuclear liability regime, as in cases of damage caused by mi-
nor nuclear activities, damage caused by low-level radioactivity, damage or 
loss caused to property on the site of the installation, etc. In such cases, the 
ordinary law under which absolute or fault liability applies to environmental 
damage, would be applied.
42
  
 Therefore, despite the fact that strict liability has been adopted in the nu-
clear liability conventions as a basis of the liability of the operator, fault li-
ability could apply alongside it in exceptional cases where the fault of the 
operator has been proved and strict liability cannot be applied. Every theory 
has its own application. As mentioned above, the former USSR refused to 
accept liability for the nuclear damage caused by the Chernobyl accident and 
attributed the liability to the fault and negligence of the operating person-
nel.
43
 At the same time, the USSR was not a Contracting Party to any nuclear 
liability convention for the regime of strict liability to apply. Despite the fact 
that the accident caused a considerable amount of damage to the environ-
ment of other States, it denied legal liability and only accepted moral liabil-
ity for damage caused by the accident.
44
 Fault liability could also be applica-
ble in the case of negligence on the part of a State with regard to enacting 
nuclear legislation or where the operator neglected to apply the existing nu-
clear safety standards for nuclear installations.  
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8.2.2 Justification of strict liability as a basis of nuclear liability 
There are certain grounds that justify the adoption of the concept of strict 
liability to govern liability for environmental damage caused by hazardous 
activities, particular nuclear energy.
45
 First, nuclear energy has a special 
character which requires a special guarantee to compensate environmental 
damage. The use of nuclear energy is a highly complicated matter and in-
volves considerable risks. A nuclear reactor involves risk and may cause se-
rious and widespread damage in many areas, even across the borders of the 
States in whose territory the installation is located or under whose jurisdic-
tion or control the activity is operated.
46
 This creates certain difficulties with 
regard to applying the rules of fault liability to nuclear damage, as it is diffi-
cult for the victims to provide proof of the fault or negligence on the part of 
the operator. This applies particularly in event of the delayed damage which 
may become apparent many years after the accident.
47
 This justifies the es-
tablishment of a regime of liability based on strict liability.
48
 It is unfair for 
the plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof with regard to the fault or negli-
gence on the part of the operator.
49
 There is evidence in international envi-
ronmental law that anyone who conducts a nuclear activity should bear the 
consequences of the liability at his own risk.
50
 Any person who carries out a 
nuclear activity and benefits from it should compensate the victims for envi-
ronmental damage suffered by the activity. Strict liability provides protec-
tion against hazardous activities by guaranteeing compensation to the vic-
tims.
51
 Furthermore, it is unfair that the State, which allows a hazardous 
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activity in its territory or under its jurisdiction or control in order to benefit eco-
nomically and develop, should not compensate other States and their victims 
affected by environmental damage caused by the activity.
52
 Strict liability is an 
adequate basis for nuclear liability for environmental damage caused by a 
nuclear activity. It makes it easier for victims of a nuclear accident to make 
claims for nuclear damage or for others to make such claims on their be-
half.
53
 A strict liability regime guarantees compensation for victims who 
have suffered environmental damage as the result of a nuclear accident. This 
is because strict liability obliges the operator of a nuclear installation to 




 In addition, strict liability is an important instrument to motivate the op-
erator and the State to take all possible measures to prevent damage and 
avoid its economic costs.
55
 It is an incentive for the operator of a nuclear in-
stallation to do all it can and take every possible preventive measure to pre-
vent a nuclear accident in order to avoid liability. It is also an incentive for 
the Installation State to observe due diligence with regard to the supervision 
of the implementation of nuclear safety standards in order to avoid providing 
the additional compensation which it would have to pay if a major nuclear 
accident occurred. Goldie argues that ‘[s]trict liability thus creates a responsi-
bility on the part of an enterprise to prevent injury or to pay the consequences 
to persons who are threatened by the permissible [activity … and the] abnormal 
danger which it is perceived to create’.
56
 He went on to say that ‘[c]onditional 
fault’ means that, in undertaking his ultrahazardous activity or venture, the de-
fendant has already created a risk for others for which he will be held account-
able in the event of his conduct or products causing harm to others’.
57
 
 Finally, strict liability helps the development of the nuclear industry be-
cause the liability focuses only on one person, i.e., the operator of the nu-
clear installation. The victims of nuclear damage know they can turn to one 
person who is liable. This is because of ‘the potential liability of suppliers of 
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equipment and/or services to nuclear installations. [The p]otential liability of 
these persons, or those working in a nuclear installation, would of course 
severally hamper the development of [the] nuclear industry’.
58
 The nuclear 
liability conventions therefore apply fault liability in limited cases and the 
operator is obliged to compensate the victims in such cases and has the right 
of recourse vis-à-vis the liable person afterwards.
59
 
8.2.3 The concept of nuclear liability: Strict or absolute liability? 
The notion of risk liability as a general notion governing liability for envi-
ronmental damage caused by hazardous activities is reflected in the doctrine 
of liability law in different ways.
60
 It has been termed absolute liability, strict 
liability, liability without fault, risk liability, liability for abnormal activities 
and liability for ultra-hazardous activities. All these notions express one 
meaning, which indicates that the person liable for damage caused by an ul-
tra-hazardous activity is held liable for damage caused by his activity upon 
proof provided by the victims of the relationship between the damage suf-
fered and the activity without the need to prove fault or negligence on the 
part of the liable person. In other words, the victims are required to prove the 
objective elements of liability without the need to prove the subjective ele-
ments. Where the causal link between the damage and the nuclear accident has 
been proved, the operator cannot escape his liability with the argument that he 




 In practice, there is some confusion regarding the concepts reflected by 
these terms. This contradiction may stem from the use of different terms 
with regard to liability which actually indicate the same concept. Exploring 
the meaning of these terms may remove the confusion and determine the 
extent of liability.  
 The term “risk liability” is used to indicate that the liability applies to 
damage caused by activities involving risk.
62
 Consequently the classical 
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conditions of liability applicable to damage caused by “non-risk activities” 
are excluded.  
 The same could be said with regard to the term “abnormal liability”, since 
the rules of liability governing “normal activities” are not applicable to dam-
age caused by abnormal activities. The concept of liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities has been developed by the Anglo-American doctrine on 
the basis of the British Rylands v. Fletcher case of 1868 
63
 and was applied 
in the jurisprudence of the States which apply this doctrine.
64
  
 Liability is also termed “objective liability” because the objective ele-
ments of liability have to be proved by the victims without the need to prove 
the subjective elements. Victims of the damage need only prove that the 
damage they suffered resulted from a hazardous activity, and do not need to 
prove the subjective elements of liability, i.e., the intent or negligence of the 
person liable for the activity in causing the damage. However, it should be 
noted that risk liability is the highest degree of objective responsibility in inter-
national law.
65
 The concept of objective liability in international law was for-
mulated by the Italian jurist Anzilotti at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury.
66
 It applies to wrongful act responsibility and strict liability and governs 
liability for damage caused by lawful and unlawful activities, while strict liabil-
ity is only applicable to liability for lawful activities. The concept of objective 
liability has been widely supported by the contemporary writers of international 
law.
67
 The two theories of liability have a real connection with nuclear activi-
ties. Wrongful act responsibility entails that the activity has been performed 
according to the rules of international law.
68
 However, strict liability ensures 
compensation for damage caused by such activities.  
 On the other hand, “fault liability” relies on the proof of subjective ele-
ments of liability. Victims of the damage are required to prove fault or neg-
ligence on the part of the operator of the activity; in the case of “non-fault 
liability” proof of these elements is not required.  
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 In the continental legal doctrine liability for hazardous activities is also 
termed “the theory of exceptional risk”, while in the Anglo-American doc-
trine it is known as “ultra-hazardous” or “abnormally dangerous” activity.
69
 
Liability for “ultra-hazardous activities” indicates that this liability is for 
damage caused by hazardous activities. It attaches to the author of the dam-
age without the need to prove his fault or negligence. The term liability for 
hazardous activity has been widely used in international law after it was in-
troduced by Jenks in his lectures at The Hague Academy of International 
Law in the mid-1960s. As Jenks pointed out: 
‘The expression ultra-hazardous activities is not a term of art and calls for 
some definition if it is to serve as the basis of our discussion. It does not imply 
that the activity is ultra-hazardous in the sense that there is a high degree of 
probability that the hazard will materialize, but rather that the consequences in 
the exceptional and perhaps quite improbable event of the hazard materializing 
may be so far-reaching that special rules concerning the liability for such con-
sequences are necessary if serious injustice and hardship are to be avoided’.
70
  
In that sense, hazards arising from an accident caused by a nuclear installa-
tion may cause widespread, serious and unlimited environmental conse-
quences.
71
 Therefore the doctrine of liability law distinguishes between haz-
ardous and non-hazardous activities. It applies strict liability to damage 
caused by hazardous activities because they can cause damage even when 
precautionary measures have been taken.
72
 However, non-hazardous activi-
ties can be governed by non-fault liability. 
 Although, all the above-mentioned synonymous notions of liability indi-
cate that liability for damage caused by ultra-hazardous activities attaches to 
the person liable for the activity without the need to prove his fault or negli-
gence, in general jurists distinguish between strict liability and absolute li-
ability.
73
 Put simply, absolute liability means that the person liable for a haz-
ardous activity is liable for all the damage caused by the activity. However, 
in the case of strict liability, there are certain circumstances which exonerate 
the liable person from liability in the case of certain circumstances. In the 
case of liability for nuclear damage, including environmental damage, the 
two terms “absolute liability” and “strict liability” are used by the doctrine of 
nuclear liability law in a broad sense. Liability for nuclear damage is some-
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times called absolute liability and often strict liability. Nevertheless, under 
both terms liability is based only on damage caused by a nuclear activity.
74
 
This simultaneous use has led to the following questions: Is liability for nu-
clear damage under the nuclear liability regime strict or absolute? Should 
liability for nuclear damage have a strict or absolute basis? The answer to 
these questions not only relies on determining the use of terminology, but 
also depends on the consequences of making a distinction between the con-
cepts expressed by the two terms of liability. In fact, there is no agreement 
on the use of a single term, either among jurists of liability law or in practice. 
Sometimes the two terms, “absolute” and “strict” liability, are used to mean 
the same thing. In other cases, the term “absolute liability” is used as it was 
defined in the nuclear liability conventions and national nuclear liability leg-
islation.
75
 Others distinguish between absolute and strict liability. Because of 
the exceptional circumstances provided for in the agreements related to the 
liability for ultra-hazardous activities, it was considered that the term “strict 
liability” is the correct term.
76
 This means that there are degrees of liability 
when the two terms are used.
77
 According to Goldie, there is some variation 
between the terms “strict” and “absolute” liability as regards the degree of 
strictness and inflexibility. The term “strict” should be used for the applica-
tion of non-fault liability to damage caused by nuclear activities rather than 
the term “absolute”.
78
 This is because there are some ‘…disturbances of an 
international character such as acts of armed conflict and invasion, of a po-
litical nature such as civil war and insurrection, or grave natural disasters of 
exceptional character which are catastrophic and completely unforeseeable, 
on the grounds that all such matters are the responsibility of the nation as a 
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 Therefore the term “absolute” liability as adopted by the nuclear 
liability conventions is more exclusive than the term “strict”.
80
 
 In addition, the nuclear liability conventions limit the scope of nuclear 
damage to cover personal and property loss, environmental damage, eco-
nomic loss and costs of preventive and reinstatement measures and leave 
other damage, such as damage caused to the means of transport and damage 
to the installation itself or on the site of the installation uncompensated under 
the Conventions. These Conventions also limit the liability of the operator in 
terms of time and amount of compensation. The operator is not liable for 
environmental nuclear damage where the damage exceeds the limit of the 
Conventions or where the damage has become apparent after the time limit 
imposed by the applicable conventions. The Conventions also exclude par-
ticular nuclear activities, such as minor activities. In these cases, the operator 
is not liable under the conventions for environmental nuclear damage caused 
by these activities even if there is a link between the damage and his nuclear 
installation. For these reasons, as Jenks argues: ‘The principle that liability 
for nuclear damage is “absolute” is generally accepted, but the expression is 
somewhat misleading in that it does not exclude the possibility of excep-
tions’.
81
 These exceptions and exonerations of liability are misleading as re-
gards the concept of absolute liability and mean that liability for nuclear 
damage is strict rather than absolute.
82
 They also narrow the scope of nuclear 
liability for environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident. Therefore it 
has been argued that nuclear liability should be absolute rather than strict.
83
 
Nuclear activities are the most hazardous activities and should be conducted 
under strict rules. The State should be held liable for all environmental dam-
age caused by such activities. 
 Strict liability is defined as the ‘liability which creates an international 
obligation to compensate merely on grounds of having caused the damage 
without any requirement of fault or negligence of any kind by the State 
which caused the damage’.
84
 Accordingly, compensation consists only of 
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reparation for environmental nuclear damage and the consequences of liabil-
ity under the nuclear liability conventions.  
 However, liability for environmental nuclear damage under the nuclear 
liability conventions is, in principle, assumed to be absolute.
85
 In our opin-
ion, absolute liability means that the person who is liable for environmental 
nuclear damage caused by an abnormal activity is liable for all the damage 
caused by his activity without any limit. It could be termed “absolute” if all 
the excuses and exonerations are removed.
86
 Therefore, the concept of abso-
lute liability is a stricter degree of liability than so-called strict liability, 
while the latter is stricter than traditional fault liability.   
 In short, various degrees of liability apply for environmental nuclear 
damage under the nuclear liability conventions. The highest degree is abso-
lute liability which should be imposed on the operator. The second is strict 
liability as a standard of liability which applies where there is some exonera-
tion from liability. The third is wrongful act liability which applies in the 
case of a breach of an obligation under the Conventions. Finally, there is 
fault liability where there has been negligence or fault on the part of the vic-
tim or the operator. However, the operator has to prove the fault or negli-
gence of the victim and vice versa.   
8.3 Strict liability of the State for environmental nuclear 
damage 
This section argues for the basis of the strict liability principle in interna-
tional law and its application to environmental damage caused by nuclear 
accidents. Section (8.3.1) identifies whether the principle of strict liability 
has been accepted by the ILC as the basis of State liability for hazardous ac-
tivities in general and nuclear activities in particular. Section (8.3.2) investi-
gates treaty law applicable to State liability. Section (8.3.3) investigates the 
general principles of law as a source of liability for environmental damage 
caused by nuclear activities. Section (8.4.4) examines the doctrine of interna-
tional law and customary international environmental law. Section (8.3.5) 
discusses state practice and judicial decisions which apply the principle of 
strict liability in environmental cases. 
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8.3.1 State liability for environmental damage caused by 
hazardous lawful activities: The ILC approach 
8.3.1.1 The focus of the ILC Draft Articles on State Liability for 
Environmental Damage  
In 1969, in its report to the General Assembly, the ILC suggested delaying 
the codification of the question of risk liability for hazardous activities as 
lawful activities and the responsibility of other subjects of international law, 
i.e., the responsibility of international organizations for wrongful acts, which 
is under codification by the ILC at the moment, until a later stage in order to 
avoid confusion with the topic of State responsibility for wrongful acts.
87
 
The reason given by the Commission was that ‘a joint examination of the 
two subjects could only make both of them more difficult to grasp’.
88
 Ac-
cordingly, the Commission deferred the examination of the question of in-
ternational liability for damage caused by lawful activities. Later, as men-
tioned, the ILC divided the question of State liability and responsibility into 
three topics which mainly focused on the codification and development of the 
general rules of international liability. Nevertheless, liability for damage 
caused to the environment was particularly taken into account. In one way or 
another, the three draft articles referred to liability for damage caused to the 
environment. The starting point was the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsi-
bility which considered a breach of international environmental obligations to 
constitute an international crime or international delict.
89
 Unfortunately, as 
discussed in chapter 7, this provision was eliminated in the 2001 Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility because the responsibility was considered to be related 
to the State and not to individuals.
90
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 In 1978, the ILC made a start on the codification of the question under 
the title “International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of 
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law”,
91
 which was codified by the ILC 
under various titles. Initially the Commission focused its examination mainly 
on liability for environmental damage.
92
 This received wide support from the 
Special Rapporteurs, Quentin Baxter and Barboza, who preferred to focus on 
the topic of the environmental issues.
93
 This is because it was considered that 
the topic of liability for environmental damage caused by hazardous activi-
ties is different from the topic of State responsibility and the existing envi-
ronmental agreements do not cover State liability for environmental dam-
age.
94
 However, some members of the Commission were in favour of 
extending the topic to cover damage to the environment of the global com-
mons such as outer space and the high seas.
95
 This was a controversial matter 
for the Commission and therefore the topic of international liability was ex-
amined in general, without devoting special attention to liability for envi-
ronmental damage. Indeed, State liability for environmental damage caused 
to the global commons was in the interests of protecting the environment 
from damage caused by nuclear activities. As nuclear activities are not pro-
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hibited by international law and are widely used in the operation of nuclear 
land-based installations, space objects and nuclear ships, damage caused by 
these installations can easily affect the environment of the global commons. 
 Nevertheless, the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities adopted in 2001 refer to the duty of States 
to protect the environment with a reference to the Rio Declaration on the 
Environment and Development and to the importance of international coop-
eration amongst States.
96
 Similarly, the 2006 ILC Draft Principles on the 
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Haz-
ardous Activities refer to Principles 13 and 16 of the Rio Declaration on the 
Environment and Development.
97
 According to Principle 13, the States should 
develop national law of liability and compensation for environmental damage 
and to cooperate in the development of international law of liability and com-
pensation for environmental damage caused by activities carried out within 
their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction. Also, according 
to Principle 16, national authorities should develop the internalization of envi-
ronmental costs based on the polluter pays principle that obliges the polluter to 
bear the costs of pollution. Moreover, as mentioned, the principles define the 
concept of environmental damage and the environment.
98
 According to the 
principles, also the States should protect and preserve the environment, as 
well as to ensure compensation to victims of environmental damage and re-
store the impaired environment.
99
 
8.3.1.2 The general principle of strict State liability 
Furthermore, initially there was some debate within the ILC about adapting 
the concept of strict liability to liability for environmental damage caused by 
hazardous activities. However, the ILC’s position on the application of the 
principle of strict liability was not clear.
100
 It was not clear whether the 
Commission was rejecting the principle of strict liability itself as the basis of 
liability for hazardous activities or whether it was rejecting the application of 
the principle only to State liability for damage caused by such activities. It 
refers to international liability for hazardous activities not prohibited under 
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international law without explicit reference to a particular basis for the liabil-
ity. Despite the fact that liability for damage caused by hazardous activities 
is based under the general rules of international law on risk or absolute li-
ability, neither the title chosen by the Commission for the topic (Interna-
tional Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohib-
ited by International Law) or any other subsequent titles of topics refers to 
risk liability as a basis of State liability for damage caused by hazardous ac-
tivities as in the case of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for 
Wrongful Acts. Moreover, the Commission did not adopt a general principle 
of strict liability in the Draft Articles that indicates the basis of international 
liability for hazardous activities as in the case of the ILC Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts.
101
 The adoption of such a principle 
is important to remove the ambiguity in relation to the application of risk 
liability for damage caused by hazardous activities in general and nuclear 
energy in particular. As Birnie and Boyle argued:  
‘[T]he successful articulation of criteria for adopting a general principle of 
strict liability applicable to cases of environmental harm would be an invalu-
able contribution to the subject, as the uncertainty regarding responsibility for 
the Chernobyl nuclear accident shows. If the Commission can secure interna-
tional support for this proposition it will have achieved a significant advance 
and will have provided a useful element of flexibility in the wider balancing of 




The application of strict liability in international liability was also supported 
by the Special Rapporteur Baxter who emphasized that the concept of strict 
liability was the basis of liability for damage caused by hazardous activities. 
He stated:  
‘At the very end of the day, when all the opportunities of regime-building have 
been set aside – or, alternatively, when a loss or injury has occurred that no-
body foresaw – there is a commitment, in the nature of strict liability, to make 
good the loss. The Special Rapporteur finds it hard to see how it could be oth-
erwise, taking into account the realities of transboundary dangers and relations 




The concept of strict liability as suggested by Baxter was discussed by the 
Commission. However, it was rejected by some members of the Commission 
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on the basis that the concept of strict liability is derived from domestic law 
and they considered that it is contrary to the concept of strict liability in in-
ternational law.
104
 According to this view, the concept of strict liability in 
domestic law is aimed only at reparation of the damage, while the concept of 
strict liability in international law as presented in the topic is aimed at the 
prevention and reparation of environmental damage.
105
 However, in support 
of his view, Baxter stated that borrowing the concept of strict liability from 
domestic law does not mean that it has the same significance and content in 
international law. It only uses the concept of “strict liability” which is a 
common principle to base the liability of a State on the proof of causality, 
i.e., the causal relationship between transboundary environmental damage 
and a hazardous activity.
106
 He stated that there is  
‘[…] no contradiction between the principle of strict liability and prevention. 
One of the latent purposes of strict liability was prevention, to discourage the 
author from conducting certain activities or from doing so in certain ways by 
imposing direct and strict liability for compensation. He believed that that con-
cept constituted an important principle of the present topic. Strict liability did 
not need to be incorporated in the present topic to the same degree as was 
known in domestic law or under some conventional regimes of international 
law; but what was important was the notion that the establishment of a causal 
relationship between certain activities and certain injury was sufficient to entail 
liability. Strict liability provided that basis’.
107
 
Baxter also considered that strict liability is optional and relied on the nego-
tiations between the source State and the affected State to establish the bal-




‘[A]t the end of the journey, the monster of strict liability should be domesti-
cated. In a conventional regime, strict liability is a commutation of an obliga-
tion of prevention, and usually – as with the Trail Smelter company – it repre-
sents a cost that the enterprise would gladly underwrite in perpetuity, rather 
than embark upon major schemes of prevention. In customary law, when 
wrongfulness is precluded or responsibility is not engaged, the acceptance in 
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principle of a rule that does not penalize the innocent victim is a matter about 
which governments could form a view when this topic [… has advanced] a few 
years […]. In any case, such a liability would be subject to equities; so the vic-
tim […] must really be an innocent victim’.
109
  
Accordingly, Baxter did not fully support the application of the principle of 
strict liability to the liability of the State and supported it only in relation to 
its application in civil liability regimes. In addition, there were divergent 
opinions among the members of the Commission about accepting the con-
cept of strict liability as a basis of State liability and reparation for environ-
mental damage caused by hazardous activities.
110
 They were in favour of the 
application of international conventions to impose strict liability upon the 
operator of the activity.
111
 
 Unlike Baxter, the Special Rapporteur Barboza considered that strict li-
ability is the main basis of international liability and reparation for damage 
related to nuclear and other hazardous activities.
112
 In support of the applica-
tion of strict liability on the topic of International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law he 
stated:  
‘As to the basis for the obligation, the Special Rapporteur considered that a 
clarification should be made: it was not logical to base the obligation of repara-
tion both on its identity with prevention and on strict liability. Although there 
had been objections to strict liability, it had been stated in support of it, first, 
that it was not a monolithic concept, since it involved different degrees of 
strictness, and, when combined with the above-mentioned mitigating factors, 
became a sufficiently flexible instrument; and, secondly, that it was not certain 
that it did not have a basis in international law. Failure to provide compensa-
tion for transboundary injury caused by a hazardous activity in the territory of 
a State could be based only on a theory of sovereignty which did not take ac-
count of the interdependence that was becoming more and more characteristic 
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of international life and which would be contrary to the principle of the sover-
eign equality of States because it would overlook the other aspect of State sov-




However, it was difficult for Barboza to convince the Commission of his 
view that a general principle of strict liability should be introduced in the 
Articles because it had been rejected by many governments.
114
 He also at-
tracted criticism because he extended the scope of international liability for 
lawful activities not prohibited by international law to cover liability for low-
risk activities which require a different solution. These low-risk hazardous 
activities have no direct environmental impact on other States during normal 
operation, but only have an effect when an accident occurs. It also covers 
liability for hazardous activities which have a long-range effect on the envi-
ronment of other States, even during normal operation, such as nuclear en-
ergy.
115
 In addition, he introduced in the Articles numerous primary obligations 
necessary for the prevention and reduction of environmental damage caused by 
nuclear and other hazardous activities. These obligations were the core of the 
topic. The fulfilment of these obligations requires the application of wrongful 
act responsibility rather than strict or absolute liability.
116
 The breach of inter-
national obligations can be treated together with State responsibility without the 
need to develop new Draft Articles. At the same time, the Commission failed to 
deal with the question of international liability for hazardous activities because 
it is difficult to prove the fault or negligence of the operator of the activity or to 
incur State responsibility once the State has met its due diligence obligation. 
This made the topic very complicated. Therefore in 1997, the Commission 
separated the question of prevention from the topic of international liability for 
damage caused by lawful activities and concentrated only on codifying it. This 
codification was completed in 2001. This was the real problem confronting the 
Commission. Later it examined the second part of the question of international 
liability for hazardous activities which focused on civil liability.  
 Finally, the issue of strict State liability was discussed by the Commis-
sion during the codification of the Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss 
in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities. 
However, some governments refused to accept strict liability of the State for 
environmental damage caused by hazardous activities. As the Special Rap-
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porteur Rao stated: ‘The hesitation to peg State liability to strict liability is 
also understandable. It is mainly due to an assessment that in international 
practice, as between States, that form of liability is not accepted for activities 
that are considered as lawful to pursue in their domestic jurisdiction in ac-
cordance with their sovereign rights’.
117
 The Commission later focused on 
the codification of the topic of civil liability which imposes strict liability on 
the operator of a hazardous activity on the basis of international agreements 
and excludes strict liability of the State as a subject of international law. Ac-
cordingly, the 2006 ILC Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case 
of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities apply strict 
State liability in the case of a nuclear accident when the State serves as an 
operator of a nuclear activity, for example, when a State is not party to the 
nuclear liability conventions. Strict liability applies for the State when it car-
ries out a nuclear activity as an operator with civil liability. The ILC selected 
a model of a strict liability regime similar to those which apply in other civil 
liability regimes, including oil, pollution, environmental damage and nuclear 
activity regimes based on international agreements.
118
 As liability for envi-
ronmental damage caused by nuclear activities as hazardous activities has been 
based on civil liability according to the ILC, this chapter continues to examine 
these issues of strict liability under the general rules of international law, in-
cluding nuclear conventions and other agreements that cover civil and State 
liability. This may reveal whether there is a general principle in international 
law on the liability of the operator and the State for environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident. 
8.3.2 Conventions on strict State liability 
The principle of strict State liability for environmental damage caused by 
nuclear activities has been acknowledged by several international instruments. 
Most of these are mainly restricted to outer space instruments. They apply the 
concept of strict State liability for environmental damage caused by the use 
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. For example, the principle is re-
flected in a number of resolutions of the UN General Assembly related to 
damage caused by space objects. These resolutions provide for State respon-
sibility to fulfil certain obligations to ensure that no environmental damage is 
                                                     
117
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caused to outer space by space objects and for liability for damage caused by 
the use of nuclear energy in outer space.
119
  
 The principle was also included in Article VII of the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
120
 This Treaty pro-
vides that ‘[e]ach State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the 
launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celes-
tial bodies, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the 
treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component 
parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies’.
121
 This provision is indirectly an application of the 
principle of strict liability under which the State is liable to compensate the 
injured parties for environmental damage caused by space activities carried 
out in outer space. However, this Treaty has become less important in rela-
tion to State liability for environmental damage caused by space objects 
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since the adoption of the 1972 Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects.
122
  
 This Convention provides directly for the absolute liability of the State 
for damage caused by space objects. It is not an independent instrument for 
State liability, but like the nuclear liability conventions, it covers environ-
mental and non-environmental damage caused by a space object, including 
environmental nuclear damage.
123
 It covers nuclear damage when a space 
object is operated by a nuclear reactor or a nuclear-powered source. The 
Convention was developed in response to ‘the common interest of all man-
kind in furthering the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful pur-
poses’ [… and the protection from] ‘damage may on occasion be caused by 
such objects’. [… and for] ‘the need to elaborate effective international rules 
and procedures concerning liability for damage caused by space objects and 
to ensure, in particular, the prompt payment under the terms of this Conven-
tion of a full and equitable measure of compensation to victims of such dam-
age’.
124
 This Convention imposes absolute liability on the launching State to 
compensate damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or 
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to aircraft in flight.
125
 The principle of absolute liability has been adopted in 
this Convention to avoid the extreme difficulties which face the victims in 
proving fault or negligence of the State or the organization launching a space 
object into space.
126
 However, in exceptional cases, as mentioned above, li-
ability for damage caused by space objects under this Convention is also 
based on fault liability. The Convention applies fault liability where damage 
is caused, somewhere other than on the surface of the earth, to a space object 
of a launching State or to persons or property on board such a space object 
by a space object of another launching State, which should be liable only if 
such damage is caused as a result of its fault or the fault of the persons for 
whom it is responsible.
127
 The Convention applies the principle of joint and 
several liability in the case of the application of absolute or fault liability 
where damage is caused by a space object on board a space object launched 
by another State and causes damage to a third State.
128
 It also applies the 
principle of joint and several liability where liability for damage is caused by 
a space object launched jointly by more than one State.
129
 Finally, despite the 
fact that the liability of the State under the Convention is absolute, it pro-
vides for some exemptions from liability.
130
 It exonerates the launching State 
of a space object from liability where the damage caused is wholly or par-
tially the result of gross negligence or an act or omission where there was an 
intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State or its representative, 
judicial or natural persons. However, these exonerations do not apply in 
cases where the damage is caused by activities carried out by the launching 
State in violation of international law, particularly the Charter of the United 
Nations and the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies.
131
 The Convention also gives the injured party the right to 
choose whether to claim for compensation before national or international 
courts.
132
 Nevertheless, the Convention has some shortcomings, e.g., ‘the 
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absence of a meaningful provision for general problems’ arising out of dam-
age caused to the environment of space.
133
   
 The provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 Space Objects 
Liability Convention in relation to State liability and responsibility in outer 
space reflected in the UN Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power 
Sources in Outer Space. These principles provide for the liability of the State 
launching a space object for damage caused by such an object.
134
 
 Finally, according to the Institute of International Law, the Draft Articles 
on Responsibility and Liability under International Law for Environmental 
Damage of 1997 state that strict liability is the most appropriate basis for the 
liability of the State for damage caused by hazardous activities and also for 
the liability of the operator of the activity.
135
 
8.3.3 General principles of law  
The principle of strict liability as a general principle of law is derived from the 
Rylands v. Fletcher case. According to the British House of Lords decision 
of 1868 (L.R. 3 HL., 330), a person who carried out an abnormal activity or 
accumulates dangerous things which may cause harm to his neighbours 
should be held strictly liable for direct damage caused by the activity or the 
thing even if he has taken all possible care to prevent the damage.
136
 This 
decision provides that ‘a person who for his own purposes brings on his land 
and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must 
keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all 
damage which is the natural consequence of its escape’.
137
 This decision was 
the first legal precedent in the history of the modern legal systems of liability 
which imposes strict liability for damage caused by ultra-hazardous activities. 
It was followed by the courts of England and other countries that apply legal 
precedents, as judicial precedents or arbitral awards are applied by English 
law. Hundreds of decisions were carried out by the English courts on the 
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basis of this decision. They applied strict liability to damage caused by ab-
normal activities and things, etc.
138
 In common law, judicial precedent is the 
main source of law. The earlier decisions pronounced by the courts in the coun-
tries which apply judicial decisions and awards had an effect in other courts 
which followed these decisions. The decisions may involve international legal 
principles where they are incorporated in municipal legal systems.
139
 These 
principles become binding for the courts of these countries
140
and may, in one 
way or another, pass into international law.
141
 
 The principle of strict liability has been accepted in general by States to 
govern liability for damage caused by some activities and in particular by 
ultra-hazardous activities. National legal systems have increasingly relied on 
the principle of strict liability to regulate liability for damage caused by ul-
tra-hazardous activities.
142
 In modern liability law systems, the origin of 
strict liability is applied by the common and civil law of the civilized coun-
tries, including European and other countries.
143
 A strict liability standard is 
applied by the modern national legislations of the Anglo-American, Latin 
law and socialist systems in many States. This was recognized in the Civil 
Codes, nuclear liability legislation and other liability legislation which gov-
ern liability for damage caused by hazardous activities.
144
 For example, it 
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Sudan, Iraq, Mexico, Austria, France,
147





The legislation of these countries applies in the case of environmental dam-
age caused by nuclear activities where there is no environmental convention, 
or nuclear legislation has been adopted by the State. When nuclear energy 
was first used, the significance of the general principles of law on strict li-
                                                                                                                            
the colonized countries continued to apply these laws even after independence and some 
made only a few modifications to bring them into line with the culture of their countries. 
For instance, the Egyptian and the Algerian national law were derived from French law, 
etc. 
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ability as adopted by the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher was realised for the 
application in cases in which the State is not party to any nuclear liability 
convention and has no nuclear liability legislation to govern liability for nu-
clear damage caused by a nuclear activity.
150
 At present, the principle of 
strict liability has been given a broader scope of application in various fields 
in these countries. For instance, in the Austrian national system strict liabil-
ity was adopted in many laws related to dangerous and other activities, such 
as motor vehicles, railways, aeroplanes, electricity and gas installations, in-




 Moreover, the principle of strict liability can also be imposed by national 
courts whether or not it is proved that the defendant took all reasonable 
care.
152
 Austrian law gives judges the flexibility to develop a standard of 
strict liability by making analogies with other activities for which strict li-
ability applies. In other cases judges do not create a standard of strict liabil-
ity, but they ease the burden of proof of liability which is considered as a 
kind of application of strict liability.
153
 However, the number of activities 
subject to strict liability may differ from country to country. The application 
of the principle of strict liability is more limited in the legal liability systems 
of some countries than it is in others, but the understanding, application and 
formulation of the principle is substantially similar.
154
  
‘However, there are significant differences in the scope of strict liability in na-
tional law. For example, in French law strict liability is an accepted principle 
of governmental liability, while in England activities conducted by public bod-
ies under statutory authority are usually excluded from Rylands v Fletcher. 
English common law also excludes from its rules on strict liability damage 
which could not reasonably have been foreseen, thus significantly limiting the 
utility of no-fault liability in cases of historic pollution damage’.
155
 
The principle of strict liability as a general principle of law is considered to 
be one of the principles of law of the civilised nations as recognized by Arti-
cle 38 of the ICJ Statute.
156
 The implementation of strict liability by the na-
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tional legal systems of civilized nations is considered to be an implementa-
tion of international legal principles as provided for in Article 38 (1) (c) of 
the ICJ Statute.
157
 This gives the principle significant weight as a legal prin-
ciple of the civilized nations, as recognized by Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ 
Statute which is one of the principles that is endorsed by many writers of 
nuclear liability law.  
‘[T]he widespread practice may be cited as evidence of a “general principle of 
law” recognized by civilized nations within the meaning of Article 38 (1) (c) of 
the International Court’s Statute. It may be argued on the basis of this wide-
spread practice, that the imposition of a higher standard of conduct in respect 
of activities involving a high degree of risk is part of general international law. 
No doubt the imposition of strict liability is partly designed to meet the re-
quirements of domestic insurance, but this should not detract from the fact that 
the overriding consideration is to improve the safety of dangerous activities, 
and to insulate the rest of society from risks inherent in the activity. Neverthe-
less, caution is required since there is evidence to suggest that many states, 
whilst favouring the imposition of strict liability on the operators of nuclear re-




In conclusion, strict liability as a legal basis of liability for environmental 
damage caused by nuclear activities as ultra-hazardous activities has been 
applied, as we will see below, in many national nuclear laws of the civilized 
and non-civilized nations. The wide recognition of the principle in national 
law increases the support of the principle in state practice with regard to its 
application to liability for damage caused by nuclear activities.
159
 The prin-
ciple of strict liability is one of the legal principles of international law rec-
ognized by the civilized nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 
38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute, which considers the general principles of the 
laws of civilized nations as principles of international law. Accordingly, a 
person who engages in an abnormal activity such as a nuclear activity is held 
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liable for environmental damage caused by such an activity even if he has 
taken all possible care to prevent the damage.  
8.3.4 Doctrinal position and customary environmental 
international law principles  
The doctrine of international law is still divided about accepting a general 
principle of customary international law for strict State liability for damage 
caused by nuclear installations,
160
 as well as in general. There are several 
different views on this issue which are reflected in the application of the 
principle to nuclear damage caused by nuclear accidents. The first argument 
completely rejects strict liability as a general principle of customary interna-
tional law as the basis of liability for damage caused by ultra-hazardous ac-
tivities.
161
 This argument was supported by the doctrine of Oppenheim, 
Fauchille, Lauterpacht and others.
162
 It considers fault liability or wrongful 
act responsibility to be the only fundamental principle that is applicable to 
damage caused by lawful and unlawful activities.
163
 It was argued that the 
concept of strict liability remains vague and has no clear application in prac-
tice.
164
 Furthermore, in practice some States such as Germany and Austria 
interpret the provisions of fault liability as having a similar function to strict 
liability.
165
 Accordingly, environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident 
can only repaired by the State if it was at fault or committed a wrongful act 
which caused the damage. This view does not correspond with liability for 
environmental damage caused by nuclear energy as it is difficult to prove the 
fault on the part of the State, and in some cases wrongful act responsibility 
cannot be established where the State has met standards of due diligence or 
there is some exoneration from responsibility. In that case, the innocent vic-
tims of a nuclear accident will bear the damage and loss themselves.  
 The second argument rejects strict liability as a legal principle of liability 
under international law where wrongful act responsibility is applicable. 
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Wrongful act responsibility applies where constituent elements have been 
proved, even if the elements of strict liability are identified.
166
 Accordingly, 
strict liability is applicable to environmental damage caused by a nuclear 
accident only in exceptional cases, in the absence of wrongful liability. Re-
sponsibility for an unlawful act should be applied first because this was es-
tablished for the performance of a hazardous activity.
167
 
 The third argument accepts the concept of strict liability where it is in-
cluded in an international convention which determines the circumstances 
and conditions of its application.
168
 Thus this argument rejects strict liability 
as a general principle of liability under international law. This is because 
‘[… i]n accordance with this view, they of course found it difficult to draft a 
general regime of liability in the absence of a solid basis in general interna-
tional law’.
169
 This argument is also questionable because it restricts the ap-
plication of the concept of strict liability of a State for environmental dam-
age caused by a nuclear accident to the existing conventions governing State 
liability. The only convention to clearly apply State liability for environ-
mental damage caused by nuclear activities is the 1972 Space Liability Con-
vention, while other conventions which govern the liability for environ-
mental damage by hazardous activities govern the civil liability of the 
operator of a nuclear installation.  
 The fourth argument argues for a general principle of strict liability in 
international law independent of wrongful act responsibility and other prin-
ciples of international law.
170





 However, it was also criticized. It 
was stated that it derived its evidence from national law and that there is no 
clear support in international case law for the introduction of a general prin-
ciple of strict liability.
173
 
 The fifth argument recognizes that strict liability is a general principle in 
international law, but it only applies to liability for damage caused by haz-
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 According to this argument, strict liability as a general 
principle of international law applies as an exceptional principle to damage 
caused by ultra-hazardous activities. Beyond that, strict liability is question-
able. This argument is appropriate for liability for environmental damage 




 Finally, it was argued that the State must ensure that no environmental 
damage is caused by hazardous activities carried out within its territory or 
under its jurisdiction or control on the basis of the absolute liability of the 
State and not on the basis of due diligence. This was justified by the fact that 
the actual damage is caused by an activity under the jurisdiction of a State 
which has a duty not to cause damage to the environment of other States. 
This view does not reject the concept of strict liability of a State for envi-
ronmental damage based on the actual damage, but it rejects it as a general 
principle of international law.
176
 It seems that this view is consistent with the 
theory of wrongful act responsibility. The violation of the obligation of a 
State not to cause damage to another State constitutes wrongful act liability 
rather than strict liability. It is also consistent with the doctrine of natural 
law.  
 In my opinion, the development of the basis of liability in the ancient so-
cieties illustrates that the root of strict liability under customary international 
law was derived from natural law.
177
 There is a natural obligation upon the 
State or operator of the activity to compensate damage caused by this activ-
ity which is imposed by the nature of things. This natural obligation is a pri-
mary obligation. It is imposed upon any person, individual or State owning 
or operating a hazardous activity in order to prevent other from being 
harmed by such activity. This was clearly illustrated by the doctrine of 
Grotius, who based sources of international law on the concept of natural 
law. As Mohmassani pointed out:  
‘He [Grotius] based international law both on natural law and on positive law. 
According to the Grotian system, states, besides being subject to the law of na-
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ture and the dictates of reason, are chiefly bound by the jus gentium which is 
derived from their consent and general practice.  
After Grotius, the Doctrine of Natural Law, while continuing to have a great 
influence on the humanization of international law, was gradually superseded 
by the Consensual Theory which built the rules of international law on the will 
and consent of civilized states.  
Thus, the recognized sources of the modern law of nations came to be custom, 
reason and consent as based chiefly on general law-making treaties’.
178
 
Moreover, strict liability based on natural obligation was expressed in Ro-
man law in the maxim: sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property 
in such way as not to harm others).
179
 According to this principle, the State is 
allowed to use its territory as a natural person enjoying the use of its own prop-
erty. However, it should respect the rights of other States and prevent damage 
likely to be caused to them or their subjects.
180
 Thus this principle limits the 
absolute power of the principle of State sovereignty when nuclear activities are 
conducted and obliges the State not to cause environmental damage to other 
States. Aréchaga pointed out: 
‘A state substantially affecting other states by emanations from within its bor-
ders –nuclear tests, fumes, air or water pollution, diversion of waters – is not 
abusing its own rights, but interfering with the rights of another, for it is the in-
tegrity and inviolability of territory of the injured state that is infringed. The 
acting state is in breach of a duty of non-interference established by customary 




Accordingly, the State or the operator of a nuclear activity is obliged to 
compensate environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident as a result 
of the activity wherever the damage has materialized. This includes not only 
environmental damage caused to the neighbouring States, but also damage 
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caused anywhere, regardless of whether it was caused by activities inside or 
beyond the borders of the State.  
 According to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration as a customary 
international law principle, the State is responsible for ensuring that activi-
ties carried out within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment beyond its borders.
182
 Principle 22 of this 
Declaration also imposes an obligation upon States to cooperate to develop 
further rules of liability and compensation in international law comparable to 
those for pollution damage and other environmental damage caused by ultra-
hazardous activities carried out within their territory or under their jurisdic-
tion or control. These two principles are part of an evolving process of cus-
tomary international law.
183
 In my opinion, despite the aim of Principles 21 
and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration, the first priority is to protect the envi-
ronment from the adverse effects caused by ultra-hazardous activities.
184
 
They generate State responsibility for a wrongful act rather than strict liabil-
ity.
185
 The two Principles oblige the State to ensure the protection of the en-
vironment and to cooperate with the development of its national legal system 
of liability in order to be consistent with the rules of international law. A 
breach of these obligations is merely considered a wrongful act. It was also 
stated: 
‘It is true that the wide terms of paragraph 21 of the Stockholm Declaration in 
regard to the environment, which refers to the responsibility of the State to en-
sure that no damage is caused, lend some apparent support to this thesis. How-
ever, that Declaration must be interpreted and applied within the framework of 
the general principles and rules of customary international law which govern 
State responsibility, as it is emphasized for instance in Articles 235 and 139 (2) 
of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. According to the customary rules a 
State’s international responsibility for transfrontier pollution cannot be brought 
into play unless the State itself has caused the damage or, if it has been caused 
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by private operators, the State has not taken all necessary and appropriate 
measures to prevent the occurrence of the damage’.
186
 
At present, the two principles are indeed included in numerous international 
treaties which cover liability for damage caused by ultra-hazardous activi-
ties. The nuclear liability principles, including the principle of strict liability, 
were accepted by numerous contracting and non-contracting countries to the 
nuclear liability conventions. Nevertheless, there are doubts within the doc-
trine of international law about considering the principle of strict liability 
under these conventions as a customary international law principle. It was 
considered that the number of States which recognize the nuclear liability 
conventions is insufficient to establish the existence of a customary interna-
tional law principle in accordance with the provisions of Article 38 (1) (c) of 
the ICJ Statute.
187
 Sands argues:  
‘[T]hat one must treat with caution arguments about the existence of custom-
ary international law […] that somehow there was a norm of practice which 
had developed. I tried to explain that there was no such norm of practice in the 
great majority of countries, and I think it would be very difficult to argue be-
fore the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice or any na-
tional court that the arrangements established in the Vienna and Paris Conven-
tions reflect in some way customary international law. This is largely because 
so few states on a global basis have participated in them. One could of course 
imagine the notion of a regional custom in the European context, but even 
then, it would be fairly reasonable to argue that countries like Austria, Luxem-
bourg and Ireland are persistent objectors. Furthermore, there is a lively debate 
as to whether procedural rules can ever be reflected in customary international 




                                                     
186
 Aréchaga, and Tanzi, 1991, at p. 352. 
187
 Pelzer, 2000, at pp. 586-587. 
188
 P. Sands, Questions to / A: N. Pelzer, H. Kohlemainen, W. Gehr, in: OECD/NEA, 
“Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability”, 2000, at p. 585. It was also argued that: ‘[I]t can be 
said that except for the corrective function – which is not endorsed by the present writer-
general principles of national law play, in relation to conventional or customary interna-
tional law, only a subsidiary role. The priority of conventional and customary interna-
tional law is not only borne out by the history of the making of Article 38 of the Court’s 
Statute, but is, moreover, justified by the fact that provisions of treaties or customary 
international law are, by nature, more direct emanations of the will of States and are of-
ten also more specifically related to subject matter envisaged by those provisions than 
are the general principles of national law. In short, those provisions relate to general 
principles of national law as lex specialis to lex generalis.’ Lammers, 1984, at p. 162. 
382 CHAPTER 8 
 
Accordingly, it seems that in general there is no clear agreement in the doc-
trine of international law on accepting strict liability as a general principle of 
customary international law which can apply to environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident. The States concluded the nuclear liability con-
ventions which impose strict liability upon the operator of a nuclear installa-
tion because there is no customary international law to support the estab-
lishment of a general principle of strict liability.
189
  
8.3.5 State practice and judicial decisions 
There is some evidence in State practice that strict liability has been imposed 
on States for environmental damage caused by nuclear activities under cus-
tomary international law and general principles of law of the civilized na-
tions as recognized under Article 38 (1) (c) of the IJC.
190
 This applies to the 
case between Canada and the former USSR regarding the crash of Cosmos 
954 in Canadian territory in 1978.
191
 This case is of particular interest be-
cause it concerns State liability for environmental damage caused by an ul-
tra-hazardous activity, as the object was operated by a nuclear-powered 
source on one hand, and the liability was based on the principle of strict 
State liability on the other hand. This dispute was resolved with diplomatic 
negotiations, based on the concept of strict State liability under the 1972 
Space Liability Convention and the general principles of international law.
192
 
According to this Convention, the principle of strict liability was considered 
a general principle of international law.
193
 In this case, the USSR ‘did not 
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 Another important case in State practice concerned the Marshall Islands 
Nuclear Tests, which were conducted by the United States in the Marshall 
Islands in 1954. The dispute concerning damage caused by these nuclear 
tests was resolved by diplomatic means without reference to judicial means. 
In 1954, the United States conducted a series of nuclear tests in the Marshall 
Islands. As a result, hundreds of Marshallese and the crew members of a 
Japanese fishing ship were exposed to radioactivity. The Japanese Govern-
ment sued the United States for $7 million compensation for damage caused 
as a result of radioactivity released by the nuclear tests it had carried out. 
Finally, after lengthy negotiations, the US agreed to pay $2 million compen-
sation as a compromise settlement for the whole dispute. However, the US 
did not admit legal responsibility for the damage caused by these nuclear 
tests.
195
 There is no consensus in the doctrine of international law to consider 
the settlement of this dispute as clear evidence of a general principle of strict 
liability under customary international law. It was argued that ‘the ex gratia 
payment of compensation by the United States for injury sustained by certain 
Japanese fishermen as a result of the US atmospheric nuclear test on the 
Marshall Islands cannot be regarded as a fully convincing precedent’.
196
 
Nevertheless, others consider that, ‘the ex gratia payment which aims at cir-
cumventing the recognition of such a legal norm, [...] if [in fact] it corre-
sponds with a structural trend, provides indirect evidence of a potentially 
existing or emerging apparent rule of customary law rather than concrete 
evidence of the non-existence of such a norm regardless of the formal char-
acterization of these payments’.
197
  
 In international judicial decisions there is also evidence in a few remark-
able cases which supports the principle of strict liability as customary inter-
national law.
198
 Some of these cases are related to State liability for envi-
ronmental damage caused by ultra-hazardous activities decided by arbitral 
tribunals and the ICJ. The Caire claim case between Mexico and France in 
1929 was one of the earliest cases in contemporary international law, as it 
recognized the principle of strict liability of the State. This case is not related 
to hazardous activities, but it adopted the principle of strict liability in gen-
eral. The decision of the Claims Commission in this case was based on the 
idea of guarantee which corresponds to strict liability. In this case, as men-
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tioned, a French citizen called Caire was killed by two Mexican officers in 
Mexico in 1927 after they demanded money from him.
199
 The Government 
of France made a claim against the Mexican Government for killing Mr. 
Caire because the two officers were working for official organs in the Mexi-
can Government. The Commission decided that Mexico was responsible for 
the murder because the two officers were answerable in their work to the 
Mexican Government. In Harris’s translation, the Commission stated that: 
‘[T]he international responsibility of the State is purely objective in character, 
and […] it rests on an idea of guarantee, in which the subjective notion of fault 
plays no part.  
But in order to be able to admit this so-called objective responsibility of the 
State for acts committed by its officials or organs outside their competence, 
they must have acted at least to all appearances as competent officials or or-




Accordingly, the Commission implicitly based its decision on the concept of 
risk liability because it corresponded to the guarantee. It could not base its 
decision on either fault liability or wrongful act responsibility. However, in 
my opinion, the decision of the Commission is based on State responsibility 
for wrongful acts, as discussed in chapter 7. This is because the Commission 
examined the issue of competence in order to attribute the acts of the two 
officers to the State. The issue of competence is not involved in risk liability 
because the liability is incurred when the damage occurs and the victim has 
proved causality. Perhaps the Commission wanted to prove that individual 
liability could be attributed to the State.  
 One of the earliest cases that defined the content of State liability for ul-
tra-hazardous activities was the 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration Case between 
the United States and Canada.
201
 The Smelter caused transboundary air pol-
lution in the state of Washington. The Tribunal stated that: 
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‘Under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the United 
States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another State or the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the 
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence’.
202
 
This case constitutes a principle of international customary law for liability 
arising out of hazardous activities not prohibited by international law under 
which the State is obliged not to cause environmental damage to other 
States.
203
 It was the first case to contribute to emerging international envi-
ronmental law.
204
 Although the Tribunal did not explicitly refer to the “the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness of the activity”, it allowed the Smelter to con-
tinue to operate. Hence, this was an implicit recognition by the Tribunal of 
the lawfulness of the Smelter as a hazardous activity not prohibited by inter-
national law. It would have decided to prohibit the operation of the Smelter 
if the activity had been unlawful. The Tribunal also imposed an obligation 
on Canada to prevent damage caused by the Smelter in future and to bear the 
responsibility of damage caused by the Smelter to the United States, regard-
less of any fault or negligence. In addition, the Tribunal established an op-
erational system for the Smelter in order to prevent damage caused by the 
Smelter in the State of Washington and to reduce the consequences of any 
damage caused by the Smelter in the future. The Tribunal decided, ‘[t]he 
tribunal is of the opinion that the prescribed regime will probably remove the 
causes of the present controversy and, as said before, will probably result in 
preventing any damage of a material nature occurring in the State of Wash-
ington in the future’.
205
 However, the Tribunal did not indicate whether its 
decision was based on fault or non-fault liability.
206
 This led to a difference 
of opinion. The Tribunal based its decision on the principle of strict liability 
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because it decided that Canada was liable for the payment of compensation 
for environmental damage and pollution caused by the Smelter to the USA 
and it imposed the measures regardless of the due diligence observed by the 
owners of the Smelter.
207
 Handl argued that:  
‘After pronouncing in general terms on what it perceived to be the proper bal-
ance of rights and obligations between the two countries in [… this] case […], 
it laid down an operational regime for the Canadian smelter which was to pro-
vide reasonable assurance that the balance concerned would not be disturbed in 
the future. It then addressed the legal implications of the remaining possibility 
of significant transboundary harm despite [… observing] the regime of preven-
tion. In so doing, the tribunal obviously moved from [… considering Canada to 
be responsible] for internationally wrongful conduct, to the issue of liability as 
a primary obligation. Compliance with the regime [… is equivalent to dis-
charging] the obligation to act with due diligence. On the other hand, [the] 
damage [… which occurred despite this] compliance, [… which was] of an ac-
cidental nature not involving negligence on [… the part of Canada], was still 
deemed to entail a duty to repair transboundary harm’.
208
  
Nevertheless, some writers pointed out that the decision of the Tribunal in 
the Trail Smelter case was in reality based of the concept of State responsi-
bility for wrongful acts.
209
 This is because the Tribunal ‘amounted in reality 
to an obligation to prevent a given event, its violation, therefore, amounting 
to a case of State responsibility’.
210
 Despite the fact that the Smelter’s activi-
ties were lawful, the Tribunal’s decision does not, in my opinion, reflect the 
existence of a general principle of strict liability. The lawfulness of the activ-
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ity does not mean that liability must be based on the principle of strict liabil-
ity. Liability for damage caused by such lawful activities can be based on the 
principle of strict liability or wrongful act liability or any other basis of li-
ability. The Tribunal held Canada responsible for the pollution because it 
breached the obligation to regulate the activity under international law and to 
compensate for the damage.
211
 In the above-mentioned passage the Tribunal 
stated that no State has the right to use its territory to cause damage to an-
other State. This means that the State has an obligation to prevent damage to 
other States. The State breaches that obligation if damage materializes. The 
right and the obligation are two sides of the same coin.  
 Furthermore, there is no judicial decision by international courts involv-
ing the application of the principle of strict liability to State liability for envi-
ronmental damage caused by nuclear activities. Nevertheless, some writ-
ers,
212
 as well as the Report of the International Law Commission on the 
work of its forty-eighth session,
213
 interpreted the dissenting opinion of some 
judges of the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests case between France and Australia in 
1973 as an endorsement of the principle of strict liability of the State for nu-
clear damage caused to the environment. In that case, Australia claimed that 
the atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by France in the Pacific caused ra-
dioactivity which would affect the people of Australia and the environ-
ment.
214
 However, the Court did not rule on the merits of the case, because 
France stopped conducting its nuclear tests. In his Dissenting Opinion, Judge 
Ignacio-Pinto argued that every State has the right to do what it wants within 
its boundaries and its sovereignty, and if damage is caused by these activi-
ties, it must repair the damage. ‘[E]ach State is free to act as it thinks fit 
within the limits of its sovereignty, and in the event of genuine damage or 
injury, if the said damage is clearly established, it owes reparation to the 
State having suffered that damage’.
215
  
 In conclusion, it could be argued that the above-mentioned decisions do 
not reflect a general principle of customary international law or a general 
principle of international law on strict liability in international case law 
which could be applicable to damage caused by ultra-hazardous activities 
including nuclear damage. This is because there are only a few cases which 
recognize the principle of strict liability, and no clear evidence for the exis-
tence of elements to establish customary international law on strict liability.  
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8.4 Civil liability regimes on strict liability for 
environmental nuclear damage  
The application of strict liability as a general principle in international law 
for environmental damage caused by nuclear accidents is observed in nu-
merous conventions related to liability for environmental damage caused by 
ultra-hazardous activities including outer space, pollution, maritime, nuclear 
and other ultra-hazardous activities. The majority of these instruments gov-
ern the civil liability of the operator of the activity under private interna-
tional law rather than the liability of the State under public international law. 
These conventions channel the liability onto the operator of the activity and 
exclude the international liability of the State for damage caused by a haz-
ardous activity.
216
 Environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident is 
essentially governed by the nuclear liability conventions. However, there are 
also some instruments which govern liability for damage caused by ultra-
hazardous activities, including the 2006 ILC Draft Principles on the alloca-
tion of loss and harm caused by hazardous activities, and environmental 
conventions apply strict liability to nuclear damage. This section therefore 
discusses the application of the principle of strict liability for environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident under these conventions. This discus-
sion involves the nuclear liability conventions (8.4.1), the ILC Draft Princi-
ples on the allocation of loss of hazardous activities (8.4.2) and the environ-
mental liability conventions which deal with strict liability and apply to 
liability for environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident (8.4.3). 
8.4.1 The nuclear liability conventions 
The nuclear liability conventions were pioneering conventions which explic-
itly adopted the principle of strict liability to apply to nuclear damage caused 
by nuclear installations, including environmental damage.
217
 The conven-
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tions refer to absolute rather than strict liability.
218
 The principle is embodied 
in all the multilateral and bilateral nuclear liability conventions, and is im-
plemented in the nuclear liability legislation of the Contracting and non-
Contracting Parties.
219
 These instruments impose strict liability on the opera-
tor of a nuclear installation where nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear ac-
cident in his installation or by nuclear substances coming from or to his in-
stallation, regardless of any fault or negligence.
220
 They also impose an 
obligation upon the Installation State and other Contracting Parties to inter-
vene to provide additional compensation to victims of a nuclear accident. 
These obligations are reflected in the objectives of the conventions which are 
mainly aimed at providing equitable and adequate compensation to victims 
of a nuclear accident, unifying and harmonizing national nuclear legislation 
and developing the nuclear industry.
221
 They are also indirectly aimed at 
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 To achieve these objectives, a number of nuclear liability principles have 
been established under the nuclear liability conventions. These include li-
ability for nuclear damage is channeled exclusively onto the operator of a 
nuclear installation;
223
 the liability of the operator is absolute, regardless of 
his fault or negligence;
224
 the liability is limited in terms of amount and 
time;
225
 the obligation of the operator to maintain insurance or other financial 
security for an amount corresponding to his liability;
226
 the obligation of the 
State to ensure the liability of the operator and to provide additional com-
pensation to victims of a nuclear accident;
227
 exclusive jurisdiction as re-
gards claims with the courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory a 
nuclear accident has occurred; recognition and enforcement of judgments of 
the competent courts by other Contracting Parties;
228
 the right of recourse;
229
 
the application of the nuclear liability between victims of a nuclear accident, 




 These principles are included in the two main conventions, the Paris 
Convention and the Vienna Convention, as well as being incorporated in the 
national nuclear liability legislation. The principles therefore unify and har-
monize the nuclear liability conventions and the nuclear liability legislation of 
different countries and bring them into line. Nevertheless, there are some dif-
ferences between the two Conventions and the legislations in terms of the detail 
of their provisions, but not in the main provisions.
231
 It should be noted that 
these principles have been discussed in relation to different aspects of this 
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study. However, this section focuses mainly on an examination of the liability 
of the operator of a nuclear installation according to the principle of strict liabil-
ity as adopted by the nuclear liability conventions. 
8.4.1.1 Multilateral nuclear liability conventions 
The 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy was the first nuclear liability convention to adopt the principle of 
absolute liability.
232
 This Convention is a regional convention which covers 
liability for nuclear damage in the OECD countries. Under the Convention, 
the operator of a nuclear installation is held strictly liable for nuclear damage 
to or loss of life of any person and damage to or loss of any property where 
such damage is caused by a nuclear accident which occurred in a land-based 
nuclear reactor installation
233
 or during the transport of nuclear materials.
234
 
This concept of nuclear damage was one the shortcomings of the convention 
because it was too narrow and excluded environmental damage caused by a 
nuclear accident. Therefore the concept of nuclear damage was expanded in 
the 2004 Protocol to Amend the Convention to also cover environmental 
damage, economic loss and costs of preventive measures and costs of meas-
ures of reinstating of the environment damaged by a nuclear accident.
235
 The 
operator is held liable for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident 
within the geographical scope of the Contracting Parties to the Convention. 
Thus transboundary nuclear damage suffered by victims of a nuclear acci-
dent in the territory of non-Contracting Parties was excluded, unless it is 
covered by the national legislation of a Contracting State in whose territory 
the nuclear installation of the operator liable is located.
236
 This definition 
was also amended by the 2004 Protocol to expand the geographical scope of 
the Convention to apply in principle to nuclear damage suffered in the terri-
tories of non-Contracting Parties, except in some cases.
237
 Accordingly, the 
operator of a nuclear installation is held liable for environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident within the limit of the geographical scope of the 
convention. However, despite the fact that the liability of the operator of a 
nuclear installation is absolute under the Convention, the operator is exoner-
ated from liability in the case of nuclear damage caused by a nuclear acci-
                                                     
232
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dent directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, insurrec-
tion, or a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.
238
 The last exon-
eration was omitted in the 2004 Paris Protocol. Therefore national legislation 
can provide for the liability of the operator for damage caused by a grave 
natural disaster of an exceptional character. In some cases, persons other 
than the operator are also liable for the damage, as in case of an act or omis-
sion by an individual with the intent to cause damage.
239
 In principle the op-
erator is still liable for the nuclear damage, and he is still liable to compen-
sate the victims of the nuclear accident, although he has the right of recourse 
against the person who caused the damage afterwards.
240
 
 However, from the beginning the Paris Convention was the subject of 
major criticisms because it does not include any provisions on international 
liability or on State intervention to compensate the remaining nuclear dam-
age caused by a nuclear accident. Therefore it was supplemented by the 1963 
Brussels Supplementary Convention,
241
 which provided for additional com-
pensation for victims of a nuclear accident. This Convention was adopted 
because it was realized from the beginning of the nuclear liability regime 
under the Paris Convention that the amount of compensation under the Con-
vention was too low and insufficient to cover all nuclear damage caused by a 
nuclear accident.
242
 It is supplementary to the Paris Convention because its 
provisions complement the Paris Convention as regards additional compen-
sation. In addition, the main provisions on nuclear liability in the Paris Con-
vention are applied in both Conventions.
243
 Therefore, the Contracting Par-
ties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention should be also Contracting 
Parties to the Paris Convention. The Contracting Parties to the Paris Conven-
tion should also be parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention in or-
der to benefit from it.
244
 As we will see in chapter 9, under the Brussels Sup-
plementary Convention, the Installation State is liable for providing 
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additional compensation to supplement the liability of the operator of a nu-
clear installation under the Paris Convention, where the required amount of 
compensation for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident exceeds the 
limit of the liability of the operator under the Paris Convention, or in the case 
that the operator has failed to pay what he is liable for. The Contracting Par-
ties to the Convention are also obliged to provide additional compensation 
where the amount of compensation provided by the Installation State is in-
sufficient to cover all the claims for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear ac-
cident.
245
 The amount of compensation provided for by the 1963 Brussels 
Supplementary Convention was further increased by the 2004 Brussels Pro-
tocol Amending it, which was adopted with the Protocol to Amend the Paris 
Convention on 12 February 2004.
246
 However, despite the fact that the 
Amended Paris Convention expanded the geographical scope of the Conven-
tion to apply to Contracting and non-Contracting Parties, the Amended Brus-
sels Supplementary Convention limited its geographical scope to apply only 
to its Contracting Parties. Thus compensation provided under the third tier of 
this Convention will be provided to victims of the Contracting Parties and 
excludes those of non-Contracting Parties.
247
 
 The 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear 
Ships
248
 was concluded because the Paris Convention and the Brussels Sup-
plementary Convention only covered the liability of the operator for nuclear 
damage caused by land-based reactors and the transport of nuclear material, 
and excluded damage caused by means of transport.
249
 Therefore the liability 
for damage caused by nuclear reactor ships is covered by the 1962 Brussels 
Convention on Nuclear Ships and maritime law.
250
 Under the Convention, 
the liability of the operator of a nuclear ship is based on similar principles 
and provisions to those of the Paris and Vienna Conventions. The Conven-
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tion prohibits the operation of any nuclear ship without a licence. It requires 
an authorisation from the Flag State before starting the operation.
251
 The 
Convention is a free-standing instrument and does not depend on being a 
party to other nuclear liability conventions. It also applies to nuclear damage 
worldwide.
252
 However, it did not enter into force because it applied to civil 
and warships.
253
 Therefore, some countries including the United States and 
the USSR refused to apply it to damage caused by warships.
254
 Under the 
1962 Brussels Nuclear Ships Convention, the operator of a nuclear ship is 
absolutely liable for any nuclear damage resulting from a nuclear accident 
caused by a nuclear ship involving nuclear fuel or radioactive products or 
waste produced by this ship.
255
 A few exceptions are provided for under the 
convention exonerating the operator from liability in some circumstances, 
such as damage caused to the nuclear installation itself or its property, 
equipment or fuel, or where nuclear damage was caused by natural disaster 
or negligence of the victim, or where nuclear damage was caused directly by 
an act of war, hostilities, civil war or insurrection.
256
 As mentioned above, 
these mean that the liability of the operator is strict rather than absolute un-
der the convention.
257
 In addition, a nuclear ship can be operated by the State 
under the Convention.
258
 However, it does not address the strict liability of 
the State as an international subject. This was discussed during the negotia-
tions for the Convention. However, it was a controversial issue,
259
 and con-
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sequently the liability of a State must fall under national law when it oper-
ates nuclear ships.  
 The 1963 Vienna Convention on Liability for Nuclear Damage was 
adopted because there was a need for a worldwide convention to govern li-
ability for nuclear damage as the nuclear liability conventions existing at the 
time did not meet this need. The Paris Convention and its 1963 Brussels 
Supplementary Convention is a regional convention which covers liability 
for nuclear damage in the OECD countries. The 1962 Brussels Nuclear 
Ships Convention is a worldwide convention, but it only covers liability for 
nuclear damage caused by nuclear ships. Therefore the 1963 Vienna Con-
vention was adopted to govern liability for nuclear damage worldwide. It is a 
global convention and its membership is open to all the countries of the 
world. Even so, the main features of these conventions, apart from the Brus-
sels Supplementary Convention, are the same, as they involve the same prin-
ciples of liability. Liability for nuclear damage is absolute under the Conven-
tion.
260
 The operator of a nuclear installation is held liable under the Vienna 
Convention for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident in his installa-
tion or by nuclear material coming from or sent to his installation.
261
 How-
ever, the operator is not liable for environmental damage caused by a nuclear 
accident. There are some exceptions with regard to liability which exonerate 
the operator from liability. These include nuclear damage caused directly by 
an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection or a grave 
natural disaster of an exceptional character, provided that there is no exon-
eration under the law of the Installation State.
262
 As in the case of the Paris 
Convention, a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character as a reason 
for exoneration was eliminated in the Amended Vienna Convention.
263
 
These exonerations mean that the liability of the operator is strict rather than 
absolute under the Convention. Nevertheless, the operator is still liable for 
nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident and for compensating the vic-
tims, although he has the right of recourse against any individual who has 
committed or omitted an act with intention of causing damage.
264
 Neverthe-
less, like the Paris Convention, the Convention had major shortcomings, 
mainly because of the limited definition of nuclear damage, the geographical 
scope, the amount of liability and the absence of State liability. Therefore the 
Convention was amended by the 1997 Vienna Protocol which improved a 
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number of nuclear liability issues in the convention, inter alia, expanding the 
definition of nuclear damage to include environmental damage, expanding 
the geographical scope of application of the Convention to apply in principle 
to nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident suffered by non-Contracting 
Parties and increasing the amount of compensation for damage caused by a 
nuclear accident. Accordingly, the operator of a nuclear installation is liable 
for environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident wherever such dam-
age is suffered in the territory of a Contracting State or in the territory of 
non-Contracting States, except in some cases where the nuclear damage suf-




 The 1971 Brussels Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of 
Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material was adopted because the Paris and 
Vienna Conventions did not affect the application of any international con-
vention that was in force or adopted at the time of the conclusion of these 
conventions in the field of the international transport of nuclear material.
266
 
A number of maritime transport conventions were concluded before the 
Paris and the Vienna Conventions.
267
 The carrier or the owner of the ship is 
held liable under strict liability or fault liability for damage caused by a nu-
clear accident during the transport of nuclear material in accordance with the 
applicable maritime transport convention. At the same time the nuclear li-
ability conventions cover liability for damage caused during the transport of 
nuclear materials. Under the Paris and the Vienna Conventions, the operator 
of the nuclear installation is liable for damage caused by a nuclear accident 
during transport of the nuclear material coming to or from his nuclear instal-
lation. In order to prevent the simultaneous application of international mari-
time conventions and the Paris Convention or the Vienna Convention, and to 
prevent conflict between them, the 1971 Brussels Convention Relating to 
Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material was 
adopted.
268
 This ensures that the operator of a nuclear installation is always 
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absolutely and exclusively liable under the Paris and Vienna Conventions for 
nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident occurring during the transport 
of nuclear materials.
269
 According to the Convention, any person liable for 
nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident during the transport of nuclear 
material by maritime transport under any international maritime convention 
is exonerated from liability if the operator of the nuclear installation is liable 
for such damage under the Paris or Vienna Convention or  a national law 
governing the liability for such damage, provided that this law favours vic-
tims of nuclear damage as in the case of the Paris or Vienna Convention.
270
 
The exoneration also applies to damage caused to the nuclear installation 
itself or to property on the site or property related to the installation or the 
means of transport carrying the nuclear material for which the operator of 
the nuclear installation is not liable. However, this does not affect the liabil-
ity of individuals who intentionally caused the damage.
271
 Accordingly, this 
Convention is considered to be a link and supplementary to the Paris and 
Vienna Conventions as regards liability for nuclear damage caused during 
the transport of nuclear material by sea. It applies to environmental damage 
according to the 1997 Protocol Amending the Vienna Convention and the 
2004 Protocol Amending the Paris Convention. 
 The 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Paris Conven-
tion and the Vienna Convention was adopted after the Chernobyl accident to 
link the two Conventions
272
 because there was no relationship between them, 
despite the fact that they are nearly identical and are based on the same nu-
clear liability principles and cover the same geographical scope.
273
 The Pro-
tocol is aimed at expanding the geographical scope of the two Conventions 
and preventing conflicts in the case of the simultaneous application of both 
Conventions to one nuclear accident.
274
 The operator of a nuclear reactor 
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located in the territory of a Contracting Party to the Vienna Convention is 
liable for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident suffered in the terri-
tory of the Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention where they are parties 
to the Protocol as well.
275
 Similarly, the operator of a nuclear installation 
located in the territory of a Contracting Party to the Paris Convention is li-
able for nuclear damage caused to the Contracting Parties to the Vienna 
Convention where they are parties to the Protocol.
276
 Thus the Protocol ap-
plies the principle of reciprocity to extend the benefits of one convention to 
the other. The link between the two Conventions created by the Protocol 
broadens and unifies the regime of nuclear liability under them to cover nu-
clear damage caused by nuclear accidents in land-based nuclear reactors and 
during the transport of nuclear material. Under the Protocol either the Vi-
enna Convention or the Paris Convention is applicable. However, the appli-
cable convention is the convention of the State Party within whose territory 
the nuclear installation is located and the operator who is liable.
277
 Although 
the Protocol does not include substantive provisions on liability for nuclear 
damage, it expands the principle of absolute liability because it expands its 
application to more States. It also extends the geographical scope of applica-
tion of the two conventions to benefit more victims of a nuclear accident. 
However, the real benefit of the Protocol will be realized when all nuclear 
States ratify the two conventions and the Protocol. Extending the geographi-
cal scope of nuclear liability depends on the number of contracting parties to 
the applicable convention. Unfortunately, the nuclear liability conventions 
did not apply to the environmental damage caused by the Chernobyl accident 
because the USSR was not party to these conventions.
278
 If a State is not 
party to a nuclear liability convention it should apply its own national law, 
but at the time of the accident the USSR had no national nuclear legislation 
either. Japan is not party to any nuclear liability convention. Therefore it will 
apply its own national law to the damage caused by the Fukushima nuclear 
accident.  
 Finally, the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nu-
clear Damage
279
 obliges the State to pay additional compensation to victims 
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of a nuclear accident, as will be discussed in the following chapter. This 
Convention is a free-standing Convention and is not supplementary to any 
nuclear liability convention. It allows all States to be party to it, not only the 
Contracting Parties to the Paris and Vienna Conventions.
280
 It does not pro-
vide for the liability of the operator, but it was supplemented by an Annex 
which constitutes an integral part of the Convention
281
 and applies by itself 
without the need to apply national legislation. This Annex provides for the 
liability of the operator of a nuclear installation. The Annex allows a State 
whose national legislation is based on the economic channel principle to par-
ticipate in the Convention which is based on the legal channel principle, 
without the need to change its national legislation. In reality, the Annex was 
adopted to satisfy the situation in United States because its national nuclear 
legislation is based on the economic channel principle and it is not party to 
the Vienna and Paris Conventions, which are based on the principles of legal 
channel and absolute liability.
282
 According to the Annex, the liability of the 
operator of a nuclear installation is absolute.
283
 The operator is liable for 
damage caused by a nuclear accident in his installation or by a nuclear acci-
dent caused during the transport of nuclear material coming from or to the 
nuclear installation.
284
 Thus the operator is liable for environmental damage 
once the victims have proved the causal link between the damage sustained 
and the accident, without the need to prove negligence or fault on the part of 
the operator. However, as in other nuclear liability conventions, the operator 
is exonerated from liability under the Annex where the nuclear damage 
caused by a nuclear accident is directly due to an act of armed conflict, hos-
tilities, civil war, or insurrection or in the case of a grave natural disaster of 
an exceptional character, unless national legislation of the Installation State 
provides otherwise.
285
 There are other circumstances which relieve partly or 
wholly the operator from liability.
286
 The provisions in the Annex on liability 
are identical to those on liability in the Amended Paris and Vienna Conven-
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tions. This is important for the Convention to be consistent with those Con-
ventions. The Convention was concluded as a compromise because the 
Member States to the Vienna Convention, as mentioned above, had failed to 
adopt an international convention on State liability for nuclear damage or to 
include the provisions of the Amended Vienna Convention governing the 
liability of the State for nuclear damage. 
8.4.1.2 Bilateral nuclear liability agreements 
There are several bilateral agreements between States in the field of nuclear 
liability which provide for the principle of absolute liability for nuclear dam-
age. Most of these agreements were concluded in the field of nuclear reactor 
ships between States operating nuclear ships and host States, in order to or-
ganize liability for nuclear damage caused by these ships when they visit the 
territorial waters and ports of these States. These agreements were concluded 
because the 1962 Nuclear Ships Convention did not enter into force.
287
 This 
Convention was used as a pattern to conclude these agreements. Therefore 
the provisions of these agreements are based on similar principles of nuclear 
liability to those included in the 1962 Nuclear Ships Convention, which are 
themselves similar to those in the nuclear multilateral agreements and na-
tional laws.
288
 Most of the bilateral liability agreements are related to the 
American nuclear ship Savannah and the German nuclear ship Otto Hahn.  
 Since the American nuclear ship Savannah entered into operation, the 
United States has concluded several bilateral agreements with many coun-
tries, particularly the European countries such as West Germany, Belgium, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, 
Portugal, Italy and Greece.
289
 The United States has accepted strict liability 
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UNTS, Vol. 487, 1964, p. 113; the Netherlands and the United States of America, Opera-
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for nuclear damage caused by the Savannah when it visits ports of other 
States,
290
 even during its operation by a private company.
291
 These agree-
ments are now considered to be in obsolete as regards the operation of the 
Savannah under the Government of the United States. The operation of the 
Savannah was transferred to a private company (FAST, First Atomic Ship 
Transport). Therefore new bilateral agreements were concluded with the host 
countries by exchange of letters and this subsequently led to the conclusion 
of new regulations by some countries and to other countries enacting new 
legislation to cover liability and compensation under the new situation.
292
 
These agreements were concluded in order to guarantee liability for nuclear 
risk in the event of the occurrence of a nuclear accident caused by the 
American Ship Savannah during its visit to their ports. However, the agree-
ments do not define the nuclear damage to be covered and left this to be de-
fined under United States law. Under United States law, damage caused by a 
nuclear accident includes ‘bodily injury or death or loss of or damage to prop-
erty or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive 
toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or by-
product material’.
293
 This definition covers only physical damage; moral dam-
age is left to be determined by the competent courts.
294
 The agreements also 
provide for the liability of the United States for nuclear damage caused by 
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nuclear accidents in connection with the ship during the construction, opera-
tion, reparation, maintenance and the use of the nuclear ship Savannah.
295
 
However, these agreements govern the liability of the US as a private opera-
tor under the national system of the State rather than the liability of the State 
under international law. They also excluded the right of recourse to recover 
compensation paid by the United States instead of other liable persons. Accord-
ingly, ‘[t]he United States shall pursue no rights of recourse against any person 
who on account of any act or omission committed on Netherlands territory 
would be liable for damage as described in Article 1’.
296
 Paragraph 4 of the 
agreement of 18 June 1964 between the United States and Ireland concerning 
exchange of notes constituting an agreement relating to public liability for 
damage caused by the N. S. Savannah
297
 is a similar provision. 
 The principle of strict liability was also included in the bilateral agree-
ments between Germany and various States such as Liberia and Brazil re-
garding the visit of the nuclear ship the Otto Hahn to their ports.
298
 For in-
stance, under Article 13 of the 27 May 1970 Treaty between Liberia and 
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Germany concerning the use of the Liberian ports by the N. S. Otto Hahn, 
the operator is strictly liable for nuclear damage caused by this ship. Liabil-
ity for nuclear damage caused by the ship under this Treaty is governed by 
the 1962 Brussels Nuclear Ships Convention.
299
 The 1972 Agreement be-
tween Germany and Brazil also provides that: ‘The operator shall be abso-
lutely liable for any nuclear damage upon proof that such damage has been 
caused by a nuclear incident involving the nuclear fuel of, or radioactive 
products or waste produced in, the ship’.
300
 This agreement also obliges the 
master of the ship to inform the Brazilian authorities in the case of a nuclear 
accident occurring on the ship, causing environmental damage to the Brazil-
ian waters or ports during the ship’s passage or while it is in the ports.
301
 A 
number of bilateral agreements allow for exoneration from liability for nuclear 
damage. Article 13 of the 27 May 1970 agreement between Germany and Libe-
ria concerning the use of the Liberian waters and ports by the German N. S. 
Otto Hahn provides for exoneration of the operator of the ship from liability in 
the case of nuclear damage caused directly by an act of war, hostilities, civil 
war or insurrection.
302
 Furthermore, Article 6 (2) of the agreement between 
Germany and Brazil concerning the entry of nuclear ships into the Brazilian 
waters and ports states that, ‘[i]f the operator proves that the nuclear damage 
resulted wholly or partially from an act or omission done with intent to cause 
damage by an individual who suffered damage, the competent courts may 




8.4.1.3 National nuclear legislation 
The US Price Anderson Act of 1946 was the first nuclear liability law 
adopted to govern liability for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear acci-
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 However, in the late 1950s, as a result of the increasing use of nu-
clear energy for peaceful purposes, a number of nuclear liability laws were 
concluded by the States, including the legislation of the United States in 
1957, and of the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom in 1959.
305
 This legislation was enacted under different systems of 
law. Of course, this can lead to some differences in the legislation which 
should be based on the principle of risk liability, as nuclear energy is one of 
the most hazardous activities.   
 To harmonize and unify this legislation, the nuclear liability conventions, 
were concluded in the 1960s, as mentioned above, and established the nu-
clear liability principles. These principles were embodied in the recent nu-
clear liability legislation of the Contracting and non-Contracting Parties to 
the Conventions. Most of the States involved in nuclear activities, including 
Contracting and non-Contracting Parties enacted nuclear liability legislation. 
This legislation imposed strict liability upon the operator of a nuclear installa-
tion for nuclear damage caused by nuclear accidents in his installations. The 
principle of strict liability therefore gained the support of a large number of the 
Contracting and non-Contracting Parties to the nuclear liability conventions.
306
 
 The principle of absolute liability has now been incorporated in the nu-
clear liability legislation of many States which is considered as part of their 
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 Despite the sub-
sequent amendments to this legislation, the principle of absolute liability of 
the operator of a nuclear installation for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear 
accident is still an essential principle in this legislation. However, as in the 
case of the nuclear liability conventions, this legislation provides for the ex-
oneration of the operator of a nuclear installation in some circumstances. 
This means that the operator has strict rather than absolute liability. For ex-
ample, the French Act of 30 October 1968 on third party liability in the field 
of nuclear energy, as amended in 1990, exonerates the operator of a nuclear 
installation from liability if a nuclear accident is caused directly by armed 
conflict or a grave disaster of exceptional character.
318
 
 The endorsement of the principle of strict liability in national nuclear leg-
islation shows that there is a growing tendency to recognize the principle of 
strict liability as a general principle of law of the civilized nations to govern 
liability for environmental damage caused by hazardous activities in general 
and by nuclear energy in particular. It also supports a general principle of 
customary international law because this legislation was adopted by civilized 
and non-civilized nations. It also endorses the principle as adopted by the 
nuclear liability conventions to cover the liability of the operator of a nuclear 
installation,
319
 as this legislation is an application of the principle as adopted 
by the nuclear liability conventions.  
 This nuclear liability legislation applies to liability for environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident within the territory of the Installation 
State and transboundary environmental damage where it embodies the new 
amendments adopted by the 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention 
and the 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention.
320
 The nuclear liabil-
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ity conventions also give national nuclear legislation a broader scope to ex-
pand the provisions of the Conventions, which leave the State to cover issues 
of liability not covered by the conventions in its national legislation.
321
 The 
application of the principle of strict liability is certainly in the interests of the 
victims of a nuclear accident and the operator of a nuclear installation. Nev-
ertheless, there are some countries which recognize the principle of strict 
liability in common law, but do not consider it as a general principle of li-
ability.
322
 This casts some doubt on whether the principle of strict liability 
under the rules of common law is always applicable to environmental dam-
age caused by a nuclear accident. American nuclear liability law, for in-
stance, does not recognize the principle of strict liability as a general rule for 
the legal basis of liability. Liability under this law is based on the rules of the 
general principle of common law which may be based on strict or fault li-
ability in accordance with the law of the State in whose territory a nuclear 
accident has occurred.
323
 US law does not provide for a basis of liability and 
leaves it to the judge to decide whether the liability is based on strict or fault 
liability.
324
 The recognition by the US of the principle of strict liability as a 
general principle of law is important in relation to liability for environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident. This is simply because it operates a 
quarter of the nuclear reactors in the world.  
8.4.2 The ILC principles of allocation of loss 
The Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary 
Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities
325
 adopted by the ILC in 2006 in-
clude the Preamble and eight principles of liability. The Principles govern 
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liability for hazardous activities under international law in general, including 
environmental nuclear damage.
326
 There is a particular emphasis on the li-
ability of a State for the preservation and protection of the environment.
327
 
The Principles apply only to transboundary damage caused by hazardous 
activities involving significant damage
328
 because such damage can cause 
transboundary damage and destruction to the environment. Activities involv-
ing no significant damage are therefore excluded. Furthermore, it was real-
ized that the classical idea of liability that based on compensation and repa-
ration of damage is not sufficient to protect the environment. Therefore the 
principles set forth a comprehensive regime of liability aimed at preventing, 
minimizing and redressing environmental damage caused by hazardous ac-
tivities. The basic objective of the principles is to provide prompt and ade-
quate compensation to victims who have suffered transboundary damage 
caused by hazardous activities including environmental damage. The princi-
ples are also aimed at the preservation and protection of the environment and 
the prevention of transboundary damage caused by hazardous activities and 
the mitigation of such damage and at restoring and reinstating the environ-
ment to its previous condition.
329
   
 To achieve these objectives, the Principles meet the basic substantive re-
quirements. They oblige the State of origin to take appropriate, prompt and 
effective measures to minimize and reduce transboundary damage. The State 
is also obliged to respond promptly to an accident caused by hazardous ac-
tivities and to consult and cooperate with other States which are likely to 
suffer damage and to seek the assistance of specialized international organi-
zations and other States.
330
 In addition, the Principles oblige States to coop-
erate in the development of global, regional and bilateral regimes of re-
sponse to prevent, reduce and compensate the incidence of transboundary 
damage caused by hazardous activities.
331
  
 However, if environmental damage is nevertheless caused by a hazardous 
activity, the State is obliged to repair such damage. Thus the Principles re-
quire the State of origin to establish international and domestic mechanisms 
and to provide appropriate procedures to ensure that the victims are compen-
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sated and that domestic, administrative and judicial mechanism are available, 
and to guarantee the victims access to information relevant to their claims 
for compensation.
332
 They also oblige States to ensure prompt and adequate 
compensation for transboundary damage caused by hazardous activities. 
They oblige the operator to maintain financial coverage to cover his liability 
for claims for compensation and they oblige the State of origin to ensure ad-
ditional compensation to supplement the liability of the operator.
333
 Finally, 
every State is obliged to adopt the necessary legislation and regulatory and 
administrative measures to implement the principles and to apply them 
within its regulatory regime without any discrimination.
334
 
 Despite the fact that the Draft Principles are non-binding, they provide 
States with a guideline to formulate a legal framework of national and inter-
national regulatory systems on liability and compensation for damage caused 
by hazardous activities as lawful activities allowed by international law. 
They are aimed at providing adequate and equitable compensation for dam-
age caused by lawful activities.
335
 Moreover, the Principles do not support 
the absolute liability of the State, unless it has engaged in a hazardous activ-
ity as an operator. This can be deduced from the commentaries to the Princi-
ples which state that ‘[i]t is envisaged that a State could be an operator for 
purposes of the present definition’.
336
 They also stated that ‘[t]he lack of any 
serious consideration of State liability may be understood in the context of 
the prior articles on prevention: failure to fulfil the due diligence duty to pre-
vent is considered to breach an international obligation and shifts the appli-
cable legal regime to one of State responsibility’.
337
 This is why the Princi-
ples embodied the principles of civil liability more forcefully than those of 
international liability. Accordingly, the ILC did not recommend that States 
develop them in the form of a convention as in the case of the 2001 Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts.  
 Moreover, despite the fact that the principles govern liability for damage 
caused by hazardous activities based on the absolute or strict liability of the 
State or the operator of the activity, they embody a number of international 
obligations which are subject to the application of State responsibility for 
wrongful acts if they are violated. Therefore, it is not surprising that these 
Principles refer to State responsibility in the Preamble. In addition, the pro-
visions of the principles are very simple and do not comprehensively cover 
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the issues of liability for lawful activities as in the case of the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts. Finally, the Draft Principles on 
the allocation of loss introduced the elements of civil liability in the regime 
of international liability. These are considered completely different from 
those of international liability in procedural and substantive terms. This is 
due to the fact that the member States of the ILC, particularly the industrial-
ized countries, rejected international liability for damage caused by these 
activities. This reduces the significance of the Principles for their application 
to environmental damage caused by nuclear activities which are governed by 
a special regime including similar provisions. The Principles would be a 
very significant instrument in relation to environmental damage caused by 
nuclear activities if they applied to the State as an international subject rather 
than a private entity. 
8.4.3 Similar environmental conventions   
Some conventions which deal with environmental matters apply strict civil 
liability to environmental damage caused by nuclear activities. The 1993 
Lugano Convention in particular emphasizes ‘the desirability of providing for 
strict liability in this field taking into account the “Polluter Pays” Principle 
[…] in particular to prevent damage and to deal with damage caused by nu-
clear substances and the carriage of dangerous goods’.
338
 The purpose of this 
Convention is to ensure adequate compensation for damage to the environ-
ment resulting from dangerous activities and to provide means of prevention 
and reinstatement of the environment to its previous condition.
339
 However, 
this Convention does not apply to environmental damage resulting from nu-
clear substances caused by a nuclear accident where the Paris Convention 
and the Vienna Convention and their related instruments are applied, or if 
nuclear liability legislation governed by internal law is in favour of the vic-
tims of environmental damage.
340
 According to the Convention, the operator 
who is in control of a dangerous activity is liable for environmental damage 
resulting from an accident caused by such activity. The Convention also im-
poses joint and several liability on all operators who are in control of a dan-
gerous activity, but the liability is only attributed to an operator for part of 
the damage if he proves that he was in control of the activity only when that 
part of the damage occurred.
341
 However, the operator is not liable for envi-
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340
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341
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ronmental damage caused by a dangerous activity if the damage was caused 
as a result of an act of war, hostilities, civil war, natural catastrophe, an inten-
tional act of a third party, compliance with a specific order or compulsory 
measures by the public authority, a tolerable level of pollution or a danger-
ous activity operated lawfully in the interest of the injured person, where it 
was reasonable to expose him to the risk of that activity.
342
 
 The 1999 Basel Protocol also established a comprehensive civil liability 
regime for compensation for environmental damage
343
 which can be applied 
to environmental damage caused by nuclear wastes. This Protocol was 
adopted in response to the 1989 Basel Convention.
344
 That Convention aims 
at the protection of human health and the environment from the adverse af-
fects resulting from the generation and management of hazardous wastes and 
other wastes. However, the Basel Protocol aims to provide adequate and 
prompt compensation for damage caused by the transboundary movement of 
hazardous wastes and other wastes, including damage resulting from the il-
legal traffic of such wastes.
345
 The Protocol imposes strict liability on the 
person who gives notification of the transboundary movement of hazardous 
wastes and other wastes in accordance with Article 6 of the Basel Conven-
tion. However, the liability is transferred to the disposer once the wastes are 
in his possession.
346 
The Protocol provides for financial limits for the liability 
to be determined by national law based on the amount of wastes and poten-
tial risk involved in accordance with Article 4 of the Protocol which deter-
mines the strict liability of the person liable for the damage.
347
 The Protocol 
also establishes a financial mechanism to ensure additional and supplemen-
tary compensation, as well as prompt and adequate compensation in the case 
of an accident caused by such wastes.
348
 Moreover, the Protocol imposes an 
obligation upon the Contracting Parties to establish the necessary legislative, 
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343
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regulatory and administrative measures to implement its provisions and to 
inform the Secretariat of measures to be taken to implement the Protocol.
349
 
Nevertheless, it does not explicitly involve provisions which apply to dam-
age caused by the disposal of nuclear wastes. However, it may implicitly 
apply to such damage because nuclear wastes fall under the category of haz-
ardous waste, particularly low-level radioactive waste which can easily be 
disposed of in other countries, particularly in the developing countries which 
may result an environmental catastrophe.
350
 It was also criticized by some 
States and NGOs because it does not provide an adequate and permanent 
compensation mechanism.
351
 Moreover, it does not reflect the polluter pays 
principle, which channels liability for environmental damage caused by haz-
ardous activities to the source of the damage, i.e., the exporters of the 




 The principle of strict liability was also included in several other conven-
tions on liability for environmental damage and pollution caused by hazardous 
activities. These conventions deal with the strict liability of the operator of the 
activities, which include offshore pollution, the transport of dangerous goods, 
pollution caused by means of transport and transboundary movements of haz-
ardous wastes. It was explicitly referred to in some conventions and implicitly 
in others.
353
 The principle was also included in the 1989 Convention (CRTD) 
related to liability for damage caused during the carriage of dangerous material 
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sources, done in a conference held in London in October 1975 and December 1976 and 
signed on May 1, 1977, Article 3, available at: 
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inside the country by road, rail, and vessels.
354
 According to this Convention, 
‘the carrier at the time of an incident shall be liable for damage caused by any 
dangerous goods during their carriage by road, rail or inland navigation ves-
sel’.
355
 The principle of strict liability is also included in a number of conven-
tions related to civil liability for damage caused by aviation. It was supported 
by the Rome Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Par-
ties on the Surface.
356
 Article 1 of this Convention establishes the liability for 
damage caused by an aircraft upon proof that any person has suffered damage 
as a result of an aircraft accident.
357
 Reference to these conventions is important 
to emphasize on the principle of the strict liability of the operator for environ-
mental damage. This is because, after the 1971 Convention on maritime car-
riage of nuclear material, the carrier or the owner is no longer liable for nuclear 
damage caused during maritime transport unless the operator is not liable for 
such damage under the Paris or the Vienna Convention or under national legis-
lation in the interest of the victims.  
 Similarly, Directive 2004/35/CE established a legal framework to prevent 
and remedy environmental damage.
358
 The Directive imposes public liability, 
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amended twice. The Directive was amended by Directive 2006/21/EC on the manage-
ment of waste from extractive industries, which broadened the scope of strict liability by 
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not private individual liability, for environmental damage in the European 
countries. It imposes strict liability upon the operator of a hazardous activity 
for environmental damage caused by the activity based on the polluter pays 
principle.
359
 However, this Directive, as mentioned above, does not apply to 
environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident when the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions and the EURATOM Treaty are applicable.
360
 According to 
Article 4 (4) of the Directive, ‘[t]his Directive shall not apply to such nuclear 
risks or environmental damage or imminent threat of such damage as may be 
caused by the activities covered by the Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community or caused by an incident or activity in respect of 
which liability or compensation falls within the scope of any of the interna-
tional instruments listed in Annex V, including any future amendments 
thereof.’ According to this Annex V of the Directive, these instruments in-
clude the 1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Con-
vention and their amendments, the 1963 Vienna Convention and its amend-
ments, the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage, the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna 
Convention and the Paris Convention and the 1971 Brussels Convention Re-
lating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Mate-
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 Accordingly, the Directive will apply in the absence of any of these 
instruments applicable to environmental damage caused by a nuclear acci-
dent.  
8.5 Strict liability and the ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle 
The idea of strict liability corresponds to the same concept of liability under 
the polluter pays principle.
362
 This principle is one of the significant applica-
tions of the principle of strict liability.
363
 It was developed by the OECD and 
based on its 1972 Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles 
Concerning the International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies 
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which was adopted on 26 May of 1972.
364
 These Guiding Principles were 
concluded in the 1974 OECD Recommendation on the Implementation of 
the Polluter Pays Principle and contains the basis for the coordination among 
States to implement the Polluter Pays Principle. The 1974 OECD Recom-
mendation induces the States to implement the 1972 Guiding Principles.
365
 
To ensure that the environment is protected under acceptable conditions, the 
Principle obliges the polluter to bear expenses of the measures decided by 




 The reason for promoting of the Polluter Pays Principle is purely eco-
nomic.
367
 It is aimed at internalizing the cost of remedying environmental 
damage.
368
 In other words, the Principle shifts the cost of remedying damage 
caused to the environment by a hazardous activity to the author of the dam-
age or the source of the damage. Internalizing the liability under this princi-
ple is justified by the fact that the person who operates an ultra-hazardous 
activity and profits from it must also bear the economic cost of remedying 
the harmful consequences caused to the environment by such activity.
369
 
This is because everything has a value and no one can gain something for 
nothing.
370
 In this sense the Polluter Pays Principle integrates the social and 
environmental costs and the costs of production, regardless of where the 
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 These costs include the costs of preventive meas-
ures taken or to be taken to prevent damage caused to the environment and 
the restoration of the environment to its previous condition. In the case of a 
nuclear accident, these costs may include the costs of prevention of the acci-
dent and the costs of preventive measures taken after the accident, such as 




 Consequently, the concept of the Polluter Pays Principle is similar to the 
concept of strict liability as adopted by the nuclear liability conventions
373
 
and the oil liability conventions
374
 and other instruments.
375
 The Principle 
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lays the burden of remedying damage caused to the environment on the 
source of the damage in the same way as these instruments. The Principle 
has a wider application in the national law systems. In fact, the Principle is 
an application of the strict liability theory, as strict liability for nuclear dam-
age has been recognized by international conventions and implemented by 
national legislations, even before the Principle was adopted. The Polluter-
Pays Principle has also been recognized by numerous of international in-
struments related to the environment such as the 1992 Rio Declaration on the 
environment and the EU Treaty. According to Principle 16 of the Rio Decla-
ration: 
‘National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of envi-
ronmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the 
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with 
due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment’. 
According to Article 191 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union, the  ‘Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level 
of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various 
regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on 
the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental 




 Nevertheless, there is a difference between the Polluter Pays Principle 
and the strict liability principle under the nuclear liability conventions, since 
                                                                                                                            
on 8.5.2015); Paragraph 8 of the UNGA resolution No. 37/92 on Principles Governing 
the Use by Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting, 
adopted by the UNGA at its 100
th
 plenary meeting on 10 December 1982, available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r092.htm (accessed on 7.7.2011); Principles 
8 and 9, the UNGA resolution No. 47/68 on Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear 
Power Sources in Outer Space, adopted by the UNGA at its 85
th
 plenary meeting, 14 
December 1992, available at: http://www.dipublico.com.ar/english/treaties/declaration-
of-principles-relevant-to-the-use-of-nuclear-power-sources-in-outer-space-unga-
resolution-4768/ (accessed on 10.4.2012).  
376
 The Lisbon Treaty, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, adopted in Lisbon on 13 December 2007, entered into force on 1 De-
cember 2009, 9.5.2008, EN, Official Journal of the European Union, C 115/47, available 
at: http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/ (accessed on 11.4.2012); http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF (ac-




418 CHAPTER 8 
 
the first is applicable to environmental damage in general including envi-
ronmental nuclear damage, while the strict liability principle under the nu-
clear liability conventions applies to nuclear damage caused by nuclear ac-
tivities including environmental damage. In other words, the Polluter Pays 
Principle applies to damage caused to the environment by nuclear and non-
nuclear activities, while the nuclear liability conventions apply to damage 
caused to the environment by a nuclear activity. Furthermore, the costs of 
remedying environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident under the 
nuclear liability conventions are paid by the operator of a nuclear installation 
and by additional compensation provided by the State. However, the costs of 
remedying environmental damage caused by a hazardous activity under the 
polluter pays principle are paid by the source of the damage. This means that 
the operator of the activity will bear costs of the remedy alone, without shar-
ing them with the Installation State.  
 The Polluter Pays Principle is undoubtedly considered as one of the prin-
ciples of the civilized nations which form a source of international law, as 
provided in Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute. This Principle has been de-
veloped as a general principle of law by the civilized nations. Nevertheless, 
the doctrine of international law does not accept the principle as a principle 
of customary international law. As Sands pointed out, the Polluter Pays Prin-
ciple is not internationally accepted as a principle of customary international 
law, and was only accepted by the EU, the UN/ECE and the OECD coun-
tries. He argued that ‘[t]he polluter pays principle has not received the broad 
geographical and subject matter support over the long term accorded to the 
precautionary principle in recent years. It is doubtful whether it has achieved 
the status of a generally applicable rule of customary international law, ex-
cept perhaps in relation to states in the E[U], the UN/ECE and the OECD’.
377
 
However, there is a growing sense that the acceptance of the principle in its 
current form ‘might provide supplementary evidence of both State practice 
and opinio iuris necessary to determine the emergence or existence of the 
stipulated customary norm’.
378
 In fact, in our opinion, the Polluter Pays Prin-
ciple will not be accepted as a principle of customary international law 
unless the principle of strict liability is widely accepted by States first as a 
principle of customary international law. This is because the Principle is 
considered to reflect the strict liability theory. The basis of the two principles 
under customary international law remains a matter of dispute for the doc-
trine of international law, as there is only limited support by States for it as 
customary international law. The concentration of liability in the domestic 
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system of liability explains the rapid acceptance of principle by the States as 
a general principle of law. However, it takes a long time for a principle to be 
accepted as a customary norm and the psychological and material elements 
must arise many times.  
8.6 The relationship between strict civil nuclear liability 
regimes and the general rules of international law: 
Strict State liability and wrongful act responsibility   
In general, as mentioned, liability for environmental damage caused by a 
nuclear accident has been based in the nuclear liability conventions on the 
strict liability of the operator of a nuclear installation. Despite this, the rela-
tionship between these conventions and the general rules of international law 
cannot be totally ignored. These conventions govern liability for nuclear 
damage under private international law and are applied by regimes of na-
tional law rather than international law. At the same time, they are consid-
ered as a source of international liability of the Contracting Parties according 
to Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute. This is because the Conventions con-
tain a number of substantive and procedural obligations which have to be 
fulfilled by the Contracting Parties.
379
 Furthermore, the principle of strict 
liability as adopted by the nuclear liability conventions is one of the princi-
ples of the civilized nations in accordance with this Article. This creates a 
relationship between the two branches of international law in relation to the 
application of the nuclear liability conventions. These conventions set forth a 
general rule under which wrongful act responsibility is applicable. Accord-
ingly, the nuclear liability conventions do not affect the rights and obliga-
tions of the Contracting States under the general rules of international law in 
relation to nuclear damage.
380
 This means that the State can resort to interna-
tional law if claims of nuclear damage have a basis in international law. This 
also indicates that the application of the general rules of public international 
law is outside the scope of application of the nuclear liability regime of the 
Conventions,
381
 and it means that wrongful act liability is applicable in case 
of a violation of a provision of the nuclear liability conventions or of the 
general rules of international law in relation to a nuclear activity. A breach 
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of these obligations constitutes wrongful act responsibility which applies 
under international law.  
 There are a number of cases which indicate the rights of a State to resort 
to the general rules of international law concerning the breach of obligations 
of the State under the general rules of international law. Frequent references 
have been made to these throughout the study. As chapter 5 indicated, the 
Installation State must fulfil some international obligations if a nuclear in-
stallation operates in its territory or under its jurisdiction or control, even it is 
operated by a private operator. For instance, the failure of a Sate to observe 
due diligence to prevent nuclear damage means that regime of liability ap-
plies to unlawful rather than lawful activity, which entails applying State 
responsibility for wrongful acts. In such cases, wrongful act liability is appli-
cable in the arena of public international law rather than private international 
law because private operators are not subjects of international law. It was 
stated that: 
‘Only the state’s own obligations are in issue here. Private parties or compa-
nies are not in general bound by public international law, although as we shall 
see […], the practice of channelling environmental liability towards private ac-
tors in national law is now a widely developed alternative to the international 
liability of states in cases of pollution damage. But the problem of attributing 
private conduct to states will seldom impinge on responsibility in international 
law for non-performance of the state’s own environmental obligations. Even 
where an activity causing environmental harm is conducted by private parties, 
as in the Trail Smelter case, the issue remains one of the state’s duty of control, 
co-operation, or notification, which cannot be avoided by surrendering the ac-
tivity itself into private hands’.
382
  
The Installation State violates rules of international law if it does not take 
care of and supervise the application of nuclear safety standards adopted by 
international instruments or by international organizations. In these cases, it 
is difficult to apply strict liability because there is no actual damage that has 
been caused by the activity to attribute the liability to the operator or to the 
Installation State. However, liability is incurred by the State as a result of the 
violation of nuclear safety standards which may cause actual damage as the 
result of the nuclear activity. It was stated that:  
‘A contemporary development in respect of certain activities likely to cause 
damage by technological or industrial means consists in defining objectively, 
in minute detail, by means of technical annexes or recommendations, the spe-
cific requirements to be fulfilled in order to comply with the duty of “due dili-
gence”. […] IAEA recommendations indicate the technical requirements in 
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preventing unintended nuclear radiation. […] The demonstration of any lack of 
due diligence is thus made easier, since the violation of any of these technical 
requirements constitutes by itself the basis for responsibility’.
383
  
Moreover, the measures of exchange of information, notification, consulta-
tion and assistance in the case of a nuclear accident are also of primary im-
portance with regard to protecting the environment. The 1986 Conventions 
on early notification and assistance in the case of a nuclear accident oblige 
the Contracting Parties to provide early notification and prompt assistance in 
the case of a nuclear accident. The violation of these obligations by a Con-
tracting State to these Conventions incurs State responsibility for wrongful 
acts. Furthermore, the State is obliged to control a nuclear activity and to 
ensure that this activity does not cause nuclear damage to the environment, 
e.g., by the dumping of radioactive wastes into the sea in violation of rules of 
international law. The nuclear liability conventions do not cover liability for 
nuclear damage caused as a result of dumping radioactive waste at sea. 
However, dumping radioactive waste at sea is allowed under international 
conventions only under certain conditions established by international or-
ganizations, viz. the IAEA and the NEA. The violation of these standards by 
a State is unlawful.  
‘Responsibility in such cases is neither strict nor absolute since it cannot be es-
tablished by proof of damage alone. But where nuclear damage is the result of 
some internationally prohibited activity, such as the dumping of radioactive 
waste at sea, or atmospheric nuclear tests, objective responsibility results not 
from a failure of due diligence, but simply from the harm caused in deliberate 
violation of international law. This is much closer to a standard of strict or ab-
solute responsibility, and offers a sounder basis for such concepts than any in-
ferences from national law or civil liability conventions’.
384
 
Similarly, there are a number of cases in the nuclear liability conventions 
that entail the application of the general rules of public international law. 
The regime of the Amended Vienna Convention refers to the application of 
the Convention being excluded for nuclear damage suffered in the maritime 
zones of Contracting Parties, but it does not determine such maritime zones. 
It leaves the determination of these maritime zones to the Contracting Parties 
according to the general rules of international law.
385
 Therefore, disputes 
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arising from the delimitation of maritime boundaries are left to be decided 
outside the scope of the nuclear liability conventions.
386
 Another example is 
the regime of the Amended Vienna Convention which imposes an interna-
tional obligation upon the Installation State vis-à-vis the Contracting Parties 
to fulfil its financial obligations if it determines the liability of the operator at 
less than 300 million SDRs or not less than 100 million SDRs during a tran-
sitional period, provided that the reduced amount of liability is available 
from public funds. The Installation State would be liable under international 
law if it violated this obligation.
387
 Furthermore, each Contracting State to a 
nuclear liability convention is obliged vis-à-vis the other Contracting Parties 
to implement the provisions of the convention in its national law and to 
comply with these provisions or to apply the convention itself. A violation of 
this obligation entails State responsibility for wrongful acts under interna-
tional law. Another case in the nuclear liability conventions oblige the opera-
tor and the Installation State to pay the costs of the necessary measures to 
prevent and reduce the harmful consequences if the environment is impaired 
by a nuclear accident. Moreover, the nuclear liability conventions oblige the 
Contracting Parties to settle the disputes arising from the interpretation or 
application of provisions of the conventions by peaceful means.
388
 The 
peaceful means for the settlement of disputes are determined under the gen-
eral rules of international law.
389
 A breach of such an obligation by a State 
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entails State responsibility for wrongful acts. The nuclear liability conven-
tions oblige the Installation State to ensure that financial security is main-
tained by the operator of a nuclear installation before commencing the opera-
tion of the installation. The Installation State is also obliged to guarantee 
compensation to victims who have suffered from environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident. It violates its obligations under the conventions 
if it has allowed the operation of a nuclear installation without the operator 
maintaining financial security. For example, the 1962 Nuclear Ships Con-
vention obliges a Contracting State to take the necessary measures to prevent 
the operation of nuclear ships flying its flag without being registered or au-
thorized.
390
 Thus the Contracting State violates the obligations of the nuclear 
liability conventions if a nuclear installation or a nuclear ship is operated 
without the operator maintaining financial security or is operated without a 
licence from the competent authorities.  
8.7 Conclusions 
The chapter shows that liability for environmental nuclear damage under 
international law is based only on the idea of strict liability because fault li-
ability and other bases of liability are unsuitable for liability for environ-
mental nuclear damage caused by nuclear activities. Hazards arising from 
the use of nuclear energy as a hazardous activity meant that States had to 
accept strict liability in the nuclear liability conventions as a basis for liabil-
ity for nuclear damage caused by nuclear energy. Strict liability is based on 
objective liability under which victims of a nuclear accident are only re-
quired to prove causality, i.e., to prove only that the damage was caused by a 
nuclear activity. However, fault liability is based on the subjective liability, 
which is based on the personal liability of the author of the damage, and the 
victim is required to prove his intention in causing the damage. This is a very 
difficult task in the field of nuclear liability, as victims of a nuclear accident 
cannot easily prove the intention of the operator in causing the accident.  
 However, despite the fact that the States have accepted strict liability as a 
basis of liability for nuclear damage, they are still reluctant to accept it as a 
general principle in international law. This chapter discussed the sources and 
the basis of absolute State liability for environmental nuclear damage caused 
by a nuclear accident in the light of the general rules of international law. It 
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discovered that in some cases liability for environmental damage caused by 
nuclear activities as hazardous activities is attributed to the State in whose 
territory or under whose jurisdiction or control a nuclear installation is oper-
ated, regardless of its fault or negligence or a wrongful act. It also revealed 
that the general principle of strict State liability still lacks support and is not 
fully accepted by States.  
 In treaty law, the only convention in international law that clearly applies 
strict State liability for environmental damage caused by nuclear activities is 
the 1972 Convention on liability for damage caused by space objects. This 
Convention was applied in the Cosmos 954 Case between the USSR and 
Canada in 1979. Nevertheless, it allows the application of fault liability 
where environmental damage is caused to other States or in space by a space 
object operated by a nuclear reactor or nuclear energy source where the 
damage is caused outside the surface of the earth, and also exonerates the 
State from liability in some circumstances. 
 There not much support either for a general principle of strict liability in 
judicial decisions and State practice. The only judicial case to support strict 
State liability for environmental damage caused by a hazardous lawful activ-
ity is the Trail Smelter case, even though that case is still questionable be-
cause it is not clear whether the tribunal based its decision on fault or non-
fault liability. In nuclear cases, strict liability on nuclear issues has only been 
applied to a limited extent, e.g., the Cosmos 954 and Marshall Islands cases 
in 1954. 
 Similarly the doctrine of international law is still divided about accepting 
the principle of strict liability as a principle of general international law or a 
principle of customary international law. Some jurists reject the principle of 
strict liability as the basis of State liability in general. Others accept strict 
State liability to govern liability for damage caused by hazardous activities, 
but they do not consider it to be a general principle of international law. Oth-
ers accept strict State liability if it is provided for in an international conven-
tion. Finally, some writers accept the principle as a general principle of in-
ternational law to be applicable only to hazardous activities. 
 Moreover, the ILC has failed to recognize the principle of strict liability 
as a general principle for State liability for transboundary environmental 
damage caused by hazardous activities in general, while it has recognized 
the principle of State responsibility for wrongful acts which was codified by 
the ILC in the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Wrongful 
Acts. The ILC recognized strict liability to apply only to the liability of the 
private operators of hazardous activities, including the liability of the opera-
tor of a nuclear activity. The 2006 ILC Draft principles on the allocation of 
loss contained the same principles of civil liability that were included in 
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treaty regimes. A breach of these principles constitutes State responsibility 
for wrongful acts.  
 Accordingly, strict liability for environmental damage caused by a nu-
clear accident is in principle still governed by the nuclear liability conven-
tions and other environmental instruments which deal with liability of the 
operator of a nuclear installation. The nuclear liability conventions apply 
civil liability under national law regimes. Under these conventions, the op-
erator – or the State when it serves as an operator of a nuclear installation – 
is liable for environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident according to 
the national legal regime. The chapter reveals that under nuclear liability 
legislation, liability for environmental nuclear damage is strict, not absolute. 
This is because the nuclear liability conventions included a number of exon-
erations and in some cases some nuclear activities are not covered by the 
conventions, such as minor nuclear activities, the disposal of waste and the 
decommissioning of nuclear installations. Moreover, under the conventions 
liability for nuclear damage is limited in terms of time and amount. In all 
these cases, the operator of a nuclear installation is exonerated from liability, 
and consequently victims of nuclear damage are prevented from being com-
pensated under the nuclear liability conventions. This means that under the 
conventions liability for nuclear damage is strict not absolute. Therefore the 
term strict liability should replace absolute liability, or these circumstances 
should be changed so that the liability is absolute.  
 The principle of strict liability also corresponds to the Polluter Pays Prin-
ciple. Both principles impose liability for environmental damage caused by 
ultra-hazardous activities upon the operator of the activity. However, the 
main difference between the two principles is that the liability under the Pol-
luter Pays Principle is an economic concept which covers only the economic 
burden of the damage caused to the environment including environmental 
damage caused by nuclear activities, while the principle of strict liability is a 
legal concept which covers compensation for nuclear damage including en-
vironmental damage. The first channels liability onto the source of the dam-
age, while strict liability channels liability onto the operator of the activity. 
 Therefore it is difficult to argue that strict liability is the only basis of 
State liability for environmental damage caused by nuclear activities. It 
should exist together with State responsibility for wrongful acts, which has 
an important role in the implementation of strict State liability and the per-
formance of nuclear activities. Wrongful act liability was rejected as the only 
basis for liability in the field of nuclear liability law because it is difficult to 
attribute the offence to the operator or the State in the case of a nuclear acci-
dent when it carried out with due care. Nevertheless, wrongful act liability is 
applicable in the case of a violation by the Contracting Parties of principles 
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and obligations of the State. The Installation State is obliged to respect obli-
gations under the nuclear liability conventions and other obligations under 
the general principles of international law. A violation of nuclear safety 
standards as included in international instruments or the dumping of nuclear 
wastes contrary to the rules of international law, for example, incurs State 
responsibility for a wrongful act rather than strict State liability. This indi-
cates the relationship between civil nuclear liability regimes and the general 
rules of international law. Nevertheless, nuclear accidents which occur in 
nuclear reactors are a clear argument for the State accepting the principle of 
strict State liability. The Fukushima nuclear accident occurred for all States 
to see, and showed that the use of nuclear reactors is unsafe and damage 
caused by a nuclear accident is beyond the capability of any private operator 
or insurance company. 
 
427 
9 THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF LIABILITY 
AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
DAMAGE CAUSED BY A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous three chapters showed that the State is responsible for 
violations of its nuclear and environmental obligations and its failure to 
prevent and reduce environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident. It is 
also absolutely liable as the operator of a nuclear installation for 
environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident to other States, even 
without the violation of the rules regulating the nuclear activity. This gives 
rise to the following question. What are the legal consequences of State 
liability and responsibility for environmental damage caused by nuclear 
activities?  
 The legal consequences of State liability and responsibility for such dam-
age actually depend on whether the damage is the result of a lawful or 
unlawful act or activity. According to international law, the legal conse-
quence of State liability for damage caused by a nuclear activity as a hazard-
ous lawful activity is compensation for the damage suffered as a result of a 
nuclear accident. The State is obliged to compensate the victims for personal 
damage, loss or damage to property, economic loss and environmental dam-
age caused by a nuclear accident. This was the approach taken by the nuclear 
liability conventions, and the 2006 ILC Draft Principles on the allocation of 
loss caused by hazardous activities, and other international liability regimes 
which deal with the issues of nuclear and environmental liability under in-
ternational law.  
 However, the legal consequences of State responsibility for wrongful acts 
vary in international law. First, the State is obliged to cease the wrongful act 
in question if it is in violation of the rules of international law, and to pro-
vide assurances and guarantees that it will not be repeated.
1
 This is particu-
larly important in relation to the protection of the environment from damage 
caused by nuclear activities. It puts an end to the continuing violation of a 
State of the rules which protect the environment and regulate nuclear activi-
ties, and subsequently prevents the occurrence of nuclear accidents and their 
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harmful consequences from damaging the environment. The continuing vio-
lation of these rules by a State is a risk and constitutes a serious threat of a 
nuclear accident occurring and causing damage to the environment of other 
States. Secondly, the State is obliged to make full reparation of damage 
caused to the injured States by this activity.
2
 The aim of reparation is to 
strike a balance between the interests of the responsible State and the State 
affected by the obligation that was breached or by a nuclear accident. Thus 
the cessation of a wrongful act is aimed at preventing damage in the future, 
while the duty of reparation is aimed at remedying the damage caused in the 
past.
3
 This approach was adopted by the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility for Wrongful Acts.  
 To explore the legal consequences of State liability for environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident and its responsibility for the violation 
of nuclear and environmental obligations, the chapter examines these issues 
on the basis of the general rules of international law as codified by the ILC 
in its Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts, international 
liability for lawful acts and the nuclear liability conventions. This is because, 
as Boyle noted: 
‘No attempt has yet been made, either in the Commission’s articles on State 
Responsibility, or in those on the prevention of transboundary harm, to de-
velop forms of reparation specifically adapted to particular kinds of damage, 
such as environmental damage. The remedies available for breach of environ-
mental obligations are thus determined by general international law. Where the 
responsibility of a state is established, an obligation arises first to discontinue 
the wrongful conduct, second to offer guarantees of non-repetition, and third to 
make ‘full reparation’ for the injury caused’.
4
  
The chapter also contains an examination of the legal consequences of lawful 
and unlawful activities because compensation applies to both. 
 The chapter is divided into five sections. The following section explains 
the relationship between State responsibility and liability and its legal conse-
quences, both in general and in particular with regard to environmental dam-
age caused by nuclear activities. Section 9.3 discusses the concept of the 
cessation and non-repetition of illegal acts and its importance in preventing 
environmental damage caused by nuclear activities. Section 9.4 examines the 
reparation of environmental damage as a legal consequence of international 
liability and responsibility in two subsections. Section (9.4.1) explores the 
concept and nature of reparation and its objectives in general and its rela-
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tionship with the consequences of international liability for environmental 
damage. Section (9.4.2) investigates forms of reparation as legal conse-
quences of State responsibility and liability for environmental nuclear dam-
age. Finally, section 9.5 contains some concluding remarks. It concludes that 
compensation is the most relevant form for reparation of environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident and for restoring the environment to its 
previous condition. However, other forms of reparation are also relevant to 
prevent and reduce environmental nuclear damage. It also indicates that the 
legal consequences of international liability have developed with the devel-
opment of the concept of international liability. The role of State responsibil-
ity in relation to the protection of the environment is not only limited to the 
classical role of liability that is aimed at the reparation of the damage, but is 
also aimed at preventing a nuclear accident and its harmful consequences. 
9.2 The relationship between responsibility and the legal 
consequences of liability 
There is no liability without damage and without liability damage has no 
legal consequences. The legal consequences in relation to environmental 
damage caused by nuclear activities therefore follow from the establishment 
of international liability. Under international law, following the establish-
ment of international liability, a new relationship develops between the re-
sponsible State and the injured State.
5
 This relationship constitutes the legal 
consequences of liability and responsibility of the State.
6
 This creates a new 
obligation for the responsible State to bear the legal consequences of repairing 
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 The duty of reparation is a secondary obligation established as a result of 
State responsibility for wrongful acts in the case of a violation or the failure 
to carry out a primary obligation.
8
 For example, it obliges a State conducting 
a nuclear activity which has breached a primary obligation not to cause envi-
ronmental damage to other States, to bear the burden of responsibility for the 
breached obligation. According to the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsi-
bility for Wrongful Acts, the establishment of State responsibility for wrongful 
act creates three obligations upon the responsible State. The first is that the 
State must cease the illegal act. Secondly, it must provide assurances and guar-
antees of the non-repetition of such an illegal act,
9
 and thirdly it must repair 
damage caused by such an illegal act.
10
 Accordingly, in the case of State re-
sponsibility for a wrongful act committed or omitted in violation of environ-
mental or nuclear obligations, such as the disposal of nuclear wastes at sea in 
violation of the rules of international law, it must first refrain from performing 
this act and provide assurance that it will not dispose of other nuclear wastes at 
sea in violation of international law, and it must compensate, for example, vic-
tims who have suffered damage caused by such waste or pay the costs of meas-
ures taken to prevent environmental damage and to restore the environment to 
the status quo ante. 
 However, State responsibility for a wrongful act may require further legal 
measures by the responsible State and other States if the wrongful act is re-
lated to the peremptory norms of general international law or constitutes a 
serious breach of an international obligation, such as a norm related to the 
protection of the common environment of the international community.
11
 As 
mentioned, a breach of an obligation by the State may be considered serious 
if it involves a gross or systematic failure to fulfil the obligation.
12
 The legal 
consequence of a serious breach of an international obligation is that all 
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States are obliged to cooperate to prevent a serious breach of international 
law.
13
 They must also refrain from recognizing an illegal situation or from 
providing assistance to continue an illegal situation.
14
 In the absence of an 
injured State, all States are considered injured States,
15
 for example, if the 
obligation which has been breached by a State is an environmental obliga-
tion related to the protection of the environment of the whole international 
community, or it constitutes an international environmental crime, or it is 
related to the use of nuclear energy for nuclear weapons. In these cases, all 
States are obliged not to recognize such acts and not to cooperate with the 
source State in the performance of such acts.  
 The duty of reparation is also established as a result of State liability for 
damage caused by a lawful activity. Liability for damage caused by lawful 
activities is a primary obligation, which constitutes compensation for the 
resulting damage as a consequence of liability. As mentioned, liability and 
compensation for environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident as a 
result of lawful nuclear activity not prohibited by international law is a pri-
mary obligation. Thus reparation for damage is always interrelated with re-
sponsibility and liability. 
 These are the consequences of State responsibility for wrongful acts and 
liability for damage caused by lawful activities under international law. 
However, this gives rise to the question of the nature of these legal conse-
quences of State responsibility. In other words, is the obligation of the State 
to remedy environmental damage a duty or sanction? To answer this ques-
tion, it can be argued that the obligation to remedy is a duty rather than a 
sanction.
16
 Sanctions as legal consequences of international liability are not 
applied in international law. International law does not allow the State to use 
force against the responsible State to meet its international obligations or to 
force it to repair the damage. In international law, reparation is not consid-
ered to be a punishment and the two notions are not the same.
17
 It was real-
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ized that the use of force as a punishment is not an effective solution to re-
pair damage caused by the responsible State. Therefore international law 
does not distinguish between civil and criminal responsibility because there 
is no authority in international law to implement sanctions in the case of a 
breach by a State of its international obligations or in the case that it has re-
fused to repair damage caused to other States.
18
  
‘Responsibility is simply the principle which establishes an obligation to make 
good any violation of international law producing injury, committed by the re-
spondent State. Whether reparation be made through diplomacy or in other 
manner is a matter of procedure, and an entirely distinct problem. […] Respon-
sibility appears, in principle, at the moment that the internationally injurious 
act has taken place within the control of the State’.
19
   
Thus punishment as it exists in national legal systems does not have a place 
in the international law of responsibility. According to Article 32 of the ILC 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the responsible State may not rely on 
the provisions of its internal law as a justification for the failure to comply 
with its obligations arising as a result of the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act. According to the commentaries, this Article is different from 
Article 3 which, as discussed in chapter 7, concerns the role of internal law 
in describing an internationally wrongful act. This is because ‘Article 32 
makes clear the irrelevance of a State’s internal law to compliance with the 
obligations of cessation and reparation’.
20
 On the other hand, Bothe argues 
that ‘pollution caused in violation of international law should also be consid-
ered a violation of internal law and therefore punishable under the national 
rules’.
21
 Furthermore, according to Oppenheim’s International Law:  
‘If the delinquent state refuses reparation for the wrong done, the wronged 
state can, consistently with any existing obligation of specific settlement and 
with restraints imposed by international law on the threat or use of force, exer-
cise such means as are necessary to enforce adequate reparation. It may happen 
that a state, while not denying its liability to pay a sum specified by way of 
damages, may assert that it has insufficient foreign exchange to make the nec-
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ternational public, in: RDC, 1961, Vol. 103, Part II, pp. 425-651, at p. 586. 
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20
 YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 94, para.1, commentaries on Article 32. 
21
 Michael Bothe, “Criminal Responsibility for Environmental Damage in Time of 
Armed Conflict”, in: Richard J. Grunawalt, John E. King and Roland S. McClain (eds.), 
Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict, International Law Studies, Vol. 
69, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1996, pp. 473-478, at p. 476. 
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essary payments, or that its exchange control regulations restrict the availabil-
ity of the foreign exchange for that purpose. It is difficult in principle to admit 
either ground has a justification in international law for non-payment of dam-
ages which a state is under an international obligation to pay, particularly in the 
light of the principle that provisions of national law afford no justification for 
breach of an international obligation’.
22
 
Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 7, Article 19 of the 1996 ILC Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility was omitted from the 2001 ILC Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility for wrongful acts. It considers the breach of an envi-
ronmental obligation to be an international crime where it is ‘a serious 
breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safe-
guarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibit-
ing massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas’.
23
 This Article was 
excluded because it is considered a sanction which was rejected by the States. 
Similarly, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter sanctions are con-
sidered to be related to the action as regards threats, breaches of the peace, and 
acts of aggression. For the application of the provisions of this Chapter, the UN 
Compensation Commission, which was established to administrate compensa-
tion for environmental damage caused during the Iraqi-Kuwait war, ‘excludes 
sanctions-related losses on the basis that they are not the ‘direct’ result of the 
invasion of Kuwait, as required under Resolution 687’.
24
 Accordingly, under 
this Resolution, compensation paid by Iraq as a result of its responsibility for 
direct environmental damage caused by the invasion of Kuwait is considered a 
sanction. Moreover, it was suggested to use force in accordance with Article 41 
of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to prevent damage to the environment if such 
damage is a threat to peace and security.
25
 It was suggested that force could be 
used against the State which causes climate change if this is identified, because 
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climate change is considered a threat to peace and security.
26
 However, deter-
mining what is an environmental threat to peace has been left to the Security 
Council, which has been given more flexibility to define environmental threats 
to peace, regardless of the traditional definition of a threat to peace under the 
UN Charter.
27
 Climate change can be a threat to security because it gives rise to 




 Finally, the legal consequences of responsibility raise the issue of the 
conduct of the responsible State in relation to the environmental or nuclear 
obligation that has been breached. In other words, is the legal consequence 
of responsibility for an unlawful act the termination or suspension of the ob-
ligation that was breached? The answer to this question was addressed in 
Article 29 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which provides 
that ‘[t]he legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act under this 
Part do not affect the continued duty of the responsible State to perform the 
obligation breached’. This is important for continuing to carry out a nuclear 
activity as a hazardous activity, governed by primary obligations which can-
not be terminated as long as the activity continues. The primary obligations 
such as the obligations of prevention must be observed to carry out a nuclear 
activity. In international law a breach of an international obligation does not 
mean that the injured State has the right to automatically terminate the obli-
gation concerned. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties the 
injured State has the option to terminate and suspend a treaty.
29
 In the Gab-
číkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the ICJ decided that the 1977 Treaty be-
tween Hungary and Czechoslovakia concerning the construction and opera-
tion of the project remained in force, despite continuing material breaches by 
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the two parties to the treaty.
30
 Accordingly, the violation by a State of its en-
vironmental and nuclear obligations governing a nuclear activity does not 
terminate these obligations. 
9.3 Cessation and non-repetition of illegal acts: Cessation 
of illegal nuclear activities and acts 
The cessation and guarantees of the non-repetition of illegal acts are the first 
legal consequence of State responsibility for wrongful acts which violate 
environmental norms and nuclear obligations under international law. The 
customary obligation in international law,
31
 which is reflected in several in-
stances, indicates that in practice the cessation and guarantees of non-
repetition of illegal acts or activities apply. For example, in the Nuclear 
Tests Cases (Australia v. France),
32
 Australia asked the ICJ to declare that it 
was contrary to international law and its sovereign rights for France to con-
duct nuclear tests in the South Pacific Ocean, and to request France to put an 




 According to the Articles, the State responsible for an internationally 
wrongful act is obliged to cease that act if it continues to carry out that act, 
and to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if the 
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 Two conditions must be met in order for an ef-
fective cessation of an illegal act. These two conditions were determined by 
the Tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior case. The wrongful act must have a 
continuing character, and the rule that was violated must be in effect at the 
time that the order is given.
35
 In addition, the ICJ discussed the issue of as-
surances and guarantees of non-repetition of an internationally wrongful act 
as the legal consequence of international liability in the LaGrand case.
36
 The 
Court granted Germany’s request for assurance and non-repetition. It con-
sidered that the commitment of the United States to ensure the implementa-
tion of specific measures was sufficient to meet Germany’s request for a 
general assurance of non-repetition.
37
 In contrast, in the Pulp Mills case, Ar-
gentina requested the ICJ to decide and declare that Uruguay must provide 
adequate guarantees to refrain in future from preventing the application of 
the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay.
38
 This request was dismissed by the 
Court because it found that there are no special circumstances in this case to 




 The function of the cessation of an internationally wrongful act differs 
from offering the State assurances and guarantees of the non-repetition of the 
act in the future.  
‘The function of cessation is to put an end to a violation of international law 
and to safeguard the continuing validity and effectiveness of the underlying 
primary rule. The responsible State’s obligation of cessation thus protects both 
the interests of the injured State or States and the interests of the international 




However, ‘[a]ssurances and guarantees are concerned with the restoration of 
confidence in a continuing relationship, although they involve much more 
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flexibility than cessation and are not required in all cases’.
41
 Thus the cessa-
tion is aimed at the prevention of further breaches of the obligation by the 
responsible State. However, ‘guarantees of non-repetition do not constitute a 
systematic consequence of the internationally wrongful act; rather they have 
an exceptional character’.
42
 In my view, the cessation of an illegal act puts 
an end to the violation of a legal act by the State and assures the regulations 
on a legal activity are in this case so that it can continue operation and does 
not cause damage to other States and the international community. This legal 
consequence is a warning given in a court decision to the State which im-
plies that the reactor, for example, may cause environmental damage to other 
States as a result of violation of the rules, and if this is repeated in the future, 
the operation of the reactor will be suspended. Wrongful acts of a State are 
based on the failure to respect the obligations of conventions or other obliga-
tions under the general rules of international law for the operation of a nu-
clear activity. 
 Nevertheless, the cessation and non-repetition of illegal acts as a legal con-
sequence of State responsibility for wrongful acts are still controversial is-
sues which require careful consideration and clarification. The doctrine of 
international law is still divided about whether to consider it as an independ-
ent legal consequence of State responsibility or as part of reparation. Some 
writers consider it as a form of reparation,
43
 while some writers treat it as a 
form of restitution
44
 and others treat it as a form of satisfaction.
45
 Others 
consider that cessation is a form of restitution, while they consider assur-
ances and guarantees of non-repetition to be a form of satisfaction.
46
 How-
ever, the ILC considered the cessation and guarantees of the non-repetition 
of an illegal act as independent legal consequences of State responsibility 
and not as a form of reparation. This can be deduced from the approach of 
                                                     
41
 YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, at p. 89, para.9, commentaries to Article 29 of the 2001 
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
42
 Sandrine Barbier, “Assurances and Guarantees of Non-Repetition”, in: Crawford, Pel-
let and Olleson (eds.), 2010, pp. 551-561, at p. 551.  
43
 Hoogh, 1996, at p. 146.  
44
 John E. Noyes and Brain D. Smith, “State Responsibility and Principle of Joint and 
Several Liability”, in: YJIL, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1988, pp. 225-267, at pp. 240-241; Grae-
frath, RDC, Vol. 185, Part II, 1984, at p. 84; UN Doc. A/CN.4/344, Second report on the 
content, forms and degrees of international responsibility (Part 2 of the draft articles), by 
Willem Riphagan, Special Rapporeur, YILC, 1981, Vol. II, Part One, at p. 86, para. 57. 
45
 Carla Ferstman, “Reparation as Prevention: Considering the Law and Practice of Or-
ders for Cessation and Guarantees of Non-Repetition in Torture Cases”, pp. 7-27, at pp. 
8 and 21, available at: http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V6N2/Ferstman.pdf (accessed on 
28.2.2012); see also Shelton, AJIL, Vol. 96, at p. 839. 
46
 Aust, 2010, at p. 385. 
438 CHAPTER 9 
 
the ILC, which dealt with cessation and non-repetition as a legal conse-
quence of State responsibility for wrongful acts in one article, and reparation 
in another separate article. This was also endorsed by some writers,
47
 who 
considered cessation and guarantees of the non-repetition of an illegal act to 
be an independent legal consequence of reparation. 
 Despite that, the cessation of an illegal act is sometime accompanied by 
restitution or compensation. In that case, the cessation of the operation of a 
nuclear reactor is required if it continues to pose a threat to other States. This 
is a consequence of a breach of the obligation of prevention, which obliges 
the State to stop the operation of the activity in order to avoid potential envi-
ronmental damage caused by that activity. However, restitution is required to 
restore the environment to its previous condition. The State has to pay the 
costs of reinstatement measures taken to clean up the environment. In the 
Trail Smelter case between Canada and the United States, the Tribunal re-
quested Canada to cease the operation of the Smelter if it continued to cause 
environmental damage to the US and to provide compensation for the dam-
age and loss caused by the Smelter.
48
 Accordingly, cessation as a conse-
quence of liability exists only in the case that an act continues and not in re-
lation to the continued harmful consequences arising out from the act. The 
continuous effects of unlawful acts are not considered to be a continuous 
illegal act, as the elimination of the harmful consequences of the activity re-
quires restitution which takes the place of reparation as a legal consequence 
of international liability.  
 There is also some confusion about distinguishing between the obligation 
of prevention as a primary obligation of international liability and cessation 
as a legal consequence of State responsibility. This raises the question 
whether the cessation of illegal act should be considered to be one of the 
forms of reparation, or mere compliance with the original obligation of pre-
vention of harm.
49
 This situation leads one to wonder whether cessation as a 
legal consequence to end the violation of an illegal act is a primary or a sec-
ondary obligation.
50
 It was argued that, ‘[t]he breach of an obligation to pre-
vent may be considered a continuing violation or wrongful act. Such a char-
acterization would depend on whether the effect of the breach is ongoing’.
51
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The obligation of prevention varies from the cessation of illegal act to activ-
ity causing damage. The obligation of prevention is a primary obligation 
based on certain procedural obligations and necessary measures to prevent 
the damage. However, the cessation of an activity is a secondary obligation
52
 
and a legal consequence of State responsibility for wrongful acts. It is aimed 
at the respect of the breached primary obligation
53
 and the cessation of a 
continuing illegal act and non-repetition in the future. This shifts the focus of 
State responsibility from only repairing damage caused by illegal act to ceasing 
such an act and guaranteeing its non-repetition in the future.
54
 Thus the obliga-
tion of prevention as a primary obligation incurs State responsibility by itself 
in the case of its violation, while the obligation of cessation is a secondary 
obligation for the State to bear the consequences of responsibility, which 
usually arises after a judgment by the court in the case of a breach of a pri-
mary rule in international law. Despite that, primary rules should be taken to 
guarantee the non-repetition of a wrongful act in the case of cessation. For 
example, in the case of the cessation of the operation of a nuclear reactor as 
a result of the violation of rules of nuclear safety, the State must apply the 
rules in order to resume the operation of the reactor. Nuclear safety rules are 
primary rules aimed at the prevention of a nuclear accident which must be 
followed at every stage of the operation of the nuclear installation, even 
when the reactor has ceased operating. Accordingly, the source State is 
obliged to cease the operation of a nuclear installation if it has violated of its 
obligations, or to modify it.  
 Although it is the duty of the responsible State to bear the costs of the 
modifications of the activity in order to avoid potentially damage which may 
be caused if the responsible State is not willing to do so or is unable to per-
form the required modifications, the international community or the affected 
States may in some cases bear some of the costs.
55
 In practice, there are 
some cases in which the affected States could share part of the burden of de-
commissioning and improving the nuclear safety of nuclear States. For in-
stance, after their independence the OECD countries gave the Eastern European 
countries financial assistance to decommission their nuclear power plants and 
replace them with new plants, or to modify and improve the nuclear safety 
standards to meet those of Western countries.
56
 As mentioned in chapter 2, in 
1995 the Ukrainian authorities announced that they were permanently ceasing 
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the operation of the Chernobyl reactor and were decommissioning it. However, 
the reactor still poses a threat to the international community.  Therefore the G7 
committed itself to providing financial assistance through the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development to help Ukraine to complete its pro-
gramme for decommissioning the reactor, improving standards requirements 
and replacing the reactor with a new model.
57
 
 In practice, the principle of cessation has not been applied very widely. 
Boyle observed that in environmental cases held before international courts 
and tribunals, the injured States ordered harmful activity to cease, but the 
tribunals failed to respond and merely ordered some preventive measures to 
be taken, such as providing information, or ordered the parties to consult and 
cooperate in providing information.
58
 For instance, in the MOX Plant Case, 
Ireland requested the Tribunal to order the UK to take provisional measures 
to immediately suspend the authorization of the MOX plant, or to take other 
measures necessary to prevent the damage caused by the plant during its op-
eration, and to ensure that there would be no movements of any radioactive 
substances or materials, or wastes associated with the operation of the MOX 
plant discharged into water under its sovereignty.
59
 However, the Tribunal 
ordered the two parties to cooperate and consult with regard to exchanging 
information related to the possible consequences for the Irish Sea and to 




9.4 Reparation of environmental nuclear damage 
9.4.1 The concept and nature of reparation and the balance of 
interests of the impaired environment and the State  
Reparation is a general principle of law applied in any national or interna-
tional legal system.
61
 It constituted a general principle of international law 
even before the appearance of so-called environmental and nuclear law. 
Reparation has been expressed in legal systems in different ways including 
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reparation, remedy, indemnity, redress, damages, etc. In addition, the nuclear 
liability conventions referred to the amount of liability and compensation as 
legal consequences of liability for nuclear damage. These concepts indicate 
the legal consequences of liability and responsibility.
62
 However, reparation 
is the term most commonly used by jurists of international law and in inter-
national practice. Some writers use it in a broader context to indicate the ob-
ligation to make reparation as the normal consequence of liability. It is im-
posed by law on the actor causing the damage. It has two objectives: (1) to 
strike a balance between the two interests, i.e., the rights and interests of the 
injured person, and the interests of the actor after the damage is caused, as 
regards the reparation for the damage; and (2) to compel the actor to act 
carefully and not to harm others or repeat its acts.
63
 Both objectives are in 
the interests of protecting the environment, as the State is required to respect 
the law in order to avoid damage caused to the environment, because it is 
sometimes difficult to reinstate the environment to the status quo ante. The 
costs of reinstatement measures required to eliminate damage caused to the 
environment and to clean up the environment damaged by a nuclear accident 
if this cannot be avoided must also be paid.
64
 
 The concept and nature of the principle of reparation have been defined 
under the general rules of international law as reflected in the ILC Draft Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility, which included a principle of State responsi-
bility for wrongful acts including the principle of reparation.
65
 According to 
the Articles, the responsible State is obliged to make full reparation for the 
damage caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State, whether mate-
rial or moral.
66
 However, the Court is competent to determine ‘the nature or 




 The principle of reparation was expressed by the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in the Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Claim for 
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Indemnity) (Jurisdiction) (Germany V. Poland) in 1927. This Case was one 
of the earliest cases to formulate the principle of reparation in international 
law. In this case, the Court stated that:  
‘It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves 
an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is 
the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no 
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.’
68
 
However, the purpose and scope of the principle of reparation had been af-
firmed by the PCIJ in its judgement in the Chorzów Factory Case in 1928. It 
its judgment the Court stated that: 
‘The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – a prin-
ciple which seems to be established by international practice and in particular 
by the decisions of arbitral tribunals – is that reparation must, as far as possi-
ble, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation 




These decisions were also confirmed in the Trail Smelter Arbitration be-
tween the United States and Canada which was the first case to recognize 
international liability for environmental damage.
70
 The Corfu Channel Case 
between Britain and Albania in 1949 recognized the duty of a State to pre-
vent activities within its territory which cause damage to other States.
71
 Ac-
cordingly, the responsible State is obliged to make full reparation for environ-
mental damage caused by a nuclear activity or unlawful environmental 
interference. Thus reparation is a means to remove damage caused by an illegal 
act or activity to other parties when responsibility or liability for causing the 
damage has been proved. It must eliminate all the harmful consequences of the 
wrongful act or the harmful consequences caused by a nuclear accident. How-
ever, it is not possible to eliminate all the consequences of a wrongful act be-
cause it is sometimes impossible to go back to the status quo ante, e.g., if 
deaths have occurred, and sometimes it is difficult to determine all the conse-
quences covered by the obligation of reparation.
72
 
 This is reflected by the nature and forms of reparation. Compensation is 
the main form of reparation and sometimes it is used in a narrow sense. Ac-
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cording to Brownlie, reparation includes all the measures taken by the re-
sponsible State and accepted by the injured State, including compensation, 
restitution, satisfaction and cessation of a breach of an obligation, while he 
uses compensation to describe reparation in the narrow sense of payment of 
money.
73
 Accordingly, compensation is the main form of reparation, and the 
cessation of a breach of an obligation is not an independent legal conse-
quence. Similarly García-Amador stated that, ‘according to Anzilotti, a 
breach or non-performance of an obligation has no other consequence in in-
ternational law than that of giving rise to a duty to make reparation’.
74
 How-
ever, according to the Special Rapporteur Barboza, the concept of reparation 
is broader than compensation because the affected State may prefer another 
form of reparation. As he stated, ‘the concept of reparation was broader than 
that of compensation. Reparation was intended to include other remedies, in 
addition to pecuniary damages, that the States concerned might prefer to 
choose’.
75
 Indeed, Barboza made a link between reparation and all activities 
conducted within the territory of a State or under its jurisdiction or control.
76
 
 In our opinion, the nature of reparation has evolved as the objectives of 
liability have evolved. The obligation of a State to make reparation for nu-
clear damage is based on the fact that the State has a duty under international 
law to prevent, minimise and repair nuclear damage caused by nuclear ac-
tivities. Accordingly, it should repair environmental damage caused by such 
activities where the damage has transboundary implications. Reparation, in 
the case of a breach of a particular procedural obligation, is aimed at avoid-
ing a possible catastrophe, such as a nuclear accident. Meanwhile the role of 
reparation in term of compensation entails monetary compensation to re-
move damage caused by the accident.
77
 Reparation in international law is a 
primary obligation in relation to the liability of the State for environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident which is established if damage is 
caused, while it is a secondary obligation in relation to State responsibility 
for its wrongful acts.
78
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9.4.2 Forms of reparation 
Forms of reparation as a judicial consequence of international liability are 
varied, and their application depends on whether they are legal consequences 
for State responsibility for wrongful acts or State liability for lawful acts. 
Reparation for State responsibility for wrongful acts may take relatively dif-
ferent forms, i.e., restitution, compensation and satisfaction, while reparation 
as a consequence of State liability for lawful activities primarily takes the 
form of monetary compensation.
79
 The latter is also the only legal conse-
quence of liability under the nuclear liability conventions. However, all 
forms of reparation are covered by the general rules of international law. 
These forms of reparation apply to remedy environmental damage caused by 
a nuclear accident.
80
 The State is obliged to provide full reparation in the 
case that any form of reparation is applied to repair damage caused by a nu-
clear accident or damage resulting from a wrongful act or a breach of its in-
ternational obligations. Unfortunately, the victims of a nuclear accident can-
not be guaranteed full compensation under the nuclear liability conventions 
because the amount of compensation under the Conventions is limited. Con-
sequently, some victims of a nuclear accident might be not compensated or 
may only be partly compensated.  
 Forms of reparation have been established on the basis of custom
81
 and 
endorsed by State practice and codified by the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility for wrongful acts. However, ‘[t]he selection of the appropri-
ate form of reparation in a particular case, of course, depends on the facts, 
i.e., the specific nature of the breach and its consequences’.
82
 The priority of 
application of forms of reparation is given respectively to restitution, com-
pensation, and then satisfaction, where restitution and compensation were 
impossible.
83
 Accordingly, ‘there is no inherent difficulty in applying any of 
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these concepts to cases of environmental damage: examples of restoration of 
a damaged environment, compensation for the value of an irreparably dam-
aged environment, or monetary satisfaction for breaches of environmental 
obligations which cause no quantifiable loss can already be found in state 
practice or national law’.
84
 
9.4.2.1 Restitution and reinstatement of the impaired environment by a 
nuclear accident 
In international law restitution is the primary and essential form of reparation 
for State responsibility for wrongful acts, and has priority over compensa-
tion.
85
 This is because the principle is to return the owner’s damaged prop-
erty to its original state (restitution in kind).
86
 Restitution is aimed at restor-
ing the situation which existed before the damage was caused, if that it is 
possible. Therefore there is no justification for the injured State to claim 
compensation or any other form of reparation if restitution is possible. Ac-
cording to Article 35 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, restitu-
tion must re-establish the situation that existed before the wrongful act was 
committed, unless it is materially impossible or involves a burden out of all 
proportion to the benefit of restitution rather than compensation.
87
 Thus as 
stated by the Tribunal in The Chorzów Factory Case, restitution should ‘rees-
tablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act 
had not been committed’.
88
 However, if the wrongful act caused material 
                                                                                                                            
mittee of the General Assembly during its fifty-fifth session prepared by the Secretariat. 




 Boyle, 2002, at p. 22. 
85
 Hoogh, 1996, at p. 156. For restitution see, Sabine Thomsen, “Restitution”, in: R. 
Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL, Vol. IV, 2000, pp. 229-232; Christine Gray, “The Different Forms 
of Reparation: Restitution”, in: Crawford, Pellet and Olleson (eds.), 2010, pp. 589-597. 
86
 Echeverria, 2003, at p. 15. 
87
 ‘Restitution, in the broad sense of restitutio in integrum, represents the obligation to 
eliminate the effects of the breach, i.e. to restore the situation to its pre-breach state. Res-
titution ‘in kind’, the return of persons or property wrongfully taken, constitutes a spe-
cific subset of the general restitutio obligation. The specific performance of restitution 
may, of course, in certain cases either be inapplicable or impossible given the nature of 
the breach and its consequences: restitutio in integrum should be discarded when there is 
absolute impossibility of envisaging specific performance or when an irreversible situa-
tion has been created’. Smith, 1988, at pp. 48-49. 
88
 The Chorzów Factory Case, (1928), PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 17, 1928, at p. 47. 
446 CHAPTER 9 
 
damage and restitution is materially impossible, then compensation or satis-
faction or both can replace it.
89
 
 Restitution as a form of reparation is an important instrument for the pro-
tection of the environment in the case of unlawful environmental interfer-
ence.
90
 The responsible State is obliged to correct the situation resulting from 
a wrongful act. For example, the State must apply the rules of nuclear safety 
if it has failed to do so and it must eliminate contamination and clean up the 
environment if it disposed of nuclear waste at the sea in conflict with the 
rules of international law. In the case of environmental damage caused by a 
nuclear accident as a result of a wrongful act, the responsible State must also 
reinstate the impaired environment to the situation it was in before the acci-
dent occurred. This served to prevent nuclear accidents and their harmful 
consequences. 
 Furthermore, despite the fact that restitution is a form of reparation for a 
wrongful act, it can also be considered as a form of reparation for lawful ac-
tivities. The nuclear liability conventions, which are based on strict liability, 
use the term reinstatement rather than the term restitution to refer to the resti-
tution of the impaired environment.
91
 However, the costs of reinstatement 
measures of the impaired environment are considered to be compensation. 
Thus in that context, restitution is a relevant form of reparation for environ-
mental damage where the liability of the State is based on a wrongful act or 
strict liability. 
 However, there are some difficulties in applying restitution to remedy 
environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident, because it is uncertain 
whether the impaired environment can be restored. As Brownlie stated, 
‘whilst it is safe to assume that specific restitution as a form of redress has a 
significant place in the law, it is difficult to state the conditions of its appli-
cation with any certainty’.
92
 In the context of the environment, the applica-
tion of restitution to repair environmental damage should be clear.
93
 Never-
theless, Article 35 of the Articles defines the concept of restitution in a 
narrow context because it should also be associated with compensation to 
provide full reparation.
94
 In the case of a nuclear accident, contamination 
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caused to the environment by the accident must be cleaned up and elimi-
nated in order to restore the environment to its status quo ante. Monetary 
compensation is required to pay for the costs of the reinstatement measures 
taken. Therefore it is difficult to consider restitution as a separate form of 
reparation to restore the impaired environment because it is sometimes associ-
ated with compensation. In order to restore the impaired environment to its 
previous condition, the responsible State is obligated to pay the costs of clean-
ing it up.  
 However, in this case it is difficult to distinguish between restitution and 
compensation. In my opinion, this distinction can be made, as restitution is 
usually carried out by the responsible State, while compensation can be paid 
by the responsible State to the injured State to repair the damage and to rein-
state the impaired environment. 
 Finally, in some cases environmental damage cannot be remedied.
95
 The 
Chernobyl accident demonstrated that it is impossible to restore the impaired 
environment to the same condition that pertained before the damage oc-
curred. In the case of a major nuclear accident, radioactivity may damage the 
fauna and flora. Everything contaminated by a nuclear accident must be 
eliminated which changes the features of the environment. Therefore it is 
necessary to make a distinction between restitution in the broader sense, 
which means a return to the situation before the damage was caused, and 
restitution in kind. In the first case it is impossible to return the impaired en-
vironment to the situation it was in before the nuclear accident, but the envi-
ronment must be cleaned up to return to the former situation. However, it is 
possible to return property to its owner by giving similar property. It is not 
possible for a State to undo a breach of an international obligation, but it is 
possible for the State to guarantee the non-repetition of such an act. In those 
cases, compensation or satisfaction is relevant to repair the damage.  
9.4.2.2 Compensation for environmental damage caused by a nuclear 
accident 
9.4.2.2.1 Compensation and reparation of damage  
Compensation in international law is the main and central remedy for damage 
resulting from an internationally wrongful act which applies after restitu-
tion.
96
 According to Article 36 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility, the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is 
obliged to compensate damage caused by such an act which cannot be reme-
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died by restitution. The compensation should cover any damage that can be 
financially assessed, including loss of profits where this has been estab-
lished. ‘Compensation is a prevalent remedy, typically in cash or its equivalent, 
calculated to make good elements of loss of, or injury to, legally protected in-
terests. It is commonly employed where the loss or injury can be quantified in 
mone[tar]y terms, but can include recognized non-pecuniary injuries…’
97
  
 According to the principle as determined by the PCIJ in its judgement in 
the Chorzów Factory Case in 1928, compensation should remedy all the 
damage caused by illegal act to return to the situation before the act was 
committed.
98
 In order to provide full reparation, compensation should cover 
direct and non-direct damage. As we saw in chapter 3, in the Case concern-
ing the United States Products Company (United States v. Germany), the 
Tribunal rejected the distinction between direct and indirect damage because 
there was no clear standard to determine the compensable damage.
99
 This 
also applies to compensation for damage caused by lawful activities. Simi-
larly, the nuclear liability conventions do not distinguish between direct and 
indirect damage caused to the victims of a nuclear accident. They consider 
that all nuclear and non-nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident is nu-
clear damage. Therefore the recoverable environmental damage must be 
caused by an activity. The injured State or the victims must prove that the 
damage was caused by a wrongful act or by a nuclear accident (causality 
between the damage and the nuclear activity).
100
 
 Thus the compensation should cover all the damage suffered by the in-
jured State or the victims. This is governed by the general rules of interna-
tional law and the nuclear liability conventions. Under the general rules of 
international law compensation is used to remedy damage resulting either 
from physical damage caused to the environment by a nuclear accident or 
from moral or legal damage resulting from a breach of environmental and 
nuclear obligations. However, under the nuclear liability conventions, com-
pensation is aimed at remedying physical damage caused by a nuclear acci-
dent, including damage or loss to property and persons, economic loss and 
damage to the impaired environment, and the costs of measures of preven-
tive and restoring it to its previous condition. It should also cover psycho-
logical and moral damage caused to victims of a nuclear accident, but it does 
not cover legal damage caused as a result of the violation by a State of its 
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international obligations. This is governed by the general rules of interna-
tional law.  
 In most cases, compensation is covered by international conventions and 
awards made by international tribunals and courts. Under the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions, compensation for environmental damage caused by a nu-
clear accident is provided by the operator of a nuclear installation under the 
applicable nuclear liability convention, i.e., the Paris convention, the Vienna 
Convention and the Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of 
Nuclear Ships.
101
 The State is also obliged to provide additional compensa-
tion to victims of nuclear damage under the Brussels Supplementary Com-
pensation and the Vienna Convention as Amended by the 1997 Protocol and 
the 1997 Supplementary Compensation Convention.
102
 As mentioned above, 
compensation for nuclear damage under these conventions is claimed under 
the civil liability regime. However, the remaining compensation and uncom-
pensated damage, including damage caused as a result of a wrongful act, 
should be claimed under the general rules of international law.
103
 Further-
more, the victims should not be awarded compensation twice. Victims of a 
nuclear accident who seek compensation under the civil liability regime of 
the nuclear liability conventions are not entitled to compensation under the 
general rules of international law, unless they have not been fully compen-
sated. 
 The principle of compensation for environmental damage is fully supported 
by the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects under the general rules of international law. According to that 
Convention, compensation should be determined by the principles of inter-
national law, including the principles of justice and equity.
104
 In the Case 
Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project the ICJ supported compensa-
tion for environmental damage by stating that both Slovakia and Hungary were 
entitled to compensation under international law because both had suffered 
damage and each State should pay compensation to the other State, according 
to the 1977 Treaty.
105
 In the case of Hungary, the Court stated that ‘Hungary is 
entitled to compensation for the damage sustained as a result of the diversion of 
the Danube, since Czechoslovakia, by putting into operation Variant C, and 
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Slovakia, in maintaining it in service, deprived Hungary of its rightful part in 




9.4.2.2.2 Assessment of compensation for environmental damage 
The assessment of compensation for environmental damage caused by a nu-
clear accident or in the case of State responsibility for a violation of envi-
ronmental and nuclear obligations depends on the applicable regime of li-
ability. Under the nuclear liability conventions, compensation is estimated 
for each nuclear accident according to the amount of liability determined 
under the applicable convention. However, under the general rules of inter-
national law there are no specific rules for the assessment of compensation. 
It is assessed by the competent court according to the facts presented, unless 
there is an agreement by the parties concerned which determines the amount 
of compensation in this case. Therefore, the amount of compensation is sub-
ject to negotiations between the States parties and the assessments of judges. 
Accordingly, the amount of compensation is limited by the provision of the 
applicable liability conventions, while under the rules of international law it 
is unlimited and the court estimates the compensation required for all the 
damage caused by a nuclear accident.  
9.4.2.2.2.1 Assessment of compensation under the nuclear liability conventions 
The assessment of the amount of compensation to be paid for the reparation 
of environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident under the nuclear 
liability conventions varies from one convention to another. The Conven-
tions limit the amount of compensation and the time for victims to bring ac-
tions for compensation to the competent court. However, the nature and ex-
tent of compensation under the nuclear liability conventions have been left to 
be determined by the competent court. This section discusses three issues 
related to the assessment of compensation under the nuclear liability conven-
tions. These are the amount of compensation, the time limit for bringing 
claims for compensation and the competent court. These issues will be dis-
cussed in relation to every nuclear liability convention with reference to 
some of the bilateral nuclear liability agreements governing nuclear activi-
ties. 
The amount of compensation 
Under the 1960 Paris Convention compensation for nuclear damage caused 
by a nuclear accident consists of two tiers of compensation.
107
 The Conven-
                                                     
106
 ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7, at p. 81, para. 152. 
 The legal consequences of liability and responsibility for environmental nuclear damage 451 
 
tion limits the maximum amount of the operator’s liability to a maximum of 
15 million European Monetary Agreement units of account (SDRs) per nu-
clear accident and not less than 5 million SDRs.
108
 This should be covered 
by insurance or other financial security up to the maximum amount of liabil-
ity set by national legislation, in pursuance of the amount provided by the 
Paris Convention.
109
 This maximum amount of compensation, however, was 
little more than the amount of nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident, 
compared with the amount of compensation provided for under the national 
legislations of some Contracting Parties, which limit the operator’s liability 
to an amount higher than 15 million SDRs as imposed by the Convention, or 
set a lower ceiling.
110
 This amount of compensation could not meet the ob-
jectives of the Convention, which is mainly aimed at guaranteeing equitable 
compensation to victims of nuclear damage. In comparison with some na-
tional laws at that time, the Convention’s maximum compensation did not 
appear to be equitable at all. Furthermore, in order to guarantee equitable 
compensation to victims of a nuclear accident, the Convention prevents dis-




 To ensure appropriate compensation for all victims who suffer nuclear 
damage as a result of a nuclear accident, the Paris Convention was supple-
mented, as mentioned above, by the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Conven-
tion to provide compensation additional to that of the operator’s liability un-
der the Paris Convention, which is provided by the Installation State and 
other Contracting Parties. This additional compensation under the Brussels 
Convention, as amended by the 1982 Protocol, is up to 300 million SDRs.
112
 
The amount of compensation under the 1963 Brussels Convention consists 
of three tiers. The first tier is provided by the operator of a nuclear installa-
tion under the Paris Convention and should be a minimum of 5 million SDRs 
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and a maximum of 15 million SDRs, covered by insurance or other financial 
security. This is the amount of the operator’s liability under the Paris Con-
vention. The second tier is provided by public funds under the 1963 Brussels 
Supplementary Convention. It is provided by the Contracting State in whose 
territory the nuclear reactor is located when the amount of compensation re-
quired for victims of a nuclear accident exceeds the first tier, the operator’s 
liability, up to 175 million SDRs. The third tier is also provided by public 
funds to be paid by all the Contacting Parties to the Convention between the 
second tier and 300 million SDRs (125 million SDRs) if the required amount 
of compensation exceeds the second tier. It is calculated according to the 
formula established in Article 12 of the Convention.
113
 This formula is based 
on 50% of the gross national product of the Contracting Party and 50 % of the 
thermal power of the installed nuclear reactors’ capacity in its territory.
114
 This 
amount of compensation under the two Conventions was further increased by 
the 2004 Protocols to Amend to the two Conventions in order to be consistent 
with the required amount of compensation for a nuclear accident, because it 
was too low to cover all the nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident.   
 The amount of the operator’s liability, as amended by the 2004 Protocol 
to Amend to the Paris Convention, raised the amount of the operator’s liabil-
ity from 15 million SDRs for the maximum amount to not less than €700 
million
115
 and for low-risk installations and transport of nuclear substances 
to €70 million and €80 million respectively per nuclear accident, the mini-
mum amount of the operator’s liability.
116
 The Protocol also allows the 
States which joined the Convention after 1 January 1999 to limit the opera-
tor’s liability in its national legislation to not less than €350 million for five 
years from the date of the adoption of the 2004 Protocol.
117
 The unit of ac-
count also was changed from SDR to euro. Finally, in case that the Amended 
Paris Convention is applicable to a non-Contracting Party whose nuclear 
liability legislation provides for reciprocal benefits like the Convention, the 
Protocol allows a Contracting Party to establish a lower liability scheme than 
that provided for under the Convention in respect of nuclear damage suffered 
by a non-Contracting Party to the extent that it provides reciprocal benefits 
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of an equivalent amount.
118
 This aims at motivation of non-Contracting 
States to join the Convention.   
 In addition, the 2004 Brussels Amended Supplementary Convention in-
creased the amount of compensation and changed the unit of account from 
SDR into euro in order to be consistent with the Amended Paris Convention. 
This Convention increased the amount of compensation up to €1500 million 
per nuclear accident. This must be guaranteed by the Contracting Parties. 
The Convention is also composed of three tiers, the same division as that in 
the original Brussels Supplementary Convention, but the amount of compen-
sation has increased. Under the Paris Convention the first tier is provided by 
the operator of a nuclear installation up to at least €700 million, which 
should be insured by his financial cover. This amount of compensation must 
also be guaranteed by the Installation State. In the case that it is not available 
or is insufficient to cover all the nuclear damage caused by a nuclear acci-
dent, it must be provided by the Installation State in whose territory the in-
stallation of the liable operator is located, up to the amount of the operator’s 
liability.
119
 The second tier is provided by public funds provided by the In-
stallation State between the first tier and €1200 million, i.e., €500 million 
where the first tier, paid by the operator (€700 million), was insufficient to 
compensate all the nuclear damage caused by the nuclear accident. However, 
the third tier is paid by all the Contracting Parties between the second tier 
(€1200 million) and €1500 million, i.e., €300 million. It is calculated for 
each Contracting Party according to the formula established in Article 12 of 
the Convention.
120
 This formula is different from that provided for under the 
1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention because it is based on the calcula-
tion of the nuclear energy that is generated and the gross domestic product of 
the acceding party. It is based on 35% of the gross domestic product and on 
65 % of the installed nuclear capacity.
121
 This method of calculation applies 
the principle of justice because the nuclear States which are the beneficiaries 
of nuclear energy have to pay the highest contributions. On the other hand, it 
makes more compensation available to victims of nuclear damage, depend-
ing on the number of nuclear contracting parties. 
 Similarly, the 1963 Vienna Convention limits the minimum amount of 
liability of the operator of a nuclear installation to not less than US$5 million 
per nuclear accident, excluding any interest or costs of claims for compensa-
tion awarded by the courts, with no maximum limit. This amount was esti-
                                                     
118
 Articles 2 (a) (iv) and 7 (g) of the 2004 Amended Paris Convention. 
119
 Rustand, 2003, at p. 140. 
120
 Article 3 of the 2004 Amended Brussels Supplementary Convention. 
121
 Articles 12 of the 2004 Amended Brussels Supplementary Convention. 
454 CHAPTER 9 
 
mated according to the 1963 value of gold, equivalent to the value of the US 
dollar in terms of gold on 29 April 1963, which was US$35 per troy 
ounce.
122
 This price does not reflect the development of the gold price, 
which is increasing and cannot be compared to the gold price in 1963.
123
 
This Convention does not have a supplementary convention to provide addi-
tional compensation to victims of a nuclear accident, as in the case of the 
Paris Convention which was supplemented by the 1963 Brussels Supplemen-
tary Compensation Convention. Therefore increasing the amount of compen-
sation provided under the Convention was one of the main purposes of the 
revision of the Vienna Convention.
124
 This was taken into account by the 




 After its amendment by the 1997 Vienna Protocol, the Convention estab-
lished the amount of compensation to either not less than the minimum 
amount of compensation (300 million SDRs)
126
 or not less than 150 million 
SDRs, provided that the difference between this amount and the higher 
amount (300 million SDRs) must be made available by the Installation State 
by public funds.
127
 It also allowed the Installation State to determine a transi-
tional period of 15 years from the date of entry into force of the Protocol to 
compensate nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident during that period, 
and to determine the amount of compensation at less than 100 million 
SDRs.
128
 However, the difference between the lesser amount and 100 million 
SDRs must be available by the State by public funds. In any case, the limited 
amount of liability must not be less than 5 million SDRs and the difference 
between this amount and the higher amount, 300 million SDRs, must be se-
cured by the Installation State by public funds.
129
 Nevertheless, the amount 
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of compensation provided by the Vienna Convention is still small to cover 
all the damage caused by a nuclear accident compared with the Paris Con-
vention and its Brussels Supplementary Convention. This indicates why the 
1997 Vienna Convention on Supplementary Compensation was adopted. 
However, this Convention does not apply only to damage caused by a nu-
clear accident to victims of the Contracting Parties to the Vienna Conven-
tion, but also to victims of the Paris Convention. 
 Therefore, both the Vienna and the Paris Conventions benefited from the 
1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.
130
 
This Convention is a freestanding convention which applies to the Contract-
ing Parties of both the Paris and Vienna Conventions. The amount of com-
pensation under this convention is composed of two tiers. The first tier has to 
be paid by the Installation State, while the second tier is paid by all the Con-
tracting Parties to the Convention. The minimum amount of compensation 
under this Convention is 300 million SDRs. This amount will be paid by the 
Installation State.
131
 The Convention also allows a Contracting Party to es-
tablish a transitional amount of at least 150 million SDRs to compensate for 
nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident for the maximum period of ten 
years from the date of the opening of the Convention to its signature.
132
 This 
amount of compensation is paid by the Installation State under the civil li-
ability regime when the amount of compensation exceeds the amount of li-
ability of the operator of a nuclear installation and the limited amount of 
compensation for a nuclear accident under the applicable convention. How-
ever, the collective contributions of the Contracting Parties must be paid by 
the Contracting States according to a formula established under Article IV of 
the Convention. According to this formula, the amount of the State’s contri-
butions is calculated on the basis of the installed nuclear power capacity of 
the Contracting State per MW thermal power and the UN Rate of Assess-
ment for that State. However, a State with a minimum rate of assessment 
which does not generate nuclear power is not required to make contribu-
tions.
133
 Thus the available amount of contributions for a nuclear accident 
depends on the number of nuclear Contracting Parties to the Convention. 
This amount of compensation is paid by the Contracting Parties where the 
amount of compensation of the first tier was insufficient to compensate all 
the nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident. Moreover, the Convention 
allows a Contracting State to arrange public funds outside the scope of the 
                                                     
130
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Convention through regional or other agreements to fulfil its obligations un-
der the Convention. This is provided that such agreements do not impose 
additional obligations on the Contracting Parties, or the member States have 
no nuclear installations in their territories, for instance, according to the 
principle of reciprocity.
134
 However, beyond this amount, compensation for a 
nuclear accident must be claimed by the State under international law.
135
 
 The amount of compensation to be paid to victims of a nuclear accident 
on a nuclear ship under the 1962 Brussels Convention on Liability of the 
Operators of Nuclear Ships
136
 is limited to 1,500 million gold francs per nu-
clear accident, excluding the interests and costs of actions for compensa-
tion.
137
 This Convention does not provide for additional compensation to be 
paid by the Installation State, but it obliges the operator to provide financial 
coverage. The licensing State must also ensure the payment of claims against 
the operator for compensation to victims of nuclear damage by providing the 




 Furthermore, a similar amount of compensation is provided by all the 
bilateral nuclear agreements relating to liability for nuclear damage caused 
by nuclear ships. Under the bilateral agreements between the United States 
and the host States, liability is limited to $500 million per nuclear accident 
with regard to the Nuclear Ship Savannah in the ports of those States.
139
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However, under the agreements between Germany and other countries con-
cerning the German N. S. Otto Hahn in the ports of those countries liability 
is limited to DM400 million per nuclear accident.
140
 The amount of liability 
under the bilateral agreements is ensured by the States involved.
141
 
 Despite the fact that the amount of compensation provided by the opera-
tor and the States to victims of a nuclear accident was increased after the 
amendments of the Paris and Vienna Conventions and the adoption of the 
1997 Convention on supplementary funding and the amendment of the Brus-
sels Supplementary Convention, it is still insufficient to cover damage 
caused by a major accident. For instance, the Chernobyl accident cost $3 
billion, which is over the limit of any nuclear liability convention.
142
 Simi-
larly, with regard to the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Government of Ja-
pan agreed to provide financial assistance of JPY 5 trillion ($62 billion) to 
the operator of the nuclear installation so that compensation could be paid to 
victims of the accident.
143
 The initial assessment of compensation for the 
damage caused by the accident was estimated to be approximately $235 bil-
lion.
144
 Furthermore, after the amendments of some nuclear liability legisla-
tions, the amount of compensation for a nuclear accident was set higher than 
the amount of compensation provided by the nuclear liability conventions. 
For instance, under the US Price Anderson Act the operator’s liability is now 
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determined at $12.5 billion per nuclear accident, Germany provides unlim-
ited liability of €2.5 billion per plant and Japan provides JPY 120 billion 
(US$ 1.4 billion).
145
 This indicates that the amount of compensation pro-
vided for under a nuclear liability convention will not cover all environ-
mental damage caused by a major nuclear accident if the amount of compen-
sation provided is limited. Therefore, the option is to compensate the 
remaining environmental damage caused by a major nuclear accident under 
the general rules of international law. The adoption of State intervention un-
der the nuclear liability conventions is considered a great step forward in 
improving the system of State liability to cover the nuclear damage caused 
by accidents in nuclear reactor. This can lead to the recognition of the inter-
national liability of State for nuclear damage caused by accidents in nuclear 
reactors, especially for transboundary environmental damage. 
The time limit for presenting claims for compensation 
The 1960 Paris Convention limits the time for presenting claims for compen-
sation for nuclear damage against the operator of a nuclear installation to ten 
years from the date of the occurrence of a nuclear accident.
146
 This period of 
time was not enough to reveal all the damage caused by a nuclear accident, 
especially personal injuries which take decades to be discovered. At the 
same time, some national laws provide for longer periods of time for bring-
ing claims for compensation.
147
 The 2004 Paris Protocol adopted a longer 
period, which allows the victims of a nuclear accident to bring claims for 
compensation for loss of life and personal injury for up to thirty years from 
the date of a nuclear accident and for other nuclear damage, including envi-
ronmental damage for up to ten years from the date of a nuclear accident.
148
 
However, claims for compensation are no longer valid if they are not brought 
within three years from the date after which the victims know or should rea-
sonably know about the damage and the operator liable for the damage.
149
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 Similarly, the 1963 Vienna Convention limits the time for the submission 
of claims for compensation for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident 
to ten years from the date of the accident. It also allows for the extension of 
the ten years under the law of the Installation State, provided that the period 
which exceeds ten years is covered by the operator by insurance or other fi-
nancial security, or by State public funds.
150
 Nevertheless, as in the case of 
the Paris Convention, it was clear that this period of time was insufficient for 
all the nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident to be revealed, as most 
conditions caused as a result of exposure to nuclear radiation take a few dec-
ades to develop. This was taken into account during the negotiations for the 
revision of the Vienna Convention and was reflected in the new amendments 
to the convention, which included a longer period of time for the submission 
of claims for compensation than that provided by the 1963 Vienna Conven-
tion.
151
 The 1997 Protocol Amending the Vienna Convention therefore re-
placed the original ten years by a period of thirty years as regards loss of life 
and personal injuries, and ten years for other injuries, including environ-
mental damage.
152
 Accordingly, claims for compensation are no longer valid 
if they are not submitted to court within thirty years from the date of the nu-
clear accident as regards loss of life and personal injury, and within ten years 
of the date of the nuclear accident as regards other injuries.
153
 The Protocol 
also gives the Installation State the right to determine a longer period than 
that provided for by the Protocol in its national law, provided that this is 
covered by the operator’s liability as regards financial coverage for any 
claim for compensation brought after the period indicated in the Conven-
tion.
154
 Furthermore, it should not affect any person’s right to compensation 
for nuclear damage who has brought an action for compensation against the 
operator within the thirty or ten years provided for by the Convention.
155
 Ac-
tions for compensation become invalid if they are not brought within three 
years from the date on which the victims of nuclear damage know or should 
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 The 1962 Brussels Nuclear Ships Convention limits the time for bringing 
claims for compensation to ten years from the date of the accident, unless the 
law of the State which licensed the operator provides for a period longer than 
ten years, provided that there is financial coverage.
157
 Similarly, the bilateral 
nuclear liability agreements, such as the agreement of 27 May 1970 between 
Germany and Liberia
158
 and Article 6 (6) and (7) of the agreement of 7 June 
between Germany and Brazil
159
 on the Use of Liberian and Brazilian Ports 
by the N. S. Otto Hahn, limit the time of liability for the submission of 
claims to the courts to a period of ten years. 
 Despite the fact that the Amended Paris and Vienna Conventions provide 
for bringing claims for compensation within thirty years in case of loss of 
life and personal injuries and to ten years for other damage, neither of these 
periods is sufficient for the damage to be fully revealed.  In the case of the 
Chernobyl accident, there are some restrictions on the proper use of the envi-
ronment in some places as they are still contaminated, and they cannot be 
used by the public, despite the fact that the accident occurred more than 
twenty-five years ago. This contamination may expose people to radioactiv-
ity, and any person exposed to radioactivity may suffer injury in the future. It 
is difficult for any victim who suffers injury as a result of radioactive con-
tamination to be compensated in accordance with the nuclear liability con-
ventions. Therefore, victims of a nuclear accident should bring their claims 
for compensation within ten years of discovering the damage and the opera-
tor liable for the damage, and not within ten years of the occurrence of the 
accident. 
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The competent court for compensation 
Determining the competent court to decide on compensation for nuclear 
damage is an important issue because the nuclear installation may be located 
in one country while the liable persons may be in another country, and the 
nuclear accident may have occurred in yet another country, e.g., in the case 
of the transport of nuclear substances where the harmful consequences be-
come apparent in another country. This raises the question of which courts in 
which countries are competent as regards claims of compensation for envi-
ronmental damage. In principle, under the Paris and Vienna Conventions, the 
jurisdiction of the competent court over claims for compensation lies with 
the courts of a Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear accident has 
occurred.
160
 However, if the accident occurred outside the territory of a Con-
tracting Party or the location of the accident cannot be determined, the juris-
diction of the courts lies with the courts of the Installation State.
161
 Further-
more, if a nuclear accident has occurs in the exclusive economic zone of a 
Contracting Party or such a zone has not been established, where it is an area 
not exceeding the limit of the exclusive zone, the jurisdiction of the court 
over claims of compensation for nuclear damage lies with the courts of that 
Contracting Party.
162
 Judgments pronounced by the competent court are rec-
ognized and enforceable in the territory of any other Contracting Party to the 
Convention without any further proceedings.
163
 Except as regards measures 
of execution, the Contracting State may not invoke any jurisdictional immu-
nity before the competent court.
164
 
 Similarly, the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent court over claims of 
compensation for environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident under 
the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation lies with the courts of 
the Contracting Parties within whose territory the nuclear accident oc-
curred.
165
 However, the competent courts which have jurisdiction over 
claims for compensation for nuclear damage caused by nuclear accidents in 
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the territorial sea or the exclusive economic zones are those of the State 
which has jurisdiction over those areas.
166
 Therefore all the Contracting Par-
ties have to recognize the competence of that court and the fact that only one 
court is competent for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident. Finally, 




 The situation is rather different from what is provided for under the mari-
time nuclear liability conventions, which give more options to victims of a 
nuclear accident to claim for compensation. Accordingly, the jurisdiction 
with regard to claims for compensation under the 1962 Brussels Nuclear 
Ships Convention lies with the courts of the licensing State, or the courts of 
the Contracting State or the courts of the Contracting Party in whose terri-
tory the damage was suffered.
168
 This is in the interests of victims of a nu-
clear accident, because it gives them more options and facilitates the proce-
dures for bringing their claims for compensation, but it affects the outcome 
of the compensation, as the amount of compensation will differ from one 
victim to another, depending on the court where the claim is presented.  
 Furthermore, despite the fact that this Convention was taken as a model 
for the bilateral nuclear liability agreements for nuclear damage caused by 
nuclear ships, jurisdiction under these agreements lies only with the courts of 
the host States.
169
 The law of the host State is also applicable to damage 
caused by a nuclear accident. Under Article 1 of the 6 February 1963 agree-
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ment between the United States and the Netherlands, the competent court for 
compensation for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident by the N. S. 
Savannah is any competent court of the Netherlands or a commission estab-
lished under Netherlands law for that purpose, and the principles of law 
which exist at the time of a nuclear accident apply to the United States. Simi-
larly, Article VIII of the 1964 agreement between the United States and Italy 
provides for the application of Italian law and the Italian courts to have com-
petence with regard to claims for compensation for damage caused by a nu-
clear accident by the N.S. Savannah. Similar provisions are provided for un-
der the bilateral agreements related to the German N.S. Otto Hahn. 
According to the Treaty between Germany and Liberia, jurisdiction over 
claims for compensation lies with the Liberian Courts and judgements issued 
by these courts are recognized and enforceable in Germany.
170
 
9.4.2.2.2.2 Assessment of compensation under the general rules of international 
law 
The assessment of compensation for environmental damage caused by a nu-
clear activity is a major problem because there are no criteria in international 
law to assess the compensation. This also applies particularly in the case of 
an assessment for compensation for the violation of a State to its interna-
tional obligations, as there is no particular method to assess the damage re-
sulting from an illegal act committed or omitted by the State in monetary 
terms.
171
 In the absence of such criteria, international tribunals and courts 
apply the methods developed to determine compensation in the civil law sys-
tem.
172
 These methods are taken by international courts as a guide for deter-
mining the amount of compensation under international law. This is because 
compensation for damage should be determined according to the rules of 
international law and not national law. Thus the matter is in the hands of the 
court unless an agreement determines the total sum of compensation.  
 The court has to determine the amount of compensation and the time for 
assessing the damage. According to the above-mentioned judgment in the 
Chorzów Factory Case, compensation should eliminate all the damage 
caused by the illegal act.
173
 The compensation must cover all the original 
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damage caused to the injured State, also including interest, economic loss 
and other related damage,
174
 restoring the situation to that which existed before 
the damage took place and settling the matter according to the principles of 
justice and equity.
175
 This means that the damages must be assessed in a way 
that allows the damage to be removed and restores the situation into status quo 
ante.
176
 However, as regards the time within which compensation for the 
damage and the interest should be assessed by the court, this is based on the 
date on which the damage occurred.
177
 This was indicated by the ICJ in the 
Corfu Channel Case, (Assessment of the Amount of Compensation). It 
stated: ‘The Court considers the true measure of compensation in the present 
case to be the replacement cost of the Saumarez at the time of its loss’.
178
 
These rules are applied by the court in each individual case and the judge 
decides how experts assess the damage.  
 These rules are not sufficient to determine the amount of compensation 
for transboundary environmental damage, which should be assessed on the 
basis of new standards. This is because it is difficult, for example, to provide 
an accurate assessment of compensation for pure environmental damage or 
pure economic loss or the costs of preventive or reinstatement measures.
179
 It 
is also because environmental damage can spread across many countries and 
can be associated with damage to persons and property, as well as moral 
damage.  
‘Compensation can be awarded for damage to the environment of a State, such 
as by pollution. 
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Compensation is for actual loss: unlike some domestic laws, international law 
has no settled concept of penal or exemplary compensation. How the amount 
of compensation is assessed will depend on the content of the relevant primary 
rules and the behaviour of the States concerned, the aim being to reach an equi-
table and acceptable outcome. The valuation of capital is a particular problem. 
Expropriation of assets gives rise to special difficulties’.
180
 
Therefore, a suggestion was made to establish new criteria for the assess-
ment of environmental damage caused by such activities.
181
 This took place 
during the codification of the topic of international liability for lawful activi-
ties not prohibited by international law. The Special Rapporteur Barboza 
stated:  
‘Harm in the present context was not assessed only in its individual physical 
dimensions, but also in relation to certain factors that would be enumerated. 
Such an assessment of harm was another difference between the present topic 
and that of State responsibility; for the activities dealt with in the present con-
text were not prohibited and the preventive measures might impose a heavy fi-
nancial burden on the State of origin, a factor which should not be ignored in 
the assessment of pecuniary damages’.
182
 
Certain international cases awarded general compensation, but other cases 
related to environmental damage deserve a mention and serve as a guide in 
nuclear cases. In the Dickson Car Wheel Company case, (USA) v United 
Mexican States, the Government of Mexico was obliged to pay compensa-
tion for using the state-owned railways and property. According to paragraph 
9 of the 1925 Agreement, the Government of Mexico agreed to establish a 
commission of experts to determine the amount of physical damage caused 
by the Railways. Accordingly, ‘[t]he Appraisal Commission, on May 29, 
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1929, rendered its decision conformably to which the Government agreed to 
the sum of $15,000,000.00 for the physical damage’.
183
 In the I’m Alone 
case, which is related to compensation for a wrongful act, the Commission-
ers considered the act of sinking the ship by the officers of the United States 
Coast Guard to be unlawful and asked the United States to formally ac-
knowledge the illegality of that act and to pay the sum of $25,000 to Canada 
for material damage caused to the ship.
184
 In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ 
awarded the UK compensation for the loss of a ship, the cost of repairs, and 
expenses arising from personal injury and death. The amount of compensa-
tion claimed by the UK amounted to a total sum of ₤843,947, including 
₤700,087 for the loss of the ship the Saumarez, ₤93,812 for the Volage and 
₤50,048 for death and personal injuries.
185
 The experts estimated the total 
damage at a sum of ₤716,780. However, the Court found that the amount of 
compensation claimed by the UK was reasonable and founded, although it 
could not award more than the amount that was claimed.
186
 
 The assessment of compensation for environmental cases is reflected 
more clearly in the Trail Smelter case, which is the case most often used as 
an analogy of environmental damage caused by nuclear activity.
187
 The 
United States and Canada agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration after 
private attempts failed to resolve it.
188
 The Tribunal awarded compensation 
estimated at US$350,000 to the US for damage caused by the Smelter from 1 
January 1932 and during the period that the Smelter was in operation.
189
 This 
is the amount of compensation agreed upon by the parties according to Arti-
cle 1 of the special agreement between them (Convention for Settlement of 
Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter at Trail). The Tribunal did 
not refer to environmental damage. However, according to Sands, pure envi-
ronmental damage is involved in ‘uncleared land’.
190
 Furthermore, on the 
basis of Article XI of the Convention, the Tribunal awarded the US $7,500 
per year as compensation to determine what damage had occurred, but only 
when the two Governments determined under Article XI of the Convention 
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that damage has occurred in the year in question.
191
 However, after the arbi-
tration commission completed its report the victims did not receive compen-




 A more recent case concerns the Iraq and Kuwait dispute over compensa-
tion for environmental damage caused by Iraq during the occupation of Ku-
wait. As mentioned above, the UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 
April 1991 reaffirmed the State responsibility of Iraq for environmental 
damage caused as a result of the unlawful occupation of Kuwait and obliged 
Iraq to pay compensation for environmental damage caused to Kuwait and 
other countries. As Paragraph 16 of the resolution stated, Iraq ‘is liable under 
international law for any direct loss, damage-including environmental dam-
age and the depletion of natural resources or injury to foreign Governments, 
nationals and corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait’. However, the Resolution did not define the concept of environ-
mental damage and the amount of compensation. It provided for the creation 
of a compensation commission to administer the funds.
193
 This case is im-
portant because ‘[t]he largest environmental claims have been processed by 
the UNCC which has awarded some US$5.2 billion in respect of over 100 
claims. These awards were in respect of damage and the depletion of natural 
resources in the Persian Gulf including costs incurred by Governments out-
side of the region assisting States affected by the damage’.
194
 
9.4.2.2.3 Claims for compensation for environmental nuclear damage 
Unfortunately, no cases of compensation for nuclear damage have been 
awarded by international courts to serve as precedents for the courts to as-
sess compensation for environmental damage in nuclear cases. As we will 
see below, in state practice compensation has been paid on an ex gratia ba-
sis. In other cases compensation was paid by national courts. These cases 
indicate the amount of compensation paid by the State for damage caused by 
major nuclear accidents. They can serve as precedents for the basis for as-
sessing the amount of compensation for environmental damage caused by a 
nuclear accident. The earliest cases relating to compensation for nuclear 
damage are claims for damage caused by the United States in relation to nu-
clear tests conducted in the Marshall Islands. During the period from 30 June 
1946 to 18 August 1958, the United States conducted 43 atmospheric nu-
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clear tests in the Marshall Islands, which contaminated the two islands of 
Bikini and Enewetak and other surrounding islands with radioactivity.
195
 As 
a result, the residents had to move 140 miles away.
196
 The Bikini Island re-
mains uninhibited to this day, while the people of Enewetak returned on 1 
October 1980, after spending 33 years in exile in Ujelang. During that time 
the inhabitants suffered from malnutrition and other hardships and a large 
part of the Enewetak Island remains contaminated by radioactivity and is 
still uninhabited.
197
 In addition, 27 Japanese crew members on the fishing 
ship Fukuryu Mara were exposed to radiation when the US conducting a hy-
drogen bomb test on 1 March 1954. As a result, one of the crew died and the 
others suffered serious injuries.
198
 
 In 1955, the United States paid compensation to Japanese crew members, 
based on ex gratia payments, for damage resulting from the tests while they 
were fishing near the Marshall Islands in March 1954, while not admitting 
its legal responsibility.
199
 It paid two million dollars for the personal injuries 
suffered by the crew and for the damage caused to the Japanese fishing in-
dustry.
200
 A letter from the United States Government to the Japanese Gov-
ernment on 4 January 1955 stated that: 
‘… The Government of the United States of America has made clear that it is 
prepared to make monetary compensation as an additional expression to its 
concern and regret over the injuries sustained… 
…the United States of America hereby, tenders ex gratia, to the Government of 
Japan, without reference to the question of legal responsibility, the sum of two 
million dollars for purposes of compensation for the injuries or damages sus-
tained as a result of nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands in 1954’.
201
 
On 16 July 1990, the people of Enewetak filed claims for compensation with 
the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal for damage caused by the nu-
clear tests carried out by the United States between 1946 and 1958. The Tri-
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bunal dealt with claims for loss of use from 24 and 27 January 1997 and 
claims for rehabilitation and other consequential damage from 14-22 April 
1999.
202
 On April 13, 2000, the Tribunal issued its decision on the claims. 
The decision obliges the United States to pay a sum of compensation 
amounting to a total of $324,949,311 to the people of Enewetak for the dam-
age they suffered and future damage that might be caused as result of the 
tests. This includes ‘$199,154,811 for past and future loss of use of 
Enewetak Atoll to claimants. It further includes $1,710,000 to restore 
Enewetak to a safe and productive State. Finally, it includes $34,084,500 for 
the hardships suffered by the people of Enewetak as a result of their reloca-
tion attendant to their loss of use’.
203
 However, ‘it is unclear whether the 
compensation included an amount for damage to the marine environment or 
loss of environmental amenity’.
204
 
 In the case of the 1957 Windscale accident, a significant number of farm-
ers received approximately ₤50,000 compensation from the UK Government 
for the damage they suffered.
205
 This compensation was paid by the govern-
ment to assist the farmers, but no regime of liability was applied.
206
 How-
ever, the accident caused harmful transboundary environmental damage to 
the neighbouring countries, i.e., Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, 
Norway and Sweden.
207
 None of the injured States claimed compensation for 
the damage they suffered as a result of the accident. 
 In the 1978 Cosmos 954 accident, the process of cleaning up and remov-
ing the satellite debris took six months and cost $CDN 14 million.
208
 Nego-
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tiations between the Canadian and the USSR authorities regarding the pay-
ments for the damages began in January 1979 and took approximately 
twenty-two months. The payment for the damages was based on the 1972 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 
other agreements between the two parties, particularly the 1967 Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the general 
principles of international law.
209
 The total claim for costs, as mentioned, 
was $CDN 6 million. However, after long negotiations the USSR agreed to 
pay only half of this amount.
210
 
 In the case of the 1986 Chernobyl accident, no State affected by the acci-
dent brought claims for compensation against the USSR before international 
courts. As mentioned, the damage caused by the accident affected many coun-
tries. However, if a case had been brought before an international court, it 
would have been difficult to assess the environmental damage caused by the 
accident, because there was no clear standard for the method of assessment. 
Therefore it is difficult for the court to provide an accurate assessment of the 
amounts of compensation required, particularly as regards the transboundary 
environmental damage caused by a nuclear activity. This requires new meth-
ods of assessment using the new technology. However, it was suggested that 
the USSR would compensate the victims of the Chernobyl accident in a way 
comparable to the Cosmos 954 accident.
211
 The accident caused the affected 
States heavy losses, including economic losses suffered by Belarus estimated 
at US$235 billion.
212
 However, the USSR did not pay compensation for this 
damage. The victims of the accident were paid compensation by their gov-
ernments in accordance with the national law and on the basis of the nuclear 
liability conventions.
213
 For example, following the accident and up to 10 
September 1986, the Federal Office of Administration in Germany received 
301,811 applications for claims for compensation.
214
 One year after the acci-
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dent this number had increased to 313,000 applications. A total of 291 mil-
lion DEM was paid in compensation and only 4,500 cases were rejected, of 
which 57 went into appeal before the administrative court of Cologne.
215
 
 As regards compensation for damage caused by the 1979 Three Mile Is-
land accident, on 9 April 1979, the victims started filing claims for compen-
sation before the courts of Pennsylvania. The allegations mainly concerned 
interruption of business, loss of wages, cancer and fear of cancer, economic 
loss, evacuation and other illnesses.
216
 However, no environmental damage 
was considered, only the loss of wages as a result of an imminent danger of 
contamination by the accident.
217
 The compensation was initially estimated 
at approximately US$1 billion. This included the financial cover provided by 
two US pools estimated at US$300 million, third party liability insurance 
provided by the pools for approximately US$50 million, including claims for 
loss of earnings and the interruption of business of approximately US$20 
million. This was settled in 1981. The recovery operation also cost US$5 
million for the long-term medical surveillance for inhabitants living in the 
area of the accident. Other claims were also brought for psychological dam-
age and expenses incurred by municipalities. By 1996, approximately US 
$56 million had been paid in settlements for compensation and the costs of 
handling claims.
218
 In addition, 2,200 claims for punitive damages related to 
bodily injury, emotional distress and other damage were not settled because 
they were considered to have no merit.
219
 
 Compensation for nuclear damage caused by the 1999 Tokaimura acci-
dent in Japan was mainly for personal injuries, physical and mental effects, 
medical examination expenses of people affected by the accident, evacuation 
expenses such as transportation, hotel and other incidental expenses, the ex-
amination of expenses related to property, contaminated property, loss of 
income and business.
220
 On 22 October 1999, the Japanese Government es-
tablished a Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compen-
sation to assess the compensation required for the damage caused by the ac-
cident. It also created a Special Consultation Centre in the Ibaraki Prefecture 
Office from 31 January to 25 February 2000 to negotiate with the victims 
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about claims for compensation.
221
 By 30 September 2000, 7,025 claims had 
been filed by victims of the accident and these had been settled; 98% of 
these claims (6,885 claims) were settled for a total amount of compensation 
of 12.68 billion Yen. They were paid by JCO, the operator of the plant and a 
subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. (SMM) of Tokyo, which owned 




 The 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant is operated by Tepco (Tokyo 
Electric Power Company), which is liable for the damage caused by the ac-
cident under Japanese nuclear law. Japan is not a party to any nuclear liabil-
ity convention. However, Tepco is in a difficult position because it has suf-
fered heavy losses as a result of the accident. The amount of compensation 
required to compensate victims of the accident is not yet known. After the 
accident analysts estimate that it will exceed $100bn.
223
 However, recent 
assessment, as mentioned above, estimated it to be approximately $235 bil-
lion.
224
 Telco initially requested a loan of 2 trillion Yen ($24.8bn) and ex-
pected to pay initial compensation of 50 billion Yen ($620m) to the residents 
evacuated from the area around the plant.
225
 The government of Japan has 
approved a plan to use taxpayers’ money to pay more than $60bn to com-
pensate victims of the accident.
226
 
9.4.2.3 Satisfaction as a means of reparation for environmental nuclear 
damage 
Satisfaction is the third form of reparation for damage caused by a wrongful 
act and is provided by the responsible State to the injured State where the 
damage cannot be repaired by restitution or compensation.
227
 According to 
                                                     
221
 NEA, Secretariat, NLB, No. 66, 2000, at p. 15. 
222
 NEA Secretariat, NLB, No. 66, 2000, at p. 16, 17, 21; The Secretariat of the OECD 
Nuclear Energy Agency, “Tokai-Mura Accident, Japan: Third Party Liability and Com-
pensation Aspects”, in: NEA, Indemnification of Damage, 2003), 2003, pp. 126-145, at 
pp. 129, 130 and 131. 
223
 Japan “to review nuclear energy policy” over nuclear crisis, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13346537 (accessed on 28.2.2012). 
224
 Thom Brooks, “After Fukushima Daiichi: New Global Institutions for Improved Nu-
clear Power Policy”, at p. 2, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1973494 (accessed on 
19.1.2012). 
225
 Japan crisis: Tepco agrees conditions for State aid, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-pacific-13360758 (28.2.2012). 
226
 Japan’s government approves Tepco compensation Scheme, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13385512 (accessed on 13 May 2011). 
227
 Article 37 (1) of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
 The legal consequences of liability and responsibility for environmental nuclear damage 473 
 
Brownlie, ‘[s]atisfaction may be defined as any measures which the author 
of a breach of duty is bound to take under customary law or under an agree-
ment by the parties to a dispute, apart from restitution or compensation. Sat-
isfaction is an aspect of reparation in the broad sense’.
228
 It is aimed at the 
reparation of material and moral or legal or political damage caused by a 
wrongful act,
229
 including a loss of honour or dignity or prestige of the in-
jured State.
230
 Thus, where appropriate, satisfaction is a legal consequence of 
State responsibility for a violation of its environmental and nuclear obliga-
tions. For example, the use of a nuclear reactor is a hazardous activity and is 
only allowed under international law for peaceful ends. However, if the In-
stallation State uses it for production of nuclear weapons and later admits the 
wrongfulness of such act and dismantles the programme at the request of the 
international community, this is considered satisfaction. When it used nu-
clear energy for non-peaceful uses, Libya was a clear example of this, but it 
subsequently admitted and agreed to dismantle its nuclear and biological 
programme on 19 December 2003.
231
 The use of nuclear energy for non-
peaceful purposes is against international law, but when Libya dismantled its 
programme, it satisfied the international community. In this case, satisfaction 
was an appropriate form of reparation for the wrongful acts of the State.  
 This may be an appropriate way of repairing environmental damage 
where such damage could not be repaired by means of restitution and com-
pensation. As Boyle pointed out, ‘[w]here neither restoration nor compensa-
tion for damage to the environment are appropriate then satisfaction is left as 
the only means of affording some nominal redress’.
232
 Thus, satisfaction is a 
means of reparation for damage caused by lawful and unlawful acts.  
 There are some cases in international practice which show that applica-
tion of satisfaction can be a form of reparation for damage cased by lawful 
and unlawful activities. In the Pulp Mills case, ‘[t]he Court considers that its 
finding of wrongful conduct by Uruguay in respect of its procedural obliga-
tions per se constitutes a measure of satisfaction for Argentina. As Uru-
guay’s breaches of the procedural obligations occurred in the past and have 
come to an end, there is no cause to order their cessation’.
233
 In nuclear 
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cases, satisfaction as a consequence of liability was demanded by Australia 
in the nuclear test case (Australia and New Zealand v France). Australia 
asked the Court to declare that France had breached the rules of international 
law because ‘[t]he deposit of radio-active fall-out on the territory of Austra-
lia and its dispersion in Australia’s airspace [was] without Australia’s con-
sent’.
234
 The ICJ, as mentioned above, stated that there are no rules in inter-
national law stating that conducting nuclear tests is unlawful and 
consequently environmental damage in Australia caused by radioactivity 
should be based on strict liability which requires compensation as a legal 
consequence of the damage. However, when France conducted the tests in 
violation of Australia’s sovereignty, this was an unlawful act. Furthermore, 
as mentioned above, in the Chernobyl case the USSR blamed the staff for 
causing the accident and declared only its moral responsibility. In my opin-
ion, this declaration does not constitute satisfaction for damage caused by 
the accident to the injured States. The accident caused considerable damage 
to persons, property and the environment worldwide and some victims are 
still suffering as a result. This cannot be repaired merely by a declaration of 
moral responsibility – at the time, the USSR denied legal responsibility. 
 Under international law, satisfaction can take different forms which can 
apply in the case of a violation by a State of its environmental and nuclear 
obligations, or in the case of environmental damage caused by a nuclear ac-





 or any other appropriate form of satisfaction, such as the 
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punishment of the responsible persons
237
 or a symbolic payment for dam-
ages, e.g., for non-pecuniary damage suffered by the affected State.
238
 These 
forms of satisfaction were adopted by the ILC Draft Articles on State re-
sponsibility and recognized in state practice.
239
 However, they are merely 
examples and choosing an appropriate form of satisfaction depends on the 
particular circumstances.
240
 However, the dignity and sovereign independ-
ence of the State limit the use of forms of satisfaction.
241
 Therefore, an ap-
propriate form of reparation should not cause humiliation to the responsible 
State.
242
 Usually the injured State gets satisfaction through diplomatic chan-
nels, for example, an official apology by the responsible State or a declara-
tion of non-repetition of the illegal act, and in some cases it gets satisfaction 
by judicial means if the satisfaction is an amount of compensation for dam-
age or loss and the claim was brought before an international court.
243
 The 
latter case is controversial because it is difficult to differentiate between 
compensation as a form of satisfaction and where it is restitution or compen-
sation for material damage caused by a wrongful act.
244
 As Brownlie said: 
‘However, it is not easy to distinguish between pecuniary satisfaction and 
compensation in the case of breaches of duty not resulting in death, personal 
injuries, or damage to or loss of property. Claims of this sort were formally ex-
pressed as a claim for an ‘indemnity’. If there is a distinction, it would seem to 
be in the intention behind the demand. If it is predominantly that of seeking a 
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In conclusion, satisfaction is an effective means for protecting the environment 
from damage caused by nuclear activities where it takes the form of monetary 
compensation or a declaration by the State of non-repetition of the wrongful act 
that was committed. The first is aimed at repairing the material damage caused 
by a lawful or unlawful act, while the second is aimed at repairing the moral 
damage caused by an unlawful act. This means that satisfaction can be effective 
not only for moral damage caused as a result of the violation of nuclear and 
environmental obligations, but also in the case of material damage caused to 
the environment by a nuclear accident. For example, satisfaction can be consid-
ered an affective means to repair nuclear damage in the case of a breach of en-
vironmental and nuclear obligations in the case of the occurrence of one the 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness because these circumstances are out of 
the hands of the State. If a nuclear accident has occurred as a result of an 
earthquake or force majeure and the State cannot repair the environmental 
damage caused by the accident, it could provide an official apology to the 
States that are affected. A statement of regret by the Accident State can sat-
isfy and comfort the Injured State and its people because the circumstances 
which caused the accident are understandably out of the hands of the State. 
9.5 Conclusions 
This chapter showed that the legal consequences of international liability 
have been developed alongside the development of the rules of international 
liability. As a result, the concept of the consequences of international liabil-
ity is no longer limited to the traditional concept of reparation, which only 
aims to remedy the resulting damage, but also includes the non-repetition of 
the illegal act and the prevention of the damage in the future. This is an im-
portant aspect in respect of the protection of the environment, particularly 
from damage caused by nuclear activities, which must be conducted under 
strict rules which prevent damage. The obligation of the State to repair envi-
ronmental damage is aimed at restoring the environment to its previous con-
dition before the occurrence of a nuclear accident, while the new role of li-
ability is to prevent damage in the future. In that sense, State responsibility 
has a precautionary purpose. The preventive function of the legal conse-
quences of liability is a primary obligation imposed upon the operator of a 
nuclear installation or the Installation State to carry out all the preventive 
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measures which prevent and minimize damage caused by a nuclear accident 
in order to avoid other legal consequences.  
 The legal consequences of State responsibility for the violation of envi-
ronmental and nuclear obligations have been developed as a result of their 
development in the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Wrongful 
Acts, while the legal consequences of liability for damage caused by a nu-
clear accident are still mainly governed by the general rules of international 
law on strict liability, the civil liability regimes of the ILC Draft principles 
on the allocation of loss caused by hazardous activities, the nuclear liability 
conventions and other related conventions. The legal consequence of liabil-
ity under these instruments is compensation for the resulting damage which 
also aims to prevent and remedy the damage.  
 Consequently, the legal consequences of international liability are varied 
and are applied in accordance with each type of liability. These conse-
quences include the cessation of the illegal act, restitution, compensation and 
satisfaction, depending on the case concerned. Thus, not all forms of repara-
tion apply in every case of liability for environmental nuclear damage. For 
example, the cessation of a nuclear activity is an appropriate consequence of 
State responsibility and is necessary if the Installation State violates the obli-
gation of prevention. Furthermore, the cessation of an illegal act is an impor-
tant consequence of liability in relation to the reparation of nuclear damage. 
The operation of a nuclear reactor is suspended if nuclear safety standards 
are violated or if stops disposing nuclear waste according to the rules of in-
ternational law. Compensation is also appropriate and the most relevant form 
of reparation for international liability in the case of environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident. Under the nuclear liability conventions, it is 
the only legal consequence of nuclear liability. However, the major problem 
is that compensation for nuclear damage under these conventions is esti-
mated per nuclear accident, and the amount of compensation is limited. In 
addition, the amount of compensation under the general rules of international 
law is unlimited, but the problem is that there are no criteria to assess envi-
ronmental damage, particularly pure environmental damage and pure eco-
nomic loss caused as a result of the impaired environment. Similarly restitu-
tion is important to restore the impaired environment to the status quo ante, 
but it is associated with compensation because the costs of reinstatement 
measures are considered to be compensation. On the other hand, restitution 
in kind cannot be considered an appropriate form of reparation for nuclear 
damage. It is difficult to return a piece of property damaged as a result of a 
nuclear accident or to restore the impaired environment to its previous condi-
tion. Finally, satisfaction can make a difference if the Accident State pro-
vides an official apology to the affected State for slight damage caused by a 
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nuclear accident, if the accident was caused by circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness or the apology is provided as a form of compensation which is 
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10 INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND  
CIVIL NUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIMES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY A 
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 
10.1 Introduction 
This study aimed at providing an analytical, practical and theoretical frame-
work for State responsibility and liability for environmental damage result-
ing from nuclear accidents caused by nuclear activities in accordance with 
the existing rules of international law. It was agreed that nuclear activities 
are extremely hazardous activities that are only allowed by international law 
because they are useful for the international community. However, because 
of the risks involved, they are governed by strict rules of international liabil-
ity based on the principle of absolute liability, to remedy nuclear damage 
caused by nuclear accidents. This study raised the question whether the clas-
sical rules of international liability that are aimed only at remedying the 
damage are sufficient for the protection of the environment from damage 
caused by nuclear activities, or whether they should also be aimed at pre-
venting the damage before it happens by preventing nuclear accidents and 
minimising their harmful consequences. More specifically, the study asked 
whether there is an obligation under international law for the State to prevent 
environmental nuclear damage caused to other States by nuclear activities 
carried out within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control, and to re-
pair such damage. It also asked who is the responsible person, what regime 
of liability is applicable, and what are the bases and consequences of liability 
for environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident to other States. 
These questions formed the core of the study. 
 The study examined these issues in the light of the general rules of inter-
national law as codified by the ILC in its Draft Articles and principles on 
international liability and the nuclear liability conventions. These sources 
determined the rules governing liability for nuclear damage, which are com-
posed of rules based on civil liability under the nuclear liability conventions 
and international liability under the general rules of international law. The 
study combined the examination of the issues of international liability and 
civil liability for nuclear damage and consolidated them rather than examin-
ing each regime in a separate part of the study. This was supported by the 
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fact that there are some common elements between the two regimes of liabil-
ity. For example, the 2006 ILC Draft principles on the allocation of loss fo-
cused on the operator of the activity as being liable for damage caused by 
hazardous activities in terms of civil liability. These principles also involve 
principles of liability for damage caused by hazardous activities similar to 
those provided for in the nuclear liability conventions.  
 The previous chapters of the thesis investigated the matter and addressed 
the research questions of the study in four parts organized in ten chapters. The 
introductory chapter presented the various aspects of the contents of the 
study and the research issues. Chronologically and in accordance with the 
research questions, the study started in Part I with the examination and de-
scription of certain major nuclear accidents which have occurred in nuclear 
reactors, and the definition of the reparable environmental damage caused by 
a nuclear accident and its relationship with State liability. This is because 
environmental damage is an essential element and the main aspect to incur 
liability for damage caused by a nuclear accident, as without damage there is 
no liability. Part II examined the preventive functions of international liabil-
ity for environmental nuclear damage. It examined the principle of preven-
tion as an essential principle in international law. The principle obliges the 
State in whose territory a nuclear installation is located or under whose ju-
risdiction or control it is operated to prevent and minimize damage caused 
by such installations. It also addressed certain procedural obligations under 
international law which are necessary to apply the principle of prevention. 
These obligations are aimed at the safe operation of a nuclear installation 
and guarantee the performance of the nuclear installation in accordance with 
the regulations under international law. If a State respects these obligations 
this will help to prevent nuclear accidents, and their breach constitutes State 
responsibility for wrongful acts. Part III examined the rules of responsibility 
and liability under the general rules of international law to repair and remedy 
environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident. It first identified the 
liable person and the applicable regime of liability for nuclear damage. The 
applicable regime of liability is based on State responsibility for wrongful 
acts which applies in the case of the violation of nuclear and environmental 
obligations by the State, and the absolute liability of the State or the operator 
which applies in the case of environmental damage caused by a nuclear ac-
cident. These regimes oblige the State or the liable person to bear the conse-
quences of international liability and responsibility to prevent and repair 
damage caused by a nuclear accident. Finally, Part IV includes this conclud-
ing chapter, which summarises the main arguments presented in the previous 
chapters, the general conclusions drawn in the study and gives some impor-
tant recommendations. The following section provides a summary of the 
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conclusions of the study. Section 10.3 provides some recommendations to 
improve the existing regime of international liability for environmental dam-
age caused by nuclear activities. Finally, section 10.4 provides the final con-
clusion, which states that the rules governing international liability for envi-
ronmental damage should be composed of rules of civil and international 
liability integrated in one unified regime.  
10.2 Summary of conclusions 
The analysis of the previous chapters of the thesis came to the conclusion 
that under international law there is a general obligation upon the Installation 
State to take certain precautionary measures and to exercise due diligence to 
prevent environmental damage caused by hazardous activities, including nu-
clear activities carried out within its territory or under its jurisdiction or con-
trol, and to bear the legal consequences of the liability and repair the damage 
if it was unavoidable. It also concluded that the operator of a nuclear instal-
lation is primarily liable for nuclear damage and that the State is liable for 
the residual damage and for violations of its nuclear and environmental obli-
gations. Moreover, it indicated that liability for environmental nuclear dam-
age should be governed by a comprehensive civil and international liability 
regime that is aimed at preventing, reducing and redressing nuclear envi-
ronmental damage caused by a nuclear accident.  
 On the other hand, it revealed that the issue of international liability for 
environmental damage caused by nuclear activities is complex and raises 
some difficult questions. It combined the most difficult issues in contempo-
rary international law, including international liability, the environment and 
nuclear energy and showed that the related legal problems have not yet been 
adequately resolved. During the course of the past fifty years the ILC has 
embarked on an examination and codification of the classical rules of inter-
national liability of States. Nevertheless, it has failed to adopt either the li-
ability of the State for environmental damage caused by hazardous activities 
or its liability in general. It has only succeeded in adopting the principle of 
State responsibility for wrongful acts. Furthermore, the liability for environ-
mental damage caused by nuclear activities is governed by primary and sec-
ondary rules of international liability which are aimed at the prevention, 
mitigation and remedying environmental damage. The rules of prevention 
are primary rules and differ from those related to remedying the damage, 
which are secondary rules. The primary rules or obligations in relation to 
nuclear activities are the rules regulating the performance and control of the 
activity in order to prevent a nuclear accident and its harmful consequences, 
while the secondary rules are the rules of responsibility which apply in the 
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case of a breach of the primary rules and are aimed at the respect of these 
rules and at remedying environmental damage caused by these activities. 
Moreover, a nuclear accident does not cause only environmental damage, 
but also other damage, such as damage or loss to persons, property and eco-
nomic loss. Finally, the roles of the operator and the State are interrelated as 
regards nuclear activities. Nuclear activities are carried out by private opera-
tors and the State. However, the majority of nuclear installations are oper-
ated by private operators and the State has a regulatory and supervisory role 
as regards these activities.  
 These general conclusions and other associated concluding remarks will 
be summarized in this section, which concludes that: the regime of nuclear 
liability has developed significantly particularly in the past decade (section 
10.2.1); the element of damage is important to identify the liability for envi-
ronmental damage (section 10.2.2); functions of international liability have 
been developed and are not only aimed at repairing the damage, but also at 
preventing the damage (section 10.2.3); and there are relationships between 
international liability under the general rules of international law, and the 
civil liability regime under the nuclear liability conventions that facilitate the 
composition of a nuclear liability regime comprising civil and international 
liability rules (section 10.2.4). 
10.2.1 Progress and development of the rules and functions of 
liability 
In general, the reason for the creation of new rules of liability is that the ex-
isting rules of liability are inadequate when applied to new issues, such as 
the new technologies, for solving the legal problems. There is no need to 
create new norms to govern a particular issue, unless the existing rules are 
inadequate. However, what is needed is the reformulation of these norms in 
a different form to apply to the new issues. This applies to the rules for the 
protection of the environment which has attracted the attention of the inter-
national community, particularly in the past fifty years, as a result of the in-
creasing use of hazardous activities, particularly nuclear energy, which ex-
posed the environment to danger. This meant that it was necessary to 
reformulate the existing general rules of international liability in a way that 
is applicable to environmental issues. This can be deduced from Principle 22 
of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which exhorts States to cooperate to im-
prove the existing rules of international law relating to liability and compen-
sation, so that they apply to liability for environmental damage caused by 
activities harmful to the environment. Following the adoption of the Stock-
holm Declaration, the development of the rules of international liability for 
 Integration of international and civil nuclear liability regimes for environmental damage 485 
 
environmental damage has been reflected in a number of international in-
struments which encourage States to cooperate in developing the rules of 
liability. This also applies with regard to the rules of international liability 
which were examined by the ILC and nuclear liability under the nuclear li-
ability conventions which were recently amended by the contracting parties. 
This means that the rules of liability are already in existence, but they need 
to be reformulated to apply to liability for environmental damage.  
 The study demonstrated that the rules governing international liability for 
environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident were developed follow-
ing the codification of the general rules of international law of liability by 
the ILC. Consequently, a number of international instruments, and substan-
tive and procedural norms of liability for environmental damage have been 
developed. During the course of the codification, the Commission changed 
the approach to one of progressive development. This led to a change in the 
view of the doctrine of international law which was also reflected in interna-
tional case law. These developments concerned the functions of international 
liability in general and liability for environmental damage in particular.  
 The efforts made by the ILC on the issue of international liability for in-
jurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law 
were aimed at the formulation of a general principle of prevention and com-
pensation. These were reflected in the 2001 Draft Articles on the prevention 
of harm caused by hazardous activities and the 2006 Draft principles on the 
allocation of loss. Under the principle of prevention, the State is required to 
take precautionary measures to prevent and minimize environmental damage 
caused by a hazardous activity. The Draft principles also addressed the is-
sues of liability, such as the polluter pays principle, which addresses the is-
sues of the prevention and repair of damage caused to the environment. 
These articles and principles codified the primary rules of international li-
ability for lawful acts.  
 However, the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Wrong-
ful Acts codified the secondary rules of international liability which were 
aimed at the liability and reparation of wrongful acts. These articles are one 
of the important topics adopted by the ILC and are considered to be a pro-
gressive development in international law, such as the law of treaties and the 
law of the sea. It is important to guarantee the application of the primary 
rules to environmental issues. State responsibility for wrongful acts forces 
the State to respect its international obligations by making it accountable for 
the violation of its obligations. This is an important aspect which makes it 
possible to prevent or reduce the occurrence of nuclear accidents and repair 
environmental damage caused to other States by a nuclear activity. This em-
phasizes the progressive development of the function of State responsibility 
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for wrongful acts which has two aspects, i.e., the preventive and corrective 
functions. As indicated in Part II, the violation of environmental obligations by 
a State constitutes the basis of State responsibility for the prevention and reduc-
tion of environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident, i.e., the preventive 
function of State responsibility.  
 Furthermore, State responsibility and liability aimed at the reparation and 
compensation for damage caused as a result of the violation of nuclear obli-
gations, and damage caused by a nuclear accident to the environment, i.e., 
the corrective function of State responsibility, are based on the classical idea 
of international liability. The latter was the only function of State responsi-
bility and liability. The new concept of State responsibility is certainly in the 
interests of protecting the environment as well as the State. It is in the inter-
ests of the environment because it helps to prevent nuclear accidents. The 
protection of the environment requires strict rules of liability. It is also in the 
interests of the State because it avoids damage and the reparation of damage 
when no nuclear accident has occurred. Consequently, the State will not pay 
for the costs of the reparation of environmental damage if it has taken pre-
ventive measures to avoid nuclear accidents.  
 Similar developments have been achieved with regard to the nuclear li-
ability regime under the nuclear liability conventions. As a result of the 
amendments of these conventions, new instruments and provisions were in-
troduced in the nuclear liability regime under the conventions. The existing 
norms governing nuclear liability apply more effectively to liability for nu-
clear damage, including damage caused to the environment. The purpose of 
nuclear liability under the nuclear liability conventions has developed in the 
same way as international liability. International and civil liability regimes are 
now aimed at the prevention, reduction and remedy of environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident. This has resulted in a comprehensive regime of 
nuclear liability for the protection of people and the environment from the haz-
ards arising from nuclear energy. Before the amendments of the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions, liability and compensation for nuclear damage caused by a 
nuclear accident were the main focus of the regime. This was the classical pur-
pose of nuclear liability under the conventions, which were mainly aimed at 
providing adequate and equitable compensation to victims of a nuclear acci-
dent. Adequate compensation means that the regime provides full compensa-
tion for the damage suffered, while equitable compensation means that victims 
of a nuclear accident obtain compensation without discrimination based on na-
tionality, domicile, or residence. However, after the amendments, the conven-
tions were indirectly also aimed at the prevention and reduction of nuclear 
damage caused by a nuclear accident. The 2004 Amended Paris Convention 
and the 1997 Amended Vienna Convention cover the costs of measures to pre-
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vent the nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident. In addition, the 1997 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation stipulates that the member States 
must apply the rules of nuclear safety. This demonstrates that the nuclear li-
ability regime aims to be comprehensive to cover the issues of prevention, 
reduction and reparation of nuclear damage caused by a nuclear activity. 
 The philosophy behind the creation of a comprehensive nuclear liability 
regime is to eliminate nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident to inno-
cent victims in a way which strikes a balance between the situation before 
and after the nuclear accident. An effective liability regime achieves that aim 
without the occurrence of a nuclear accident. If there is no nuclear accident 
has occurred, the question of liability will not arise under the regime at all. 
However, the nuclear liability conventions do not contain any provisions on 
liability which oblige the operator of a nuclear installation and the Installa-
tion State to ensure nuclear safety standards. The 1986 Chernobyl accident 
and the 1999 Tokaimura nuclear accident in Japan occurred as the result of 
carelessness by the operating staff with regard to the application of nuclear 
safety standards and preventive measures, and as a result of the lack of su-
pervision by the Installation State. If these standards had been carefully ap-
plied, these accidents might have been avoided. The prevention of nuclear 
accidents should be one of the main aims of any legal nuclear liability re-
gime governing liability for nuclear damage caused by nuclear activities. 
This requires the adoption of provisions which hold the operator liable for 
breaches of safety standards and hold the Contracting States accountable for 
breaches of rules of international law. Therefore, future amendments to the 
nuclear liability conventions should introduce the provisions of liability that 
place the financial burden on the operator of the nuclear installation and the 
Installation State to ensure the implementation of nuclear safety standards. 
However, this differs from absolute liability which is the basis of liability for 
nuclear damage under the regime. The regime already includes provisions 
which oblige the Contracting Parties to respect the provisions of interna-
tional law. Therefore, fault liability can apply in addition to absolute liabil-
ity, but each applies when it is relevant in the particular case concerned. 
 In conclusion, the concept of international liability has developed and is 
aimed not only at serving a reparative function, i.e., liability and reparation, 
as in the classical concept of international liability, but is also aimed at pre-
ventive functions, i.e., the prevention and reduction of environmental dam-
age. The latter encourages the State to take all the necessary preventive 
measures to prevent a nuclear accident caused by a nuclear activity, in order 
to avoid the responsibility which is preferable than to paying for the repara-
tion of the damage afterwards. However, the former provides a corrective 
function for the victims of environmental damage. It provides the rules and 
488 CHAPTER 10 
 
identifies the source of responsibility and liability in order to protect the 
rights of the victims or the injured party and to correct the situation, and 
strike a balance between the rights of the victims before and after the dam-
age.   
10.2.2 No liability without damage: The relationship between 
damage and liability 
Chapter 2 of the study presented the factual background and a description of 
the major nuclear accidents that have taken place in nuclear reactors since 
they were first used. It outlined the nature and characteristics of transbound-
ary environmental nuclear damage and classified nuclear accidents into three 
types: the “internal accident”, when the risks and harmful consequences re-
sulting from a nuclear event are limited to the nuclear installation; the “ex-
ternal accident”, when the risks and harmful consequences of a nuclear event 
occur outside the nuclear installation, but are limited to the State in whose 
territory the installation is located; and the “transboundary accident”, when 
the damage caused by a nuclear event spreads beyond the borders of the 
State and has transboundary implications. This classification corresponds to 
the geographical scope of the nuclear liability conventions and is also based 
on the risks associated with nuclear activity. On the basis of the risks in-
volved, nuclear accidents are also classified into “non-nuclear accidents”, 
when a nuclear event has no harmful consequences, “minor nuclear acci-
dents”, when a nuclear event has minor harmful consequences which are 
usually limited to the nuclear installation, and “major nuclear accidents”, 
when a nuclear event has external or transboundary implications. This indi-
cates that not every accident caused by a nuclear activity incurs the liability 
of the State. Only major nuclear accidents which have transboundary impli-
cations can incur State liability for environmental damage. Nuclear damage 
caused inside the installation is governed by ordinary law, while nuclear 
damage caused outside the installation is governed by the nuclear liability 
conventions, and transboundary damage is governed by the nuclear liability 
conventions and the general rules of international law. 
 The examination of the major accidents caused by nuclear reactors and 
their relation to the application of the nuclear liability regime to damage 
caused by nuclear activities revealed the following:  
 
(1) The 1957 Windscale accident was the first major nuclear accident 
caused by nuclear activities for peaceful purposes which caused 
transboundary environmental damage. However, no international nuclear 
liability regime had been established at that time which was applicable to the 
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damage caused by the accident. Compensation for damage caused by the 
accident to the victims was provided by the British Government as 
assistance, and no environmental damage caused to other States was 
compensated because no State claimed for such damage. This accident 
revealed the urgent need for an international nuclear liability regime to 
compensate damage caused by nuclear accidents. 
(2) The Cosmos 954 accident of 1978 was caused by a USSR space object 
which was operated by nuclear power. Nuclear waste and debris resulting from 
the accident spread over large areas in outer space and the earth, mainly 
affecting Canadian territory. The damage caused by the accident was not 
covered under the nuclear liability conventions because nuclear facilities, such 
as a means of transport, were excluded under those conventions. It was covered 
under the general rules of international law and the 1972 Space Liability 
Convention.  
(3) The 1979 Three Mile Island accident was the first nuclear accident to 
draw the attention of the international community to the severe damage that 
could be caused by a nuclear accident. The damage caused by the accident was 
limited to the United States. It was covered by US law because the United 
States was not a party to any nuclear liability convention and no claims for 
environmental damage were presented. This revealed that ratification by the 
nuclear States is important to expand the scope of application of the nuclear 
liability conventions, particularly with regard to the United States, which owns 
a quarter of the reactors operating worldwide.  
(4) The 1986 Chernobyl accident alerted the international community to 
the need to strengthen the international nuclear liability regime to provide 
equitable and adequate compensation to victims of a major nuclear accident. 
The damage caused by the accident affected many countries worldwide, 
particularly the European countries. However, compensation to the victims 
was paid by their governments according to national law, and no State made 
claims to international courts for the damage suffered. Furthermore, at the 
time of the accident the USSR had no nuclear liability legislation to cover 
third party liability claims and was not a party to any nuclear liability 
convention. The accident revealed that the rules of nuclear liability under the 
nuclear liability conventions and the general rules of international law were 
inadequate to apply to liability for damage caused by a major nuclear 
accident. It also revealed the need for a wide acceptance by the States of the 
international nuclear liability regime.  
(5) The 1999 Tokaimura and the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accidents in 
Japan revealed that the amount of compensation required for nuclear damage 
caused by a major nuclear accident exceeds the amount of the operator’s 
liability and his insurance under the nuclear liability conventions, even if the 
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damage caused by the accident is limited to the Accident State. The damage 
caused by these accidents was mainly limited to Japan, but other countries 
also suffered economic losses as a result of having to discard Japanese 
products. The damage caused by the two accidents was compensated by the 
operator under Japanese nuclear law, because Japan is not a party to any 
nuclear liability convention. However, the amount of compensation under 
this law was insufficient to cover all the damage caused by the two 
accidents. Therefore the Japanese Government paid additional compensation 
to supplement the liability of the operator. The amount of compensation 
required for the victims of the two accidents was much larger than that 
provided for under any nuclear liability convention. This emphasizes the 
urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear liability regime which fully covers 
the damage caused to victims of a nuclear accident. 
 Chapter 3 defined the legal concept and scope of reparable environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident. Such a definition is necessary to estab-
lish and determine the scope of liability for environmental nuclear damage. 
The chapter combined the examination of reparable environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident as a result of lawful and unlawful activities, 
despite their different bases of liability. It examined the physical environ-
mental damage caused by a nuclear accident and the moral or legal damage 
resulting from the violation by a State of its environmental and nuclear obli-
gations. The first is a constituent element in risk liability. Environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident is therefore an essential element on 
which the absolute liability of the operator of a nuclear installation or the 
Installation State is based. The reparable environmental damage caused by a 
nuclear accident should cover all the damage caused as a result of the im-
paired environment. The definition of reparable damage, under the nuclear 
liability conventions and other sources of international law, includes damage 
and loss caused to persons, property, the costs of preventive and reinstate-
ment measures of the impaired environment, and economic loss caused as a 
result of a nuclear accident. Nevertheless, pure environmental damage is still 
difficult to define and is not clearly covered under the nuclear liability con-
ventions. It is also problematic in international law because it is difficult to 
quantify and there are no generally accepted criteria or methods to calculate 
such damage. Finally, economic loss resulting from a nuclear accident is 
problematic, particularly pure economic loss, which is difficult to quantify. 
A nuclear accident can cause economic loss to many countries, even if they 
suffer no physical damage, as a result of embargos on the production of the 
countries affected by the accident, particularly the production of the Acci-
dent State which can affect the economies of many countries worldwide. 
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 However, the element of damage is not a constituent element in State re-
sponsibility for wrongful acts. In order to invoke State responsibility for 
wrongful acts, it is not necessary that the conduct of a State causes physical 
damage to another State. However, it is difficult to invoke State responsibil-
ity without damage being caused by the State, as there is no liability without 
damage. Therefore, the doctrine of international law still refuses to accept 
the element of damage as a constituent element in State responsibility for 
wrongful acts or to accept liability without damage. Some authors consider 
that State responsibility is incurred only when physical damage is caused by 
a State’s conduct. Others consider that it could be incurred without physical 
damage. Finally, still others argue for State responsibility to be invoked 
without physical damage, but they consider the violation of an international 
obligation to be legal damage, because in relation to nuclear activities it is 
the reason why a nuclear accident is caused by a nuclear installation.  
 Finally, certain conditions are required for there to be liability for nuclear 
damage caused by a nuclear accident. First, the reparable environmental 
damage should be caused by a nuclear accident or a nuclear activity as de-
fined in the nuclear liability conventions. Secondly, the damage should be 
actual environmental damage. It is difficult for a State or the victims to claim 
reparation without actual damage, unless there has been a violation of an 
international obligation. Thirdly, there has to be proof of the causal link be-
tween the damage and the accident or the activity. If the damage does not 
result from a nuclear accident, it is difficult for the victims to claim for repa-
ration of the damage under the nuclear liability regime. However, the prob-
lem of causation is not resolved either under the nuclear liability conventions 
or under the general rules of international law. There is no method or crite-
rion for the determination of pure environmental and economic loss caused 
by a nuclear accident, particularly as regards the latent damage caused to 
persons, which may sometimes take a few decades to develop. Consequently 
it is difficult to prove the damage which constitutes liability. Fourthly, the 
damage must be significant, as insignificant damage is not covered under the 
nuclear liability conventions and the general rules of international law, but is 
covered under national law. However, there is no method to determine what 
is significant and non-significant damage caused to the environment. Finally, 
the damage must not have been previously compensated and must not be 
compensated twice, as damage repaired under national law cannot be 
claimed again under international law, unless the victim was not fully com-
pensated under national law.  
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10.2.3 Functions of international liability 
10.2.3.1 The preventive function 
The use of nuclear energy for peaceful ends is a fundamental right in interna-
tional law which allows any State to carry out a nuclear activity within its 
territory or under its jurisdiction or control. However, this right is not abso-
lute. It is restricted by the fact that the State is obliged not to abuse that right 
by using nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes and to respect the sover-
eignty of other States and not cause environmental damage to them. Chapter 
4 addressed the principle of the prevention and reduction of environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear activity. It addressed two main issues, the legal 
basis of the principle and the cooperation between States to prevent and re-
duce environmental damage caused by a nuclear activity. It indicated that the 
principle of prevention is a fundamental principle in international law that 
obliges a State conducting nuclear activities within its territory or under its 
jurisdiction or control not to cause damage to the environment of other 
States. The principle is also interrelated with other principles, particularly 
the principle of due diligence and the precautionary principle. The Installa-
tion State is obliged to ensure that the nuclear activity is based on the princi-
ple of due diligence and to take precautionary measures to prevent and re-
duce harmful consequences of a nuclear accident. Thus these principles 
constitute an important tool to achieve the objective of prevention of damage 
caused by hazardous activities. Without exercising due diligence and taking 
precautionary measures, it is difficult to achieve the objective of the obliga-
tion of prevention for these activities. The principle of prevention was de-
veloped by the ILC in its draft articles on international liability for lawful 
activities, although it had a basis in international law even before the princi-
ple of due diligence and the precautionary principle existed. The obligation 
of prevention is aimed at the respect for nuclear and environmental obliga-
tions in order to prevent nuclear accidents. The violation of that obligation 
constitutes State responsibility for wrongful acts. The principle of prevention 
applies to lawful and unlawful liability because it is aimed at preventing 
damage caused by lawful activity and a violation of the obligation consti-
tutes a wrongful act. Thus the principle forms the basis of State responsibil-
ity for a wrongful act. However, the principle of prevention is not absolute 
because it applies only in the case of significant damage caused to the envi-
ronment, and therefore non-significant damage can be inflicted on the envi-
ronment without incurring responsibility. 
 The examination also indicated that the principle of prevention does not 
only impose an obligation on the source State to prevent the damage, but 
also imposes obligations on it to cooperate with other States and with the 
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international organizations concerned to prevent damage to the environment. 
The effectiveness of the principle of prevention relies on the cooperation 
between the source State and the affected States in sharing the information 
related to the presumed nuclear activity. Thus cooperation between States 
constitutes an essential principle in international law in relation to conduct-
ing nuclear activities. It is aimed at preventing hazardous consequences of 
such activities. Without close cooperation between the source State and the 
affected States, it is difficult to effectively prevent nuclear damage which 
could be caused by nuclear activities.  
 To prevent environmental damage being caused by a nuclear activity, 
certain procedural rules and obligations of international law must be fulfilled 
by the source State and the affected States. They must be observed by the 
States during the construction of a nuclear installation, during the operation 
of a nuclear installation before and after a nuclear accident, and after the end 
of the economic life of a nuclear installation when it is decommissioning of 
the installation and the nuclear waste is disposed of. They constitute a com-
prehensive regime to prevent and reduce environmental damage which can 
be caused by a nuclear accident during the economic life of a nuclear instal-
lation. Before the construction of a nuclear installation, the State must estab-
lish a regulatory regime to organize the activity, select a site for the installa-
tion in a safe place that does not expose people and the environment to 
danger, assess the impact of the activity on people and the environment, and 
designate the person who is liable for the operation of the installation and for 
compensation of the victims in the event of a nuclear accident caused by it. 
The State must also inform the States most likely to be affected when a nu-
clear activity is conducted, particularly the neighboring States because they 
are the countries most affected by a nuclear accident caused by nuclear ac-
tivities conducted within the State’s territory. Moreover, the State also is 
obliged to ensure the safety of the nuclear installation and inspect it on a 
regular basis to ensure that safety standards are applied by the operating 
body in accordance of international standards. The international organiza-
tions concerned established international nuclear safety standards for differ-
ent aspects of nuclear energy, particularly those established by the IAEA, to 
guide the States and harmonize their nuclear safety legislation. Unfortu-
nately, States are not obliged to adopt these safety standards, except those 
contained in international conventions such as the 1994 Convention on Nu-
clear Safety and the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. In addi-
tion, the State is obliged to cooperate with other States, particularly the af-
fected States and the international organizations concerned as regards the 
proposed activity and to provide them with the relevant information about 
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the activity. It must give prior notification, consult, negotiate, exchange in-
formation, and cooperate with them and the public in good faith in providing 
the relevant information. Finally, it must notify other States and the interna-
tional organizations concerned in the event of a nuclear accident, provide 
assistance and cooperate with them to prevent and reduce the harmful conse-
quences of the accident. These procedural obligations are carried out by the 
State under national law in accordance with the rules of international law.  
 These procedural obligations were examined in chapter 5. The examina-
tion showed that the application of these obligations is important to ensure 
the safe operation of a nuclear installation. They are necessary when a haz-
ardous activity is carried out, particularly an activity related to nuclear en-
ergy, and it is necessary to apply the obligation of prevention and determine 
the content of the principle of prevention. Procedural obligations are mainly 
obligations contained in conventions. Some were developed after the Cher-
nobyl accident. The delay of the USSR in giving notification of the Cherno-
byl accident led to a spread of the nuclear damage caused by the accident to 
a considerable number of States. Therefore the 1986 Conventions on early 
notification and assistance were developed after the accident. They con-
tained two significant obligations, viz. the obligation of the State to give 
early notification of a nuclear accident and the obligation of the State to pro-
vide assistance. The two obligations are important to prevent and reduce en-
vironmental damage caused by a nuclear accident.  
 The State does not violate the obligation of prevention under international 
law if it has fulfilled these procedural obligations, even if damage is caused 
to the environment by a nuclear accident. The remedy for such damage falls 
under the principle of absolute liability. However, the violation of these 
principles constitutes State responsibility for wrongful acts. This creates a 
link between responsibility for wrongful acts and lawful hazardous activities. 
The procedural obligations are primary rules and their violation constitutes 
State responsibility for wrongful acts, which are secondary rules of liability. 
There is a legal basis for State responsibility for the violation of these obliga-
tions in international law. They were included in the ILC Draft Articles on 
the prevention of harm caused by hazardous activities and the principles on 
the allocation of loss, other ad hoc instruments and the general rules and cus-
tomary principles of international law. Accordingly the State is responsible if 
nuclear activities are conducted in a nuclear installation in violation of the 
existing rules of international law. The State is responsible for a wrongful act 
if it has conducted a nuclear activity without enacting legislation or regula-
tions to organize the activities, without conducting an environmental impact 
assessment or without the prior authorization or determination of the person 
who is liable, or if it has not observed nuclear safety standards. Finally, the 
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State is also responsible if it refused to cooperate with the States likely to be 
affected by a nuclear accident or provide these States or the public with the 
necessary information, or if it enacted or omitted to enact nuclear legislation 
in conflict with the existing nuclear agreements. Thus State responsibility is 
a relevant basis for the international liability of the State. It also has an im-
portant role in preventing nuclear environmental damage after a nuclear ac-
cident. This shifts the aim of liability from a preventive function to a repara-
tive function. 
10.2.3.2 The reparative function 
The reparative function of liability is the main aim of any legal liability re-
gime, whether civil or international and regardless of whether the liability is 
related to lawful or unlawful acts. It strikes a balance between two rights, the 
right of the injured person which has been reduced as a result of an act or 
activity of another person and that person’s right which has increased in 
value as a result of the act. In order to repair damage caused by a violation of 
environmental and nuclear obligations, and environmental damage caused by 
a nuclear accident, the person who is liable, the applicable liability regime to 
remedy the damage, and the sources and legal consequences of that liability 
must be determined.  
10.2.3.2.1 The person who is liable and the applicable regime of liability 
Chapter 6 of this study identified the person who is liable and the applicable 
regime of liability. It examined whether or not there is an obligation upon 
the State to intervene to repair environmental damage caused by nuclear ac-
tivities or whether the liability applies only to the operator of a nuclear in-
stallation, or both. It also examined whether a civil or international liability 
regime of nuclear liability applies to environmental damage caused by a nu-
clear accident. Moreover, it made a distinction between civil and interna-
tional liability for environmental nuclear damage, investigated the possibility 
of integrating the two regimes in one unified regime, and determined 
whether or not such liability should be based on civil or international law, or 
both. This is particularly important because in practice and in theory there is 
some confusion about the relationship between the two regimes in relation to 
liability for environmental nuclear damage.  
 The examination revealed that when nuclear activities first started, States 
refused to accept any kind of liability for nuclear damage and therefore the 
operator of a nuclear installation was considered liable. However, at a later 
stage, States, as public entities, accepted sharing some of the liability with 
the operator of a nuclear installation, by providing additional compensation 
to victims of a nuclear accident under civil law. This was reflected in the 
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nuclear liability conventions which oblige the States to provide additional 
compensation to supplement the operator’s liability. This was also adopted 
in the ILC Draft principles on the allocation of loss, which introduced civil 
liability in the international liability regime, but did not adopt the principle 
of State liability. The State only accepted international liability for environ-
mental damage caused by a nuclear accident in a limited number of cases, 
such as environmental damage caused by space objects in accordance with 
the 1972 Space Liability Convention and in the case of a violation of its in-
ternational obligations. Moreover, the IAEA Member States made some at-
tempts to conclude inter-state treaties on nuclear damage or to introduce 
elements of international liability in the nuclear liability conventions, or to 
conclude an international instrument to deal with civil and international li-
ability rules, but all these attempts failed. These developments were reflected 
in the doctrine of international law and of the ILC, which argues for a com-
prehensive international nuclear liability regime capable of repairing envi-
ronmental damage caused by a nuclear accident. This should contain the 
provisions on nuclear liability under civil and international liability inte-
grated in one unified regime of nuclear liability. However, the composition 
and integration of the nuclear liability regime of civil and international liability 
raises the question of how these rules can be applied, despite their differences. 
Therefore, as we will see below, it was suggested that these rules should be 
drawn up in one international instrument and that an international ad hoc court 
or tribunal should be set up to deal with civil and international claims for nu-
clear damage.  
 In my opinion, if such an integrated regime of liability is established, the 
civil liability procedures must be exhausted before international liability is 
applied. Accordingly, if the amount of the operator’s liability is insufficient 
to compensate all the nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident, the re-
maining damage should be compensated with supplementary funding pro-
vided by the States under the nuclear liability conventions. Compensation for 
nuclear damage can then only be claimed from the Installation State, if the 
damage is not compensated by the operator. Such compensation should be 
paid by the public authority of the State under the national legal system. If 
the victims cannot be compensated under the regime of civil liability, inter-
national liability should apply. The residual damage which cannot be com-
pensated by public funds should be compensated by the State under interna-
tional law. The State also is subject to international liability in the case of the 
violation of an international obligation under the nuclear liability conven-
tions or under the general rules of international law. This means that the in-
ternational nuclear liability regime should apply three stages or levels of liabil-
ity according to the priority of the person who is liable to provide compensation 
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for the nuclear damage. These are the primary liability of the operator of a nu-
clear installation, the secondary liability of the State to intervene by providing 
additional compensation to supplement the operator’s liability, and finally, the 
residual liability of the Source State, i.e., the original liability for the damage 
caused by activities conducted within its territory or under its jurisdiction or 
control.  
 This is justified by the fact that civil liability procedures favour of victims 
of a nuclear accident, as it is easier for the victims to claim reparation of the 
damage before national courts than before international courts. The victims 
must first make a claim against the operator of a nuclear installation. Impos-
ing the residual liability on the Installation State is also justified because it 
allowed a nuclear activity, i.e., a hazardous activity which causes damage to 
other States, to be carried out in its territory or under its jurisdiction or con-
trol. It also benefits from this activity by improving its social and economic 
conditions, as reflected in the development of the State. At the same time, it 
can pay full compensation more easily than the operator. The adoption of the 
principle of State intervention in the nuclear liability regime is the first stage 
of the recognition by the State that it will share the burden of liability with 
the operator of a nuclear installation or will bear full liability for nuclear 
damage caused by nuclear activities. Furthermore, increasing the amounts of 
compensation with supplementary funding paid by the State in the last 
amendments of the nuclear liability conventions, makes it more likely that 
the State will accept full liability for nuclear damage under international law.  
10.2.3.2.2 The origin and source of liability 
The study indicated that the origin and source of international liability for 
environmental damage caused by nuclear activities is based on State respon-
sibility for wrongful acts and the principle of absolute liability in accordance 
with international law. Chapter 7 examined State responsibility for wrongful 
acts as a source of international liability for its breaches or omissions in per-
forming its environmental and nuclear obligations under the nuclear liability 
conventions and the general rules of international law, in the light of the ILC 
Draft Articles on State responsibility for wrongful acts. These Articles apply 
to the responsibility of the State in the case of the violation of the obligations 
of prevention, and minimizing and redressing environmental damage caused 
by a nuclear accident. The Articles defined and characterised the principle of 
State responsibility as a source of State responsibility for wrongful acts un-
der the general rules of international law.  
 The principle is traditionally based on wrongful acts. The wrongfulness 
of an act is decided on in international law irrespective of the description of 
the act under national law. State responsibility for wrongful acts applies 
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when conduct which is considered unlawful under international law is attrib-
uted to a State. The acts which are attributed to the State are mainly those 
carried out by the organs of the State which have governmental competence, 
including those of the legislative, judicial and executive authorities, regard-
less of rank. However, such conduct must be described as being unlawful 
under international law. The act is unlawful when a State is not in compli-
ance with the rules of international law and with regard to the obligation, i.e., 
the commission or omission of an obligation in conflict with international 
law. Environmental acts are described as being unlawful when an organ has 
committed a breach of an environmental or nuclear obligation under interna-
tional law. This violation may be directly or indirectly related to any rule in 
international law, regardless of its source. It is a direct breach when it is 
committed by the State vis-à-vis its international obligations related to orga-
nizing a nuclear activity. However, it is an indirect breach in the case that a 
national law constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State, 
such as a violation of national safety legislation under the Convention on 
nuclear safety.  Accordingly, the violation of the State of its environmental 
and nuclear obligations and the attribution of a wrongful act to the State con-
stitute State responsibility for wrongful acts. However, not all acts are con-
sidered wrongful acts. Under international law the wrongfulness is precluded 
in certain circumstances, including self-defence, force majeure, a fortuitous 
event, distress and a state of necessity. Furthermore, not all of these circum-
stances preclude wrongfulness with regard to the violation of environmental 
and nuclear obligations. For example, self-defence does not preclude envi-
ronmental and nuclear obligations, as it is not acceptable for the State to use 
nuclear weapons for self-defence which can themselves cause an environ-
mental catastrophe. In addition certain conditions limit the application of 
these circumstances to environmental and nuclear obligations. These circum-
stances do not apply to the peremptory norms of international law, which are 
concerned with the protection of the environment of the whole community. 
Because of the importance of the protection of the environment, particularly 
from pollution caused by new technologies, the 1996 Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility considered the violation by a State of its environmental obli-
gations regarding the whole international community as an international 
crime. Unfortunately this provision was excluded by the 2001 Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility, which considered only a gross or systematic failure 
by the State to fulfil its obligations as a serious breach of international law. 
Finally, these circumstances cannot preclude a wrongful act when the cir-
cumstance in question has come to an end and the situation has normalised. 
Furthermore, the State is obliged to provide compensation for damage 
caused as a result of precluding the wrongful act. 
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 The analysis showed that State responsibility for wrongful acts is an im-
portant source of international liability for the protection of the environment 
from hazards arising out of the use of nuclear reactors. The principle of State 
responsibility for wrongful acts applies in some nuclear and environmental 
cases. For example, the principle was applied by the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) case in 1997 and by the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United 
Kingdom) in 2001. The importance of the application of the general princi-
ples of State responsibility for environmental damage caused by nuclear ac-
cidents is that there is no environmental or nuclear regime for State respon-
sibility for wrongful acts. There is no inter-state treaty on international 
liability for nuclear damage which applies in the case of the violation of in-
ternational obligations. The issues of environmental damage and pollution 
are mainly developed in international agreements. These agreements involve 
certain provisions and obligations which are necessary for the protection of 
the environment and prohibit harm to the environment, but they do not cover 
the issues of State responsibility for the violation of international obligations. 
They only include primary obligations which incur State responsibility for 
wrongful acts, while the rules of responsibility are secondary rules which 
determine the conditions and consequences of State responsibility under the 
general rules of international law. This indicates that State responsibility for 
wrongful acts is an important basis for the prevention of nuclear accidents 
and avoiding environmental damage. This emphasises the progressive devel-
opment of the rules of international liability in international law as well as 
the function of international liability. It not only has a corrective function as 
in the classical idea of international liability, but also has a preventive func-
tion. It also indicates the applicability of the general rules of State responsi-
bility for wrongful acts to environmental cases. 
 Despite the importance of State responsibility for wrongful acts to protect 
the environment from damage caused by nuclear activities, liability for nu-
clear damage is essentially based on the principle of absolute or risk liability. 
Under this principle, liability applies when actual damage is caused by a nu-
clear installation as a hazardous activity, regardless of any fault, negligence 
or wrongful act committed by the operator of the installation or the State. 
Thus the damage is a constituent element in risk liability. Liability is in-
curred by the State if environmental damage is caused by a nuclear accident, 
even if this damage was associated with a violation of an international obli-
gation. However, a number of exceptions are made under the nuclear liabil-
ity conventions, e.g., for armed conflicts, hostilities, civil war and insurrection, 
which limit the liability under the principle, and make it strict rather than 
absolute. 
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 Chapter 8 examined the main aspects of absolute liability for environ-
mental damage caused by nuclear activities as lawful activities not prohib-
ited by international law. This included the concept of the principle and the 
justification for its application to environmental damage caused by nuclear 
activities, and the basis and origin of the absolute liability of a State for envi-
ronmental nuclear damage caused by such activities under the general rules 
of international law. It also included the absolute liability of the operator un-
der the nuclear liability conventions and other instruments related to the li-
ability for nuclear activities, because most nuclear activities are carried out 
by private enterprises. The polluter pays principle was examined because the 
liability under this principle is similar to the absolute liability under the nu-
clear liability conventions. Finally, the chapter looked at the relationship be-
tween the rules of liability under civil and international law, because the li-
ability under the nuclear liability conventions covers the absolute liability of 
the operator under civil law, and a breach of these conventions constitutes 
State responsibility under international law.  
 The examination of the sources of State liability under international law 
revealed that the principle of absolute liability is an essential principle in 
international law applicable to liability for environmental damage caused by 
nuclear energy. State liability for nuclear damage is established when nu-
clear damage is caused by a nuclear activity carried out by the State within 
its territory or under its jurisdiction or control and there is a basis of liability 
under the general rules of international law. However, it also revealed that 
there is more evidence for the application of the principle to the liability of 
the operator of a nuclear installation than to the liability of the State.  
 Unlike the principle of State liability for wrongful acts which was 
adopted by the ILC in its Articles on State responsibility for wrongful acts, 
the ILC failed to adopt the principle of the absolute liability of the State as a 
general principle of international law in its draft articles on international li-
ability for acts not prohibited by international law, and based the liability on 
civil liability of the operator of the activity.  
 Furthermore, there is little evidence in treaty law to support the absolute 
liability of the State. The only convention which clearly supports the princi-
ple of the absolute liability of the State is the 1972 Convention on the liabil-
ity for damage caused by space objects which was applied to the liability for 
damage caused by Cosmos 954 in 1978.  
 There is also support for the principle of absolute liability in the general 
principles of law based on the doctrine of the Rylands v Fletcher case. A 
number of national laws in the civilized nations, including the nuclear liabil-
ity legislations, adopted the principle to govern liability for damage caused 
by ultra-hazardous activities. They support the application of the principle to 
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liability for environmental damage caused by nuclear activities. However, 
there are some writers reject these principles unless they are accepted as 
general principles of international law.  
 Moreover, the general and customary principles of international law sup-
port the absolute liability for environmental damage, but they are still in con-
flict with the doctrine of international law which is divided about accepting 
the principle of absolute liability of the State either as a general principle of 
international law or as a customary international law principle.  
 Finally, there are some environmental and nuclear cases in international 
case law that support this liability. However, there little support in state prac-
tice and judicial cases to support the absolute liability of the State. There are 
a limited number of nuclear and environmental cases which cannot be consid-
ered evidence for the existence of a general or customary international law 
principle of absolute liability that applies to liability for environmental dam-
age caused by nuclear activities. In state practice the principle was applied, 
for example, in the Cosmos 954 case, which was based on the 1972 space 
convention and the general principles of international law. In the Marshall 
Islands Nuclear Tests which were conducted by the United States in the 
Marshall Islands in 1954, the US did not recognize its legal liability for 
damage caused by these nuclear tests and paid an ex gratia payment to the 
Japanese Government. However, judicial cases that support liability for envi-
ronmental damage caused by nuclear activities were based on State respon-
sibility for wrongful acts rather than on absolute liability. For example, in 
the 2001 MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), the Tribunal or-
dered the two parties to cooperate to exchange information regarding the 
activity and to take appropriate measures to monitor the risks and effects, 
and to prevent environmental damage to the maritime environment. The vio-
lation of this obligation incurs State responsibility for wrongful acts. Fur-
thermore, in the 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration Case the Tribunal did not in-
dicate whether or not its decision was based on absolute liability or wrongful 
act responsibility. Therefore, the doctrine of international law still differs on 
whether to consider that the Tribunal decision concerning the payment of com-
pensation by Canada for environmental damage and pollution caused by the 
Smelter to the US is based on the principle of strict liability or wrongful act 
responsibility.  
 In contrast, the principle of absolute liability for environmental damage 
caused by nuclear accidents is clearly supported by the nuclear liability con-
ventions and other civil liability instruments that apply to environmental 
damage caused by nuclear activities. The operator’s liability for environ-
mental damage is recognized in the nuclear liability conventions, the 2006 
Draft principles on the allocation of loss and other related international in-
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struments. These instruments channel the liability to the operator of the ac-
tivity under civil law. The conventions provided for the absolute liability of 
the operator of a nuclear installation because he is the prime beneficiary of 
the operation of the installation and the States rejected the liability for dam-
age caused by such activities under international law.  
10.2.3.2.3 The legal consequences of responsibility and liability 
The establishment of State responsibility and liability for environmental 
damage caused by a nuclear accident also establishes a new obligation in 
international law for the responsible State to bear the legal consequences of 
liability for a violation of its obligations and for transboundary environ-
mental damage caused by a nuclear accident. The legal consequences of in-
ternational liability for environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident 
were discussed in chapter 9 of this study. As no environmental or nuclear 
liability regime provides for the legal consequences of State responsibility 
and liability, the general rules of international law apply. Under these rules, 
the legal consequences of State responsibility for wrongful acts are the ces-
sation of the illegal act and reparation of the damage, i.e., restitution, com-
pensation and satisfaction. However, as the liability for damage caused by 
lawful activities is based on the idea of absolute liability, the legal conse-
quence of liability is compensation for the damage. It is the only legal con-
sequence of international liability for damage caused by hazardous activities 
in general, and under the nuclear liability conventions for environmental nu-
clear damage caused by nuclear activities in particular. Therefore according 
to these rules, the legal consequences of liability for environmental nuclear 
damage might be the cessation of the nuclear activity in question in the event 
of a violation of nuclear safety requirements or providing an official apology 
to the injured State if the damage is slight, or providing compensation for 
environmental damage, or reinstating the impaired environment to the status 
quo ante. These forms of reparation are applied depending on their rele-
vance. For example, the cessation of a nuclear activity is relevant in the case 
of the violation of nuclear safety requirements in order to avoid the occur-
rence of a nuclear accident and damage caused by a nuclear installation. 
However, restitution in kind as a form of reparation for environmental dam-
age is not relevant in the case of damage caused by a nuclear accident be-
cause it is difficult to return an object when it has been damaged, though it is 
possible to value the damage in terms of monetary compensation or to pay 
the costs of preventive and reinstatement measures to prevent and eliminate 
environmental damage.  
 This reveals that the legal consequences of State responsibility for wrong-
ful acts related to nuclear activities are different from those related to the 
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reparation of environmental damage caused by a nuclear activity which is 
based on absolute or risk liability. The former is aimed at the respect of envi-
ronmental and nuclear obligations. This also helps to prevent and minimize 
harmful consequences, while the latter is aimed at the reparation of actual 
environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident. This also reveals that 
the legal consequences of international liability have been developed along 
with the development of the rules of international liability as adopted by the 
ILC draft articles and the amended nuclear liability conventions. They are 
not only aimed at the reparation of damage, as in case of the classical role of 
international liability, but they also have a preventive role aimed at prevent-
ing environmental damage. Similarly, after the amendments of the nuclear 
liability conventions, liability for environmental damage based on risk is 
aimed at preventing damage because the State is obliged to pay the costs of 
preventive measures as a legal consequence of its liability.  
 The adoption of the duty of cessation and guarantees of the non-repetition 
of illegal acts by the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for wrongful 
acts is a significant development in the law of State responsibility for wrong-
ful acts. It shifts the aim of State responsibility from only repairing damage 
caused by an illegal act to the cessation of such an act and guaranteeing its 
non-repetition in the future. This is significant for the protection of the envi-
ronment. Shutting down a nuclear reactor which has violated its environ-
mental obligations is an effective way of preventing environmental damage 
which could potentially be caused by a nuclear accident. A reactor which 
operates in conflict with international safety requirements must stop operat-
ing in order to avoid a major nuclear accident. Thus cessation is an instru-
ment to avoid damage and State responsibility. Unfortunately, in practice the 
courts have not applied the principle of cessation in nuclear cases very often. 
In the MOX Plant Case in 2001, Ireland requested the Tribunal to order the 
UK to immediately suspend the authorization of the MOX plant to protect 
the maritime environment from radioactivity caused by the plant, but the 
Tribunal ordered the two parties to cooperate and consult in exchanging in-
formation regarding the activity and to take appropriate measures to prevent 
the risks and the damage. 
 In addition, reparation is the second legal consequence of State responsi-
bility and liability for environmental damage caused by a nuclear activity 
after the cessation of a wrongful act by a State. Unlike cessation, which is 
only a legal consequence of State responsibility for a wrongful act, repara-
tion is a legal consequence of liability for lawful and unlawful activities. The 
responsible State must make full reparation for material environmental dam-
age caused by a nuclear accident and moral damage caused as a result of the 
violation of environmental and nuclear norms under international law. The 
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purpose of reparation is to balance the interests of the responsible State and 
the injured State in the case of environmental damage both before and after 
the accident, or in cases when norms of international law have been violated. 
The original situation which existed before the damage to the environment or 
before the rules governing the environment were violated must be restored. 
Therefore restitution is the first form of reparation under international law. 
However, in most cases it is difficult to return the status quo ante. The Cher-
nobyl accident showed that it is impossible to restore the impaired environ-
ment to what it was before the nuclear accident, but it was possible clean up 
the environment so that it could be used again. Some places contaminated by 
radioactivity are still unusable as a consequence of the accident. Therefore, 
compensation is the most effective form of reparation under international 
law in these cases and is a common legal consequence of international liabil-
ity for lawful and unlawful acts. It is the second form of reparation if restitu-
tion is not possible.  
 Compensation for environmental nuclear damage is based on the nuclear 
liability conventions and the general rules of international law. Under the 
nuclear liability conventions, compensation is provided by the operator of a 
nuclear installation, who is obliged to maintain financial security to cover his 
liability. The conventions or the national law of the Accident State provide 
the applicable law. The competent court to claim for compensation is also 
the competent court of the Accident State. The judgments of the competent 
courts are recognized and enforced by the Contracting States. Furthermore, 
the conventions oblige the State to guarantee the liability of the operator and 
to provide additional funds for victims of a nuclear accident when they can-
not be compensated under the operator’s regime or he failed to provide com-
pensation. Nevertheless, it was clear that this additional compensation is in-
sufficient to repair all environmental damage caused by a major nuclear 
accident, because liability and compensation are limited by the amount of 
compensation provided for under the applicable convention for a nuclear 
accident. On the other hand, only a small number of nuclear States partici-
pate in the nuclear liability regime under the nuclear liability conventions. 
Consequently, compensation for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear acci-
dent in a nuclear reactor must to be paid by the governments of the victims 
in the case of transboundary damage. As the study indicated that compensa-
tion for nuclear damage caused by the Chernobyl accident was paid by the 
governments of the victims because the USSR was not a party to any nuclear 
liability convention, the amount of compensation under other nuclear liabil-
ity conventions was limited to cover all the damage caused by the accident. 
For example, the economic loss suffered by Belarus was estimated at 
US$235 billion and Germany only paid 291 million DEM compensation in 
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individual cases. Compensation for nuclear damage caused by the To-
kaimura and Fukushima accidents was also paid by the operators of the in-
stallations under Japanese law because Japan is not a party to any nuclear 
liability convention. It was supplemented by the Japanese Government be-
cause the operators could not fulfil their financial obligations. In the case of 
the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Japanese Government agreed to give 
financial assistance to the operator amounting to JPY 5 trillion ($62 billion) to 
compensate the victims of the accident. The initial assessment of the damage 
caused by the accident was estimated at approximately $235 billion. There-
fore, the residual liability must be borne by the State, though there is a little 
evidence in international law to support the liability. Under international 
law, compensation for environmental damage is assessed by the court, unless 
the parties in dispute have agreed the amount of compensation. However, 
there are no generally agreed criteria for States to assess the damage and de-
termine the amount of compensation. Therefore international courts and tri-
bunals rely on the criteria established by national law as a guideline to de-
termine the amount of compensation, because compensation must be 
determined according to the rules of international law, not national law.  
10.2.4 The relationship between State responsibility, State liability 
and civil liability  
The study indicated that liability for environmental damage caused by nu-
clear accidents is governed by State responsibility for wrongful acts, State 
liability for lawful activities based on the principle of absolute liability, and 
civil liability under the nuclear liability conventions, which cover the abso-
lute liability of the operator of a nuclear installation. These regimes of liabil-
ity are applied together to environmental damage caused by a nuclear acci-
dent. Although each of these regimes of liability is independent and should 
apply on its own, there are certain relationships between them that facilitate 
their integration in one comprehensive unified regime of nuclear liability 
that also applies to liability for environmental damage caused by a nuclear 
accident.  
 In general, there is a clear relationship between State responsibility for 
wrongful acts and State liability for lawful acts. Before the ILC made a dis-
tinction, the two topics were both related to international liability which ap-
plied to damage caused by lawful and unlawful activities. However, the dif-
ference between the two regimes lies in the basis of liability, as unlawful 
activity is based on wrongful act responsibility, while lawful activity is based 
on risk or absolute liability. The two topics were divided as a result of all 
sorts of development and the increased use of the hazardous industrial activi-
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ties which jeopardised the international community and put it at risk of ca-
tastrophes that can cause serious damage. Therefore, the three draft articles 
and principles related to international liability adopted by the ILC, i.e., the 
2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts, the 2001 
Draft Articles on Prevention of Harm Caused by Hazardous Activities and 
the 2006 Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss, which codified the gen-
eral rules of international liability, apply to environmental damage caused by 
a nuclear accident.  
 As mentioned above, State responsibility for wrongful acts is necessary 
to control the operation of a nuclear activity in accordance with the rules of 
international law and to prevent and reduce environmental damage. This is 
important for the protection of the environment. It guarantees the respect of 
environmental and nuclear obligations regarding the operation of a nuclear 
activity to avoid nuclear accidents, because the violation of these obligations 
can lead to a nuclear accident. Furthermore, environmental damage caused 
by hazardous activities does not necessarily result from a breach of an inter-
national obligation, but could be the result of a nuclear accident caused by 
lawful activity. In that case, the liability is constituted on the basis of risk 
liability. State liability is necessary to remedy environmental damage caused 
by a nuclear accident. Thus the regime of international liability for environ-
mental damage caused by nuclear activities is one topic, but it has different 
bases, depending on the case in question.   
 At the same time, despite the fact that a distinction can be made between 
the regime of nuclear liability under the nuclear liability conventions which 
governs the civil liability of the operator of a nuclear installation, and the 
regime of nuclear liability under international liability which governs the 
liability of the State for nuclear damage caused by nuclear accidents, there 
are a number of factors which prove the relationships between the two re-
gimes and facilitate the creation of a comprehensive nuclear liability regime 
based on the rules of civil and international liability. For example: 
 
(1) The nuclear liability conventions are sources of international law ac-
cording to Article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute and sources of international 
liability. They provide for State liability for nuclear damage if there is a ba-
sis for liability under the general rules of international law. Furthermore, the 
nuclear liability conventions do not preclude the rights of the State under 
international law in relation to nuclear damage or breaches of obligations 
provided for by the Conventions which incur State responsibility for wrong-
ful acts.  
 (2) The nuclear liability conventions contain a number of principles re-
lated to nuclear liability. Some of these principles, such as the principle of 
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absolute liability, are principles of international law, despite the fact that the 
divergence of the doctrine of international law about being considered prin-
ciples of civilized nations or customary international law principles. In fact, 
the ILC Draft principles on the allocation of loss, which must incur State 
liability, focused on civil liability and cover the same issues of liability as 
those concluded in the nuclear liability conventions.  
 (3) Compensation for nuclear damage is a common legal consequence of 
liability under the nuclear liability conventions and State liability for nuclear 
damage caused by nuclear activities.  
 (4) Under the nuclear liability conventions the State is obliged to guaran-
tee the liability of the operator and to provide additional compensation to 
compensate environmental nuclear damage. This liability is governed by the 
rules of civil law, not international law. However, a breach of these obliga-
tions incurs State responsibility for wrongful acts under international law. 
 (5) Despite the fact that the State, as a subject of international law, is re-
sponsible only for acts of its organs and representatives, and is not responsi-
ble for acts of individuals as private subjects, according to the opinions of 
international lawyers and decisions of international courts, it is responsible 
for the conduct of individuals if it did not control the conduct of those per-
sons and failed to observe the duty of diligence or due care. Most nuclear 
activities are operated by private operators, and at the same time they are 
carried out within the territory or under the jurisdiction or control of the 
State. The State also has a supervisory role over these activities. 
 (6) The nuclear liability conventions refer to the settlement of disputes 
between the contracting parties, arising from the interpretation or application 
of the conventions or the determination of maritime zones which are re-
solved under the general rules of international law. 
10.3 Recommendations 
The study makes certain proposals to improve and fill the gaps in the inter-
national nuclear liability regime. These include the establishment of inter-
state conventions which cover civil and international liability issues (10.3.1), 
the ratification of the recent nuclear liability conventions by the nuclear 
States and the implementation of the new rules adopted by the ILC draft arti-
cles and the nuclear liability conventions (10.3.2), the creation of an ad hoc 
tribunal for nuclear damage (10.3.3), the creation of standards for the assess-
ment of environmental damage and compensation (10.3.4), and conducting in-
depth research into certain liability issues which are not adequately exam-
ined in this study (10.3.5). 
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10.3.1 A single instrument for civil and international liability 
(comprehensive regime) 
The study indicated that neither the nuclear liability conventions which ap-
ply to civil liability, nor the rules of State liability under the general rules of 
international law is – on its own – adequate to deal with liability for envi-
ronmental damage caused by a nuclear accident. The nuclear liability regime 
has become complicated as a result of the numerous nuclear liability conven-
tions which apply to the question of liability for nuclear damage. Further-
more, it is difficult to deal with all the nuclear damage caused by a major nu-
clear accident under the existing liability regime in the absence of a binding 
inter-state treaty which governs State liability for nuclear damage. The study 
therefore suggests the creation of an international instrument which contains 
the rules on nuclear liability, both civil and international liability. This in-
strument should include all the elements and principles of civil and interna-
tional liability relating to nuclear damage. It should be based on the following 
main elements:  
 
(1) the liability of the operator of a nuclear installation;  
(2) State intervention to supplement the liability of the operator;  
(3) the obligation of the State and the operator to take preventive 
measures and to ensure nuclear safety standards;  
(4) the obligation of the State to provide early notification and prompt 
assistance in the case of a nuclear accident;  
(5) the obligation of the State to repair nuclear damage caused to other 
States and the global commons by a nuclear accident;  
(6) the principle of absolute liability;  
(7) the principle of wrongful act liability, and; 
(8) the legal consequences of the liability of the operator and the State for 
environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident and for a violation of 
international obligations. 
 
More specifically, the structure of a new convention on nuclear liability 
should be based on the existing principles and provisions of nuclear liability 
under the nuclear liability conventions and those provided for under other 
international instruments governing liability for injuries caused by ultra-
hazardous activities. The proposed convention should contain the same legal 
principles and nuclear liability issues provided for under the Paris and the 
Vienna Conventions, i.e., the principle of absolute liability, a definition of a 
nuclear accident, a definition of nuclear damage, the limitation of liability in 
terms of time and amount, insurance, the channelling of liability, the juris-
 Integration of international and civil nuclear liability regimes for environmental damage 509 
 
diction of the court, exoneration, etc. It should also deal with all the issues 
related to liability for damage caused by nuclear ships, the transport of nu-
clear materials, the decommissioning of a nuclear installation, non-peaceful 
nuclear activities and the disposal of nuclear waste. The adoption of the 
principles of nuclear liability under the nuclear liability conventions in one 
instrument will integrate and harmonize the national nuclear liability laws 
under a unified international liability regime. On the other hand, the new 
convention should also contain the main principles and elements of interna-
tional liability, including the liability of the Installation State to take the pre-
ventive measures, providing information and assistance in time, and the 
reparation of nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident. It should include 
the basic elements of State responsibility for wrongful acts, the absolute li-
ability of the State and the legal consequences of State responsibility and 
liability for nuclear damage. This would create a comprehensive international 
nuclear liability regime which could cover all the nuclear damage caused by 
a nuclear accident inside and outside the territory of the State. 
10.3.2 The ratification of the recent instruments and the 
implementation of their provisions in national law  
The recent amendments to the nuclear liability conventions are a significant 
step forward in the development of the nuclear liability regime. Neverthe-
less, they created a vacuum between the conventions and the national legis-
lation of the Contracting Parties to cover nuclear damage caused by nuclear 
accidents. The substantial liability provisions adopted in the 1997 Amended 
Vienna Convention, the 1997 Supplementary Compensation Convention, the 
2004 Amended Paris Convention and the 2004 Amended Brussels Supple-
mentary Compensation Convention resulted in a lack of harmony between 
the nuclear liability conventions and national nuclear liability legislation. 
This affects the implementation of the liability provisions when a nuclear 
accident occurs. The new provisions in the amended conventions cannot be 
effective unless they are adopted and implemented by national legislation. 
Therefore the existing national legislation of the Contracting Parties to the 
nuclear liability conventions must be amended to include the new provisions 
adopted by the conventions.  
 One of the main obstacles to the implementation of the new instruments 
is the lack of ratification and acceptance by the Contracting Parties. There-
fore the study recommends expanding the ratification of the nuclear liability 
conventions and other related international instruments. This increases the 
number of contracting parties to the nuclear liability conventions and ex-
pands the geographical scope of application of these conventions. This 
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means that more compensation will be available to victims of a nuclear acci-
dent. This particularly concerns the ratification of the conventions by nuclear 
States. The number of contracting parties to the nuclear liability conventions 
is limited and most of the States that have ratified the conventions do not 
have nuclear installations. As mentioned above, the US which operates a 
quarter of the nuclear installations worldwide is not a party to the nuclear 
liability conventions, except for 1997 the Vienna Convention on Supplemen-
tary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. The Chernobyl accident demon-
strated that the participation of non-Contracting States in the conventions 
will benefit the victims in their state in the case of a nuclear accident. There-
fore the international organizations which sponsor the nuclear liability con-
ventions should convene an international conference and invite their Mem-
ber States to ratify the recent instruments modifying the conventions and to 
implement the provisions in their national legal systems. This could encour-
age them to ratify the conventions and encourage other States to participate 
in the regime.  
 The current situation as regards the ratification of the nuclear liability 
conventions following the amendments is disappointing. Only nine States 
ratified and acceded to the 1997 Protocol amending the Vienna Convention. 
Three of these States have minor nuclear installations and three others have 
no nuclear installations. The 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensa-
tion for Nuclear Damage was ratified by four States including the US, but it 
has still not entered into force. The 2004 Protocols amending the Paris Con-
vention and the Brussels Supplementary Compensation Convention, were 
each ratified by two States, but have not yet entered into force. Finally, there 
are major nuclear States such Canada, China, India, Japan and South Korea, 
which are not parties to any nuclear liability convention.  
 Similarly, the ILC Draft Articles on prevention of harm, the ILC Draft 
principles on the allocation of loss and State responsibility for wrongful acts 
contain significant substantive and procedural rules which should be imple-
mented by States if they also conclude nuclear and environmental agree-
ments and in national law. The ratification of the 2001 Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility is particularly important in the case of a violation of environ-
mental and nuclear obligations. Furthermore, the ratification of the 2001 ILC 
Draft Articles on prevention of harm is important to prevent and reduce the 
harmful consequences of a nuclear accident. Similarly, the 2006 ILC Draft Ar-
ticles on allocation of loss is important to guide States in the implementation of 
civil liability for damage caused to the environment.  
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10.3.3 An international court for nuclear disputes (procedural 
rules) 
The study also suggests the establishment of an ad hoc international court or 
tribunal to deal with all the disputes arising with regard to nuclear damage 
caused by nuclear activities. This should be competent to deal with claims 
from all the victims, individuals and States. Such an ad hoc court is impor-
tant to avoid jurisdictional conflict when more than one nuclear liability 
convention is applied to nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident or in 
the case of the establishment of an international liability regime composed of 
civil and international nuclear liability rules. The establishment of such a 
court is also important to ensure equity for the victims of a nuclear accident 
in the case that the amount of compensation under the applicable convention 
is insufficient to compensate all the nuclear damage that was caused. In par-
ticular, the amount of the operator’s liability is limited for each nuclear acci-
dent under the nuclear liability conventions. The competence of that forum 
should include civil and international disputes relating to nuclear damage. It 
should be competent to deal with claims for compensation for nuclear dam-
age caused by a nuclear accident in the territory of a contracting party and 
for transboundary nuclear damage, also in the territory of non-contracting par-
ties. Finally, it should be competent to decide on disputes arising from the 
interpretation or application of the nuclear liability conventions. 
 Indeed, international disputes relating to transboundary environmental 
nuclear damage can be resolved by the ICJ or the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration (PCA). There are some environmental and nuclear cases, as men-
tioned throughout the study, that have been dealt with by the ICJ and PCA 
such as the Nuclear Test cases, the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case and 
the MOX Plant case. However, the significance of such ad hoc forums is 
justified by the fact that, these Courts deal with the international disputes 
between States. However, an ad hoc forum can deal with civil and interna-
tional disputes in a much broader sense. As the study suggested transbound-
ary environmental damage caused by nuclear activities should be governed 
by a comprehensive regime of liability which covers civil and international 
liability. Accordingly, an ad hoc court should only deal with nuclear disputes 
on a case by a case basis. 
10.3.4 The creation of standards for the assessment of 
environmental damage 
The study revealed that the assessment of environmental damage, particu-
larly pure environmental damage, is still a major problem in international 
law. Furthermore, pure economic damage caused as a result of the impaired 
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environment is not covered by the nuclear liability conventions because it is 
difficult to calculate. It is therefore suggested that States should agree on a 
specific standard or method for the assessment of environmental damage 
caused by nuclear accidents which should be generally accepted. There are 
some examples of methods to calculate environmental damage in national 
law, and these could be used as a guideline by international courts and tribu-
nals. However, these methods differ from one national law to another. If 
such a method were adopted, it should take into account not only the com-
mercial value of the environment, but also the value of nature and the long-
term impact of the environmental damage on public health and on the clean-
ing-up costs of the impaired environment. The valuation should have a legal 
and economic basis and should be drawn up in a legal document containing 
evidence for the valuation of the damage and compensation. At the moment, 
new technologies can provide an economic assessment of the impaired envi-
ronment. The method used to estimate environmental damage should the 
same for all States.  
10.3.5 The follow-up and further research 
A number of issues have not been dealt with adequately in this study. Fur-
ther research is needed. The most important of these are the issues of civil 
nuclear liability, State liability for environmental damage caused to the 
global commons, liability for damage caused by private activities, and State 
liability for damage caused by nuclear activities used for non-peaceful ends. 
These four issues were not adequately examined in this study due to the lim-
ited space available as planned in the study.  
 The study mainly examined the issues of international liability and re-
sponsibility for environmental nuclear damage under the general rules of 
international law, the liability of the operator and State intervention to pro-
vide additional compensation under the nuclear liability conventions. How-
ever, some of the liability issues under the nuclear liability conventions re-
quire further examination and should be dealt with in a separate study. This 
particularly applies to liability for environmental damage caused during the 
disposal of nuclear waste, the decommissioning of a nuclear installation, the 
transport of nuclear materials and the safety of nuclear installations. These 
four issues are certainly still very complicated issues in the nuclear liability 
regime and require particular attention. 
 Similarly, the issues of State liability for environmental nuclear damage 
caused to the global commons need to be examined because if these areas, 
particularly maritime areas, are left to be used irresponsibly by States, the 
global commons will be damaged and this damage will also affect the States. 
 Integration of international and civil nuclear liability regimes for environmental damage 513 
 
The issue of State liability for environmental damage caused to the global 
commons was actually studied by the ILC during the codification of interna-
tional liability, but no concrete conclusion was reached. This is because the 
issues of damage to the global commons and the attribution of liability to the 
State are very complicated.  
 In addition, an in-depth study of State liability for environmental damage 
caused by private nuclear activities is important because most nuclear activi-
ties are carried out by private enterprises. The State has an important role in 
permitting, controlling and supervising the nuclear activities. However, the 
liability of the State for environmental damage caused by private activities 
has not yet been defined. Therefore this matter requires further research. 
 Finally, the study did not contain an examination of international liability 
for environmental damage caused by nuclear activities used for non-peaceful 
ends. This question was also excluded by the ILC in its draft articles related 
to international liability and the nuclear liability conventions. It was dis-
cussed during the amendments to these conventions, but was rejected by the 
nuclear States. Furthermore, it is not dealt with in the doctrine of interna-
tional law. Nevertheless, it requires particular attention because damage 
caused by the use of nuclear activities for non-peaceful purposes can cause 
and environmental catastrophe, and in some cases it is difficult to distinguish 
between nuclear activities used for peaceful purposes and those used for 
non-peaceful purposes. For example, nuclear activities for peaceful uses can 
produce nuclear materials used for the production of nuclear weapons. En-
riched uranium used for the production of nuclear weapons is produced from 
spent fuel from nuclear reactors used for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, 
nuclear waste resulting from both peaceful and non-peaceful uses can be 
disposed of in the same site without any distinction being made between 
them. 
10.4 Final conclusion 
The study concludes that the State is responsible for environmental damage 
caused to other States by nuclear activities carried out within its territory or 
under its jurisdiction or control, according to the general rules of interna-
tional law. The State is obliged to prevent environmental damage which is 
caused by nuclear accidents to other States and is responsible for the viola-
tion of its obligations in accordance with wrongful act responsibility, and for 
environmental damage caused by a nuclear accident in accordance with the 
principle of absolute liability, and it is responsible for the legal consequences 
of such liability. State responsibility for wrongful acts constitutes a general 
principle of international law adopted by the ILC in its Draft Articles on 
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State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts. However, there is no general princi-
ple or customary principle of international law on the absolute liability of the 
State for environmental damage caused by nuclear activities or by hazardous 
activities in general which is acceptable to the doctrine of international law 
or which has been adopted by the ILC. Accordingly, it was considered that 
the State and the operator of a nuclear installation should share liability for 
nuclear damage caused by a nuclear accident if the damage exceeds the op-
erator’s capacity to pay or the limit imposed by the applicable nuclear liabil-
ity convention. The operator has primary liability for environmental damage 
caused by a nuclear accident and the State has secondary liability and must 
provide additional compensation to the victims in accordance with the nu-
clear liability conventions. Finally, the State has primarily liability for the 
residual damage and for the violation of its obligations under international 
law. Therefore the study suggests the establishment of an international nu-
clear liability regime for nuclear damage integrating the elements of civil 
and international liability in one convention, as well as the establishment of 
an ad hoc court to deal with civil and international claims for nuclear dam-
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-(1930): Text of Articles Adopted in First Reading by the Third Committee of the 
Conference for the Codification of International Law (The Hague 1930), 
League of Nations publication, V. Legal, 1930.V. 17 (document 
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YILC, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 225-226. 
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G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (III), available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (accessed on 
11.4.2012); http://www.un-documents.net/a3r217a.htm (accessed on 
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Use of the Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 
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th
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2.html (accessed on 10.4.2012). 
-(1970): Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 24 
October 1970, available at: 
http://www.hku.edu/law/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outline4/2625.htm (ac-
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http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3281.htm (accessed on 4.4.2012). 
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the UNGA at its 100
th
 plenary meeting on 10 December 1982, available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r092.htm (accessed on 7.7.2011); 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf (accessed 
on 10.4.2012). 
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A/RES/41/36, adopted on 11 November 1986, 66th plenary meeting, avail-
able at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r036.htm (accessed on 
7.5.2012). 
-(1990): UNGA Resolution No. 45/55 on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, 
adopted by the UNGA at its 54
th
 plenary meeting on 4 December 1990, avail-
able at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/paros/docs/res45-55.htm (accessed on 
10.4.2012).  
-(1992): Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space 
and Other Recent Development, adopted on 14 December 1992, see G.A. 
Res. 47/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/68, 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf (accessed 
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10.4.2012); http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/resolutions/47/68GA1992.html 
(accessed on 10.4.2012); 
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-(1997): Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigation Uses of International Wa-
tercourses, General Assembly Resolution 51/229, 99 plenary meeting, 21 
May 1997, Annex, Official Records of the General Assembly, 
A/RES/51/229, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/51/49), 21 May 
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-(1991): Resolution 687 (1991), adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meet-
ing, on 3 April 1991 S/RES/687 (1991), 8 April 1991, available at: 
http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm (accessed on 
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-(1989): United Nations General Assembly, Forty-Fourth Session, Official Records, 
Sixth Committee, 32nd  meeting held on Friday, 3 November 1989, New 
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June 1972 by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
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-(1972): Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
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-(1992): Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Report of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 3-
14 June 1992), A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I); 
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YILC, 1976, Vol. II, Part Two. 
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-(1978): Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on 
the work of its thirtieth session 8 May-28 July 1978, UN Doc. A/33/10, 
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the work of its thirty-ninth session (4 May-17 July 1987), UN Doc. 
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10, YILC, 1988, Vol. II, Part Two. 
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1.2.5.2.1.2 Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago 
 
-(1969): First report on State responsibility (Review of previous work on codifica-
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-(1971): Third report on State responsibility (The internationally wrongful act of the 
State, source of international responsibility), UN Doc. A/CN.4/246 and 
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-(1999): Second report on State responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/498 and Add.1–4, 
reprinted in YILC, 1999, Vol. II, Part One, pp. 3-100.  
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1.2.5.2.2 Reports of Special Rapporteurs on State liability 
 
1.2.5.2.2.1 Special Rapporteur Robert Q. Quentin Baxter 
 
-(1980): Preliminary report on international liability for injurious consequences aris-
ing out of acts not prohibited by international law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/334 
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reprinted in YILC, 1985, Vol. II, Part One, pp. 97-101. 
-(1986): Second report on international liability for injurious consequences arising 
out of acts not prohibited by international law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/402, In-
corporating documents A/CN.4/402/Corr.l, 2 and 4, reprinted in YILC, 
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YILC, 1990, Vol. II, Part One, pp. 83-109. 
-(1991): Seventh report on international liability for injurious consequences arising 
out of acts not prohibited by international law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/437, In-
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219. 
-(1999): Second Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Aris-
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1.2.5.3 International Law Commission Secretariat 
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State Practice Relevant to International Liability for Injurious Conse-
quences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law”, Study 
prepared by ILC Secretariat, United Nations, General Assembly, 
A/CN.4/384, 16 October 1984, International Law Commission, Thirty-
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Law”, study prepared by the Secretariat, A/CN.4/471, 21 July 1995, YILC, 
1995, Vol. II, Part One. 
-(2001): Topical summary of the discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly during its fifty-fifth session, Geneva, 23 Apripl-1 June 
and 2 July-10 August 2001, prepared by the Secretariat, International Law 
Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
Its fifty-second Session (2000). UNGA Doc. A/CN.4/513, available at: 
http://daccess-dds-
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nt (accessed on 22.4.2012). 
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sion, Fifty-sixth session, Geneva, 3 May-4 June and 5 July-6 August 2004, 
A/CN.4/543, 24 June 2004. 
 
1.2.5.4 International Law Commission Draft Articles on international liability 
 
-(1958): Draft Articles on international responsibility of the State for injuries caused 
in its territory to the person or property of aliens, UN Doc. A/CN.4/111, In-
ternational responsibility. Third report by F. V. Garcia Amador, Special 
Rapporteur, YILC, 1958, Vol. II, Annex, at p. 71. 
-(1976):Draft Articles on State Responsibility for wrongful acts adopted the ILC at 
its sessions twenty-fifth to twenty-eighth, see Report of the International 
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courses. UN Doc. A/CN L.463/Add.4, 1993. 
-(2001): Draft Articles on Prevention of Tansboundary Harm Caused by Hazardous 
Activities, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 
53rd session, UNGA Official Records, Supplement No.10 (A/66/10), pp. 
370-436, reprinted in YILC, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, pp. 146-148 and with 
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-(2001): Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
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http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf (accessed on 
24.4.2012). 
-(2006): Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising Out of Hazardous Activities. Text adopted by the International Law 
Commission at its fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the Gen-
eral Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of 
that session (A/61/10). The report also contains commentaries on the draft 
articles, will appear in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
2006, Vol. II, Part Two, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_10_2
006.pdf (accessed on 24.4.2012). 
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-(1956): YILC, 1956, Vol. II, A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l 
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-(1987): YILC, 1987, Vol. II, Part Two, A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.l (Part 2) 
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-(1990): YILC, 1990, Vol. II, Part One, A/CN.4/SER.A/1990/Add.l (Part 1) 
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-(1986): Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear Safety and 
Radiological Protection, Draft resolution recommended by the Committee 
of the Whole, IAEA General Conference, IAEA, General Conference, 
GC(SPL.I)/8, 25 September 1986, and GC(SPL.I)/15/Rev.1, 26 September 
1986, first special session, 25 ILM 1389 (1986), available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/intlm25&div=164&g
_sent=1&collection=journals (accessed on 29.4.2012). 
-(1986): Resolutions (GC(SPL.I)/RES/1 and GC(SPL.I)/RES/2) at its first special 
session on 26 September 1986 and adopted resolution GC(XXX)/RES/468 
on 3 October 1986 at its thirtieth regular session, UNGC resolution, 
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-(1987): Record of the Fourth Plenary Meeting, IAEA Doc., GC(SPL. I)OR.4, Mar. 
1987.  
-(1988): Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear Safety and 
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http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC32/GC32Documents/English/gc3
2-869_en.pdf (accessed on 29.4.2012). 
-(1988): Thirty-Second (1988) Regular Session, Record of the Three Hundred and 
Eleventh Plenary Meeting, held at the Austria Center, Vienna on Friday, 23 
September 1988, IAEA General Conference 23 September 1988, 
GC(XXXII)/OR.311, 10 November 1988, agenda item 10, OR 311, availa-
ble at 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC32/GC32Records/English/gc32or
-311_en.pdf (accessed on 24.4.2012), El Baradei, Nwogugu and Rames, 
Part 2, 1993, p. 1396. 
-(1990): Liability for Nuclear Damage, the IAEA General Conference, Thirty Fourth 
regular session, (GC(XXXIV)914), GC(XXXIV)/931/Add.1, 17 September 
1990, available at: 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC34/GC34Documents/English/gc
34-931-add1_en.pdf (accessed on 24.4.2012). 
-(1990): International Atomic Energy Agency, General Conference Resolution 
GC(XXXIV)/RES/530 on “Code of Practice on the International Trans-
boundary Movement of Radioactive Waste”, Sept. 21, 1990, 30 ILM 556 
(1991), available at: http://www.jstor.org/pss/20693549 (accessed on 
18.10.2010); IAEA doc. INFCIRC/386, 13 November 1990, available at: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf386.shtml 
(accessed on 6.4.2012). 
-(1992): Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Matters Relating to 
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Protection: Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
Report by the Board of Governors and the Director General, Thirty-sixth 
regular session Sub-item 12(d) of the provisional agenda 
(GC(XXXVI)/1001, IAEA General Conference, GC(XXXVI)/1009, 1 July 
1992, available at: 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC36/GC36Documents/English/gc3
6-1009_en.pdf (accessed on 29.4.2012). 
-(1996): IAEA, “Measures to Strengthen International Cooperation in Nuclear, Ra-
diation and Waste Safety”, IAEA Doc. GC(40)/INF/9 (Sept. 13, 1996), 
available at: 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC40/GC40InfDocuments/English/
gc40inf-5_en.pdf (accessed on 24.4.2012). 
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-(1987): IAEA, Note by Director General, “The Question of International Liability 
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Gov/INF/509, 26 January (1987).  
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22 May 1987. 
-(1997): Note by the Secretariat, Liability for Nuclear Damage IAEA Board of Gov-
ernors, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/822-GC(41)INF/13, 19 September 1997, 
available at: 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC41/GC41InfDocuments/English/
gc41inf-13_en.pdf (accessed on 25.4.2012). 
 
1.2.6.3 Reports of Standing Committee  
 
-(1990): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, First Ses-
sion Vienna, 23-27 April 1990, SCNL/1/INF. 4, 2 May, 1990. 
-(1990): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Second 
Session Vienna, 15-19 October 1990, SCNL/2/INF/2, 22 October, 1990. 
-(1991): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Third Ses-
sion Vienna, 8-12 April 1991, SCNL/3/INF. 2/Rev. 1, 23 April, 1991. 
-(1991): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Fourth Ses-
sion Vienna, 2-6 December 1991, SCNL/4/INF. 6, 12 December, 1991. 
-(1992): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear damage, Fifth Ses-
sion Vienna, 30 March-3 April 1992, SCNL/5/INF. 4, 10 April, 1992. 
-(1992): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Sixth Ses-
sion Vienna, 12-16 October 1992, SCNL/6/INF. 4, 20 October, 1992. 
-(1993): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Seventh 
Session Vienna, 24-28 May 1993, SCNL/7/INF/6, 21 June, 1993. 
-(1993): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Eighth Ses-
sion Vienna, 11-15 October 1993, SCNL/8/INF. 4, 11 November, 1993. 
-(1994): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Ninth Ses-
sion Vienna, 7-11 February 1994, SCNL/9/INF. 5, 4 March, 1994. 
-(1994): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Tenth Ses-
sion Vienna, 31 October-4 November 1994, SCNL/10/INF. 4, 18 November 
1994. 
-(1995): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Eleventh 
Session Vienna, 20-24 March 1995, SCNL/11/INF. 5, 24 April, 1995. 
-(1995): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Twelfth 
Session Vienna, 26-30 June 1995, SCNL/12/INF. 6, 25 July, 1995. 
-(1995): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Thirteenth 
Session Vienna, 30 October-3 November 1995, SCNL/13/INF. 3, 27 No-
vember, 1995. 
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-(1996): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Fifteenth 
Session Vienna, 6-10 May 1996, SCNL/15/INF. 5, 3 June, 1996. 
-(1996): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Sixteenth 
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-(1997): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Seventeenth 
Session Vienna, Part I, 3-7 February 1997, SCNL/17/INF. 4, 28.02-1997. 
-(1997): Report of Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Seventeenth 
Session Vienna, Part II, 10-11 April 1997, SCNL/17/INF. 7, 28.04-1997. 
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-(1956): The IAEA Statute, approved on 23 October 56, available at: 
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html#A1.3 (accessed on 6.4.2012). 
-(1990): Summary of Discussions in the Informal Working Group on “The Relation-
ship between the Civil and State Liability Regimes”, 26 April 1990, 
SCNL/1/INF.4, Annex II, p. 21. 
-(1991): Proposal for Additional Provisions and Amendment to the Vienna Conven-
tion Submitted by the Delegations of Italy, 11 April 1991, Standing Com-
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SCNL/3/INF.2/Rev.1, 23 April 1991. 
-(1991): Aide-Memoire, “Claims Procedures in Respect of Nuclear Accident Having 
Transboundary Consequences”, prepared by Greenpeace International for 
the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2-6 December 1991, available at: 
http://www.skeptictank.org/treasure/GP4/NUKP63.TXT (accessed on 
24.4.2012). 
-(1991): Proposal by the delegation of Egypt on “Settlement of Claims”, 10 April 
1991. Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, Third Session, 
8-12 April 1991, SCNL/3/INF.2/Rev.1, 23 April 1991. 
-(1991): Proposal by the Turkish Delegation Regarding the Amendment of Claims 
Settlement Provisions of 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage, SCNL/4/2, Relates to document SCNL/IWG.2/9, at p. 53, 
SCNL/4/INF.6, 12 December 1991, at p. 58. 
-(1991): Report of the Working Group held on 9-10 April SCNL/3/INF.2/Rev.1, 
Annex II.  
-(1994): Report of the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
SCNL/10/INF.3, 4 November 1994, Annex I. 
-(1995): Australia and Ireland, Non paper “Civil Nuclear Liability”, SCNL/11/1, 15 
March 1995. 
-(1995): IAEA “Guidelines on Reportable Events, Integrated Planning and Informa-
tion Exchange in a Transboundary Release of Radioactive Materials”, 
INFCIRC/321, IAEA, Vienna 1985, available also at: 
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-(2004): (IAEA, INLEX, 2004): International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability 
(INLEX), “The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage”, Explanatory Texts, IAEA, (July 2004), Board of Gover-
nors and General Conference Doc. GOV/INF/2004-GC(48)INF/5, available 
at: http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf-
5expltext.pdf (accessed on 18.2.2012), reproduced in IAEA International 
Law Series, No. 3, 2007, IAEA Vienna 2007, pp.1-160, also available at: 
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1279_web.pdf (ac-
cessed on 18.2.2012).  
 
1.2.7 International Maritime Organization 
 
-(2010): International Conference on the Revision of the HNS Convention: Consid-
eration of the Draft Protocol of 2010 to the International Convention on Li-
ability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996, considered Oct. 5, 2009, 
United Nations International Maritime Organization LEG/CONF.17/3 (not 
open for signature; not in force) available at: 
http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/HNS/LEG-CONF.17-3.pdf (accessed on 
23.4.2012). 
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on civil liability, Report by O. K. Kaufmann, Paris, April 4, 1958, NE/LEG 
(58) 5. 
-(1958): Group of Experts on Third Party Liability: Conclusions of the Third Ses-
sion, 22 May 1958, [NE/LEG(58)14], cited in Group of Governmental Ex-
perts on Third Party in the Field of Nuclear Energy, “Definition of ‘Nuclear 
Incident’ in the Paris Convention: Coverage of Normal, Lawful Release of 
Radiation Which Cause Damage”, Not by the Secretariat, 
NEA/LEG/DOC(94)3. 
-(1960): Exposé des Motifs of the 1960 Paris Convention (Revised text of the Ex-
posé des Motifs of the Paris Convention, approved by the OECD Council 
on 16th November 1982), available at: http://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/nlparis_motif.html (accessed on 24.4.2012). 
-(1972): Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles Concerning the Inter-
national Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, adopted on 26 May of 
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25.4.2012). 
-(1975): The Polluter Pays Principle, adopted by OECD in its declaration of 1975, 
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cil (Cooperation in the Field of the Environment Concerning Natural Re-
sources Shared by Two or More States, Nairobi, 9-25 May 1978, GC 6/CRP.2, 
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Aspects of Actions by Public Authorities to Prevent and Control Oil Spills, 
20 April 1981, C(81)32/Final, available at: 
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Governmental Experts on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear En-
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the early exchange of information in the event of a radiological emergency. 
(87/600/EURATOM). OJ L-371 of 30/12/87, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/radioprotection/doc/legislation/87600_e
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